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The period between 1895 and 1915 was one of
remarkable decline in British humanitarian conscience,
During these two decades, two divergent attitudes, the px'e-
dominant racist creed and the patronising condescension of
traditional philanthropy, were supplemented by a new school
of thought which saw itself as the keeper of true colonial
conscience in Britain. Originally conceived by Mary lCingsley
as a commercial lobby, this 'Third Party' (as i1 called
itself) was sustained mainly by the humanitarian idealism
of John Edt and Es D. Morel.
'xeter Hall' continued its traditional function
as watch-dog for aboriginal rights arid pressure . group in
Imperial affairs, but its former position of primacy was
already undermined not only by the fact that its ro3.e and
methods were no longer a. deposit of popular and, official
attitudes, but al5o by the relative ascendancy of the Third
Party as the moat positive public factor in Imperial thought
and policy towards West Africa.
Indeed, during this period, the personality of
Morel was synonymous with a reformist movemsn which saw the
native land settlement as the indispensable btiwark of
Imperial policy in West Africa. Questioning the Colonial
Office method of developing these tropical 'estabes t , the
it
Third Party adv,c8ted Imperial &djnjtratjy rol'crms there.
alsoThee 'ee8Ure-gDOUp ativitiee arW examined front
the stand-point of Britl.h ImperL al thought, while the West
African responses to these pub]Jo and official attitudes are
given their due importance. T1i ideas d activities of
these pressure-groups were not totally Gut of tune with the
intentions of the Colonial Office, but. since official policy
was threatened by its inherent vea1ne Its ad too expeditious
methods, by unwholesome alleg1..nce to personal friendships,
party affiliations, and indiv11ual	 ercial adventurism,
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Towards the end. of the nineteenth century, an
Imperialist soirit swept through Britain. 	 Hitherto, the
most formative instinct oxi the thoughts and actions of English-
men had been the 'national ideal 1 .	 Gradually, however, the
words 'empire' and. 'inmerialism' had. replaced the daily
currency of 'nation' and. 'nationality'; power and, dominion
became more fashionable to the masses than individual liberty
and national principles. Men's thoughts were turned. more
outward than inward; the national ideal gave place to the
Imperial
The factors which fostered this transformation can
here only be summarized.. The 'national ideal' had been
nurtured in feelings of superiority, now, Victoriai. self-
confidence was undermined. 2 Overwhe1min international trends
correspondingly turned the domestic excitement due to cheap
newsDaoers, manhood suffrage and bouts of economic depression
into a more brazen sense o national inferiority. 3
 The German
naval programme threatened the hitherto sedate pose of the
1. W.F. Monnypenny, 'The Imperial Idea' in The Empire and the
Century (London, 1905) tp. 5-6.
2. A,P. Madden, 'Changing Attitudes and Widening Resoonsibil-.
ities' in The Cambridge History of the British Empire
Volume III pp. 339-405. (Cambridge, 1959) P.340.
3. See Elie Haley, A History of the English People V, (London,
1926, 1931) pp . 8-12.
Pax Brittanica. Moreover, accentuation of commercial rivalry
between the Great Powers was virtually synonymous with this
international hostility. On the one hand, the United States,
Germany and. France, by means of hostile tariffs, State
bounties and protection, made nonsense of British Iree-Trad.e
policy; on the other hand, even smaller British colonial
customers were passing from mere consumers to producers, and.
therefore rivals.	 But the rise of a new commercial power,
Japan, which bade fair to become a keen rival in the markets
of the Far East, meant that Britain should keep pace with new
developments. 1	In this effort to stem the tide of commercial
embarrassment, imperial motives in West Africa were probably
influenced by this global necessity; official policy
probably regarded West Africa merely as a factor in its global
strategy, as a stop-gap in the imperial scheme for the most
threatened Eastern zone. 2
 But these global tentstives never
ruled out the possibility of economic gain in West Africa once
the imperial commitment was made there. 3 The identification
of colonial possessions with British greatness and wealth
prompted the scramble' for Africa4 , even if the 'scramble'
could serve another purpose in the East.
1. F.D. Lugard, 'New British Markets' in The ineteenth
Century, Sept. 1895 P.442; see also bit Hallett in
The Nineteenth Century, August 1895; Also Halevy, op. cit.
Pp. 10-12.
2. R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians
(London, 1961) passim; also Chaps. I and XIII.
3. Lady Lugard, 'The Tropics and. the Empire' in The Empire
and the Century (London, 1905) Pp. 817-34.
4. E.D. Lugard, in Nineteenth Century Sept. 1895.
Other characteristics gave significance to the
commercial ethos of those days.
	 It was a generation of
materialism. "An industrial imperialism had succeeded the
mercantilist approach earlier in. the century: now it was
itself being replaced by a financial, 'stock-jobbing',
variety". 1 Joint-stock companies were created to exploit
territories in Africa, most of them in a manner that was both
crude and scandalous.2 It was the golden age of the City,
which was not only involved in stock-jobbing operations, but
also exercised immense influence in the politics of Britain.3
Parliament itself was no less cominercialised: the proportion
of businessmen in Parliament at this time probably exceeded
that of any other preceding epoch. 4 Men's minds were turned
to Africa which was now a new frontier of opportunity.5
But 'expansion', 'consolidation' and 'development'
bc • cit.
1. Madden, P.340.1 See also A.G. Gardiner, Sir William Harcourt
II, Pp. 389, kl L1, 5lL1: sneech made by Harcourt on 8 May
1896; also H.C. Debs. 45 XL, 886.
2. Sidney Olivier, White Capital and Coloured Labour (Leonard
and Virginia Woolf,. London, 1906, later 1929) Pp. 52-56.
3. For example, Chamberlain's Tari.f programme might have met
a more auspicious fate were it not for the opposition of
'the City' which 'broke' him.
	 See Halevy, op. cit. pp.10-
20
4. Haleyy, op. cit., Pp. 15-16. According to HaleYy over 250
members o± the 670 M.P.s in 1895 were businessmen or
represented business interests.
5. For the general background on Imperialism, see J.L. Hobson,
Imperialism: a Studt (London, revised 1948); C.j. Bodelson,
Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism (London, 1924), A.P.
Thornton, The Imperial Idea and its Enemies (London, 1959);
Robinson and Gallagher, op. cit. also RC.K. Ensor, England,
1870-1914 (Oxford, 1936).
virtually went together. As Chamberlain was in 1895 emphas-
ising that the Colonies were 'undeveloped estates' '4nich must
be developed1 , British arms were forcing their way into
Ashanti. 2 By 1905, however, Lugard. was already reducing
British policy to a 'dual mandate t : the bringing of the nativ
races 'who are centuries behind ourselves in mental evolution'
'to a higher plane of c.vilization and progress', 'while
economically developing the tropics in such a way as to
benefit British industrial classes'. 3 Viscount Milner was to
define this task of 'development or consolidation' which
followed the 'epoch of exaDnsion' as 'constructive imperialism
but it must be noted that even the 'development and 'consolid-
ation' meant imperial expansion, though not necessarily
territorial.
There was commercial exa9nsion in the export of
capital earmarked for this colonial 'development'. 	 In most
respects, it involved the raising of loans for colonial
railways, the ubsid.ization of shipping companies supposed to
serve imperial interests, the establishment in the Colonies
and. Drotectorates of local departments of trade and industry
geared to the imperial economy which represented great initial
1. H4C. Debs. u.S. Vol. 36, 22 Aug. 1895, 641, 642.
2. J.L. Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain Vol. 3, 1895-
1900 (MacIi11an, 1934) Pp. 21-2. Also Henry Birchenougb.
Nineteenth Century and After March 1902 'Mr Chamberlain as
an Empire Builder', Pp. 361-68.
3. F.D. Lugard, 'West Africa' pp.835-60 in The Empire and theCentury, (London, 1905), P. 859: See also his later workThe Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa, (Edinburgh, 1926).
4. Viscount Mimer, Constructive Imperialism,(London,l908) P.57
6expenditure •1 Thus at enormous costs, harbours were construe-
ted and motor-roads built in the Colonies, but railways were
the most spectacular feature. Towards the close of the
nineteenth century, an astonishing growth took place in
colonial railways, almost amounting to an economic revolution.2
By the end of the century everyone of the new African colonies
could boast a railway, financed mostly by loans with interest
from the 'exporter of capital' and 'the banker of the world'5,
Thus although these loans served to 'develop' the colonies as
well, they were a reflection of the general policy of 'capital
export' which was a feature of the period.	 In 1881, the
amount of English capital invested abroad was estimated at
£1,250 millions, bringing in an annual interest revenue of
£52 millions; in 1915, the investment abroad was £3,805 mill
and the income, £200 millions. The share of the mpire in
this was roughly half. In 1896, £1,125 millions were invested
in the Empire (53%), and, in 1915, £1,890 millions, that is
about 50% of the wbo1e.	 No doubt, the tropical African
'estates' claimed much less than the white colonies.	 Not
1. Lady Lugard, 'The Tropics and. the Emire', 1Do.8l7_3A- in The
Empire and, the Century (London, 1905) Pp. 825-6.
2. For the West African illustration of this, see Alan NePhee,
Economic Revolution in British West Africa (London, 1926)
3. See S.H. Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa, (London,,l93E
also L.H. Jenks, The iigration of in1ish Capital (London,
1963). For the British supremacy as extorter of capital
see W.L, Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902,
Pp.1, 7k. For proper discussion, O.K. Hobson, The Exoort o
Capital (191k); Also ffale'Vy, op.cit. pp. 15-iS. -
k. See Ralph Fox, The Colonial Policy of British Imoerialism(London, 1933) P.3k.
V.
much, relatively, was expected immediately from the West Coast
of the 'Dark Continent' whose trade was said to be in 'decline
But the new importance of her minerals, vegetable oils, rubber,
timber and cotton probably created a less pessimistic economic
image after 1895. More permanent and extensive arranements
were made in the imperial administrative apparatus, particul-
arly in the reorganisation of the oolonial machinery which
also involved heavy sums.	 it i reckoned that, whereas the
trading balance of all the West African colonies increased
almost seven times between 1896 and 1928, the administrative
expenses for the same period increased over ten times.2
But this policy of 'development' was severely
threatened by a more dynamic and venturesome spirit of 'exploit
ation' which was a dominant feature of those days. 3 As
Preidrich Naumann wrote: 'History teaches that the general
progress of civilization can be realized only by breaking the
national liberty of small people...., that there should be
leader nations and. others that must b? led, and we ought not
to wish to be more liberal than history itself' 4 4 And, in
reply to the question whether natives had a right to their
1. Sir Charles Duke, Problems 0f Greater Britain (London,1890)
vol. 2, P.179. See also Robinson and G-allaø'her, op.cit.
Pp. 379-409.
2. Fox, op.cit., P.31.
3.See J.H. Oldham, Christianity and the Race Problem (London,
1924) Chap. VII, 'Ethics of Empire', esp. pp . 94-95.
4. Quoted in Oldharn, op.cit., P.95.
8.
land. and property and, to an independent development, Dr
Paul Rohrbach, one of the leading authorities on German
colonia]. affairs wrote in 1908:
	 "Rights of the natives,
which can be recognised only at the cost of holding
back the evolution of the white race at any point,
simply do not exist. The idea that the Bantu, Negroes,
and iottentots in Africa have a right to live and. die
after their own fashion, even if multitudes of human
beings among civilized. peoples of Europe are in
consequence forced to continue to live in cramped.
proletarian conditions, instead of rising to a higher
level through the full exploitation of the productive
capacity of our colonies.......is absurd."1
Although it was not totally unchallenged,
1. Paul Rohrbach, Deutsche Kolonial Wirtschaft, P.44;
Also Q. in Old.ham, P.95.
9.
especially by its 'scientific' opponents1 , the sense
of 'progress' which these thoughts reflected had. been
reinforced. in Britain by the Darwinian thesis of
organic evolution. Darwin's survival of the fittest
was elevated from a biological statement to a social
and. political precept. 2 Progress came to be
regarded. as the product of a grini and, fierce struggle
for survival. Not the individual but his type
therefore mattered in the calculations and impulses
of men.	 'To yield. to feelings of humanity and pity
was to attempt to reverse nature's inexorable law
that the weak should give place to the strong,
and. the progress by which weaker peoples were
1. For example, see Jean Finot, Race Prejudice, (London
1906), (Translated by Florence Wade-vans); Sir H.H.
Johnston, 'The White Man's Place in Africa' pp.937-46
in The Nineteenth Centur3r and After, (June 1904), and.
also 'The Empire and Anthropology'in The Nineteenth
Century and After, (July, 1908).
2. G.P. Gooch, 'Imperialism' pp. 308-397, in The Heart
of the Em'pire, (London, 1902), P.312.
10.
dispossessed by the stronger or made to subserve to their
purposes was regarded as inevitable'. 1
	I'Iany people came to
the conclusion that considerations of morality were irrelevant
in the territorial expansion of dominant races, which was -
inevitable. The man who succeeded had leitimacy on his
side 2
This national 'conceit' probably influenced the
form of national hysteria often called Jingoism. Accordng
to Hobson, this was 'a malignant form of the old affection of
patriotism' which became 'pestilent' as the British masses
were 'drunken on empire'.	 As an 'inverted patriotism whereby
the love of one's own nation is transformed into the....fierce
craving to destroy the individual members of another nation,
it was nurtured, as Hobson says, in a "quick ebullition of
national hate" which was then exploited by the sensational
yellow press, the popular music-hall, the political platform,
and at times, even the pulDit. Closely connected with
inadequate poor education and crowd instincts, jingoism was
immediately characterised by mass savage credulity, vibarious
brutality, general glorification of war and military procedures
contempt for pacific means, and belief in summary methods.3
As this 'full-blooded imperialist psychology' developed, most
working-class men, like 'civilised bandits', entertained the
1. See Oldham, op.cit., P.94.
2. See A.F. Wyatt, 'The Ethics of Empire' in Nineteenth
Century, April, 1897, P.516.
3. See J.A. liobson, The Psychology qngoism (London, 1901),
Pp. 1, 2, and psim; Gooch, 3l2-27. loc.cit.
:14.
feelinrr that an Englishman was one of the chosen race. 1 A.
few sane men, like the Bishot of Stepney denied the view that
British imperial success was an act of Providence 2 ; but a
large portion of the masses saw the acquisition of new markets
for British goods, or the annexation of new territories as
ordained by God. 3 In this spate of mass religion, native
races were frankly declared to belong to a lower order of
humanity, aid therefore had no claim to the ordinary privileges
of white men.
Even some influential people, however uncomfortably,
swam on this jingo tide. 6 Since 'savage peoples' were 'weak',
the 'blessed strong' 'shall prey upon' them. 7	'The Anglo-
Saxon stock', Chamberlain said, was 'infallibly destined to be
the predominant force in the history' of the world. 8 Even the
hitherto more cautious Lord RQseber7 came to believe that
'our olthers are braver, our sailors hardier, our captains
1. Pox, o.cit., P.33.
2. Rt. Rev, the Bishop of Stepney, 'The Empire and the Church'
pp .167-73 in The Empire and the Century (London, 1905).
3. Hobson, Jinpoism, oD.clt., passim.
loc.cit,
Li.. Gooch,/Pp. 327-8.
5. R.C.E. insor, The SDectator, 3 July 1936 in 'The Evolution
of Joseoh Chamberlain' says that Chamberlain "had no great
respect for his idolators."
6. W.S. Blunt, My Diaries, Pt. I, P.283; Also Ref. in O1dham
OD.Cit., P.96.
7. See C.H. Pearson, National Life and. Character (1893); also
Benjamin Kidd, Social Evolution (l89L) and Houstons
Chamberlain, Foundations of the Nineteenth Centuy (1899)
8. Speech at Toronto 1887 Foreign and. Colonial Steehes.
Also J.L.Garvin, faf a o Tôièph hamber1ain,voI.,1ac.11am
1933) pp.333-7.
12.
skilfuller (sic.), our statesmen wiser than those of other
nations'.	 Cecil Rhodes, a 'personification of ImDerialisrn',
voted in the Cape Colony Assembly for the Strap Act, giving
the master the right to flog natives. Sir Arthur Hardinge
sneered at the anti-slavery faction in Zanzibar. On the
continent, the imperial 'distemper' was no less vicarious.
Dr Karl Peters, the so-called father of German Imperialism
and the founder of German East Africa, revelled in his
murders and immoralities in Africa and was treated as a hero
until Bebel denounced him in the Reichstag.1
These attitudes were promoted by the alarming conduct
of some of the poets and men of letters, who lent excitement
and colour to either imperial 'discouragement or success'.2
Thus the Poet Laureate, Austin, eulogised the Jameson Raid,
Rudyard Kipling delighted at the 'satisfactory killing' of
Boers; while Henley wildly rejoiced at the tardy victory of
a large British force over a Boer army one-fifth its size.
According to G.P. Gooch, George Meredith, William Watson, and
Stephen Phillips, among a few, struck a higher note, but these
were few; 'others caused concern among the ually small sane
few when they sold their talents for the applause of the
market place.'3
loc.cit.
1. See G.P. Gooch,/Pp. 328-330.
bc. cit.
2. Madden,/Pp. 340, 34-1-2, 348.
boChit.
3. Gooch,/PP.340.
Also Hobson Jingoism, passirn, J.M. i-obertson, Patriotism
and Empire London, 1899) Pp. 52-3.
13.
This conduct bred an element of panic in British
and imperial politics, which in turn signalled a corresponding
growth of armaments. 1 Consequently, the soaring expenditure
of the Unionist Government between 1895 and 1900, for example,
broke the hallowed canons of the 'Gladstonian Garrison'2.
Borne people even began to feel that a certain 'dichotomy'
existed between Imperialism and social reform at home. 3 As
Nastermen complained, in those days of 'lust of domination,
the stir of battle, the pride in magnitude of Empire, delight
in rule over alien nations, commercial aggrandisement, and
dissatisfaction with anything short of predominance in the
councils of the world', 'programmes of social reform' 'reposed'
'on the dusty shelves or the brains of great statesmen', and
were 'occasionally noticed in Parliament or at election times
as sub3ect for reproach or peroration'. 	 'The stupendous
problem of life for millions of over-ridden men, resolved
itself into a kind of military pa2-eant, with occasional
fighting to lend it dignity' . 	 whereas the old national
spirit was one of defiance to aggressors, the new jingoism
was tainted by the agressive desire for great and rapid
1. Hobson, Imperialism, op.cit., passim.
2. Francis W. Hurst, 'Imperialism and Finance' pp. 1-il? in
Liberalism and Empire (London, 1900) passim.
loc.cit.
3. Nadden/P.339.
4. C.F.G. Nasterman, 'Realities at Home' in The Heart of the
Empire, (London, 1902) po. 1-7.
5. J.M. Robertson, op.cit., P.53.
i4.
gain. 1 Leckv who had Darticularly condemned 'the egotism of
English olicy', 2
 later pointed at 'the levity' with which
wars were made with 'barbarous' nations and 'how strongly
the present commercial policy' was 'stimulating the passion
for aggression'. 3 This passion was so forbidding that
isolated warnings were directed to a state of affairs which
by a "sufficiently evil conjecture of circumstances', 'a
Moses of the Music-Hall, with perhaps a few Aarons of the
Areopagus', might be enabled 'to start a Jingo crusade in
which the nation' 'might march as straight to dire disaster
as ever did any host of 'drugged, bemused and bewildered'
fanatics in the Dark Ages.....'4
But to emphasise the jingoism of the masses is not
to underestimate the anti-jingo forces, many of which were
little concerned with imperial affairs or foreign policy.
For example, the Home Rulers, the Irish party, the rising
Labour and trade union groups, as well as the traditional
'Gladstonian' forces, more concerned with the realities at
home, were dourly unimpressed by the jingo hysteria. Even
some Fabian and Liberal Imperialists found the jingo 'craze'
unacceptable. Thus Bernard Shaw supported imperialism if it
1. The Spectator Oct. 8, 1898 Vol. LXXXI, P.480. 'the New
Jingoism'.
2. W.E.H. Lecky, The EmDlre: Its Value and Its Growth (London,
1893) P.43.
3. Lecky: Map of Life, P.180.
4. See John N. Robertson, Patriotism and Emoire (London, 1899)
P.55, and passim.
15.
meant 'a well-considered policy to be pursued by a common-
wealtn of communities flying the British Flag', and.
regarded it as 'a grave symptom of national infatuation' if
it was 'a mere cetchword. vaguely denoting our insular self-
conceit' .	 Lord Curzon who found ingoism synonymous with
! swaggering attitude or chauvinism', 'megalomania',
'reckless cuoidity', 'vanity of racial domination' and 'greed
of commercial gain', therefore felt it was opposed to the
'moral basis of imDerlalism', which be said. was 'not merely
justice, order, or material prosperity, but the sense of
partnership in a great idea, the consecrating influence of a
lofty purpose....' 2 .	 Thus within the broad canvass of
British politics, each of the various groups demonstrated its
attitude of approval or disaptroval to the 'forward' pattern,
particularly as the South African War war'ed 3 , but the problems
of the West African Colonies were, in comparison, barely
broached.
Much of the colonial crisis there as in other
tropical belts of Africa, was shrouded from public view by
a 'soporific illusion' which kept the British conscience
cornolacently unaware of what was going on there. This illus-
ion was the then current idea of taking u the White Han's
1. G.E. Shaw: Fabianism and the Errpire (London, 1900) P.1.
2. Lord Curzon, 'The New Imperialism' in The Nineteenth
Century and After, Jan. 1908, Pc. 159-160.
loc.cit.
5. See Madden,/pp. 3k5-51, which is a masterly survey.
16.
Burd.en.	 This doctrine was as much the outcome of the new
imperial situation as a continuation of traditional British
attitude5to .frica. Although there were now new excitements
and greater contacts, British thinking od. Africa had not
totally changed from the pessimism of the 'White Nan's
Grave', which had posed the problem of sifrvival to European
adventurers. Although a revolution in the stu&y of tropical
medicine had reduced mortalities and modified this attitude,
the image of barbarism persisted.	 The sensational impressioiu
of earlier travellers to Africa, the later dominant racism
which 'destroyed the intellectual foundations of racial
ecalitarianism', and the missionary propaganda, all helped
to create this European image o± Africa. But the missionary
aspect needs to be emphasised. Much of the argument in
popular missionary publications had tended 'to demonstrate
the overwhelming need for missionary work'. Although they
talked of an ultimate racial equality of all men, they also
uttered 'the worst astects of cultural chauvinism', 'The
darcer the picture of African barbarism, the more necessary
the work of the missionaries'.	 'They consciously chose
to report on those aspects of African culture most likely to
be shockinc to their readers'. As Professor Curtin says:
1. Olivier, oo.cit., Pp. 56-7.
17.
"It is hard to escape the conclusion that the systematic
misrepresentation of African culture in the missionary
press contributed, unintentionally to the rise of racial
as well as cultural arrogance......1
Like the missionaries, the New Imperialism also
magnified African barbarism in ord.er to justify its sway.
It also claimed the virtues of early humanitarian conscience.
William Wilberforce had harped on 'the humanity, justice
and, the duties of ChriStian men' to help 'open the way to
an eternal futurity of happiness', among aboriginal
populations. 2	Now, in the 1890's, Rudyard Kipling gave
the imperial challenge its own 'evangelical turn' when
he bade young Britons to take up the 'White Man's Burden'.3
According to this 'humanitarian' attitude: Tropical countries
were not suited for settled habitation by whites.
Europeans could not work in their climate or rear their
children there. The native could prosper and, labour
under good government, but was incapable of developing
his own country's resources. He was barbarian, benighted,
1. For these views, see Philip D. Curtin, The Image of
Africa (Wisconsin, 1964) P. 176, 197, 363 - 87; also
pp . 479 - 80.
2. William Wilberforce, The African Slave Trade and. its
Remedy (1839),(2nd. Ed.. 1840) pp. 528-9; See also
Appeal to Re1ipion, Justice and. Humanity of the Inhabitants
of the British Empire, In behalf of the Negro Slaves in
the West Indies, (1823) pp. 32-33.
3. See WM. MacMillan, The Road. to Self-Rule, A Study in




and unprogressive. One of the principal reasons for
this arrested development was that his livelihood had
been made so easy for him by natural conditions that
he had not been obliged to work, at any rate, not to
work steadily and in a proper and efficient manner.
The European, therefore, must in the interest of human
progress, make arrangements to enable and induce the
blackman to work productively under his direction and.
and, training.	 To him the economic profit, which
the blackman could not either create or wisely use;
to the blackman peace and protection, relief from
disease and famine, moral and social improvement and
elevations and the blessings of EuroDean culture in
general.	 To effect these uDliftng developments was the
"White Man's Burdentt. l
	Shorn of its surious humanit-
arianism, however, this doctrine was not very different,
in its practhal application, DOm the prevalent 'acism
of those days.
1. See Rudyard Kioling, TheC
and The Government of Trop
Also. Q, in Ol,vier, op . c
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Thus as the men of the New ImDeriallsm looked
round the Empire and observed the 'unharvested El Doradostt,
only few were inclined to ask what was "the real root of
our title to some of these undeveloped estates". 1 It is
with some of these few vis---vis the public and official
attitudes that this thesis deals.




THE "THIRD PARTY" AND IMPERIAL TRUSTEESHIP
The period of imperial expansion which was
signalled. by the arrival of Joseph Chamberlain at the
Colonial Office was, therefore, one of divergent attitudes
towaHs colonial peoples, The general belief, as
bravely advertised in the popular press, was of the
"damned nature" of the African negro. This major school
believed that the greatest curse of Africa, and, the
greatest obstacle to its progress, was the '1unspeakable"
and "unconquerable" aversion to regular work in the African.
Therefore, any attempt to place this "lazy" and "useless"
creature on an equality with the white man was doomed to
miserable failure. 1	At the other extreme, was the trad-
itional philanthropist and missionary school which sought
to lift the negro up in the plain of civilization by
divesting him of his natural habits and. mores. Conceiving
its role from an Olympian height of European civilization,
this school treated Africans with a spirit of patronising
1. Leo Weinthal to E.D. Morel, 1 Sept. 190k, F9/T-Z, E.D.
Morel Papers. Weithal was a South African and Editor
of the African World who published a lot of racist matter
in that press. By 22 April, 1908 he had fallen out with
E.D. Morel on racial argwnerxts. He was the author of
Nj Story of the Cape to Cairo Road, Rail and River Scheme
(k vols.) (London, 1923).
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condescension.	 There was, however, a small but perceptible
growth of a school which identified itself with the develop-
ment of a true colonial conscience in Britain. It was
a school which saw the administration of the negroid races
of Africa as a challenging problem of cosmic importance,
demanding of justice and, wisdom, but above all an
appreciation of ethnological facts. This school called
itself "The Third. Party", 2
 and although several other
influences operated under its tanner, it was mainly apotheo-
sized in the ideals of Mary Kingsley, John Holt, and. E.D.
Morel.
The Third Party believed, that the West African was
besieged. by the two other enemy schools whose attitudes it
opposed. The more positive and. assertive racist school
advertized. the inferiority and. incapacity of the West Africax'i
objected to his being a land-owner, and. preached the creed.
that West African wealth belonged. to the white race while the
African was to remain a perpetual labourer and wage-earner.
Strangely enough, however, some educated and. seai-educated.
Africans were also alleged to belong to this inimical
1. E.D. Morel, Nigeria: ItPeoples and Its problems (London
1911),, P. xi
The Philanthropist and Missionary School would not have
accepted this accusation. See Chaps. 2 and 3 for the
attitude of traditional humanitarians.
2. This term seems to have been coined by Morel. Vide E.D.
Morel, Nigeria, Pp. L- XIX.
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category. It was held that since they were perverted by
the unsuitable educational methods of Europe, they lacked
racial polarity and national pride, and betrayed the true
interests of their country to its foes.
	
The second
undesirable school, the Third Party alleged, was to be found
in the missionary and philanthropist alliance. It was
recognised that their aims and desire were generous to the
African, but that their approach had unconsciously done
cruel wrongs to him.
The Third Party, therefore, posed between these
two shools of' thought and practice, the "damned nigger school,
and the denationalizing school". 1 It called on all having
relations with West Africa to take note of the existing and
traditional systems there. It desired that the West African
should continue to be a land-owner with security of tenure,
an agriculturist and trader, under Brilash rule. Tt
advocated an increased study o West Africa, and demanded
that time should be allowed for the gradual development from
within thqe, deprecating the swift and immediate intro-
duction of European norms and formulae which not only
dislocated the .1frican polity but also made hybrids of its
inhabitants. As the publicist of this school later
1. Morels words, Ibid, P. xiii.
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summarized its maxims.
"It was a school of thought which saw in. the
preservation of the West African Land for him and
his descendants, in a system of education which
shall not anc'licise, in technical instruction; in
assisting and encouraging agriculture, local
industries and scientific forestry; in introducing
labour-saving aooliances, and, in strengthening all
that is best, materially and soiritually, in
aboriginal institutions, the highest duties of our
Imperial rule....." I
Although Morel reduced the general premise of hia
school to a doctrinal thesis of trusteeship, it was a
programme which had been adumbrated by Mary Kingsley and
which John Bolt believed, in. Mary Kingsley plucked
the chords of negrophilism in the hearts of Bolt and Morel;
and Bolt had acknowledged that without the inspiration of
Mary Kingsley, he might never have shown the degree of
interest which he did to West Africans. 2
 A biographical
appreciation of this woman is hardly relevant to this work;3
a sound assessment of the position of the negro which is
1. Ibid, Pp. xiii - xiv.
2. ohn Bolt to Morel, 9 Nov. 1911, F.8/ L , E...D.Morel Papers.
3. Several biographies of this woman have appeared. See
Stephen Gwynn, The Life of Nary Kingsley (MacMillan,
1932); Cecil Howard, Mary Kingsley, (London, 1957);
Qiwen Campbell, Nary Kings1e, Methuen, 1957.
24-.
central in her anthropology has been mad.e. 1 Within a
general assessment here will be found a detailed exposition
of her aims, her political activities an& her relationship
with groups and personalities who mattered to her.
The figure of this daring woman with masculine
energy2 was perplexing both to her contemporaries and later
historians. 3 But her ability was never in. doubt.
	
She
dealt with great issues of imperial significance from an
almost inspired4-
 insight of a sympathetic, sincere and.
generous mind. This quality was akin to what Hancock caj..led
her virtues of "attachment, 3ustice, and span" "which
distinguish the great historian from the crowd of journey-
men" 5 . She was intrepid, but her audacious spirit probably
led to some crudities in her statements. She did not
possess the ability for formulating theories, but having
tried, from her reading, contacts and travels, to see the
African society and. mind from within, she then attempted to
correct the erroneous views held about Africans at the time.
1. J.E. Flint, 'Mary lCingsley - A Reassessment', in Journal
of African History, IV, 1 (1963), pp . 95 - 104-.
2. DNB.
3. J.E. Flint, op. cit. P. 95.
4-. R.S. Rattray, Ashanti (Oxford, 1923), p . 81.
5. Sir Keith Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs,
vol. 11, Problems of Economic Policy, 1918 - 39 Part 2
(Oxford, 194-2) P. 330.
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In distributing responsibility for the then pre-
vailing notions about Africa, she blamed the early merchants,
and Government officials; but she believed that mission-
aries were most culpable. The traders' contribution to the
evil was negative: t1ie failed to tell all they knew about
the West Coast, keeping all available information to
themselves. 1 The error of the earlier Government officials,
according to her, arose from the conditions that surrounded
them in West Africa, and the nature of their restricted
influence, distrusted by the trading community since the
1865 Committee, precariously provided with men and, money,
and badly quartered. The unhealthy climate, and the then
short-sighted administration made for lack of continuity
of service. Colonial officials, therefore, came back to
England embittered, and found an outlet in supporting racist
views, which Kingsley believed, did not cause their loss of
opportunity overseas. 2
 But she believed that, of all, it
was the philanthropist and missionary alliance which most
fostered the view of the debased African, harping as they
did, ax horrors and general sensationalism which so sharply
differentiated from the tenor of 'classical" missionary
1. Mary Kingsley, West African Studies, (London, 1899)
Pp. 315 - 6.
2. Ibid. Pp. 317 - 9.
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reports. 1 All of them were supported by the apathy of the
English public which loved to hear horrible stories.2
To her, the picture painted of the JLfrican by the majority
of West African mission reports was that of "a child,
naturally innocent, led away and cheated by white traders and
grievously oppressed by his own rulers." 3 This pious
propaganda, she claimed, led 	 the Government into a policy
of destroying native states and, the power of the African
ruling classes at large through predatory wars.L4 She
believed that the destruction of West African institutions
merely lowered the morale of the African race, stopped its
trade and endangered its cultural advantages. 5 It Is,
however, not so much this destructive imperialism that
Kingsley objected to, as the lack of constructive statesman-
ship and. machinery to rebuild the wreck. 6 It was this
obssesion that led her to the various political schemes she
formulated. Her opposition to the Crown Colony system of
administration for West Africa stemmed from these consider-
1. Ibid. Pp. 320 - 1.
2. Ibid. P. 321.
3. Ibid. P. 322.
4. Ibid. P. 322.
5. Ibid. Pp. 378 - 9.
6. ibid.
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at].ons: that it was anachronistic, autocratic, expensive
in men and, money, caused wars and consequently retrogression
in trade, and could never produce the desired constructive
statesmanship.
From 1895 till 1900, therefore, Nary Kingsley was
the symbol of dissent in imperial methods for West Africa;
In spite of her humanitarian, zeal, however, she was 'the
Intellectual and philosophical spokeswoman for the British
traders to West Africa". 1 It was this partisanship forr
British traders which seemed to have dominated her; but
it Ls safe to condude that she believed, in the traders
because she thought that they were most qualified (by virtue
of experience, justice and humanity) to rule West Africa
to the African and. imperial advantage. She liked and.
associated with Goldie, de Cardi, and. John Harford, mainly
because of their administrative and commercial success and.
knowledge of the coast. 2 But she was most at home with John
Holt with whom she opposed the Colonial Office methods of
administering the West African colonies. This relationship
between Kingsley and bit, a relationship of perpetual.,
inspiration and mutual education, ,has been preserved in
1. Flint, op. cit. P. 96.
2. John Harford first opened the Qua-Ibo River after NcEachen
had. traded. there in a hulk. No trade seemed. to have been
done there by white men when McEachen withdrew in 1873
until Harford went in.
de Cardi possessed an unrivalled knowledge of the natives
of the Niger Delta through personal acquaintance. It is,
however, doubted whether he was really a Count.
2. See Cherry Getzel, Jo
Africa in the era of
mercantile activities
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excellent documentation, 1 which tangibly portrays their
views and activities in relation to several contemporary
issues.	 While Kingsley inspired Holt to a more intense
negrophilism; it was often from Holt that she sought
information on some aspects of West Africa which her own
huge experience could not compass.
This fact, therefore, is a credit to John Holt.
In assessing the career of John Holt, the mercantile activity
is necessarily pre-emineiit. 2
 But humanity, not commerce,
was the raison d'etre of his existence. 	 He was a trader to
West Africa, "and had quietly done in the best way known to
him, whatever work caine his way..... .AS a trader, he had
worked hard and tried to keep pace with others in enterprise
and pusbfulness in the establishment of the abric 0±' British
commerce in West Africa, and in developing without fuss and.
ostentation, the resources of Southern Nigeria. 	 L glance
1. John Holt Papers, in the archives of John felt and. Co.
Ltd., in India Buildings, Water Street, Liverpool.
of bit.
3. John bolt to E.D. Morel, 22 Oct. 1903., 8/l, EDMP.
Holt's connection with West Africa was so close that
some uninformed people assumed, that he bad originated
the trade in palm oil, mahogany or rubber, which was
not true.
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at his d.iary1 shows that bit was a pioneer. Morally
stern and. an uncompromising fighter against injustice and.
the exploitation of human misery, he at the same time
disliked publicity, though when occasions demanded it, as
during the Congo question, he was ready to dance to the
conventional tune. Apparently harsh and brusque, his
harshness seemed at times to be a veneer because he was at
the same time kind, in any case, he was brought up in the
bard. "Coast" way.	 He had the audacity to voice his
convictions without caring whose ox was gored. The
diplomatic trimmings of such friends as Dr Edward Blyden2,
bored and, incommoded him. 3 He had a masterly grip of
the social, political and economic problems of West Africa,
and offered his knowledge to Governments and individuals.
A woman who knew him very well summarized, his humane career
so vividly:
"His intense individuality, his resentment of
1. C.R. bolt, The Diary of John bolt and the Voyage of the
'Maria', (Liverpool, l91I8.)
2. For the career of Dr Blyden, see H.R. Lynch, Edward W.
Blyden, 1832 - 1912, and Pan-negro Nationalism,
(Unpublished London Ph.D. thesis 19EM-). Also by the
same author, 'Edward W. Blyden: 'Pioneer West African
Nationalist' in Journal of African History, V. 3 (1965)
pp. 373 - 388.
3. bolt to Morel, 3 Oct. 1906, P.8J3, EDMP.
In this letter, bolt says: "Dr Blyden's sincerity does
not commend itself to me. To Lugard be can express
regret at his departure.	 To you he can confess that
it is well that Lugard. is going.
	
This is, I suppose,
diplomatic, but it is not to my liking.
	 If I object
to a thing I say so or keep silent."
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control, his scorn of assistance, made him reDudiate
any interference, whether by companies or by the btate.
He wanted no backing either of politicians or of
soldier. He had absolute confidence in his own
methods of dealing with the M'rican apart from all
government complications - such a merchant as John
Bolt, far-sighted, self-reliant, guid.ed by an unfailing
instinctfor good business, was never lured by the
pleasure of quick profits to the exploitation of the
native.	 He was pledged, if only by his sense of
successful commerce, to a system of free labour for
the inhabitants of the country..... t'	 I
It was, however, Bolt's broad-mindedness which
reinforced this individuality and which also was a back-
ground to his negrophilism. 	 This quality produced in him
that belief in fair, honest and just treatment of men, his
condemnation of bad, laws, and was the genesis of his free-
trade zeal. He sought to right the wrongs believed to have
been done to West .Alricans, and his actions were duly
appreciated by West Africans. He was on excellent terms
with most enlightened West Africans. Dr Nojola Agbebi
1. Mrs A. Stopford Green, "A Founder of the Society"
in Journal of the African Society, October, 1915.
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gave him his portrait and was respectfully frank with
him.	 R.B. Blaize, the Laos merchant, was ever in praise
of hiii, and. in 1900 assured him that "we on the Coast are
not gn,orant of the silent wor1ç^ which you are doing for
the benefit of our country and race," and then acclaimed
bit's desire for "the people of the West Coast to be
honestly, fairly and intelligently treated by the Government"2
Other Coasters benefitted from or hopefully solicited his
humanitarianism. In 1906 and 1909, bolt's financial
favour was sought and received. by Dr Obasa of Ikiaah
in a project for a Girls' School to be built in Lagos.
Two years later, he gave one hundred pounds for a technical
schorol at Ibad.an.	 He was approached by Bishop James
Johnson for financial help in the proposed Native Christian
Church. 4
 Other individuals or even missionaries whom he
1. Mojola Lgbebi to bolt, 2 April 1902, B0X22/l, Jobn bolt
Papers. Agbebi, Dr Mojola, Born 10 Apr]J.. 1860 at Ileslaa,
Nigeria, third son of George Vincent Abebi, and Peggy
Vincent (nee Pearse); Poet and. man of letters; Joined and
broke with various re1igous sects in Lagos for one reason
or another. Edited. for some time,The Lagos Observer,
The Lagos Weekly Record, and Iwe Irohin. Eko; Died May 1919
2. R.B. Blaize to bolt, 8 Aug. 1900, Box 22/1, JUP.
Richard Beale Blaize was a financier, and philanthropist
of Lagos. Edited The Lagos Times.
3. Dr Obasa of Ikijah to bolt 15 Dec. 1906 22/3, JHP.
Obasa of Ikijah to bolt 14 Aug. 1909 22/3, JHP.
Dr Orishadipe Obasa of Ikijah, Lagos. 1863 - 1940.
M.R.C.S. (England), L.R.C.P. (London).
4e Bishop James Johnson to bolt, 18 Feb. 1909. 22/3, JUL
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did not trust, acknowledged his kindness to Africans. In
1896, be bad. given a bell to the Church at Bonny at the
instance of the fourth ann.iversary celebration of the Delta
Pastorate Institution, 1
 in 1909, the C.M.S. Becretary
thanked Iolt for his offer to ship a Mission House in the
Niger Territory to Patani free of cost. 2
 A few years later
Chief Egbu of Warn thanked dolt for a steamer ship.
Writing in 'Pdin' English, Chief Egbu acknowledged Bolt
as " one who likes Black-man."3
In his transactions, therefore, Bolt was always
full of gratitude to West Africans who had built up the
fabric of his trade. This sense of obligation reinforced
his natural disapproval of injustice: "They made me what I
am; their labour, their muscles, their enterprise, have
given me everything I possess. 	 I am bound to try and.
protect them against outrage and injustice." 	 In this
spirit, even when his commercial instincts might have
1. D.C. Crowtber to Bolt, 13 Nay 1896. 22/2 JEP.
2. C.M.S. Secretary to Bolt, 30 Aug. 1909; 22/2 JHP.
3. Chief gbu to Bolt, 7 Oct. 1912, 22/2 JHP.
John Bolt in the African Mail, 2 July, 1915.
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mastered his humanitarian sid.e, 1
 liolt tenaciously tried to
discharge his debt to those who had laid the foundations
o his prosperity.
He shared this sense of duty and obligation to
West Africans with Kingsley: the former for his economic
success; the latter for her anthropological achievements.
This mutuality of interest enables the historian to expose
their attitudes to the imperial issues of their time, their
political ideals and economic principles.	 They were both
imperialists, but more in the sense of longing "for patience,
honesty, and. a just recognition of human rights amongst the
people we govern, no matter what their colour, intelligence
or degree of natural mental evolution." 2 In striving to
present what they considered to be the proper attitude to
West Africa, they condemned the British press for ignorance
0±' West A.I'rican affairs; but they were most bitter towards
1. Holt to Morel,. 26 April 1911, P8/4, EDMP.
In this letter bit criticises the appointment by his
son of a certain Major Leonard as agent of his company
at Gabon because heasincompetent; but bolt makes the
important point that "the purpose for which our
Company exists must always be kept in view by those who
are runnizg it apart from all philanthropy or sentiment."
2. bolt to Morel, 20 June 1900, P8/i, EDMP.
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the Times for its alleged invincible ignorance. 1
 Both
supported the Liquor traffic to West Africa because, as
they said, the liquor sent out was neither poisonous nor
clemoralising. 2 They hated the introduction of coinage
to West Africa and wanted the barter system of trade to
continue. 3 They saw the Sierra Leone Hut-Tax crisis as
the result of Colonial office ignorance and incompetence,
and Chamberlain's obstinacy, or at least that of the
officials who misled him. 4 They criticized the adminis-
tration of West Africa as wasteful and. saw direct taxation
as a threat to peace. 5
 Bolt disliked the "craze" for
'development', especially the then current mania for
railway construction, except when they were built economically
1. Kingsley to Bolt, 21 Feb. 1898, 16/k JEP.
.&part from Chirol whom she says "understands Germany and.
Japan" and is therefore the best man in the Times, all
other editors and. chief contributors - starting from
Russell Wallace, Ma3or Darwin (who wrote the West African
articles though an. arm-chair geographer) to Kellet of
the Royal Geographical Society - are, to her ignorant
and amusing "Like the Diplomatic Service the Times
knows nothing about West Africa", Kingsley declared.
2. Kingsley to Bolt, 27 Nov. 1897, 16/1, JEP. See Cbap.II
3. Kingsley to Holt, 2 Feb. 1898, 16/1, JEP.
This attitude is further illustrated in Chap. VII.
1• See Appendix.
They would. seem to have agreed. with Bentham who in 1831
pleaded that Britain should cease "to regard the colonies
with the greedy eyes of fiscality."
5. Bolt to ore1, 23 Aug. 1901, P8/I, EDMP.
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or made to pay their way. 1 Kingsley, however, did not
condemn railways generally, but there seemed to have been
no particular railway route she supported. 2 They
wanted to destroy the present Colonial Office System in
order, as they alleged, to save the West African Colonies
from political instability, economic ruin and social misery.3
In the campaign to evolve a new system of West African
administration, Kingsley had the initiative, and. tried to
implicate Holt in her political designs.
The political ambitions of Mary Kingsley, as
already indicated, were mixed up with her primary desire
to give British traders to West Africa, particularly the
Liverpool men, a determining voice in West African colonial
affairs. The school which she founded, although its
humanitarianism was later deepened with new influences, was
really intended to be a trader's lobby.	 She could not
tolerate the existing system because it "maddens me to see
you men who know being ousted from power by sentimentalists -
clerical collars and ostrich plumes. 4 Her aim was "to
1. Holt to Morel, 13 June 1910, P8/4, EDMP. See Chap. VII
2. The correspondence between Kingsley and. Holt clearly shows
this attitude which will be further explained in Chap.VII
See Kingsley to bit, 21 Sept. 1898, l6/2,JiP.
3. Kingsley, Studies, P. 32k.
11. Kingsley to bolt, 3 March, 1898, 16/1, JHP.
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form a Liverpool School of Politics for controlling West
African Legislation, as firmly as the Manchester School
did"; the only difference being that whereas "the
Liverpool School would, if formed, be permanent, because
Liverpool knows Africa personally", and "has that grasp of
the necessary confliction of interests as well as knowledge
of detail and. working methods", "Manchester only knew itse1f1
She was angry that Liverpool men persisted "in lea.ving
West African administration in the hands of men who are
amateurs at it." 2 Eer pessimism about the future of West
Africa was sadly deepened by the notion that the ct'ficials
in the Colonial Office had, complete control of its local
administration, and. "all the healthy, quiet development the
traders built the foundations of is being destroyed by the
conceited fools." 3 She fe3t that the system which
Chamberlain was running would never reap political success
because his methods were too expensive in men end. money.k
The prob1e of administering West Africa, according to her,
could only be solved."by handing over the control of govern-
ment finances there into the hands of a sort of House of
1. Kingsley to Bolt, 19 March 1898, 16/1, JHP.
2. Kingsley to Bolt, 21 March 1898, 16/1, Jill'.
3. Kingsley to Holt, 21 April 1898, 16/2, Jill'.
k Kingsley to bit, 26 April, 1898, 16/2, JHP.
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Commons, that House of Commons to be composed of the
traders at present working the 1est African trade, (and)
this means organising the traders."1
Thus dissatisfied with the state of affairs
in wbich, according to her, on the evidence of Sandford
Arthur Strong, the Librarian of the House of Commons, even
Cabinet ministers were said. to be incapable of making
their own speeches without help, Kinsley advised Holt to
"come out and fight." 2 Conceiving the West African Empire
and, its traders' position as a sort of German Confederaton
with a difficult problem of unity and. leadership, she tried
to unite the traders under a leadership. She suggested
the plan to Holt:
"We want a Moltke and Bismarck to uiate the
excellent good stuff - Jones, Goldie and the
West African Chiefs.	 I invite you to be .bismarck,
I'll do my best as Noltke; we have got our sound
stuff, English common sense, which will do for
Wilhem." 3
Holt liked German methods ol' administration, but even at
that, he was appalled by this facetious German allusion;
no wonder he demurred.4
1. Kingsley to Holt, 26 April, 1898, 16/2, JHP.
for details of Kingsley's scheme vide the Studaes
pp . 392 - 419.
2. Kingsley to Holt, 29 Jan. 1899, 16/3, JHP.
3. Kingsley to Bolt, 8 Nov. 1898, 16/3, JHP.
4. Ibid.
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Therefore, Mary Kingsley went out in search of
individuals and. Members of Parliament who would, wish to be
connected with traders. She met Sir Alfred Lyall, 1 a
Liberal Unionist and die-hard free-trader who was anxious
to enter Parliament. Lyall, however, was "not keen to
leave £1,200 job fox' his seat on India Council;" and at any
rate,he felt thai traders "don't care about anything but
local interests or some passing thing of the hour."2
Then she came into contact with Sir Spencer Walpole 3 , "a
priest at free trade," a former Governor of the Isle of Man,
and. Secretary to the General Post Ofice.
	
Kingsley
claimed that he was "a mature man of business and. affairs,
and a good speaker who could be relied on to go for the
government like a fox-terrier a rat."	 She also spotted
1. Lyall, Rt. Eon. Sr Alfred Comyn, K.C.B. cv. 1881, Hon.
D.CIL., Oxford & LL.D. (Cambridge); Born 1- Jan. 1835,
son of Rev. Alfred Lyall; Educ. at Eton; of Bengal
Civil Service; Lt. Gay ., N.W. Provinces, India 1882 - 87;
Member of Council of Secretary of State for India, 1882-
1902; P.C. 1902; Ford's Lecturer in English History,
Oxford Union 1907; Publications: British Dominion in
India; Life of Warren Hastings 1902; Life of Marpuiss of
Dufferin;l905. Died 10 April, 1911.
2. Kingsley to Holt, 2 Dec. 1898, 16/3, JUP.
3. Walpole, Sir Spencer, K.C.B.cv. 1898; Eorn 6 Feb. 1839,
eldest son of Rt. Hon. Spencer H. Walpole; Educ. at Eton;
Clerk in the ar Office, 1858; Inspector of Fisheries,
1867; Lt. Gov. of the Isle of Man, 1882; Sec. to the
Post Office, 1893 - 99; Hon. D.L. Oxford and LL.D.
Edinburgh, Published biographical works; Died 7 July,l907
4. Kingsley to bit, 2 Dec. 1898, 16/3, JHP.
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and. tried to engage Charles Straclaey1 , who though a union.ist,
was a free-trader, and. "a most noble man with great influence
and ability, looked on here as one of the most coming
Statesmen." However, although she recognised that Strachey's
association with the Spectator might be an asset, and although
be was "an active intensively vivid man," Mary Kingsley
regretted his lack of depth, charm and. great learning.
But she was confident that "he is just an extremely useful man.
and. ambitious." As Chamberlain's confidant, Kingsley
believed, that Strachey "had great power with mm since he
is not afraid of him" because "Strachey thinks he could do
it 3ust as weu." 2 She exhorted Bolt to continue to see
members of Parliament, in particular hacleari 3 , Conservative
member for Cardiff, who, according to her, had been asked
i. Strachey, (Sir) Charles, K.C.M.G. Cr. 1926, C.B. 1920;
Born 1862; 3rd. son of Sir John Strachey, G.C.S.I.;
married 1893 Margaret (a. 1925) daughter of Sir Walter
Raleigh; Educ. at King's Coil, Cambridge; worked in
F,O. 1885-99; 1900 - Col. Office; 1906, Principal Clerk
West Afric., JYept; 1909 Principal Clerk, Niger Dept.;
1913-1k Travelled in West Africa; 1919 represented the
0.0. at the Peace Conference; 192k-7 Asst. Under Sec.
of State for Colonies. Club: Uuion. Died 15 March, 19k2.
2. Kingsley to Bolt, 2 Dec. 1898, 16/3, JHP.
3, Maclean, James Mackenzie, Born 13 Aug. 1835, son of
Alexander !!ac1ean; Editor of the Newcastle Chronicle,
1855-58; Leader-writer "ianchester Guardian, 1858-59;
Editor and, proprietor Bombay Gazette, 1859-79; part
proprietor arid London contributor western Mail, Cardiff
to 1900; President of the Institute of Journalists, 1897 -
98; Conservative N.P. for Oldham, 1885-92, first
Conservative M.P. for Cardiff for O yrs; seconded
address to Crown in House of Commons, 1886; Conservative
1VI.P. for Cardiff 1895-1900, Died 22 April 1906.
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by the Canton Club to "chaperon" Winston Churchill for
Parliament. She does not seem to have placed too much
confidence in the young Churchill's ability and humanitarian-
ism'tecause he is no doubt full of foolishness"; but
might watch out for him because he is "full of go", and.
"will like his father make the fur fly." 1
 Having,
therefore, received only limited acquiescence from Liverpool
and Manchester in her one-time plan of forming an Advisory
Council or a sort of House of Commons for commercial men,
Mary Kingsley turned her attention "to forming a parlia-
mentary Party that you and me can more or less manage."2
The arrangement of this parliamentary Party was,
however, not easy because the elements in the Parliamentary
opposition, although they did not always see eye to eye with
much. of the Government methods, were not enthusiastic to
commit themselves to the cause of commerce, however enlight-
ened. Having failed to rally spontaneous response from
individuals and to organise a parliamentary party, Kingsley
was then inclined to mass propaganda - publishing in the
press and lecturing at strategic platforms in the country.
She explained the plan and the difficulty of parliamentary
solidarity to volt:
"What I should. like to see would be a political
1. Kingsley to bit, 10 May 1899, 16/4, Jill'.
2. Kingsley to bolt, 10 May 1899, 16/4, JHP.
L1l
propogan.da throughout all the manufacturing districts
so that the members of Parliament sent up by those
districts would be really representative of the
English commercial power, and a party capable of
representing it in the House properly; meanwhile
the government should lose its bye-elections.
How this is to be engineered is- difficult to see
when the opposition is such a trashy and flabby
set....." 1.
Also it does not appear that the allegiance of her
"faithful) Noncomformists" on whom she had rested her
electoral hope because "they are a big voting body"2,
had. been steady enough to guarantee any tangible result
especially as she embarrassed her friends by championing
the cause of liquor traders.
Kingsley's plans failed for several reasons.
As already indicated, members of Parliament were not
generally keen on committing their careers to vague
mercantile interests. When, members were committed to
commerce, it was not to a vague end pedantic scheme of
traders' welfare, but to specific and individual
industries and corporations. Even among the traders
themselves lack of unity and. initiative prevailed.
1. Kingsley to Holt, 28 July, 1899, l6/LI, JHP.
2. Kingsley tQ Holt, 28 April 1898, 16/2, JHP.
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Although they had. by 1892 begun to come together, away
from the fierce rivalry of old, they still lacked qualities
of lasting partnership1 which further served to put them
at the mercy of the Colonial Office. 2 As Kingsley
complained, even "Liverpool men will trust no man outside
their own set."3 This lack of leadership and unity among
the merchants themselves not only gave Chamberlain and his
aides the opportunity of using their ability to overshadow
her proposals, but also did not inspire the bulk of the
commercial men in parliament to rally to her banner.
On the other hand, the species of reforms and
schemes which Kingsley put forward, however brilliant,
might have appeared to many people as bizarre and out-dated.
"She was attempting to recreate and. fossilize the conditions
of the 1880s, when government was rudimentary, and the
traders untrammelled, by taxation, regulations, and official
control."	 To transform the conditions of the 'informal'
empire into a systematic administrative expedient with
parliamentary sanction and legal validity had little if any
merit in the era of jingoism. It might be plausible to
argue that men who knew so much of West Africa and. had
1. Kingsley to bit, 30 July' 899, i6/1I, JEP.
2. Kingsley to Holt, 17 Aug. 1899, 16/4, JHP.
3. Kingsley to bolt, 28 Aug. 1899, 16/4, JHP..
Li. Flint, 'A Reassessment', op . cit. p 104,
-3.
contributed so much to Its development ought to be given
some voice in its administration. As will be seen later
they were given an opportunity to air their views on
Colonial administration. But it must be emphasized that
such a scheme as drawn up by Mary Kingsley, however
innocently conceived, might have been equivalent to
ultimately granting self-government to merchants having
connexions with Africa 	 As a reactionary and conservative,
Kingsley stubbornly supported the traders because she
believed that they shared her ideals. As will be seen
later, it could be proved that some of these ideals were
forward-looking, 1 but they failed to fire the imaginations
of men of the New Imperialism. It was an era of dynamic
changes which, though strong in tradition, was not marked
by traditionalists of the Kingsley stamp. Chamberlain
and. his active colonial officials represented the temper
of the age. Mary Kingsley led a school of disheartened
Gladstonians.
These efforts to provide what was believed to be
the best government for West Africans made closer the
candid relationship between Holt and Kingsley. Sometimes,
however,. bit felt that Kingsley had, fallen under the spell
of Goldie. Others, on the other hand imagined that she
was really fascinated by A.L. Jones.	 It was, however,
1. See Chap. VII.
Bolt himself and possibly Sir Robert Jefferies, sometime
statistical expert at the Board of Trade, who more
powerfully swayed her opinions than Goldie and. Jones ever
did. Moreover, the educated Africans liked Bolt so much
that they propagated the view that it was Bolt who
converted Kingsley to a recognition of African rights,
a point Of view which did not take into account what
Kingsley called "a.lot of original sin in me that makes me
give little credit to any of my jujus.' 1 After her death,
Bolt acknowledged, her influence over him: she was a
"noble woman" "the dear woman" 2
 who was "my spiritual
mother."3 He confessed her wonderful influence in
"getting us to think on right lines and to work for the
good of the African peoples."	 It will be absurd to
dismiss all this as mere sentimental and. emotional effuslons.
And. Bolt paid his life-long tribute by helping to inaugurate
the African Society in commemoration of her interest in
African affairs.
Mary Kingsley could equally well be described
1. Kingsley to Bolt,	 Narch 1899, 16/3, JUP.
This letter contains the various views described above
respecting her relationship with the people referred to.
In.ite of external influences on her, Kingsley felt that
her interest in Africa was originally developed from
within her; an attitude which inclined her to uphold
what she felt was an article of faith - to present the
African as he was arid not as he ought to be.
2. Bolt to Morel, 20 June 1900, P.8/i, EDNP.
West Africa, June 1900.
3. Bolt to Morel, 9 Nov. 1911, f8/ L. , EDMP.
k. Ibid.
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as E.D. Morel's "spiritual mother". If she influenced
Bolt, Morel was influenced by both, and in a corresponding
manner, Morel was also a 'tonic' to Bolt. 1
 Mary Kingsley
inspired Bolt spiritually, but Morel fired his imagination.
In spite of his personal economic involvement, Iolt
might never have taken an active interest in the Congo
Reform Association were it not for Morel's persistent
zeal and influence. 2 After Kingsley's influence in his
"mind and the resultant action, Morel came wearing her
mantle, and a great and. strong, energetic moral figure,
lofty in his ideas, very sensitive, very courageous, and
with a great gift of speech." 3 Hoit continues a
description of the Morel influence:
".....It is all very wonderful to think but
there it is and it has made me my African mind,
what I am. Mary Kingsley discovered me and, made
me think; Morel carried on her work and kept me
thinking, and. I perforce had to do what I could
to redeem myself from utter meanness by lending
a helping hand, not much." L.
This eulogistic acknowledgement of Morel's influence on
1. Bolt to Morel, 1 Jan. 1912, P8/14, ED1P.
Bolt here says he is indebted to Morel for "your
great moral tonic to me."
2. See S.J.S. Cookey, Great Britain and. the Congo Question
1892-1913, (Unpublished London Ph.D. thesis 196k.)




ITolt demands a sketch of his background, an assessment of
his attitude to colonial rule and. .his relationship with
the merchant community of Britain.
ED. Morel combined the virtues and. vices of his
French father and. snglish mother: he is said to 'have
inherited the French exactitude, acuteness ar logicality
when he made a point, and demonstrated the Englis1
stubbornness, imatiene, audacity and scorn for other
people's views when he knew they were in the wrong.1
This combination made him formidable when he attacked or
defended a view. As a background to his interest in
Africus, we may trace as well another combination of two
personal circumstances. Iis motTher descended from the
de Homes, a Quaker family 2 , and this might have left in the
young Morel that reformist and. Iumanitariaff touch
1. F. Seymour Cocks, E.D. Morel, The Man and His Works,
(London, 1920) P. 15.
2. Ibid., P. 18. "The de Homes appear to have become
members of the Society of Friends at a very early
period....., and. several o them suffered persecution
for their faith..... The Friends' Burial Ground at
Co].chester contains numerous monuments to deprtèd
members of the family. The de Homes married into
other families of the same religious persuasion.
Thus Morel's mother and the first Lord Nonksweil
(formerly the Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Porrat Collier) had
a common ancestor in Dorothy Fox, daughter of Francis
Fox, of ft German's, Cornwall, who married Joseph
Collier of Plymouth, their son Benjamin's only daughter,
Mary, marrying Abraham de Home in 1786. It is an
interesting coincidence that the late Lord Monkswell
became President of the C.R.A. (founded by Morel) in
1906, in succession to the first President, Earl
Beauchamp, who retired from the position on accepting
a seat in the cabinet."
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associated with Quakerisin.	 Moreover, as a young man, he
was in the employ of A.L. Jones1 in Liverpool where he must
have come into contact with the most baleful aspects of
West Africa. There and. then he plunged into the literature
of West Africa, and. learned almost everything that he
wished to know2 , so that by the time Kingsley, in one of
1. Jones, Sir Alfred Lewis, K.C.M.G.(1901) J.P. Eon. Fellow
of Jesus College, Oxford; Senior Partner in the firm of
Elder, Dempster and Co. Shipowners, President of the
Liverpool Chamber of Commerce and British Cotton
Growing Association, Chairman of Bank of British West
Africa, Ltd.; Founder of the Liverpool School of
Tropical Medicine; born at Carmarthen, 184-6. Clubs
Canton, Constitutional. Died 13 Dec. 1909.
2. Morel wrote the following in his unpublished reminiscences:.
"The office I was employed in was the centre of West
African interest in Liverpool - indeed. in England; and
West Africa, I was not long in apprehending, seemed likely
to occupy a great deal of public attention. There was
something very huge and mysterious about the whole
subject which exercised anicreasing fascination over my
mind. Liverpool was full of West African traditions -
mostly evil ones.	 It had, been Bristol's rival in the
Slave Trade. The -office was always full of black men -
stokers and. others coming up for their pay; anglicized
native merchants, very wealthy some of them; occasionally
a striking figure in handsome flowing native garments.
To watch a steamer unload her endless barrels of palm-oil,
bags of kernels, bags and casks of rubber, elephant tusks,
huge mahogany logs and so on, always sent a thrill of
excitement down my back. Everything that came from West
Africa seemed impregnated with a wonderful pungent smell.
The captains were full of weird yarns about wonderful
happenings, horrible native customs and. such-1ice. Then,
too, one was always hearing vague political talk - of the
French trying to steal our 'hinterland', of trouble with
the Portuguese or with the Niger Company, of a supine
Governor who would not build railways into the interior.
I plunged into tne old West African literature: learned
the geography of the coast, section by section, with the
help of maps and steamer charts, studied its flora and.
fauna, laid myself out to read up everything I could find
about the current problems in the newspapers ... the more
I read the more interested I grew: international rivalries
and administrative problems were forcing West Africa to
the front rank of national interest, and secondly that




her recruitment drives, brought him to know Holt in
1899, Morel was already one of the most informed people
in Britain on West African affairs.
The first meeting of Holt and Morel seemed
like the meeting of men from different worlds. For,
indeed, there was little in common between the two men
who were soon to become bed-fellows. bit felt that
Morel had been sent to get commercial intelligence for his
rival in business, k.L. Jones.	 Morel's assessment was
that bolt was an "abrupt and ill-bred" old man. 1	Gradually,
however, a common element was discernible.	 Both had lived
tough lives. Morel had lost his father in infancy, and, had.
worked hard inLiverpool, giving part-time French lectures
to make ends meet.	 He had, also seen what West Africa was
like from his contacts in Liverpool and omnivorous
application to its literature. 	 At the same time, he had
learned to trust himself.	 In the same way, bolt was self-
reliant, tough and courageous. He had gone to Fernando
Po in 1862 at the age of 21; had indulged in the cut-throat
competition methods of those days, and. had triumphed
without the favour "of charter, grant, and concession".
Moreover, he "had no contempt for the Africans" 2 he met
there. Therefore, despite their disparity of age and
1. in Bolt to Morel, 31 July, 1901, P8/i, EDMP., bolt
summarised their attitudes to each other when they L'irst
met.
2. Mrs Stopford. Green, op. cit.
cultural bearings, "an extensive, almost daily,
confidential, warm and. often fatherly correspondence
grew between Holt and Morel." Wuliger continues in
his accurate summary of their early relationship:
"bit provided a wealth of first hand, intimate
information, increased his human contacts, gave him
business advice and help, and. at times flattered him.
Morel, for his part, put on the mantle of enlightened
commerce, and stood with bolt in almost every issue
that came up about West Africa." I
This relationship was, as with Kingsley and.
bolt, one of mutual inspiration and education. From
the beginning bolt helped to bring Morel to the limelight.
It was bolt who suggested that Morel should address the
Women's Liberal Aseoclation at its annual meeting in
June, 1901.2 He had advised Morel, who addressed the
women on "England's Relations to Her Native Races in West
kfrica", to use the occasion to meet influential people
who could be of use to him later. 3 bolt's generous
judgments of Morel's efforts encouraged hiw.
	
This was
of immense help to Morel because "to feel that you whom
1. See Robert viuliger, The Idea of Economic Imperiallsmg
with Special Reference to the Life and work of E.D. Morel.
(Unpublished London Ph.D. thesis in Economic History
1959) P.15.
2. The meeting was held at the Memorial Hall, Farringdon
Street, London, on Tuesday 11 June, 1901.
3. bolt to Morel, 26 May, 1901, P8/i, EDMP.
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poor Miss Kingsley used to call her political leader
think so well of my efforts" 1 , was a precious asset and
a great moral encouragement. And. although late in 1901
they had differed on a business deal, Morel implored
"Miss Kingsley's political prophet" to continue to be
his guide. 2 Even after Morel had virtually seized the
initiative, he was still full of respect and, gratitude
to llolt.	 He confided this to bit:
".....To a very considerable extent I have got
you to thank for moulding my views on West African
affairs, for condescending to argue with me; for
allowing me to hold forth by the yard, (so) to
speak; for giving me at any and every time, and
on any West African sub3ect, your time, your
attention and, your knowledge; for writing me
letters which are a West African education in
(itself).....,.all this I have to thank you. for,
as I have to thank poor Miss Kingsley for bringing
me into touch with you......"	 3
Apart from this encouragement, bolt protected
Morel from his enemies. In 1899 when. A.L. Jones
threatened to deal with Morel for alleged disrespect
to the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, it was to bolt
that Mary Kingsley appealed not to see with Jones on
the matter. She told bolt that Morel "was a struggling
1. Morel to HQlt, 7 Nov. 19OO 18/1, JHP.
2. Morel to Holt, 20 Oct. 1901, 18/1, JUP.
3. Morel to bolt, 28 Oct. 1902, 18/1, JHP.
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young man with a family", and, that she would be"sorry
for them" i1 Jones cooperated with Goiclie in the latter's
"nagging" to "get rid of him." 1 At other times, when
Morel suffered from the underhand attacks of Jones and
other foes, he was sustained by the Zriendsiip, kindness
and support of Holt, who often cheered his spirits when
he was gloomy, and provided him "with that stimulus which
a nature like mine wants so badly at times".2
bit was, however, keen on keeping the journal-
istic influence of Morel to his own advantage, and he was
wont to deflect him from meeting too many important men
except thQse he approved of.	 In 1905, when Morel felt
that taking office in the African Society "might strengthen
my moral position",. bolt's paternal disapproval was
entire:
"I do not want to see you in the company of such
a lot of respectables that you may run the danger of
becoming as emasculated as they are. I see the
influence of your connexion with these 'powers that
be' n that you not so freely criticize their doings
as you used to. You are becoming too friendly in
1. Kingsley to bolt, 25 JUly, 1899, l6/ L , JHP.
2. Morel to liolt, 25 Dec. 1902, 18/1, JUP.
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personal matters to be able freely to criticize
their doings. You are able to listen with patience
to a man who is evidently in favour of killing the
natives in order to do good......' I
Thenceforward, bit never relaxed his effort to
keep Morel under his thumb. In 1911 he wanted Morel to
become the Secretary and publicist of the African
Association together with the African Mail. 2 But Morel
felt that the salary the .kssociation promised was paltry,
in any case, he told Bolt that such a connection would
"fetter my independence in all these questions." 3
 Yet
bolt insisted that Morel should be the correspondent
and contact-man of his company in London at a retainer.
Morel's quotation of Emerson on independence was merely
academic; five months later he signed a contract with the
Company for one year. 5 Lack of financial independence
and his great respect for bolt, often led Morel to temper
abstract principles with the hard facts of life.
Once he was asstired of Bolt's support, Morel
virtually seized the initiative in their politics of
dissent in the interest of AfrL cans and British Commerical
power. His chief claim to universal fame was his
I. Bolt to Morel, 28 Sept. 1905, F8/2, EDMP.
2. Bolt to Morel, 10 pril 1911, F8/ L4, EDMP.
3. Morel to Holt, 12 April 1911, 18/8, JHP.
Li.. bolt to Morel, 26 April 1911, F$/LI-, EDMP..
5. Morel to Bolt, 25 Aug, 1911, 18/8, JHP.
championship of African rights which at that time were
being undermined by a reckless and. swift application of
European capitalism in tropical Africa. An apostle of
the Third Party1 , later to become its ostensible leader,
Norel soon reduced to an academic theory of trusteeship
the attitudes of his School. He contrasted two methods
of administering tropical Africa, and, therefore, two
divergent policies.
	
One method was to dispossess the
African of his rights in land,. to declare that the whole
territory and its products were the property of some
European state or corporation, and then to exploit it in
the interest of European capitalism, using the African
either as a slave or as a hired labourer. This method,
accOrding to Morel, lea to the degradation of the African,
and. eventually to the ruin of his country.	 The reasons,
he said, were both psychological and economic. 	 If the
African was deprived of his land. rigbt, he would put no
effort into his work. He became unhappy, and if force were
substituted to induce him to work, the regime would become
atrocious, as was seen in the case of the Congo. In any
case, possessing no property of his own, the African would
have nothing with which to purchase the manufactured goods
of urope.	 Consequently, imports would fall;
	 there
might be some native risings ruthlessly suppressed which
might lead. to depopulation, trade would dwindle, the cost
1. bit to Morel, 9 Nov. 1911, P8/k, EDMP.
of products might increase, - and finally, the tax-payer
in Britain would be called upon to advance funds.1
Although Morel treated this logic with the unfailing
faith of a revealed religion, arguments could be advanced
to prove that the party he opposed theoretically had a
good case.2
The other method, which he advocated, was a
policy of preservation 0±' the rights of the African in
land. He wanted the African to be recognized as a free
man, a human being who needed some help in the development
of his country, not as a mere tool of industry. 	 He
persistently advocated this policy in the teeth of bitter
opposition from concession-hunters. 3 Morel saw this
question of Land Tenure as the key to the whole problem
of African administration. He summarized his case with
characteristic logic
"Native ownership in land must needs be the
foundation-stone of all normal European rule in the
African tropics, because the economic ob3ects of
normal European rule is the development of commercial
1. Vide E.D. Morel, Great Britain and the Congp, (Smith
Elder & Co.) P. 86 for Morel's marshalling of' these
views.
2. Vide Hancock, op. cit., Pp. 173 - 236 where the pros
and cons arguments re concessions a-re made.
3, This is treated in Chap. VI.
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relations, and. any between the European and the native
is impossible, unless the native has articles to sell
with whuich to purchase manufactured goods.....In
other words, as long as the native has free access
to the soil, he will develop his land, he will put
forth every effort to increase its productive value,
he will exchange its produce with manufactured goods,
sent from Europe, a normal commercial relationship
will be set up, imports and exports will expand,
the prosperity of the whole country will increase,
and incidentally, the workers of Britain, or France
or Belgium w,ll benefit, first by the employment
created by the manufacture of the goods exported to
West Africa, secondly by the ncreased supply of
valuable foodstuffs and raw materials.	 I
This meant that the policy of expropriation
injured British trade and demoralised Africans, and
was regarded by the Third Party, not bnly as a beacon
to anarchy, but also as immoral and uneconomic.2
Having, then, armed himself with a formidable
theory of Colonial government, Morel immediately proceeded
to stir up the colonial conscience in Britain. Like
Mary Kingsley, who blazed the trail, Morel found himself
still confronted by a public which knew little or nothing
I. Morel, Great Britain and the Congp, P. 86-87.
See Chaps. V. and VI.
2. Ibid.
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about African problems and was largely indifferent to
their implications. He determined to continue the work
of Kingsley, to rouse that public from indifference and
apathy.	 Despite the ferocity of his opponents, he
championed the cause of enlightened policy in tropical
Africa.	 For the purpose of clarity and logic, he reduced
his own theory to a three-point programme. First, he
reminded the British public in his writings that a system
of African right to the land really had existed in West
Africa, as far as could be ascertained, from time immemorial,
and that this system was just and adapted to the needs of
that country. Secondly, he consistently maintained that
the West African, when treated as a free man, was hard-
working and. industrious, capable with little administrative
supervision of developing his country. Viewed from this
angle, his anger with Grogan and, his break with Weinthal
are understandable. Thirdly, he never equivocated on the
issue of Free Trade which he saw as the natural process of
trade. 1
 The historical merits of these apparently academic
ideas need, not now be discussed until we see Morel actually
fighting for his beliefs. What is particularly relevant
here is how these views were received by his contemporaries.
1. These ideas appear in Norel's works but for a clear
exposition, see Cocks, op. cit, Pp. '4-3 - 52.
Grogan insisted on the lazy African myth and Morel goes
all out for him. vide Morel, Affairs of West Africa,
Pp. 178 - 182.
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Apart from savage, but unilluminating, newspaper
war waged by perverted racists, reviews to a book would
normally indicate the reactions of articulate members of
the society to its message. In 1902 Morel publisned his
first book, Affairs of est Africa, which indicated the
reforms he wished to see in West African colonial adinini-
stration. Public response equally represented the various
British attitudes. 	 Some people found the work careless,
extravagant, emotional and. brash.	 The Times, although
it found Ttgreat satisfaction that the public will welcome
a contribution to our general knowledge on the subject,
at once so intelligent, and so informing as Mr E.D. Morel's",
however went on to register its disapproval for the author
having "fallen into error based on an insufficient knowledge"
of African countries. At the otherfavourable extreme,
the book was found to be informative and. stimulating.
Sir Charles Duke was of the opinion that the book
constituted "the best reflection on the conditions of
Africa" which had been produced "since that curious volume
the Dark Continent".	 .T. Stead, the crusader and editor,
praised the book. An enthusiastic reviewer in the Speaker
said it was "so replete with information, so free from
prejudice, and so full of good suggestions for the greater
prosperity of vvest Africa that it cannot be too widely or
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too carefully studied"1 . The most penetrating
appreciation, however, came from quarters characterized
by neither unsoberly adulation nor carping bigotry.
The Glasgow Herald wrote that "Mr Morel is an able represent-
ative of the Liverpool School of thought about West Africa,
the school which combines faith in Kingsleyizm with an
eye to the main chance, that is, Liverpool trade and rooted
suspicion of all governmental ways and. proceedings."2
This tone was taken up by the Aborigines' Friend whicia
while describing some of Morel's projected reforms as
"questionable t1 , truly discerned him as "a disciple of
Miss Mary Kingsley, and spokesman for the more broad-minded
section of the Liverpool and Manchester traders, who carry
on most of the British commerce in West Africa...."3
To a great extent both latter views are valid;
but one cannot fully understand the exact role of Morel
vis--vis the merchant community until one gains an insight
into the personal equations involved in these relationships.
But before analysing these relationships it is necessary
first to examine the role of an organ which not only
1. W.T. Stead, the 'crusader', was editor (with A.G. Gardiner)
of the Daily News and Leader. bit and Morel had a
high opinion of him; he was also very popular on the
West Coast for his writings on behalf of natives.
2. Glasgow Herald,'Review of E.D. Morel's Affairs of vlest
Africa', 27 Dec. 1902, F.3., EDMP.
3. L.F. April 1903,(For reviews see F.3, EDNP)
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represented the apogee of Morel's journalistic effort,
and fostered the enlightened interests of traders and
West Africans, but also indicated the true nature of the
relationship between the different parties.
lip to this time, Morel had been editorial
assistant to E. Hugh Chalmers in West Africa. 	 He was
finding himself unfairly over-worked and exploited by his
chief. He alleged that Chalmers was using him for
questionable roles, interfered with his letters, was
peremptory in his dealings, and caluinnised him with men
who mattered. 1 When in February 1903 his two-year
contract with Chalmers expired, Morel resigned from service
in vest Africa. Before then, n 1902, he had asked the
merchants to support a new west African weekly paper which.
he contemplated to inaugurate. But until the plan bore
fruit, the traders arranged to pay him. as their publicist
and contact man 2 , and. when hi connection with Chalmera
1. In a letter to Bishop Dr Joseph Crane Hartzel, dated
17 April 1903, Copy F 9, EDMPI,, Morel referred to
Chalmers' unharitableness arid wicked insinuations
against him.	 He told llartzel that he "wrote practically
the whole of West Africa, and Chalmers got the credit."
2. Mrs Green had helped in negotiating this. 	 Morel's
connection with Mrs Green is discussed later in this
chapter.
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lapsed1 , Morel courageously started a new editorship
by organising and promoting the West African Nail, a
paper which although it never really was a financial
success for the fourteen years of its existence, was the
organ of the Third Party. Because the West African Nail
was the chief medium through which this party expressed
their views on West Africa, and as an organisation which
revealed Morel's relationship with tthers, an account of
his editorship of this paper is imperative.
The West African Nail was run. by a company,
E.D. Morel, Limited, founded by Morel in February 1903.
The main object of this company ws the publicaton of
this weekly paper. 	 Morel was employed a its editor on
a salary of £400 per annum, and a contract was signed with
John Richardson and Sons of Liverpool to print the paper.
1. Apart Crom his association wi.th West Africa, and later
with the West African Nail, Morel's association with
other journalists became closer once he established
himself n journalism.	 "He knew and. associated
in his editorial work with the following: H.. Massinghani
and Sir Henry Norman (joint-editors of the Daily Chronicle
till the Boer War); Sir Douglas Straight and H,N. Cust
of the Pall Mall Gazette; the late Sir James Knowles
of the Nineteenth Century; Sir Percy Bunting of the
Contemporary Review; J.L. Hammond of the Speaker (now
the New Statesman and Nation); C.P. Scott of the
Manchester Guardian; Sir Edward Russell of the Liver-
pool Daily Post; W,T. Stead and A.G. Gardiner of the
Daily hews and Leader; Robert Donald of the Daily
Chronicle; J.S.R. Philips of the Yorkshire Post;
J. Nicol Dunn and Fabian Ware, successive editors of
the Morning Post; Sir Valentine Chirol, for many
years foreign editor of the Times, and Greig, for some
colonial editor of the same journal."
Cocks, op. cit, Pp. 30-31.
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On 3 April, 1903 the maiden volume of this weekly was
launched along with its aims. The first of these was
to attract the attention, and to wid.en the interest of all
classes in West eJrica generally. Secondly, it aimed
at supporting existing commercial, mining and industrial
interests with as full, reliable and. impartial business
intelligence as possible, and. to show how necessary it
was for the safe-guarding of those interests that current
political events taking place in Africa should be studied by
practical businessmen engaged in. the West frican world
of affairs. Thirdly, it wished to help by every means the
two great movements connected with West kfrica, namely
the Sanitation Movement (which was centred round the London
and Liverpool Schools of Tropical Medicine), and the Cotton
Growing Movement whose role later became questionable.
Lastly, the West African Mail hoped "to bring to bear upon
political and. administrative questions relating to the
development of West Africa by the nations of Western Europe
such criticism as may be necessary and available, in the
interest of both the European and the native." t Thus
the paper was intended to be at once a business organ and.
a medium for public instruction. If the enthusiastic
'1. West african Mail, 3 Aprl 1903.
wishes showered on Morel when the paper appeared 1
 would
be taken as an indication, a great financial success
might have been anticipated.
From the start, however, the paper was in
desperate financial circumstances,,
	 The authorized
capital of the company was £5,000, divided into 5,000
£1 shares of which 3,000 were first issued.	 Of this
£3,000, Morel had put down £500 as a guarantee for bona
fides. He also entered into self-denying agreements to
give other shareholders 6% of the interests before he took
his due2 , apart from his salary which he did not even
draw for several years. The Managing Directors' Report
read by Morel at the Registered Office of the Company in
Liverpool on k May 1903 (only a few months after) revealed,
however, that of the £3,000 worth of shares issued only
£2,512 had, been received (that is combining both cash and
promise). 3 Morel summarized the administration of the
1. Good wishes were sent to Morel by Sir Charles Duke, Sir
11.11. Johnston, Sir Alfred Jones, Sir Edward Russell, Mrs
Alice Stopford Green, Professor Donald Ross, W.T. Stead,
F. Swanzy, J.A. Hutton, John bit, Dr E.W. Blyden, C.J.
Cutciuffe Hyne, and Winston S. Churchill.
VideWAM, 3 April 1903.
2 Morel to bit, Feb. 1903, 18/9, JHP.
3. A letter from Morel to bit dated May 1903 indicates the
probable shareholders, but it must be noted that many of
them did not pay up the shares promised as follows:
Morel £500	 Hutton £100	 Budges £125
John bolt £500	 Swanzy £100	 Morel's father-
AL. Jones £500
	
Mrs Green £100	 in law £100
de Qardi £250	 L. Jones £100	 Tubbs £100
Zochonus £250	 Swift £250
see 18/9, JEP;	 also G. 2b - kb, EDMP.
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paper as having been run economically,but that "it is no
small undertaking to create a paper out of nothing -
everything has had. to be made, not copied from ...... a
service of news, reserve of matter, advertising organization,
extensive circulation agencies, etc." 1
 He optimistically
hoped that t1it is only in the actual development of all
these matters that one gets one's experience."
From this time onwards, the fortunes of the
paper oscillated from a momentary hope to a dismal
financial gloom. Between February 1903 and 31 January
1904 the paper made remarkable strides "as a wage-earner",
and tried to consolidate its position with the advertising
public. The average advertising revenue per issue for
the month of April 1903 had been £16. 18. Od., by January
1903, it bad, amounted to £42M 19. 7d. 2 Soon after,
however, a letter of 31 March 1904, circularised and, signed
by Arthur H&ton of Manchester and. Zochonia, the Liverpool
trader, alerted other traders that the West African Mail
was doing exceedingly valuable and. honest work for West
African interests generally, but was in need of further
capital. 3 In January 1904 the position had been so
hopeful that Morel in his report was confident that the
1. Morel to bit, 9 March 190k., 18/2, JUP.
2. 'Report of the Managing Director, from 12 Feb. 1903 to
31 Jan. 1904, to be presented 14 March 1904. 18/9 JHP.
3. J. Arthur Button and Zochonis to bolt, 31 March 1904,
18/9, JUP.
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paper in course of time would give financial returns to
its shareholders. 1	This was never to be realised. 	 On
20 December of 1904, Morel informed Ilolt that the paper
required the instant attention of the shareholders.2
Within the two years of its existence the company had
spent £3,000 in building up a property with e. present
"earning capacity" of some £2,300 per annum. 3 This
"earnings" might have been good business if it had.
represented profitst; actually the net annual losses
often represented the difference of these sums. Although
the first few years of any newspaper are normally bad,
these have been unpecedentedly bad for the West African
Mail.
Several circumstances contributed to this
embarrassing situation. apart from advertisements, the
circulation of a. paper of this description ou1d never be
considerable in a Britain largely apathetic to colonial
information except when they were tinged with fantasy.
Attempts were made to display the paper at a number of
bookstalls and. railway stations, but to continue this
meant a consderab1e outlay which the company could not
meet.	 In Lurope and. the United States of America, attempts
were made at circulation, but with limited success.
1. Report of the Managing Director, op. cit.	 18/9, JEP.
2. Morel to bIt, 20 Dec. 1904., 18/2, JHP.
3. Ibid.
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In West Africa, ag?nts were appointed at Sierra Leone,
Cape Coast, Bathurst Conakry, Old. Calabar, Lagos and
Sapele, but with the exception of Sierra Leone, where
the work was well done by a Sierra Leone Coaling company,
results were on the whole unsatisfactory.	 The Agents in
Cape (oast, the Donovan agency, did not reider any account
for several months. An Agency was established at no cost
in Hamburg and another in Paris, but produced no large
results. An experiment in the United States and. Canada
was unsuccessful and was cancelled. Other events, however
remote, might have adversely affected a paper already
suffering from rickety finances. Externally, one event
after another was disadvantageous. The collapse of the
West African Mining Market deprived the paper of much
mining revenue in the shape of advertisements and company-
meeting announcements. The protectionist agitation and.
the RussQ-Japanese War both might have reduced trade, and
consequently the advertising revenue of the company. But
the failure to build up an American advertising connection
after £350 had. been spent on the enterprise, and the
venality of dishonest servants, all increased the bad debts
already incurred.1
One of the real sources of financial failure was
the small amount of paid-up capital with which the Company
was run. Merchants who benefitted most from the paper were
1. Ibid.; also 'Report of the Managing Director l90it.
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not too generous to it; while the "maflgnant hatred of
Jones" must have discouraged would-be supporters. Although
the losses seemed to decline between 190 L4. and. 1907, the
record was by no means encouraging. By February 1907,
the margin between the realisable assets and the liabilities
of the company was so narrow that the Directors' Report
for that year spoke of winding up the company. The paper
'was kept going mainly by the persistent, though tardy,
generosity of bit and the tenacity of Morel.	 The bulk
of the merchants (sinee th paper did not immediately
produce profits) did not show sufficient financial interest
by supporting an organ wiuch publicised their activities.
In 1910, Morel agreed. with bolt that the attitude of the
merchants was short-sighted and, unimaginative in not
realising the importance of the paper to their interests.1
Much of the straits in which the paper foi.ind itself was,
however, in part due to the competition from West Africa,
which despite its imperfections after Morel left it, was
older in the field; there was little room at that time for
two papers In so specialised a field as West Africa.
In spite of its financial and organisational trouble
the African Mail pursued the policy marked out for it at
its inception.	 Commercially, it provided the vest African
trade with weekly information valuable to the merchants'
community. In political and economic affairs, it opposed
1. Morel to bolt, 19 Oct. 1910, 18/7, JHP.
Morel to bolt, 28 Aug. 1910, 18/7, JIll'.
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monopoly, privilege and all impediments to free circu-
lation of trade in Africa. It advocated the claims of
the merchant community to Tepresentatlon and consultation
in L 1 administrative questions directly and indirectly
affecting trade.	 It advocated the importance of sanit-
ation in West Africa and backed the work of the two Schools
of Tropical Medicine. It helped the British Cotton
Growing Association by publishing a. large amount of
information on the sub3ect 1 , but when impure motives
were alleged against the promoters of the Cotton movement,
the AfricanNail began to udiciously sit on the fence nd
later to criticise the Associatioi. The African Mail
advertised and. publicised the West African Colonies ni
Britain, however restricted its nfluence was. In June
1900, a correspondent	 in the Lagos Weekly Record
had stigmatised the apathy of the British public towards
West African affairs in relation to other imperial issues:
'T ] is eloqueni of the thraldom exercised over the public
mind by the war in South Africa, that the acquisition by
Great Britain of an empire in West Africa, half the Size of
India, should have passed well-nigh unnoticed.
	
General
Lugard.'s departure from Britain at the end of the last
year, to take up the administration of Northern Nigeria,
was but casually referred to in the Press, and the full
1. 'Reports of theManaging Director' s l8/9JHP.
significance of the transfer of powers from the Niger
Company to the Colonial Qffice over the Niger territories
is - speaking generally - quite unrealised. br the people
at home."1 The African Mail bridged this gap. In 1911,
Hesketh Bell thanked Morel for the service of his paper
with respect to his own administrative area, but this
role was representative. 	 "Advertisement is as necessary
to a new country as to a patent medicine" said Hesketh
Bell, "and until the great British Public is awakened to
a consciousness of what Northern Nigeria is like, its
needs of administration will go unfiilfilled."2
Most important, the paper championed the 3ust
cause of Africans, and identified itself with International
questions (its supplement became a specialist organ of the
Congo Reform Association) which proved both materially and
morally beneficial; it increased its sale at home,
brought in new subscribers, and achieved the moral success
of being quoted extensively inthe world press, to be
mentioned often in the House of Commons, on public
platforms, and, to acquire a certain prestige. 3
 Holt
always complained that the African Mail was not critical
enough of the West African Governments and the Colonial
1. Lapos vJeek1y Record, 23 June 1900.
2. H. Bell to Morel, 3 Oct. 1911, F9/A-B, DMP.
3 Reports of the Managing Director 18/9, JHP.
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Office. 1 This might have induced Morel to make some
wild, and unsubstantiated statements2 ; otherwise he was
a critic of experJ.ence. 	 The African Nail was read in
the Colonial Office and, by west African officials. The
Colonial Office files contain several articles in the
paper which were minuted. upon by the officials. There
can be no doubt that it did enormous good as one of the
most powerful and positive checks upon the Colonial Office
deliberations on West Africa in a public sense. Indeed,
within the period of its existence, the African Mail,
because of its penetrating and. encyclopaedic quality,
constitutes one of the most valuable source-materials for
iay social, political and economic history of West Africa.
The attitude of the merchant commimty to the
African Mail was a reflection of their attitude to the
more important question of African welfare and Morel's
political and economic ideas. 	 The three major Chambers
of Commerce, a1hougb they continued. their traditional
role as pressure-groups, only vaguely canvassed the true
interest of Africans. They were almost wholly concerned
with the commercial advantages for which the Chambers were
founded. In spite of the perennial references which the
1. bit to Morel, 2 Feb. 1906, P.8/3, EDMP.
2. Minute of 21 Sept, 1906 by R.L. Antrobus on West
African Mail article of 21 Sept. 1906 on the Crewe
Read Affair, CO 520/40 (See Chap. IV).
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African Trade Sections of these Chambers made to African
welfare, they were really committed to mercantile prosperity,
strict benefit to their particular trade , its safety, and
cooperation or opposition with the British Government as
each measure was adopted. 2 They always were critical of
state intervention and control and the octupus of officialism,
but members did not scruple to use their positions in the
various Trade Sections for promoting personal ends. An
apt illustration of this sorry state of affairs was the role
of most influential businessmen in the west African Committee
meet].ngs. At the instance of commercial pressure, typified
in the activity of Mary ICingsley, the Colonial Office
started regular meetings (at th C.O.) with representatives
of the London, Liverpool and Manchester Chambers of Commerce,
the Under-secretary of State for Colonies usually presiding.3
Merchants had advocated and. supported these meetings where
Government policy was explained to them and their suggestions
1. Elijah Helm, Chapters in the History of the Manchester
Chamber of Commerce (with an ddress by the Rt. Hon the
Earl of Ioseberry)(London, 1897) Pp. 1-2.
The Manchester Chamber of Commerce was founded in 1794
when it was called a "Commercial Society". In his
speech, Roseberry referred to the pressure-group activity
of the Chamber when, for example, it helped in carrying
the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846.
2. Charles B. Muagrave, The London Chamber of Commerce from
1881 to 1914 (London, 1914) P. 87.
Musgrave was Asst. Sec. 1881-1909 and Sec. from 1909 to
1914 of the London Cthamber which had been formed and
incorporated in Oct. 1881.
3. See Musgrave, op. cit., P. 40.
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discussed.	 Some time after, however, personal interests
seriously brought the existence of these meetings to
question. People, like Alfred Jones, who bad supported
these meetings when they had influence at the Colonial
Office, began to agitate in favour of discontinuing them
according to Holt because "he finds he has not got the
hold of the present Colonial Office leaders that \he had
when Marlborough and Churchill reigned there". Holt
discerned the implication of this self-interest in the
same letter to Morel:
",....,Miss Kingsley strongly advocated the union
of the governing classes with the merchants in the
interest of our West African possessions, Jones was
an advocate of these conferences when they were
inaugurated and they started well enough and did
useful work for a time, but unfortunately public
ideals were not kept to the front; the epresentativea
did not go to London to voice the views of their
Committees but personal views and personal interests
were put in front and selfish aims took the place of
public aims.	 It is a great pity, but with Jones
in charge of LiverpooL and Moor in charge of London
arid Hutton leading Manchester, it is all cotton
growing and. steamship instead of tlae wider interests
of the community and. the promotion of the moral and
material welfare of the natives of Africa....." I
1. bit to Morel, 17 Dec. 1908, F8/3, EDiP.
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Of course, if Alfred Jones, Arthur Hutton and Ralph Moor
were asked their views, they would claim that cotton
culture and shipping were beneficial to trade generally
and to the African as well. 	 As will be seen later, these
industries were to a great degree essential, but the people
running them were too "interested advocates" and were
"too apt to overlook other more important matters in
their eager pursuit of their own special hobbies...."1
Bolt and Morel then tried to rouse the merchant
community to show more interest in the affairs of West
Africans. The position of comparative disinterestedness
among the traders and businessmen generally, particularly
those in Liverpool, emphasized and made more remarkable
the isolated activity of Bolt and Morel. After Mary
Kingsley had made energetic, but futile, efforts to unite
and bestir them to a fuller consciousnesa of their imperial
duty, they were still unimaginative and after individual
advantages. In the African Trade Section of the Liverpool
Chamber2 , there was sad. inactivity even after Bolt had
1. Eolt.to Morel, 1'? Dec. 1908, F.8/3, EDMP..
2. Its Chairman was Sir A.J. Jones with Bolt sometimes his
deputy. After the death of Jones in 1909, .A. Moore
became the Chairman.
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rallied, members, He summarized the position in a
letter to Morel:
"In the Chamber there is nobody giving special
attention to West African matters though the
office staff and. appliances have been enlarged for
the purpose.......they give so much time to
entertainments that they have little time to
spare for business....." I
He lamented. that "traders a class took too shallow
an idea of their lives and duties, never thinking of
the basic laws affecting their trade and. existence,"
(that is by not taking a deeper interest in Africans).
"They always do not think below the surface of thins."2
At times, personal issues obscured the true merit
of these ideals of African welfare; they, however, also
explained them. John Holt and Morel found a mutual target
in Sir L.L. Jones 	 Holi could not trust Jones who was not
only his rival in business but also very powerful with the
'powers that be".	 1e was also suspected of' speaking ill
of bit behiM his back in order to 'inure' him with those
in power. 3 He was believed to be a "hypocrite" end.
Chamberlain's sycophant, and "would sacrifice a friend
for financial expediency"4 .	 Morel, who was also at the
I. bolt to Morel, 22 Aug. 1901, F8/l, EDMP.
2. bolt to Norel, 5 July 1901, P8/1, EDMP.
3. bolt alleged. that Jones would normally tell any of the
West African Governors i he (bolt) criticised their
actions in the Chamber.
4. Several letters from bolt to More], allege this.
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head of the Congo movement, attacked Jones the more for
using his position as the Consul of King Leopold of
Belgium to obstruct his efforts to arouse the conscience
of Britain. 1
 In any case, since Jones represented the
symbol of monopoly and privilege, which the Third Party
badly bated, he became the butt of Morel's journalistic
power.2
There were, of course, some merchants who
shared the Third Party ideals but were allegedly prevented
by Jones from associating with them. F. Swanzy 3
 often
showed keen interest in Elorel's views expressed in West
Africa on African affairs, and might as well have been
regarded as a member of their enlightened Party, but the
great influence which Jones had over him was alleged to
have blunted his independence.	 Trigge5, as Morel told
Ilolt, was a "man of much larger ideas" until "Jones filled
1. Vide S.J.S. Cookey, Great Britain and the ConRo, op. cit.
2. Vide Chap. VII of the present thesis for a discussion of
the role of L.L. Jones.
3. F. Swanzy had financed the Win4wood ReadExpedition to
the Niger, Read was a journalist who visited West Africa
and later published lurid accounts: African Sketchbook
(1873), Savage Africa (1867).
Kingsley to bit, 4. July 1898, 16/2, J]EIP.
LI. . bolt to Morel, 8 June 1901, P8./i, EDMP.
5. Was a director of the Niger Company.
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him up with all sorts of bitter fairy tales about me..."1
Russell2
 sympathised with Morel's labours but incipiently.
H.E. Cookson was too old. to play any dynamic humanitarian
role3 . Apart from one or two exceptions, Morel agreed
with Bolt that lack of genuine Interest in West Africans
by merchants was widespread:
",.....The bulk of the merchants have very
few ideas outside their business and a natural
outcome of this is rather to make them almost
resentful of any one that has. Also they had the
field so long to themselves that they do not feel
the need of studying anything outside the
fluctuations of the market....." 1-
To Morel, George Miller, 5 was among the most
prominent in this party of indifference to West kfricans.6
It was no use for Bolt to preach to him that Miller had
1. Morel to Bolt, 12 Sept. 1910, 18/7, JUP.
2. Edward Russell had business connectons in the Congo
and the Gold Coast.
3. Bolt to Morel, 5 July 1901, P8/i, EDMP.
U. Cookson was a director of Hatton, Cookson and Co.
Ltd; a Liverpool firm of merchants with interest in
West Africa.
k. Morel to Bolt, 12 Sept. 1910, 18/7, JHP.
5. George Miller was at this time director of Miller
Brothers, which was originally a Glasgow firm with
business agencies in Liverpool and West Africa.
6. Morel to Bolt, 12 Sept. 1910, 18/7, JEP..
7"his share of goothiess if only we could get at it and.
work it"1 , for Morel had. already made up his mind that
Miller was "a very miserable specimen, with no knowledge
of men and. little o things."2
 It is possible, as bit
regretted, that there might be "something lacking in me or
in him which prevents our harmonizing" 3 , and although Morel
was not surprised at this, the point was that none of them
had struck the appropriate chord in Miller, in the same
manner as Kingsley and. Morel had fired bolt's imagination.
Morel believed that the cause of Miller's apathy to A.frican
weif are was his desire always to lead. lie liked to shine
as "a prominent personality", as a "big man in the public
eye". Vain and egocenti'ic, "be combines great canniness
with considerable ambition"; interests in Africans,
moreover, beng immediately unremun.erative, Miller was
therefore not genuinely interested in ±t.A1. kpart from
their role in he Congo movement, (where personal interests
were also involved.) the merchant communit3' remained.
ununited for humanitarian actions.
It might be said. in defence of the Chambers of
Commerce that the connection between business and. sentiment
1. bolt to Morel, 24 July 1912, P8/4, EDMP.
2. More], to bolt, L4. Jan. 1912, 18/8, JHP.
3. bolt to Morel, March 1912, 18/8, JEEP.
4. Morel to bolt, 21 Jan. 1906, 18/3, Jill'.
is apparent only in the world of ideas, not of existing
facts. But even the Chambers would repudiate this defence
since they saw themselves as humanitarians as well.
Almost every letter written to the Colonial Office, by
the Chambers of Commerce, was couched in terms solicitous
of African welfare.	 They almost defeated the Third Party
in their own game. The Chambers of Commerce, probably,
knew that a 3ust appreciation of the eternal laws of right
and wrong, with due regard for humanity, should lie at the
root of commercial action, 1	In practice, however, they
allowed their business instincts to overcome this essential
humanitarianism.
In the British business world, however, there
was another redeeming feature. The enlightened role of
William A. Cadbury2
 supplemented the magnanimous support
given by bit to Morel's African work. Cadbury came
from a great Birmingham Quaker family. His extensive
business enterprises in West Africa, particularly connected
with cocoa culture and trade, probably induced him to an
obligatory interest in West Africans. His religious
1. Vide Musgrave, London Chamber of Commerce, op. cit. P.90.
2. Cadbury, William Adlington, 	 2nd son of Richard
Cadbury; Head of engineering section of family Bourneville
Model Village; Director of the Firm of Cadbury; visited
Gold Coast and .shanti 1909, and again in 1930, on
behalf of his company for cocoa culture; Lord Mayor of
Birmingham, 1919.
For the role of Cadbury Brothers, vide l.A. i1liams,
The Firm of Cadbury, 1831 - 1931 (London 1931).
78.
convictions, as a Quaker with its natural compassion for
the ill-treated and wronged, probably induced him to help
in the campaign to set things right not only in West
Africa but also in the Congo. 1 Holt appreciated Cadbury's
broadmindedness. He regarded him with affection. On
6 Septeiiber 1910, when Morel was about to pay Cadbury a
visit, bit conveyed his admiration to him:
"Then you visit Mr Cadbury.....say how much
I admire his African work, and the high principles
which have induced him to do all he has done and
tried to do for the benefit of the Black race,
which has been for so many years forcibly drawn 2
upon to cultivate the Islands of 3an Thome....."
And when on 22 May 1911, Cadbury was expected to visit
bolt, the emotions of the latter were not handicapped;
indeed they ran riot when he expressed his feelings to
Morel:
"I can hardly tell you with what ,oy I look
forward. to the visit, although I know that it will
also be a most trying one to me, as I should have to
see a man of uncommon greatness o± mind, and character,
a man who soars high above the ordinary crowd, and. a
person that I cannot meet without evoking very strong
feelings.	 There are some men it is .mpossib1e to
1. Rene NacColl, Roger Casement (1963), P. 63.
2. Holt to Morel, 6 Sept. 1910, F.8/'#, LDNP.
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meet without strong emotional feelings, and I am
sure that Cadbury is one of them. He is so great -
great I mean in. everything that constitutes human
greatness in the higher sense.....'1 4,
The very extravagance of this sentiment (which
Morel equally shared) was probably symptomatic of their
mournful isolation at a time when other merchants
proclaimed humanitarian ideals while deprecating the very
instrument that was essential for these ideals to
materialize, In cQfltrast, Cadbury's idealism was not
phoney though esoteric. He had. taken notice o Morel's
role in the .A.friçan Mail, particularly when he defended.
him against attacks by people who either misunderstood.
or misrepresented. his methods in the West &fricari Islands,
and on the Gold Coast. The relationship, which Holt
had helped to foster, was immediately solidified by
financial dependence on the one, and. journalistic support
by the other. Cadbury matched the extravagant emotions
for him, by extravagant generosity to Morel, 	 it was
Cadbury who made Morel's tour to west Africa in 1910
possible. And, when Morel later attempted to enter
Parliament, Cadbury's generosity was so fantastic that
one begins., to wonder whether a uid pro tuo was not
perverting genuine idealism. Cad.bury agreed to give
Morel £800 a year, plus another £I--00 "for each
i. bit to Morel, 22 May 1911, F8/k, EDMP.
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election you have to fight before you enter into Parliament."
If Morel happened. to die, Cadbury agreed. to pay his widow
£500 a year, until their youngest son. was of age, when
this would be reduced to £300 per annum. However, if
Morel felt that the annuity of £800 was not enough, he
would favourably consider any supplementary estimates he
might submit, "especially during the years of special
expense on the children's education." And be caps this
fantastic munificence with a generous encouragement: 111
have, as you know, the fullest confidence in you all and.
it is my earnest desire that you, should, get into Parliament
where your special abilities will have the most seope.ul
The financial support which Holt and Cadbury
provided supplemented Morel's acquaintance with the political
and social elites of the time.	 The latter connection was
mainly encouraged by the practical force of Alice .hrnella
Ad.d.erley Stopford Green. Mrs Green, the seventh daughter
of Rev. Edward Adderley Stopford of Meath, and the wife
of John Richard Green, the historian, inherited the rigid
tenets of her mother's almost-Calvinist protestantisin,
end her father's political abi1ity. 2
 During the ten years
following her husband's death in 1883, her house in
1. Cadbury to Morel, 12 April 1912, F.8. EDMP.
2. Rev. topford had opposed the Disestablishment of the
Church of Ireland, but seeing that Gladstone was
determined upon it, he eventually assisted him in
drafting the Bill of 1869.
DNB.
Kensington Square becama the centre of a brilliant group
of friends.	 Following her husband's footsteps, she
became a. radical and ardent Home Ruler. But she developed
her own individual qualitLes. Her conversational powers
and mordant wit were said. to hava made her formidable in
arguments.2
It was- probably Holt that introduced Morel to
her in 1901. Morel's association with Mrs Green proved
most valuable. As a Vice-President of the &trican
Society, she knew almost every Colonial Governor and.
Colonial Office official. She introduced Morel to
the "men who mattered", including Sir Harry Johnston, de
Cardi, Sidney Buxton, Reginald Antrobus of the Colonial
Office, .krthur Brisbane and, others. She brought Morel
into contact with responsible ournalisrn, which probably
influenced his critical methods. She disliked Lugard.,
Mimer and Cronier3 , and. other military Imperialists of
1. These included Florence Nightingale, Mary ingsley,
Bishop and Mrs Creighton, Mr & Mrs Humphrey Ward,
Bishop Stubbs, John Morley, LB. Hald.ane, R.A.L.
Fisher and Winston Churchill.1
2. D.Ir.B.
3. In an undated letter to Morel, Mrs Green regarded Cromer's
statement that he opposed ema1e suffrage "because men
are men and womeir are women" as 'senseless'.
	
lso bit
later told Morel that Cromer's reason was disappointing
coming from such an 'eminent man'. But Miss Kingsley
considered the question unimportant so far as even
traders were not within the pale of power.
Mrs Green also said that "Lugazd is the worst enemy of
freedom next to Mimer that we have" (Mrs Green to Morel,
44- Nov. 1901).
	 She was opposed to their military
administrative minds.
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that class. Towards the end of the 19th Century she
in fact came politically imder the influence of an Irish
journalist, John Francis Taylor, and. her views progress-
ively became "ant-nglisti and. anti Imperial on nearly
every question".	 She became a close personal friend of
that tragic worthy and moral pervert, Sir Roger Casement,
and later emigrated to her country, Ireland., where she
became a $.enator with a string of academic honours.
Mrs Green's influence in Imperial affairs and.
home politics, although it cannot be precisely pin-pointed,
was probably great. Mary Kingsley even acknowledged
that "she is . far greater power than I ever was in
London".1 She was in touch with everyone who mattered,
and. "was amazingly clevertt.2 She had not been brought
up in the "Coast School", as Kingsley told bit, but she
liked Africans, and appreciated bolt and Kii.gs1ey for
their pro-African activities and. broadmind.ed.ness. 	 But
before her death, Kingsley's En1ish patriotism had
almost estranged her with Mrs Green, and. she tried to
wean bolt from her:
'Suppose there was something that would do
England a great deal of harm if it were generally
known, well I bould. not tell it Mrs Green; her
sympathies are Irish." 3




This statement brings into focus the important theme of
Irish attitudes to Africa. It will be seen in the
subsequent chapters dealing with particular issues that
Irish members of Parliament were always critical of
Government policies and administrative measures adopted
in West Africa.	 Their opposition can be variously inter-
preted. Irish criticism of Imperial method in West Africa
was part of a wholesale Irish obstructionist method.
They tended to oppose almost everything that the Government
did. As lovers of freedom, however, their criticism was
part of the Irish struggle for independence. Moreover, it
had a psychological reaction on the whole question of Irish
Home Rule; by criticising the administrative inadequacies
'-
of Imperialism in far-away lands, they served to make the
most immediate ones of Ireland always a living issue even
when they were not formally discussed. But one can never
escape from positting the hypothesis that as much as Irish
members made opportunist use of African problems, it should
not be denied that several generations of colonial
experience must have bred some anti-imperial attitudes and.
definite philosophies of liberalism and good government,
however Gladatonian some of them still remained in their
criticism of Imperial expenditure.
This anti-Imperialism was, however, a deviation
from the norm within the Third Party. Mary Kingsley
with bit and Morel were Imperialists who wanted reforms in
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order that the West African empire might be made profitable
both to Britain and the kLricans. Mrs Green, on the other
hand, was an anti-Imperialist of the most extreme kin4.
Her anti-Imperialism probably reflected her natural
radicalism.	 With her liberal associations and academically-
oriented mind, her opposition to exploitation might have
been a product of some abstract idea o± humanitarian
liberalism. But as a victim of British Imperial experiment
in Ireland, Mrs Green saw Africans as identical tools in
the same Colonial crucible. Her pro-African zeal was
well understood by Holt and. Morel, both of whom resisted
Mary Kingsley's efforts to estrange them with her. Later
in her career, she cooperated with Morel in his campaigns
for Irish Home Rule, and. in the couriter-blas against Sir
Edward Carson's importation of arms. On the death of Holt,
it was Mrs Green who wrote one of the most penetrating of
the obituary notices.1
Mrs Green's practical ability was, however, not
invincible. She failed along with others to purify a
society of which she was a Vice-President from the internal
ills which perverted its humanitarian ideals. Founded in
1900 to propagate those ideals which had inspired Nary
Kingsley, the African Society soon confined itself almost
1. JYLrs Green, 'A Founder of the Society', op. cit.
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entirely to geographical and anthropolical pursuits
which wS,a restricted conception of its true function.
Even tbs academic pre-occupation was a redeeming feature,
since it could be argued that African anthropology was a
major part of Kingsley's life effort. The true aims of
the Society were soor. undermined by interested adventurers.
Meetings of the Society soon became occasions for banquets
and, financial demands from members. After attending an
annual meeting of the Society in 1907, Holt, a Vice-
President, wrote to Morel in disgust: "The report will
amuae you. The work of the past yeat' has been chiefly
dinners and. subscribers. This would seem to be the
chief objeets of a Society founded to commenimorate Nary
Kingsley and to promote her practical ideals. She would
have abhorred these things.....ul	 In July of the seine
year, Holt advised Morel to inform Sir Harry Johnston,
(the President), "who has been too easy-going with these
people u
 that "there is a game of some sort on, which is
not in the public interest or to do honour to the name- of
Mary Kingsley.'	 bit continues in the same letter:
"......He surely ought to see that Jones and.
Shalford have some game on. That bringing Ralph
Moor and. Ommaney and Sir Alfred Jones on the Council
so unexpectedly, so suddenly, is not- because of any
love they bear to the Society, but because they think
1. Halt to Morel, 26 June 1907, F.S/3, EDMP.
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they can make some use of it for their own ends.
This Society has been going for years and not one
of them has taken the least interest in £t; but now
all of a sudden they see ri opportunity of gaining
something for their own ends, and. therefore, they
come in a crowd....." '1
As we have seen, Holt bad opposed Morel's wish to take
office in. the Society because connection 'with "respectables"
there might influence his journalistic independence. He
advised him to warn the public against "the wire-pulling
that is going on by a group of designing nien." 2 Articles
immediately appeared in the West African Mail denouncing
the apathy of high-placed members of the Society to true
African welfare and pointing out that interested people
had sought nominations into the Council of the Society
to promote their selfish ends.
However, the Society was not wholly morally
effete. It had cooperated with other humanitarians to
1. bit to Morel, 11 July 1907, F8/3, EDMP.
Shelford. was a member of Messrs Shelford. and. Sons, who
constructed	 most of the railways in West Africa;
	 *
Sir Ralph Moofi after his retirement as High Commissioner
for Southern Nigeria became a businessman in London;
Omnianey was a Crown Agent.
Jones maintained very close ties with the other three,
forming with them what was supposed to be a business
compact.
For the various allegations against the interests these
men were connected with see Chap. VII.
2. bolt to Morel, 11 July 1907, F.8/3, EDMP.
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procure the release of King Nauajof Benin River from his
exile.	 But Neville's commendation of the Society for
this action was, in fact, an urbane censure on its short-
comings: ttThe West African native wants a channel where
he can rely on sympathy and assistance and I hope the
Society will identify itself more and, more with native
affairs in which direction it has a distinct and, useful
future." 1 The Society was never fully able to see itself
playing the role of a humanitarian pressure-group. Apart
from the useful journal it published, the Society proved.
to be a talking-house where retired governors, derelict
administrators, traders and travellers in Africa exchanged
views on matters almost entirely geographical. Annual
meetings degenerated. into banquets where its finances were
squandered. 2
 But its most unwholesome aspect, was that
interested people who had business connections with Africa
used their influence to secure positions in the Society and
forced. others more genuinely interested in the human
problems of Africa to roam the corridors of power. This
influence was used. not always to promote African or Imperial
1. Neville to bit, 28 July 1906 Box 7/Li., flIP.
2. Volumes of the Journal of the African Society contain
very interesting articles on African geography and.
anthropology; but very prominent were reports of
banquets held and demands on members to pay up their
dues.
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welfare, but by probably playing on the Colonial Office
sense of trusteeship, it served to gain official attention
and. friendship for personal material ends.
This lack of keen humanitarian conscience is
perhaps representative of any generation of materialism.
It was, however, also fed. by a lack of sufficient Colonial
intelligence. The works of Mary Kingsley, Flora Shaw1
and, other newspaper correspondents had not fully brought
West Africa into a proper focus in the popular mind.
Even members of Parliament did not always master tieir
facts. Morel had broadened and. deepened. the Colonial
horizons of some members and had wished. to form a more
lasting parliamentary nexus in the Kingsley style2 , but
1. Flora Shaw, later Lady Lugard, wrote profusely on West
Africa, See E. Moberley Bell, Flora Shaw ' 1852-1929 (1911-7).
2. Norel maintained close connection with several Labour and
Liberal and. Radical M.P.s.	 The closest to him were Sir
Charles Dilke,J.C. edgwood and J. Cathcart Mason.
Duke came to know Morel in 1900 through the Editor of the
Speaker who revealed Morel to him as the anonymous author
of the Congo series. After a comparative seclusion due
to Mrs Crawford's adultery case, Dilke returned to public
life in 1892 M.P. for the Forest of Dean, speaking mainly
on ndustrial, foreign and Imperial questions. For his
championship of the rights of weaker races see Chaps. III
and. IV also Stephen Gwynn and Gertrude M. Tuckwell, The
Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles Wentworth Duke, Bart
M.P. (London, 1917) P. 368.
See Chap. V for Wedgewood's connection with Morel.
John Catheart Mason, h.P. (L.U.) for Orkney and Shet.land
1900; he resigned in 1902 but was re-elected as Liberal
in 1902, 1906 and 1910.	 Born 18J-8, was the younger son
of Rugby Mason M.P. Educated at Laleham and Rugby, he
later read. law at the Middle Temple, was an able parlia-
mentary hand..
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in spite of their loyalty to him, Members of Parliament
were already hitched to the wagon of the more traditional
Exeter all. 1 Morel, therefore, wanted to enter parlia-
ment and via parliament to attain a position of power in
order to secure his ideals. Before attempting to enter
parliament, however, he felt it was necessary to visit West
Afrca to see what the negro was in his- own home.
The details of Morel's journey to West Africa are
hardly germane to the argumeit.
	
e left Liverpool on 22
October 19102 and. after visiting Nigeria, and Sierra Leone
where he was remembered as "the white man with the straight
eye", he returned to Britain in March l9ll.	 The importance
of the journey was great. Morel renewed his vgour after
the Congo agitation had taken a great toll. He had seen
the African in his natural habitat, and was now in a better
position to advise r criticise the Colonial Office and the
local adinnistrations with the integrity of first-band
knowledge. The trip by way of 'his newspaper articles also
proved financially profitable and strengthened Ins indepen-
dence. But one o± the greatest results of his visit was
1. See Chap. IV for details of this parliamentary organisation
of the humanitarians.
2. Mrs Morel to Holt, 22 Oct. 1910, 18/7, JHP.
3. Cocks, op. cit.,	 Also Morel's Notes on The Travel,
Fl/2, EDNP.
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his book, Nigeria: Its People and Its Problems. 1	It
was a revised compilation of the articles he had. published
in the Times, but its appearance in book-form obviously
excited new interest.
Although the book did not escape the censure
of some educated .kfricans 2 as Morel himself knew, it went
a long way to educate the Englsh public, and to establish
Morel's claim in the West African pantheotL.	 Dedicated to
the memory of Mary Kingsley, Morel showed himself as the
upholder of tradition, and a faithful apostle of the Third
Party.	 Holt's eulogy was poetic:
"If the spirits of the departed. can visit our
sphere, you have constantly led. her spirits with you
during all the years you have written and. fought for
the lives and liberties of the Negro in his own
country."	 3
H.S.W. Edward.es, a Colonial official at Bida was of the
opinion that the book "stands alone as a weighty and
reasoned statement of the problems we have to grapple with."
1. (London, Smith, Elder and Co., 1911).
2. As will be seen in Chap. V., educated. native criticism
was in fact gradually being generated against Morel
because of his position onthe 'Land Question'.	 Morel
had however advised Kitoe Ljasa, a Lagos lawyer, to
read. the book properly before firing at him. Morel to
A,jasa, Li Nov. 1911, copy P9/A-B. ED.
3. Holt to Morel, 9 Nov. 1911, P8/k, .DMP.
k. H.S.W. Edwardes to Morel, 25 Nov. 1911, F.9/E ADNP.
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Morel, in the book and elsewhere, always tried to proffer
wise and constructive advice to the Colonial Office and.
C1onia1 governments, but much of the advice 7although it
praised the work of the officials, often took the form in
which it appeared that only Morel could carry out the
necessary reforms. This view is further illustrated when
Holt expressed his attitude to the projected reforms, but
with the characteristic tinge of usually resigned adulation
"Better would it be if they wotLld put you in a
position to carry them out yourself for you know your
own meaning better thar they will ever do and you have
ideas 0±' constructive statesmanship which I fear few
of our Government have.....'1
It was, therefore, this aspiration to be in a
position of direct power to effect the reforms which he
advocated at home and in the empire which drew Morel to
enter practical politics and aspire to Parliament. His
friends Charles Strachey and Alfred Emmott 2
 (who was now
Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies) might be
expected to have given him every support in his West African
1. bit to Morel, 15 Nov. 1911, P.8/ LI-, EDMP.
2. Emmott (Lord) Alfred (1858-1926) let Baron of Oldham
(1911); eldest surviving son of Thomas Emmott of
Brookfield, Oldham; Educated: Grove House, Tottenham
B... (London); M.P. (Liberal) Oldham, 1899-1911;
Under-Sec. Colonies 1911-1k, First Commissioner for
Works, 191k-iS; Director of the War Trade Dept.,
1915-19.
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work, but the feeling began to be expressed that things
might be best if Sir Charles Duke, and after his death,
Noel Buxton. manned the Foreign Office, and Morel the
Colonial Office.	 But on. the death of Duke in 1911,
U.K. Hudson, his Secretary, and. brother to Sir Robert
Hudson, one of the chief priests of Liberalism, wanted
Morel to take Duke's place on foreign policy. 	 Josiah
Wedgewood continued to urge Morel to "come into Parliament".
And e.fter his generous gift to him, Cadbury had discerned
that to fight an election would be just what Morel's
"pugnacious spirit wants for a tonic."1
Bolt, for his part, wished that Morel should
enter Parliament to carry out the imperial ideas of the
Third Party. He tried to influence merchants, particularly
those in Liverpool, not only to see Morel as a crusader
in the honest and fair treatment of Africans, but also as
their spokesman implementing the ideals of Mary Kingsley.
Bolt, moreover, believed that the wish to have Morel in
Parliament was greatly emphasized by the state of affairs
in Parliament itself. Praising Morel in a letter to
Brabner, a Liverpool merchant, he accused both parties in
Parliament of playing financial politucs
"It is a great thing to have one man with such
ability; with such courage, such unselfishness,
1. Cadbury to Morel, 	 Oct. 1912, F8/Oadbury, EDMP.
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such dogged pertinacity; disinterested independence
of spirit.	 I sometimes wish he was in Parliament
where he could make his voice heard to some effect on
behalf of the ideals of which he is possessed - the
worst of it is, both parties in Parliament only want
time servers, and peoDle who are seeking their own
selfish interests there from a money point o± view.
They do not want indeDendent, honest men seekinR r the
good. of the nation as a whole, arid the true interests
of the Empire - They would be thinking all the time
of what it would cost them to say anythin' in o ppo-
sition to a leader of their own party. 	 It is place
and percuisites they are thinking of more than their
country's good.	 They try to make both things serve
their purpose, but not with much success for the
country......' I
To a neutral advucate, this cynical insight into selfish
motives in politics might have inspired an urge for reform,
to the merchant community, however, it 'was significant
only for its triviality. The merchants were as well
committed to "perquisites". 	 It might be, as riolt claimed
in a letter to A. Black, another Liverpool merchant, that
"since the days of Wilberforce we have had no such man
(as Norel) in Britain who has done so much for freedom
I. Holt to Brabner, 13 July 1910, Cops 18/12, JHP.
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and righteousness towards the negro races of Africa."1;
yet as it has been shown above the relation between
commerce and, sentiment in real life is not always
apparent. Even the argument that Morel was always
mindful of the welfare of traders - "those whose material
interests give them a right to be considered equally with
the inhabitants of the country", 2 not always convinced
most important merchants. Morel's persistent attacks on
reckless capitalism in Africa were not always well-mceived.
by people who felt that their humanitarian pretensions
were being exposed. During the Land movement influenta1
quarters even claimed that Morel's views were at variance
with the mature commercial ideas of Chamber of Commerce
men. 3 Another reason for mercantile opposition to Morel
was his attitude to Jones and the latter's antagonism
towards him. Even after Jones' death, he was alleged to
have already fed most of the mercantile establishment in
Liverpool, Manchester and London with "fairy tales" about
Morel. They were grateful to him for his Congo work, but
were not over-impressed with his political aims. The
1. ilolt to A. Black, 31 Aug. 1910, Copy 18/12, JHP.
Also Thomas Bolt to Morel, 21 Nov. 1907, F.9/H, EDNP.
Thomas Holt also compares Morel with Wilberforce.
2. Bolt to A. Black, 7 Sept. 1910, Copy 18/12, JEP.
3. e.g. the attack on Morel by G.A. Moore, President of
the African Trade Section of the Liverpool Chamber,
Chap. V.
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attitude of the merchants can. be
 further explained.
Although Jobn bit had rashly condemned all parties in
Parliament as selfish, it is, however, known that by
1910 the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection
Society had. formed a Parliamentary Committee dedicated
to colonial problems. 1 If this much-publicised. committee
failed, to rectify the alleged colonial abuses of the
government, the merchants might have asked, though with
only limited justification, what greater effort one man
could show to these global problems.
It was also the composite issues which convulsed
ritish politics at the time that also influenced mercantile
attitude to Morel's political aims. Tariff fleform
Agitation, the Irish Qiestion, the German Me'nace, and
Socialism, were severally canvassed and, opposed with such
fury that a man like Morel who participated in all of
them could never be satisfactory to a group whose membership
had various political and social philosophies. 	 More-
over, shorn of ts vague humanitarian content, the Imperial
factor, although it had lost much of its national awareness
since the close of the South african Var, still retained
its popular consciousness of economic power always present
since Chamberlain harped on the policy of "developing our
Estates". Most merchants, therefore were not over-
1. Treated in Chap. IV.
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impressed. by a creed which tended to put economic success
below humanity.
Morel could not have been expected to be acceptable
to all shades of opinions in face of these multiplicity
of issues. :Even his acquired progressive views contrasted
with Rolt's old-fashioned liberalism. Holt, however,
advised Morel to be true to his conscience and. maintain
his radicalism. 1 This support and, as has been shown,
that from influential members of the Liberal Party, assured
Morel's nomination as the Liberal candidate for Birkenhead.
Re had been proposed by James Irvine2 , and. when he was given
the assurance that the Liberals there would foot all his
expenses and give him massive support, and the broad hint
that the Unionist majority of 1015 for the seat in the
election held in December 1910 was a fraud, Morel agreed
to stand after a dexterous show of coyness. 3 When on 8
November 1912, he was officially nominated as candidate,
he gave a summary of his stand. in British politics. He
stood for equitable distribution of wealth socially
produced., maximum wage standards, Irish Home Rule, Welsh
Disestablishment, the Insurance Act, arid be supported. the
1. bit to Morel, 15 Nov. 1911, F8/ LI, EDMP.
2. Irvine to Morel, 9 Oct. 1912, F9/ , EDMP.
3. Morel to Cadbury, 14 Oct. 1912, copy , F.8/Cadbury, EDIP.
principle of the Licensing Bill of 1908. He was liberal
in Concert of Europe matters; advocated friendship with
Germany, though a defensive navy for Britain. 	 He spoke
and. wrote against Tar/'iff Reform, conscriptionism and
isolationism. He advocated women's suffrage, diminution
of the powers of the House of Lords, public control of
Secret Treaties and Land. Reform.1
Although Morel had tried to widen his interest
by harping on domestic and foreign policy issues, he never
totally allowed the urge for political expediency at home
to undermine his urge for colonial conscience. As the
possibility of an election became more elusive (not held
until 1LI December 1918), Morel saw no electoral disadvantage
in bringing home to 'his constituents those moral ideas
which he saw were the basis of true imperialism. At the
Church Congress in Southainpton, on 2 October 1913, he
once again supported his thesis for African land rights,
and, warned the public against the policy which led to
"social misery and a landless proletariat", against
"forcing loans upon African natural rulers in the interest
of cosmopolitan finance and for the greater profit of
armament firms". He spoke against imposing European
culture and, legal norms end institutions upon African
societies not suited for them. He chastised the Church
1. Birkenhead News, from Nov. 1912 to Sept. 1914 contain
Morel's speeches.	 See also Morel's Notes for the
speeches. F2/l, DI'1P.
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for the "staggering abruptness" with winch it transmitted
exotic ideas and habits to Africa. 1
 In 1908, Holt had.
expressed. the wish that John Morley, because of his speech
on India Reform which had relevance to West Africa, would
join their party. 2 Now, Morel criticized Morley's view
in the Lords, that it was "impossible to prevent the
condition of labourers in the tropics from being unpleasantly
akiu to slavery", for being tendencious, it might be
"disastrous to the maintenance of a high standard of rule
by the whiteman in the Tropical belt." 3
 Not only,
therefore, was Morel practically against the physical
coercion of ..fricans, and in support of legitimate and
equitable commercial transactions he also set a theoretical
high standard of colonial ethics.
The Third Party attitudes to the torcible impact
of British rule in West Africa and. the effects this had on
the traditional African social and political patterns will
be examined in subsequent chapters.
	
But even their
attitudes to the European colonial structure and, to the
various Colonial Officials give an insight probably more
penetrating than the Official sources would. offer. The
1. Morel's Notes for the Speeches,
	 P2/i, EDMP.
2. Holt to Morel, 19 Dec. 1908, P.8/3, EDMP.
3. Morel's Notes, P2/i, EDMP.
4. See Section dealing with punitive expeditions in Chap. II.
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Third Party attitude to the almost unlimited powers of
the Colonial Governors was already reflected in Mary
Kingsley's scheme by which power would be shared between
British merchants, the African chiefs and the Colonial
Office. This suspicion of the powers of these Governors
was even deepened in John Holt's opinion that they were
'too vast', 'arbitrary' and 'autocratic', and had the
effect of preventing the establishment of 'a properly
organised system' of colonial administration. He wrote
as follows in the same letter to Morel:
"....We all know that the best form of government
is an autocracy, if you have the best man there;
otherwise it is about the worst. You have no
restrictions on his Conduct, or action or policy.
There cannot be a more dangerous thing than to give
any man absolute power, and this is what you have in
our West A.rican Colonies,....' I
This autocracy was reflected in what he called the "avalanche
of proclamations", which although they might have been
drawn up for other colonies, the "mad lawyers of Downing
Street" were "adapting to the West Coast."2
As will be seen later, Bolt's views on the
British policy of supporting the 'man on the spot' were
shared by other critics. But in the absence of any other
scheme which was deemed feasible at the time, these
criticisms were somewhat irrelevant. It might have been
1. Bolt to Morel, 1k Sept. 1910, F8/3, iDMP.
2. Bolt to Morel, 16 June, 1903, P8/2, EDMP.
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suggested that there ought to exist an African Council
to play the same role in African affairs as the India
Council was doing for Indian matters. This argument
did not always take into considerati<n the historical fact
that although British interest in India was initially
promoted by a trading company, yet there bad been almost
a century of ±Lrect British Government administration of
that sub-continent. On the other hand, colonial
administration, by commercial men,had been discredited
with the revocation of the Charter of the Royal Niger
Company in January 1900. As has been indicated, the
attitude of the mercantile communities towards colonial
problems was, moreover, never as statesmanlike as Mary
Kingsley would have wished. They did not always look
beyond the immediate horizon of individual economic
advantages which disqualified them for permanent, long-view
involvement in colonial administration.
Morel, who was no more enainoured. of this fetish
of the "man on the spot", than other critics were,
therefore advised Holt that "until you have got the
machinery to control the man on the spot, which you at
present have not, the fetish is bound to exist", and. should
even be supported. 1 Thus although bit and Morel found
in most of the West African Governors the worst aspects of
Imperial rule, they did not attack them openly. Such an
1. Morel to bolt, 21 Sept. 1910, F8/Ll, EDMP.
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open criticism would not only imbue in the Governors an
antagonistic reaction detrimental to Bolt's commercial
transactions; it would also expose Morel as an enemy of
the official colonial structure and therefore little
regarded in the Colonial Office.
Thus although they disapproved of the colonial
methods of several West Akricaii Governors, they refrained
from outright public- condemnation. Sir Ralph Moor 1
 was
accused 0±' tyranny and war as High Commissioner for Southern
Nigeria (where he was even connected with the business
interests of Alfred Jones). When he retired as High
Commissioner and. involved himself in the commercial politics
of the London Chamber of Commerce, the true relationship
between Moor and Jones was exposed. It was believed that
it was Jones who used his influence to metal Moor at the
head of the African Trade Section of the London Chamber,
made him a director of one or two of his companies and the
London Agent of the B.G.G.A. Bolt was of the opinion
therefore that as High Commissioner, Crown Agent or as
President of the Africa Trade Section of the London Chamber,
Moor was never prepared to take sri independent position,
1. Moor, Sir Ralph R. (1860-1909) K.C.M.G. 1897, High
Commissioner, Southern Nigeria from 1900; retired
Oct. 1903; Son of W.H. Moor, !'i.D. of Buntingford,
Herts; Educated at home; Served in Irish Constabulary,
1881,-. 91, Deputy B.C. and Vice-Consul in the Oil
Rivers (Nier Coast) Protectorate, 1892; Ag. Commissioner
and Consul-General, 1892-95; Commissioner & Consul Gen.
1896-1900.
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much less take up a policy antagonistic to Jones 'on any
subject'. 1 When $ir Walter Egerton2 as appointed
Governor of &utherii Nigeria, Holt misjudged his 'pacific'
pose, and. even 'gave him broad an candid hints on.
3
	adainistration'.	 Though 'a man of big ideas and. push
'honest' and, not easily influenced by self-seeking
businessmen, 5 gerton did not filfil the high hopes
nourished by Holt nd Morel. In particular, hi a'leged
autocratic and eztravagcnt methods revolted against Holt's
pacific and frugal. conscience:
'.....I have no confidence iaEgerton. H& comes
from a bad school in East. We do not want those
Eastern men in West Africa; we want to train our own
men there in politics; just as we do in. trade, and
we should. do, if we ha& the right men at the C.0. to
	
do it..,...	 6
The personal views and. qualities of other Governors
or administrators determine& the attitude of the Third
1. Ilolt to Morel, 15 Jan. 1909, P8/3, EDMP.
2. For the comparative roles of Moor, Macgregor and
Egerton, see S.M. Tamnuno, The Development of British
Administrative Control of Southern Nigerii;
1900-12: A Study in the Administrations of Sir Ralph
Moor, Sir William MacGregor and Sir WalteiEgerton,
Unpub1ished London Ph.D. 1962).
3. Holt to Morel, 5 Narch 190k, P8/2, EDMP.
LI-. John Eaglesoine to Morel, 16 Oct. 1911, F9/1, EDMP.
5. Holt to Morel, 15 Jan. 1909, P.8/3, LDMP1
6, Holt to Morel, 5 July 1910, P8/LI, EDMP.
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Party as well. Sir Percy Giruoard.1
 was considered to be
'good' because he believed in Indirect Rule based on his
pro3ected land settlement in Northern Nigeria but mainly
because he was "quite independent of any outside influence"2,
presumably the pervasive influence of Alfred. Jones. The
alarming information that Hesketh Bell 3
 intended, to abandon
the Indirect Rule poiicy and rule directly4 , his statement
at the African Society dinner on May 1911 that Northern
Nigeria did not want traders, and his persistent military
actions against the Munchis 5 disaffected him with Bolt.
Other governors like Rodger, Probyn and Denton6
 were not
1. Girouard, Najor-Gen. Sir Percy, K.CSU.G., R.E.,18&7-1932;
1896 Director of Sudan railways; 1898-9 President,
Egyptian Railway Board; 1899-1902 South African War;
1902-4 Commissioner of Railways, Wransvaal and Orange
River Colony, 1907-9 Gov. of Northern Nigeria; 1909-12
GOv. East African Protectorate.
2. Bolt to Morel, 15 Jan. 1909, P8/3, EDMP.
3. Bell, Sir Henry Hesketh, G.C.M.G., 1865-1952; 1882
entered Colonial Service, West Thdies; 1890-3 Gold Coast;
1894 Receiver-General, Bahamas, 1899 d.ministrator,
Doininica; 1906-9 Gov., Uganda Protectorate; 1909-12
Gov., Northern Nigeria; 1912-16 Gov., Leeward Islands;
1916-25, Gov. Nauritius.
4. Bolt to Morel, 14 Sept. 1910, P8/4, EDMP.
5. Bolt to Morel, 5 July 1910, P8/4, EDMP.
6. Denton, Sir George Chard.in, K.C.M.G.,C.M.G.,F.R.G.S.,F.Z.S.
Governor of Gambia 1900-11; Col. Sec. of Lagos 1888;
Administered the Govt. of Lagos, 1889-91.
	
(1851-1928).
Probyn, Sir Lesley Charles, K.C.V.O. (1834-1916); Served.
in India during Mutiny, Special C.O. Commission in Br.
Guiana 1882, Ldministrator of Sierra Leone.
Rodger was Governor of the Gold Coast.
lOLl..
independent of adverturous merchants and, in particular
"played up to Jlones". 1 Naturally, they did. not find
the ideal governor in Lugard, because of his 'military
administrative mind', because of his opposition to traders
in Northern Nigeria and his alleged alliance with Bishop
Tugwell who fanatically opposed the liquor traffic.2
However, probably because of Lugard.'s prestige arid, power,
bit always coimselled. Morel not to attack him personally,
but to "go for the Government policy" of "extravagance and
waste in anything they attempt."3
The ideal Governor was William MacGregork of
Lagos. He was, of course, like others in their presumed
eagerness for more revenue. But be was incomparably the
most favourable Governor of the lot. After a meeting with
MacGregor, bolt eulogised. him in a letter to Morel.
1. bolt to Morel, 5 July 1910, P8/LI. , EDMP.
2. bolt to Morel, 21 Aug. 1900, F8/l, EDMP.
For Herbert Tugwell, See Chap. II.
3. bolt to Morel, 18 July, 1905, P8/2, EDMPS
4. MacGregor, Rt. Hon, Sir William (l81I.7_l919), P.C.
G.C.M.G., K.C.1i.G., C.B., M.D. .Aberdeen); Hon. D. Sc.
(Cambridge), Hon. LL.D. (Edin. and Aberd.), etc., etc.
Surgeon; Hg. Comm. and Consul-Gen. Western Pacific;
Administrator of Br. New Guinea, 1888; Lt. Gov. 1895;
Governor of Lagos, 1899-190 11. ; Governor 0±' Newfoundland,
190k-9; of Queensland 1909-1k; F.R.G.S. etc., won
several gold medals. Also Mary Kingsley fledal, 1910.
105.
..,,..The more I see him the more I like hint.
He has a lot of humour in him. His knowledge is great,
his experience of men and matters most varied and wide.
His grip of many subjects is thorough. His energy and.
industry are wonderful. His aims are practical, his
ideas sound, his humanity most praiseworthy, his native
policy all we can desire.	 His crowning virtue is that
of being a man of peace; patient and. tactful and with
an earnest wish to be just to his feUow creatures. He
is honest beyond doubt.,....1	 I
In his successor, Sir Walter Egerton, we have seen how
high humanitarian expectations were subdued by harsh and
extravagant, howbeit honest and well-meaning, methods.
This private criticism of the Colonial Governors
contrasted with Morel's open friendship with the most
experienced of their more humble subordinates. It was
correspondence with these Residents, District Commissioners
and other mature officials that provided Morel with
colonial information though acquaintance with friendly
educated African opinion prevented his seeing events wholly
through official spectacles. He judged the officals
generously, and influenced them by cultivating their esteem.
H.S.W. Edwards, an official at Bida )found Morel's thoughts
on the Nigerian administrations "a genuine source of deep
gratification, ...... a deep incentive to continued effort
and en encouragement in the heat and, dust o the work."2
I. Holt to Morel, 13 Dec. 1902, P8/1,EDMP.
2. H.S.i. Edwardes to Morel, 25 Nov. 1911, F9/E, EDUP.
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In Temple, Burdon and Orr, 1
 Morel found "the triumvirate
which has been able to steer the ship of state in Northern
Nigeria through many rapids unknown tothe general public
who do not realise anything beyond the Governor's name,
whoever the Governor may be." 2 Residents on leave visited
him and discussed Colonial administration with him. Other
residents, like W.A. Ross of 0yo and H.J. Rawlings of
Ibadan, helped with illuminating local information and also
tried to off-set his unpopularity when his colonial fortunes
were low. 3 At times, Morel's audacious, probably indiscreet
regard for what he considered to be the truth, was
ungraciously regarded, as when Captain Elgee, 4
 Resident of
1. Orr (later Sir Charles), K.C.N.G. l870_l9L 5; 1889-1902
served in Royal Artillery in India, China and. &uth Africa,
1903-9 Resident, N. Nigeria; 1911-17, Chief Sec., Cyprus;
1918-19 Intelligence Dept., War Office; 1919-26 Col. Sec.
Gibraltar; 1926-31 Governor, Bahamas.
Burdon, Major (later Sir) John Alder, K.B.E., 1866-1933,
1897 Niger-Sudan campaign; 1898-9 Commandant, Royal Niger
Constabulary; 1900 Resident, N. Nigeria; 1903-6, 1909-10
Resident, Sokoto; 1910-15 Col. Sec., Barbados; 1915-25
administrator, St. Kitts; 1925-31, Governor, Br. Honduras.
Temple, Charles Lindsay, cJ.ML., 1871-1929; 1898, 1900 and
1901 Ag. Consul, Paraguay; 1899 Vice-Consul, I'anaos,
Brazil; 1901 Resident, N. Nigeria; 1910-13 Chief Sec.,
N. Nigeria; l9lL. .l7
 
Lt.-Gov., N. Nigeria.
2. Morel to Holt, 21 Sept. 1910, 18/7, JHP.
3. W.A. Ross to Morel, 13 April 1912, F9/P-S, EDMP
H.J. Rawlings to Morel, 13 Lov. 1911, E9/P-S, EDItP.
k. Elgee, Captain Cyril Hammond, F.R.G.S. (1871-1917).
British Resident at Ibadan. since 1903; unmarried,
served in Ashanti Campaign, Relief of Kumasi, 1900 (medal),
.D.C. and private see. to Sir Wm. MacGregor of Lagos
1900-02; member of the Liquor Traffic Commission 1909,
Travelled widely in the world; wrote an lEportant
Memorandum on Negro Education, 1906.
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Ibadan, instigated the Bale to sue Morel for libel,
or when Sir Matthew Nathan of Christiansbrg Castle1
caused a row end infelicitously broke off correspondence
with Morel merely because his picture appeared in the
West African Mail. 2 Thus, in spite of their private
criticism of the Governors, Morel and. bit (however
grudgingly) supported. the colonial officials, hoping by
so doing to innoculate them against the worst ills inherent
in the policy of supporting the "man on the spot".
These colonial attitudes were by no means
totally at variance with those of other humanitarians, but
the Third Party always tried to maintain a separate
identity. Thus although the humanitarian interest in the
affairs of West Africa might be said to have "cut across
party allegiance, and drew its strength as a political
force from Free Traders, Imperialists and Socialists alike",3
the Third Iarty aspect of British humanitarianism was
itself not an omnibus school. It had. individual variations
and predilections, but it leadership waS really
1. Major Matthew Nathan who was sometime a Governor of the
Gold Coast was, however, very close to Mary Kingsley.
2. Nathan to Morel, 25 Nov. 1903, F9/L-N, ED]iP.
Morel to Nathan, 15 Dec. 1903, copy , F9/L-N, EDMP..
3. A.F. Madden, 'Changing Attitudes and. widening Responsib-
ilities, 1895_l91Ll' in Cambridge History of .l3ritish




impregnated with a few of 'tbe last representatives
of the Old. Liberal Party of Retrenchment and Reformu.l
They regarded themselves as different in aims and methods
from other humanitarians. Although Bolt and Morel were
Vice-Presidents of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines'
Protection Society, they thought very little of that
body, regarding them as not only ignorant of African
affairs2
 and therefore often allowed their enthusiasm
to outrun their knowledge, but also as a spent force1
particularly after the death of Fox Bourne3 . In any case,
Nary Kingsley had spread in Britain and. West Africa, the
idea that John Bolt alone was worth more than. ten Aborigines' -
Protection Society men.
From 1895, when that spirit of imperial
expansion arid consolidation was supported by a political
and racist bastardization of Darwin's biological discoveries,
till 1915 when death removed. John Bolt from the humanitarian
1. Kingsley to Bolt, 21 June 1899, 16/LI-, JHP..
Gradually, however, with new influences, its political
horizon widened. Thus it contained an old-fashioned
liberal like Bolt as well as radicals like Morel and.
Wedgewood.
2. See Chaps. III, IV and V for their disagreements.
3. Morel to Bolt, 1 April 1909, 18/6, JHP.
LI. Kingsley to Bolt, 15 Sept. 1898, 16/2, JHP.
Letters of LB. Balize to Kingsley and articles published
in Lagos at that time seemed to indicate that Kingsley's
lessons were 'going home' to the natives of West Africa.
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scene, the Third Party advocated reforms in West African
Colonial affairs. For her part, Mary Kingsley loved
'natural' Africans, but her attempt to construct colonial
and anthropological theories in face of her natural
inability for that method often led her to literary and
conceptual 'nonsense', 1	which then induced, some West
Africans to suspect and. attack her. 2
 But although she
loved Africans, she loved British traders more, and if the
former were to be saved from the rapine of their foes, they
must be subjected to the rule of British traders, and if
this proved impossible, she found no necessity in championing
a cause which was not only hopeless but also o secondary
importance. 3 With Morel, who had first thought that Holt
was not a sure friend, and. Holt whose support for the
1. Flint, Re-assessment, P. 101.
2. Rev. Mark C. Hayford., in 1901 his Nary H. Kingsley from
an African Standpoint attacking Mary Kingsley. He
discusses the vexed question of whether the black man is
necessarily the intellectual inferior of the white.
Criticising Kingsley's views on Africa and. its people,
Hayford alludes to her statement 'that the blackman could
never be equal to a really great white man', and. that the
'mental difference between the two races is very similar
to that between men and women among ourselves'.
3. Kingsley to bit, 20 May 1899, 16/4, JHP.
4. In 1904, Morel had written thus to Alfred Emmott.
"With regard to Liverpool friends, I have none, I thought
I had one in Mr Holt, but when put to the test, he has
failed me." Morel to Eznmott 11 April 1904, F8/EDNP.
This was a reference to Morel's early efforts to interest
bolt in the CRL.
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former was even to prove 1ttoo eulogistic" 1
 as time went on,
the Third Party leadership virtually took the form of a
family compact.2
Excepting the Irish deviation, they were all
imperialists, but of the reformist hue.	 Their criticism
of the imperial methods of the Colonial Office, Colonial
officials and reckless commercial adventurers, did the
imperial cause some good; not merely through any easy and
straight-forward application of their doctrines, but in
making Imrialism dramatic and controversial, and
therefore emphasising its morality at a time when emphasis
on consolidabion and method of rule was becoming almost more
impoi'tant among conscientious men than the idea of mete
territorial acquisit:i,ons. 	 They advocated the rights of the
West Africans in forceful terms, and. preached against the
"Jesuitical doctrine of killing in order to do good."
Although they at times pretended to speak for God as well,
yet they represented one of the most direct sources through
which the Imperial doctrine of trusteeship was finally
formulated in clear terms.4
1. Morel to Holt, 21 Sept. 1910, 18/7, JIIP..
2. Holt had put in £1000 during the national presentation
to Morel for his Congo work. Also it was Holt who left
Morel an annuity of £100 from 1915.
3. Holt to Morel, 28 Sept. 1905, P.8/2, EDMP.
4. In 1913, Leonel Curtis wrote Morel copious letters.
soliciting Morel's views on the idea and practice of
trusteeship.
Curtis to Morel, 31 Jan. 1913, P9/A-C, EDMP..
Curtis to Morel, 29 April 1913, F9/A .-C, EDNP.
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Therefore, when Nary Kingsley left the scene,
her spiritual influence never departed from her followers.
incapacitated by old age and incurable imbecility,1
Bolt possessed till his end, the antioue zeal of a
crusader. And with Morel (soon to divert his attention
to foreign affairs when his colonial counsel was no more)
the Third Party fought, like Peelites, in obedience to
their tenets; for the "true welfare and progress of
our protected subjects: wards whom we have a solemn
moral duty as Trustees under ?rovidence,."2,
1. Although Morel thought otherwise, (Morel to Bolt, 1 July
1910, 18/7, JHP.) by 1910 there had been a remarkable
decline in Bolt's mental and, physical powers: the
'old friend, the strong strenuous thinker, and worker,
is gone' (Bolt to Morel, 13 June 1910, F8/'4-, EDMP.)
2. Bolt to Morel, 12 Nov. 1911, F8/ Ll, EDNP..
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CHAPTER III
EXETER HALL AND T.ADITIONAL CONSCIENCE
1
Apart from the Third Party, two other
main humanitarian movements also watched over the
interest of West Africans during the imperial era.
The Anti-Slavery Society persevered in its old efforts
to stamp out slavery and the slave trade. The
Aborigines' Protection Society continued its traditional
role as watch-dog for aboriginal rights. In order
properly to understand the attitudes of these
movements to contemporary West African affairs it
is necessary to sketch their antecedents.
The APS could be said to have formally
antedated the ASS because after the Emancipation Act
of l33, which was mainly a result of the efforts
of the Anti-Slavery Society, the British public was
painfully deluded into believing that the crusade
against all manner of slavery had been won; the
Emancipators could as well chant their Nuric Diznitis.
1. Two other societies quietly cooperated with
Exeter Hall. "The Society for the Recognition
of the Brotherhood of Man", based mainly in
Somerset, was fairly active in the early l90's.
With Miss Catharine Impey as its Secretary, this
Quaker - influenced movement published a journal
called Anti-Caste. Its main function was to look
after the interest of the 'coloured' population
in Britain (vide MSS Brit. Emp. S20 E5/7-).
Also the African Aid Society founded in 1903
cooperated with the APS.
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The ASS was, therefore, mi8takenly dissolved. It
was 800fl realised, however, as Sir Robert Peel put
It .n 14O, that British people had done "no more
than rescue their own character from the degradation
in which the slave trade (and slavery) had involved
1
them." The British and Foreign Antlu-Slavery Society
was necessarily reconstituted in 1&39 to continue its
work for "the universal extinction of Slavery and
the Slave Trade and the Protection of the Ilights and
Interests of the Enfranchised population in the
British possessions, and of all persons captured a
2
slaves."
However, in 137, before the 133 was
reconstituted, the Abàz'igines' Protection Society had
been born. It was formed through the initiative
of philanthropists and Quakers who believed that 14
1. Q. in John Harris, ACeiiiry of EmancipatIofl,
(Londoii, 1933) P.a9. For the early struggle
for Emancipation; Eric Williams, Caitali
and Slave	 (New York, 1944); E. Coupland,
The Brit s AntI-Slaveryj4ovement (London, 1933).
2. From the Constitution of the British and Foreign
Anti-Slavery Society, 1e39; Section II.
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was equally important to befriend and watch over
other aboriginals than those really enslaved. Of
these humanitarians Dr. Thomas Hodgkin was one of
the most zealous. He had nourished a deep veneration
for William Penn, the Quaker, and this probably inspired
him to devote his life to cafry on Penn's humane and
Christian policy towards aboriginal races. It was
mainly at Hodgkin's instigation, and as a result of
deliberations at informal gatherings of Friends, in
which he actively participated, that in l35 Thomas
Fowell Buxton, the reformer, obtained the appointment
of a $elect Committee of the House of Commons to
consider what measures ought to be adopted with regard
to the native inhabitants of countries where British
settlements are made, and to the neighbouring tribes,
in order to secure to them the due observance of
justice and the protection of their rights, to promote
the spread of civilization among them, and to lead them
to the peaceful and voluntary reception of the Christian
religion."1 This Select Committee, with which
Dr. Hodgkin and his associates cooperated as a sort of
outside committee, and which was thus in one sense the
1. Quoted in H.R. Fox Bourne, The Aborigines'




parent, in another the offspring of the APS, sat
through three sessions, and after collecting a
great mass of valuable evidence, presented an elaborate
2
report to Parliament in June l37.
It is important to indicate some of the
recommendations of this Parliamentary Report because
they formed, to a great extent, the ideals which
always inspired members of the Society. The first of
the nine recommendations placed the protection of
aborigines on the Executive; in other words, Governors
and not the legislators of each Colony, should have
authority for decision on all questions affecting the
interests of aboriginal tribes, because "the legislative
body was virtually a party and therefore ought not
to be a judge in such controversies." Contracts for
service were to be limited, while no vagrancy laws
or other regulations should be allowed, which might
cripple the energies of the aborigines by preventing
them from selling their labour at the best price, and
at the market most convenient to them. It spoke out
1. John Harris, op. cit., tends to give the honour
of founding the APS to the first TF. Buxton; but
Fox Bourne is inclined to emphasise the role of
Dr. Hodgkin.
2. It is said that the youngest member and one of the
most energetic in the Committee was William Ewart
Gladstone, who, probably, wrote the first draft
report.
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against the sale of ardent spirits. With regards
to "Native Lands", It declared that "so far as the
lands of the Aborigines are within any territories over
which the dominion of the Crown extends, the acquisition
of them by H.M's subjects, upon any title of purchase,
grant or otherwise, from their present proprietors should
be declared i1lgal and void". It was against the
acquisition of new territories without the sanction
of the Home Government, while advocating the provision
of religious Instruction and adherence to sIip1e forms
of justice understood and agreed to by the chiefs.
It, however, declared it "inexpedient" that treaties
should be frequently entered into between the local
Governments and the tribes in their vicinity because
"compacts between parties negotiating on terms of such
entire disparity are rather the preparatives and the
apology for disputes than securiths for peace; as often
as the resentment or the cupidity of the more powerful
body may be excited, a ready pretext for complaint will
be found in the ambiguity of' the language in which
their agreements must be drawn up, and in the superior
sagacity which the European will exercise in framing,
in interpreting and in evading them." Lastly, the
report urged tliat.missionaries, "those gratuitous and
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invaluable agents," should be protected and assisted,
but concludes with a judicious advice for the missionary:
"It is necessary that with plans of moral and religious
improvement should be combined well matured schemes
for advancing the soia1 and political improvement of
the tribes, and for the prevention of any sudden
changes which might be injurious to the health and
3-
physical constitution of the new converts."
These recommendations Immediately became a
charter of aboriginal rights which the Society
tried to implement. From 137 until his death n
5th April 1g66, Dr. Thomas Hodgkin ably directed the
iFS towards these Ideals. Assisted by L.C. Chamarovzow
and from l54 by F.W. Chesson, Hodgkin for thirty
years largely controlled the Society. According to
Chesson, Hodgkin's labours were ceaseless in attending
Committee and general meetings of the Society, in
keeping up a world-wide correspondence both with the
oppressed, and in the preparation of memorials to
1. Vide, Tohn Harris, op. cit., Pp. 77-SO. These
are also discussed in (hR. Neilor, British Imperial
Trusteeship, l7&3-l5O, (London 1951).
British and. other Governments and colonial øfflcials
for the mitigation of these colonial and aboriginal
1
calamities.
Apart from his diligence, it is the example
of humane and disinterested duty which Hodgkin left
for lila followers that was particularly fruitful.
An informant who immensely cherished his work noted
that "he gave up his time, ability and fortune to
succour the needy and to defend the oppressed,"
knowing "nothing of expediency as separated from the
highest moral considerations." He left a legacy of
inflexible adherence to truth, a noble reverence for
justice which did not permit of "one law for the white
man and another for the black, or of a graduated scale
of morality by which the exact measure of the natural
rights which subject races" might enjoy was "to be
determined by the varying shades of their complexion,
or by the difference between their social condition
2
and that of a more favoured people." These truly




describe the character and temperament of the founder
of the APS, but they are more significant as an
example of conscientious effort: the spirit which
animated him and his colleagues became in part a
traditional ideal which was incumbent on his successors
to carry on with honest zeal.
At the same time, another feature of the
Society which persisted throughout the years was
already apparent. This was the attempt to unite
divergent politicians so as to form one humanitarian
front in parliament. This important strategy was
particularly marked by the energetic organisation of
F.W. Chesson, the APS Secretary from 166 till 18,
who worked with rare sacrifice" for the achievement
2
of this invigorating objective.
let the APS and the ASS, although to some
extent composed of the same persons, existed as
1. For example, Sir Robert Nicholas Fowler, the
Treasurer of the Society at this time was an
active member of the Conservative Party; but
he was greatly supported and helped by Chesson
who was to the last an ardent Liberal. When
Chesson died, Fowler completely endorsed
Gladstone's obituary notice. Vide	 July l97.
2. Fox Bourne,	 P. 26,	 July 197.
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separate bodies until 1909. They at times cooperated,
but often adopted different lines of policy respectively
in tune with their political strategy or pedantic
attachment to original ideals. In l9, the ASS had
refused to cooperate with the APS in publicly denouncing
slavery, because according to the ASS Secretary, Charles
Allen, the ASS wished to give the Anti-Slavery Conference
sitting at Brussels an opportunity to do its work. On
13 January 19O, Charles Allen again told the APS that
the ASS could not attend the "Mansion house Conference"
called by the APS to discuss the Liquor and the Arms
Traffic. The ASS, as will be seen later, was suffering
from several internal and external combination5of
circumstances, and saw its success in calling the
Brussels Conference as an opportunity to demonstrate
that it had neither become effette nor abdicated its
primary duty. On 16 January l9O, Charles Allen
denied the APS view, embodied in a resolution, that
liquor was "one of the two prominent causes and agencies
of slavery and the Slave Trade in Africa." But when
a-
1. Charles Allen to Fox Bourne, 20 Dec. l9 cot,y
in ASS papers.
2. Charles Allen to Fox Bourne, 13 Jan. ].90. (ibid.)
3. Charles Allen to J?ox Bourne, 16 Jan. l90. (ibid.)
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later in that year Ho1.and was suspected of refusing
to sign the Declaration appended to the General Act
of the Brussels Conference, Charles Allen then sought
the cooperation of the Al'S because, as he claimed, it
was important "that public opinion be raised,
Deputation sent to Salisbury to strengthen the hands
of England." This idiosyncratic opportunism of the
two movements was therefore always undermined by
forces not within their control. But the fitful
effort made for closer union after Chesson's death
in	 was nullified as Fox Bourne became the new
APS Secretary.
A new chapter in the history of the APS,
therefore opened when the mantle of Elisha fell on
H.R. Fox Bourne at the beginning of l9. Henry
Richard Fox Bourne was one of the eight sons of
Stephen Bourne. In l33 Lord Melbourne's Government
had sent Stephen Bourne to Jamaica to supervise the
apprenticeship system which was to prepare the negroes
there for complete freedom. It was there that on
24 Dec. 137 Henry was born. Descended from an old
Puritan family that had produced some public-spirited
1. Charles Allen to Fox Bourne, 27 Oct. l9O, (ibid.)
The Times 23 Oct. lg9O.
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cit zens, his father, Stephen Bourne was well 1nown in
the early 19th Century as one of the more ideaListic
spirits In the Whig circles, having associated with
Caroline Fox, the niece of Charles James Fox, in
Sunday School work and. well-meaning philanthropy.
With Zachary Macaulay and Lord Brougham he had
denounced slavery. It was for these humanitarian
activities at home that Stephen Bourne was sent to
Jamaica in l33.
The family afterwards spent a few years In
British Guiana. Henry was between 10 and 11 years
old when his parents returned to London i
After attending a private school there, he entered
London University in i&56, since at this time Oxford
and Cambridge barred non-conformists, joining classes
at King's College and the City of London College. He
is said to have attended, at University College,
London, lectures on English Literature and History
given by Henry Morley, whose intimate friend and
assistant he afterwards became. In 1855, he entered
the War Office as a clerk, devoting his leisure to
literary and journalistic work. This was congenial
to him because his father who had in December 1826
founded the World, the first Nonconformist and
exclusively religious journal in England, had
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always maintained a respectable association with
journals and journalists. Henry regularly contributed
to the Examiner, an organ of advanced radical thought,
of which Henry Morley was editor, arid also wrote for
Charles Dickens in Household Words.
From l62, H.R. Fox Bourne started his
independently published works some of which show
painstaking research and capacity for prolonged effort.
In l68, he published his English Seamen Under theudors.
Although written in a straight-forward narrative style
almost barren of comment and criticism, his imperial
attitude s nevertheless discernible. He extols the
berioc adventures of the founders of British colonial
empire, 'the naval supremacy of England over the
nations of Europe', and the transformation which
made 'the little island of Britain', 'a rich and
2
powerful nation'. In the second volume of the same
book, Fox Bourne praises 'the bluff, dare-devil seamen
of the time of Elizabeth', 'who saved England from the
danger that threatened her at the hands of ambitious
Spain', rejoicing at 'the establishment of a British
1. Vide DNB for Sketch. Also the Times 5, 6, , 11 Feb. 190
AF May 1909.
2. H.R. Fox Bourne, English Seamen Under the Tudors,
(London, l6) Vol. I. P. vii.
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Empire spreading all round the globe, a hundred
times as great as Britain itself, through which were
to be disseminated all those blessings of civilization
and good government .....' The Romance of Trade,
published in l7l, though a romance, portrays Fox
Bourne's philosophy of trade. He welcomes the services
rendered by science to trade, discusses the hindrances
and stimulants which political action would offer to
trade which culminate in his admiration of the Cobden
Treaty. His later opposition to monopolies was
already foreshadowed in this work which shows his vast
knowledge of the history of monopolistic practices -
To Fox Bourne these 'curious political interference
with trade' might be tolerated when they were 'harmless',
but must be withdrawn, when they ceased to be beneficial
2
to the community. The tone of these works is somewhat
uncritical; but in harmony with the then popular
narrative style. His patriotism is nevertheless
portrayed in his praise of Englands commerce and
colonial expansion.
1. Fox Bourne, English Seamen op. cit. Vol. II,
P. 307.
2. Fox Bourne, The Romance of Trade (London, 171)
Pp. 1-22; 96-137; 138 -164; 165 - 196.
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Having retired from the War Office in 1870,
Fox Bourne used the money granted him in lieu of a
pension to purchase the copyright and control of the
Examiner, but the paper proved in his hands a
financial failure, and was ai3posed of in 1873. He
spent much of the next two years on a Life of John Locke
which he published in 1876. From 1876 to 1877, he was
editor of the Weekly Desatch wiiich under his auspices
well maintained its radical independence. Though a
Home Ruler, Fox Bourne opposed Galdstone's Home Rule
Bill of 1885 because of its propoa1 to retain Irish
members at Westminster. This led to his retirement
from the editorship. His confi*mned Liberal views were
always readily discernible but they became ever more
rigid and dogmatic when he ceased to be a political
journalist and became the propagandist of the
Aborigines Protection Society.
It was in 1889 that he began his Secretaryship
of the APS; and it is admitted even by unfriendly
critics that in almost all the delicate work undertaken
bY the Society in the twenty years he virtually led it,
he was not wanting either in sincerity or responsibility.




Public men resorted to him as to an encyclopaedia.
His acquaintance with European History and European
languages enabled him to command a range of reference
for his testimony which was not always available to
his opponents, and gave himp an advantage rarely to
be claimed for enthusiasts.
!ox	 interest in African affairs was
both pervasive and incisi.ve. Although he failed later
In his efforts to secure the franchise for Africans
in the Transvaal and Orange River in 1906, his strong
protests against the forced labour in Angola and the
.	 .
cocoa - growing islands of San Thome and Principe, helped
to compel the Portuguese Government to admit the
necessity for reform. He persevered in the effort of
the APS to expose 'the fiendish cruelty' of the Belgian
authorities towards the Congolese, directing the
attention of the public to the scandals in the Congo,
and protesting against unjust means which procured
temporary and inglorious gains in tropical Africa.
In. a series of pamphlets on Egyptian affairs, he
denounced the alleged abuses of the English military
1. Vide Fox Bourne, Civilization n Conoland: A
Story of International Wrong-Doing (London, lO3),
Pp. 297, 29a, 300, 303.
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occupation, and advocated egYptian self-government
between 1906 and 19O. Throughout his Secretaryship
of the Al'S, Fox Bourne's patient pertinacity In
investigation and his clearness of exposition gave
his views on African questions wide influence.
But some qualities in the man's character
accounted fox' much of his successes, just as other
defects produced certain failures. On the AP front,
Fox Bourne developed the pugnacious spirit of a
zealt, though he always tried to justify his
statements. A very modest man, he nevertheless
possessed high courage, unflinching independence and
unwearying passion for freedom. He was inspired by
the same Idealism which had throbbed in Clerkson and
Wilberforce, matching this spiritual urge with a rare
combination of thoroughness and pugnacity. A terror
to 'evil-doers in Africa' and the champion of ever7
tribe from the Cape to Nigeria, which stood In danger
of commercial exploitation and reckless official
methods, Fox Bourne was always Insistent oniMembers
of Parliament, airing his views and soliciting support
for these without fearing intimidation. He possessed
the one qualification most vital for any agitation -
a single mind which was as often troubled as there were
l2.
rumours of colonial disturbances. However, he very
nearly brought his power to lie mainly in denunciation,
never being able to propound constructive alternative
policies once he had systematically destroyed the
arguments of his opponents. Gradually he began to
nourish profound antagonisms towards those in power
and to some of his colleagues who might have disputed
the wisdom of some of his tactics; and even when he
had no opponents to dispute with his agonising belief
in the t'ruismr of his own opinions, however authent-
icated with copious facts, almost degenerated into
unwholesome prejudices. Always subduing a self-
consuming indignation, he gradually developed to be
a nervous wreck, "not very impressive at public
meetings" and speeches became a bore to him. Even
some of his admirers; not to talk of the officials
to whom his advocacy was directed, found him irascible
and apt to take more extreme views of incidents than
a reasonable interpretation could support. But it
must be understood that, although he lacked Morel's
flare for urbane journalism, Fox Bourne was also
1. Vide The Times of 5, 6, , 11 Feb. 1909)
May, 1909; Daily Mail 10 Feb. 1909;
Westminster Gazette 6 Feb, 19 09; DailyNews
1909; Justice, 20 Feb. 1909.
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dealing with moral issues on which it might be
impossible to take too extreme a view.
Even before Fox Bourne became its Secretary,
the Al'S had maintained its traditional position as
watch-dog for aboriginal rights, and. a humanitarian
pressure-group in Colonial policy. Throughout these
years its role was almost always that of protest and
its politics that of dissent. When in and after l7O
it was proposed to cede the Gambia to France, the Al'S
objected to the transfer because "we cannot so easily
get rid of the moral obligations which the actual
possession of settlements which have been under
ritish rule since the early part of the century
imposed upon us. Upon the faith of our occupation
British merchants have settled at Bathurst and carried
on trade with the interior, and many thousand of
coloured people, either belonging to the country or
planted there as liberated Africans, have been
1
taught to look to our flag for protection." The
acti&a the Al'S probably helped to procure the
Gold/&iancipation Ordinance of l74, which was intended
1. Q. in Fox Bourne, the Al'S, P.42.
A will be pointed out1ter this protest shows
that the Al'S did not always favour a 'Little
Englander' Policy.
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to enforce the anti-slavery provisions of the
famous Emancipation Act of 134. Almost till his death,
Chesson, its keen and insistent Secretary, was
officially occupied with opposing the seizure and
1
deportation of King Jaja of Opobo to Barbados in
With the appointment of Fox Bourne as
Secretary, the APS continued its role with more
reliable intelligence even if his dynamism did not
always reckon with official sensitivity. In l9,
a debate was raised in the House of Commons, at the
instigation of the Society, in condemnation of a
punitive expedition against the Tavieves, on the
eastern side of the Gold Coast, in the pre'ious year,
when the tribe was almost ex" .terminated in vengeance
for the killing of a young official who had rashly
interfered in a local quarrel. In l9O, in a
similar debate, with reference to a "yet more
murderous expedition", against an "obnoxious" chief
and his followers in the Sierra Leone interior, the
Government is said to have "only saved itself from the
risk of defeat by apo].ogising for the misconduct of
its subordinates". As a consequence of the Society's
appeals in 19l against the incarceration of thirty-
1. These activities are enumerated in Fox Bourne's
	 .
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six Africans in the Gold Coast without trial, all
the "political prisoners" who had not died were
liberated. Other persistent appeals against the
alleged official countenancing of child-slavery
in the Gold Coast probably resulted in the more
1
zealous enforcement of the law.
Indeed, as early as l9O, the APS was
already well-known in West Africa for its tireless
humanitarian campaigns on political and economic
issues affecting Africans. Between l9O and l91,
the APS so persistently znemoralised the Colonial Office
that the permanent officials there wondered who were
the disloyal "busy-bodies" in the Gold Coast "inciting"
2
them to these heady protests. When, therefore, in
l9l, Fox Bourne informed the Colonial Office of his
intention to visit West Africa, he was discouraged from
doing so. He would "not be allowed to fall into the
3
hands of the opponents of the Government." Instead,
he wrote to the Gold Coa5t Chronicle and suggested
1. Vide Fox Bourne,	 Pp. 49 - 50.
2. Minute of 22 April 19l by A.W.L. Hemming,
CO/96/220.
3. Minute of 114. Sept. l9l by Hennning, CO/96/220.
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that "patriotic residents" in the main towns there
should form local committees so as to supply
1.
beneficial information to his Society. For
obviously, as will be seen later, such accurate
intelligence was most necessary for any just,
generous, and humane government policy, but more so
for proper criticism which the Colonial Official
would notice. To informed protests of the Society
against the Ijebh War, in the Lags interior, in
192, may in part be attributed the conciliatory
measures that were adopted, "in lieu of reckless
slaughter," in the Egba district, though the
persistence of this policy in and after ]94 in
several West African districts would seem to indicate
that the successes of the Society in the ear]ier phase
were probably exaggerated.
1. Gold Coast Chronicle 21 and 2 Dec. l9l, Letter
f 13 Nov. l9l from Fox Bourne. Vide also
David Kimble A Political Histo r of Ghana,
l5O 1920 tOxford, 1963) Pp. 330-1 for the
effect of Fox Bourne's letter on the people of
the Gold Coast. Note, however, that in 1897, the
APS described as "unwarranted" the claim by the
Gold Coast Aborigines Rights t Protection Society
(formed that year) that the former was its parent
body. Vide AF July 1897.
2. Fox Bourne,	 , p.49.
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With the arrival in 195 of Chamberlain at
the Colonial Office, occasions for protest seemed to
have been multiplied by his systematic and
comprehensive policy of establishing British control
in West Africa. The Colonial Office policy was
based on two conslderations.The first recognised the
grim necessity of ultimately resorting to Corce as
a means of establishing British authority, in the
suppression of barbarous customs or even In the
various commercial arrangements without which
'our African estates' could not properly be
'developed'	 Chamberlain expounded this j,olicy
when in rcb 197, he told the Royal ColonIal
Institute that the British Humanitarians who
sympathised with the fate of wicked African Chiefs
rendered negative service to humanity: ".,..You
cannot have omelettes without breaking eggs; you
cannot destroy the practices of barbarism, of slavery,
of superstition, which for centuries have desolated
the interior of Africa, without the use of force;
but If you will fairly contrast the gain to
humanity with the price which we are bound to pay
1. H.C. Deb. 45 6 Aug. ].95, 641.
Also quoted in J.L. Garvin, Life of Joseph
Chamberlain, Vol. 3, l95 - 1900. Pp. 19-20.
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for it, I think you may well rejoice in the result of
such expeditions as those which have teen recently
conducted with such signal successes in Nyasalarid,
Ashanti, 3enin and Nupe - expeditions which may have,
and indeed have, cost valuable lives, but as to which
we may rest assured that for one life lost a hundred
will be gained, and the cause of civilisation and
the prosperity of the people will in the long run be
eminently advanced...... •."
This military attitude of the Colonial
Office was, therefore, partly a reaction to situations
which pacific methods could not cope with; it was
also however adopted because of other related
policies. The Colonial Office tended to believe that
these military expeditions on one tribe would have the
moral lesson of intimidating other tribes to obedience.
For example in October 199, W.H. Mercer, then a
principal clerk, minuted that military operations in
Northern Nigeria would "help towards the settlement
of the country of Southern Nigeria by their moral
effect on the natives, who are in general acquainted
1. Proceedings of the Ro yal Colonial Institute,
Vol. XXVIII la96-7, London Annual Dinner,
197, Pp 23 - 7.
Also Charles W. Boyd Mr. Chainber1air?s' 3eeches
Vol. 11 (1914) Pp 3-4..
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with and Influenced by events at a considerable
1
distance." On the other hand, the Colonial Office
always considered it one of its imperial functions
that barbarous customs, and in particular slavery,
must be suppressed. In January 1900, Reginald
Antrobus minuted that "public opinion in this country
requires (and in Mr. Chamberlain's opinion rightly)
that imperial control over savage countries should
be justified by some serious effort to put down
2
slave-dealing." Since the Ashanti, some Northern
Nigerian Einirs, the Aros and other native 'powers'
persisted in these barbarous dealings, application
of force was merely logical.
However, since most of these pL-t4.ve"
expeditions were suggested by Colonial officials,
1. Minute b W.H. !4ercer (later Sir) on Moor to CQ
22 Sept l99, CO 444/2.
Mercer W.H. l55 - 1932 KCMG (1914) 1st class
clerk âO	 Principal cherk 1B9; worked with
the CA 1900-21; Chairman West African Currency
Board, 1916.
2. Minute by R.L. Antrobus on Moor to CO 2 Jan 1900
CO 520/1.
Antrobus, (later Sir) Reginald, KCMG, C.B.;l53-
1942; 18O-9, Private Secretary to successive
Colonial Secretaries; l89-90 acted as Governor
of St. Helena; l9-1909 Asst. Under-Sec. of State
for the Colonies; l909-1 Sn. Crown Agent for the
Colonies; 19-l909 was in charge of the West African
Dept. of the C.O. though several reorganisations
did not make this a permanent assignment.
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they were mainly allowed because Colonial Office
policy was to support the 'man on the spot'. As
Antrobus minuted in 199, the Colonial Office attitude
in Africa was influenced by its practical policy:
"not to administer but to control administration."
The Colonial Office "deliberately" left "the
initiative in most matters to the local governments"
and "refrained from interfering with them more thafl"
was "necessary to secure that the Colonies shall be
administered on lines which " would "meet the approval
2
of Parliament". This poUcy of supporting the Colonial
officials was recapitulated by Lord Onslow when he
addressed the African Society in ?4arch 1907:
"When I had the honour of taking a share in
the Colonial Administration under Mr. Chamberlain,
it was the settled policy of the Colonial Office
that you ought never, except under very
exceponal circumstances, to interfere with
the decision and the policy of the man whom
you bad sent out to administer, and in return
we at the Colonial Office only asked for one
1. Minute by R.L. Antrobus on Moor to CO
14 June l99, CO 444/1.
2. Minute by R.L. Antrobus on W.T. Dyer to CO,
16 Sept. 1902, CO 520/16.
3. Lord Onslow was Parliamentary Under-Sec. for
Colonies from 12 Nov. 1900 till 23 July 1903.
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thing, and that was that we should be kept
fully and completely informed of what the
man on the spot intended to do and what he
advised us to do. So long as we were kept
absolutely informed of what was about to be
done, the occasions on which the Colonial
Office interfered were of the very rarest."
The disastrous outcome of this policy was to make
more despotic the already huge powers the Colonial
2
Governor* possessed. Since many of these Governors
came to West Africa with previous military experience,
they were more inclined to adopt military and too
expeditious methods in dealing with Africans, whether
the motive was hmanitarian, political or economic,
using the cheap military glories gained against
unarmed Africans for winning military honours at
borne. This policy which was inaugurated by the
Ijebti' Expedition, followed by the Ashanti Expedition
of l95, featured other disturbances provoked in the
Sierra Leone Protectorate by the imposition and
"reckless enforcement" of a Hut Tax and the licence
4
accorded to an undisciplined Frontier Police. Its
economic aspect was specially marked by the forcible
overthrow of King Nana of the Benln River in l94,
1. Journal of Afrcan Society, Vol. Vi, 1906-7,
London pp. 304-5; Speech made by the 4th Earl of
Onslow on March 1907.
2. Holt to Morel, 14 Sept. 1910.
3. West Africa, 12 Oct. 1901.
4. AF. Nov. ig99.
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the Benin Expedition and conquest of 196, and
the brutal handling of the Brass disturbances
2l95. In the various punitive expeditions against
African chiefs and communities, there was a real
compound of political aims and economic considerations,
but the imperial humanitarian note was never lacking.
The attitude of the APS to the punitive
raids was in harmony with the pacific policy
advocated by unofficial bodies in Britain; but it was
at variance with the hysterical pride shown by the
mass of the public in the victories gained by
British forces over 'barbarous' chieftains in
.3
Africa. While accepting that the practices of some
African chiefs might be 'obnoxious', the APS
nevertheless believed that "the hunting down of such
1.. For the British economic motives behind the Benin
Expedition see T. Eneli, 0vrennjhjn Ernminent
Nigerians of the !'Tineteenth Centurl (Ed. K.0. Dike)
Tlbadan, 1960)
2. Vide J.E. Flint, Sir George Goldie and the Making
of Nigeria. (0.U.P. 1960) F'. 187-215; E.J. Alogoa,
The Akpssa Raid (Ibadan, 1960); also E.J. Alogoa,
The Small Brave City State (Ibadan and Wisconsin
1965) Chap. 7.
3. There was hysterical pride in the British press
over the military overthrow of African chiefs
and chiefdoms. See Mornin g Post 11 June 1902,
13 May 1902, African Times1 5 Nay 1902.
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people, with destruction of their villages and
slaughter of large numbers" could have "no civilising
1
effect on the survivors." It was particularly
alarmed by the activities of the West African Frontier
Force, which, it said, called "for vigilance and
earnest protests from all" ho held "the views of the
APS." In 1902 and 1903, it publicly condemne& the
WAFF and Lugard's military penetration in Northern
3
Nigeria. Chamberlain might tell the Colonial
Institute that "you cannot make omel$ttes without
breaking eggs,' rather the APS saw this Jesuitical
doctrine as "not a product of civilization but a
4
survival of barbarism
This attitude of the APS was re-emphasised
by the persistent attacks made by Fox Bourne in
April 190]. on Chamberlain's "system'atic and comprehensive
design for the forcible development of our West African
estates", which according to him, had the effect of
1. Annual Report of APS, 1901.
2. Ibid.
3. Annual Reorts for 1902., 19 03 also in A? Feb. 1904,
May 1907,	 March 1907.
4. The A? of May 1907 specifically referred to
Cham15rlain' s remarks.
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"over-awing native communities who, with or without
good reason, object to the arrangement by which we
1
propose to control them." He vigorously denounced
the policy of sending a Mohammedan force against
Pagans and vice versa because when the troops had
no fighting to do they were apt to pursue mi5ChOUS
ends. Moreover the employment of these troops in
such a way as to satisfy their tribal or racial
antagonism was objectionable, just as the enlargement
of these armies was iikely to prove dangerous to the
general community. Fox Bourne contended that the
Colonial Office was trying to develop West Africa too
rapidly, and was employing Africans fa'cibly for the
purpose. He however observed that the APS had no
objection to the annexation of West Africa by Britain,
but protested against the policy of forcing trade on
to the people of Africa. He denied the humanitarian
motives behind the attack on Ashanti and saw it as
1. Fox Bourne, Blacks and Whites in West Africa
(pamphlet). Also in "Star! April 1901.
2. Fox Bourne 'Against Employing Black troops in
West Africa' in West African News, 3 April 1901.
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primarily economic: "Gold was at the bottom of the
business.....It remains to be seen whether real and
lasting advantage to either whites oi blacks has been
procured by our recent acquisitions of territory and
assertions of authority. In that case, perhaps, it
will be found that there is more profit in utilising
the huge hardwood trees that cover some 12,000 sq.
miles of forest land, and in cultivating the ground
thus made available, than in grabbing at the gold,
of which there are reported to be rich stores in
1
portions of the country." In October of the 8ame
year, Fox Bourne accused the British colonial
authorities in West Africa of "nigger-hunting,"
maintaining that most of the expeditions were ostensibly
for the suppression of slavery, human sacrifice, and
savage institutions, while in essence their real
object was the promotion of British commerce.
1. Fox Bou..rne 'Against Employing 8lack troops in
West Africa' In West African News, 3 April 1901.
2. Fox Bourne, in a lecture on 'Punitive ExpeditIons'
in Oct. 1901 under the auspôes of the Liverpool
Peace Society.
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Although men like 'Sir Alfred Jones sat on
the fence and even supported the policy of ultimate
use of force, commercial opinion was in general
opposed to this forcible method of promoting commerce.
John Holt wroteseries of letters to Morel Inducing
him to publish attacks in West Africa on the
Government policy of punitive expeditions. He
opposed this policy because it was financially
expensive, ecoiomical1y disastrous to trade, since
"it is bad policy to kill people we want to trade with...'t
It was inhuman, and destructive of African political
and social institutions. He was so alarmed by the
serries of punitive raids in West Africa th he
bitterly criticised the attitude of the governing
classes to the Africans. " - They are a bad lot and
are turning the African into a driven brute, a thing
to kick, bully, rob and enslave rather than follow
the old Ideal of kindness and patience and respect for
1. vest Africa, 4 Jan 1902.
2. Holt to Morel, 7 Aug. 1900.
Holt here laments that Chamberlain would support
the operations of WAFF by asking for a Parliamentary
grant.
3. Holt to Morel, 29 Dec. 1900, F/l, EDIP.
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truth and right. This jingo craze is making us
regard our friends as creatures to be despoiled and
ruled by force. This intolerant Imperialism is a
cruel selfish devil.;.." He was of the opinion that
the true results of marching through West Africa
with armed bands to pacify it would be smoking
villages and homeless peo1e; sad specimens of the
Pax Brittanica. lie alleged that the suppression of
slavery and other African rebellion was used to
justify punitive raids. Holt wrote to Morel:
"They go on smashing and announce everything
now settled but you soon find the smashing
and settling have to be done again. We must
have these brave soldiers to banquet when they
come home and tell them how proud we are of
theni......It is part of the new Imperialism.
I will not believe the slaves being set loose
by thousands until I have proof. I know how
these bloody scoundrels cry slavery and native
atrocities in order to justify their brutalies
and lack of tact, pa1ence or sympathy towards
the natives......." .,
1. Holt to Morel, 2 April, 1901, F/l, EDMP.
2. Holt to Morel, 23 April, 1901, F/l,
3. Holt to Morel, 26 April 1901, F8/l.
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A leader in West Africa summarised the views of the
merchants by criticising the 'wrong policy' of
punitive raids: "Commercially, it Is not practical
to shoot your customer. Politically, it is not
practical in a country like West Africa to destroy
the native form of society, ... and. break the power
of the chiefs - Financially, it is not practical, for
it means the piling tIp of debts	 and the ultimate
impoverishment of the country' Morel, who might
have presented the merchants' case in the leader
referred to, was not out of tune with the views of
the APS on these punitive expeditions. He wrote:
"The country (i.e. BritIsh West Africa) needs
po1itial rest...It should be our object to
intermeddle as little as possible with native
institutions, abide with scrupulous exactitude
to both the spirit and the letter of our
treaties with the Chiefs; develop the native
peoples along the lines of their own
civilisation.... use conciliation In preference
to dictation.... Patience, more patience, and
again patience that ought to be the cornerstone
o' British policy in West Africa ...."'
1. West Africa 12 Oct. 1901.
2. Affairs of West Africa, (London 1902) Pp. 15-16.
For Morel's further attacks on the punitive expedition
see also his 'Conditions of Rule in West Africa' in
AF July 1901, A speech delivered on 11 June 1901 to
TEe Womens National Liberal Association; 'British
Policy in Ashanti' in Pall Mall Gazette 8 Jan. 1901.
Morel here concludes that "the two things which
British West Africa requires are peace arid
adminstrative reforms."
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These criticisms echoed in the House
of Commons • On 23 February 1903, Alfred Eminott,
Liberal Member for Oldham, drew the attention of
the House to reports in the Morn1g Post of that
day, expressing dismay at what he felt were
purposeless military expeditions in Sokoto and Southern.
Nigeria.1
 The following month, John Ellis 2 forced
Chamberlain to proclaim that no charge was expected
to fall on the National Exchequer during the financial
year 1903-1904 in consequence of what Ellis called
"avoidable military operations" in Nigeria? On
4
2 June 1904, T.W. Russell told the House how
Trenchard, an officer in Southern Nigeria, had
attacked the natives of Ibibio and the Ohuhl3. country
and burned six villages. 5
 The Unionist Government
1. H.C. Debs. 45, 1903, vol.CXVIII, 493.
2. Ellis, t. Hon. John Edward, P.C. 1906. J.P. D.L.
Liberal M.P. for Rushcliffe, Notts. since l5;
Pan. Under-Sec for India, 1905-6. Born 141.
Managed Colliery. Company Director. Died 5 Dec. 1910.
3• HC Debs. 43 1903. Vol. 122, 1629.
4• Russell,Rt. Hon. Sir Thomas Wallace, 1st Bt. Cr. 1917;
P.C.; T14l-l920); Educated at Madras Academy, Cupar,
Fife; Settled in Ireland 159; Sec. of various
Temperance organisations; Liberal LP. for S. Tyrone
l6-19l0; N. Tyrone, 1911s18; Interested in Irish
Land Question.
HC Debs. 43 1904 Vol. 135, 5&
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always justified these expeditions as necessary
expedients if barbarous customs were to be eliminated.
Not always convinced by the Government's case, the
Liberals themselves when they caine to power persisted
In the same policy of punitive measures, and justified
it with the same arguments they had rejected while in
opposition. On the 1st Narcb 1906, James O'JCelly
referred the Commons to a large number of punitive
expeditions mounted against natives of Southern
Nigeria during 1904-5," in which large number of
natives were killed and wounded, villages destroyed,
cattle and goods seized and carried away; and trade
deteriorated." 2
 The explanation then given by
Winston Churchill did not lack the imp'ia1
humanitarian motives, but was hard'y regarded as
authentic or convincing; a few weeks later J. Cathcart
Wason Implored the Government to discourage punitive
1. O'ICeUy, James, M.P. (Nationalist) County of
Roscommon since l95; born 145; Son of JohnO'Kelly of Itoscominon. Ed. at Dublin Tjniv.;
Sorbonne; Served in French Army Siege of Paris),
in Cuba, USA against Indians; travelled in
Mexico; formerly war correspondent of Dail y Ne
M.P. County of Roscommon 10-5; N. Roscommon,
l5-92. Died 22 Dec. 1916.
2. H.0 Debs, 45. 1906, Vol. 152. l20, 121.
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, It must be pointed out, however, that
much as it would have been more constructive
according to Dr. Blyden, to replace "Maxim guns and
Martini rifles" by a wholesale war on tropical
2
diseases, much of these criticisms were either
saftimental, selfishly inspired or utterly myopic.
n t might seem ungraciousto undermine "The g'eunds
of humanity" on w?ich the APS and other humanitarians
built their case by referring to the fecund accretions
of tribal barbarities which these expeditions helped
to eliminate. But even the attitude of the Chambers
of Commerce was no more humanitarian than it was
short-sighted. The merchants saw that punitive
raids caused wars which led to commercial regiess and
they opposed them forgetting that out of temporary
turmoil would emerge a more lasting tabi1ity and
order. By emphasing the welfare of Africans the
merchants tried to give their intelligent self-
Interest astute legitimacy. But when the same
1. HC Debs. 45. 1906, Vol. 155, 497, 49g.
2. An address by Dr. Blyden before the African Trade
Section of the Liverpool Chamber on 9 Sept. 1901
in WesAfrica, 12 Oct. 1901; also by Blyden,West Africa before Europe (London, 1905) P.35-6.
3. Annual Report of APS, 1902, A? Feb. 1904.
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Africara stood in the way to their complete
commercial sway, as in the case of King Jaja, the
same merchants championed the equally myopic policy
of African destruction.
The contrast between the traditional
emotionalism of the APS and its allies, and the
interested though practically reasonable, motives
of the Third Party, was bitterly marked when the
Liquor Traffic to West Africa caused an open crisis
wrong the humanitarians. Temperance had always been
an issue which touched on the sensitivity of a large
portion of English Society. As a dynamic factor
dividing the political opinions of men as well, it
had always aroused the sentiment and emotions of
2
people, often generating impetuous reactions, and
obscuring a sober calculation of what was possible.
Opposition to the Liquor Traffic in West Africa was
a reflection of the traditional humanitarian
conscience for temperance. Supported by other groups
1. For the oppositior to Jaja, See Flint, oldie, op.cit.
2. For the significance of temperance in British politi,
see R.C.K. Ensor, 'Some political and economic
interactions in later Victorian England.'
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society,
h Ser. 1111 (194.9) ,17-28. Aijo A.F Iath1en,
op. cit., P.339.
149.
who saw an opportunity to deal with their commercial.
rivals, the Anti-Liquor campaigns almost immediately
tarnished the popular image of Liverpool merchants
who engaged in the trade; other people who supported
them stood the danger of a sullied reputation. The
West Coast trader came to be regarded as "a thoroughly
bad lot of unprincipled men who have been driven to
abandon the slave trade by outside power and are
1
now engaged in killing off the natives with spirits."
It must be emphasised, however, that the
Liquor traffic in West Africa was a very old branch
of trade, flourishing In spine parts of the coast
even before the British occupation. It developed as
part and parcel of the general barter trade,almost
rivalling arms and ammunition as the most important
means of exchange in West African trade system. A
trader who went into West Africa without "trade
spirits" to exchange for the raw materials which the
Africans gathered and cultivated must surely be a
novice In the Coast trade for he would soon learn
1. Kingsley to Holt, 27 Nov. l97, 16/i, JHF.
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1
the futility of his venture. Another point worth
mentioning is that even before the white man
brought 'trade spirits' to Africa, the West African
already drank fermented alcoholic beverages obtained
from various species of palm trees, guinea-corn,
maize, millet and other cereals. But when
European 'gin' came into West Africa, it was
quickly admitted as an article of trade, an essential
to African ceremonies, burials, and marriage
festivities. By the early 19th century, however,
this trade had so much become part of the African
system that African chiefs cherished it as they bad
1. J.E. Flint, Golde7
Originally, the spirits imported were largely
of Brazilrian origin; but the trade was soon
confined to Continental sources, being mainly
products of Dutch and German distólleries.
They were brought by British, French, German
and African merchants engaged in West African
commerce and exported from Rotterdam and
Hamburg in the steamers of Elder Dempster and.
the German Woerman lines.
2. Tizes 7 July 1911.
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1
cherished slavery. When later its scope and
proportion increased with more demand, the liquor traffic
was also attacked with the same crusading spirit as
slavery and the slave trade had been.
The anti-liquor campaign was led by the
tradiiona1 humanitarian movements, spearheaded by
the Aborigines' Protection Society but gaining the
adhesion of Temperance societies, particularly that
of the Church of England. When in March l7 the
2
Nat.ve Races and Liquor Traffic United Committee
was formed, it crystallised into a solid body the
1. An African Chief summarised the system of
commerce as follows: "We want three things,
powder, ball and brandy, and we have three things
to sell, men, women and children." See
T.F. Buxton The Slave Trade and Its Remedy (l4O)
P. 20. Also quoted by N. Perhaxn in 1gard:
iears of Authorit y (Collins, 1960)P. 560.
2. 1ormed in l7, the NR and L.T.UC was led by the
following: President: The Duke of Westminster;
Chairman: Archbishop of Canterbury; Vice-
Chairman: Sir John Kennaway, M.P.; Chairman of
Executive Committee: Clarence A. Roberts Esq.;
Vice-Chairman of Ex. Corn.: T. Morgan Harvey.
Hon. Sec. Dr. C.F. Harford-Batterby, M.A. D.D.
Their office was at 139, Palace Chambers,
Bridge Street, Westminster.
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divergent interests and doctrines inimical to the
trade. The APS cooperated with the Committee in
producing the most energetic and ubiquitous
opposition the Liquor party had to contend with.
In West Africa, the missionary allies of the APS
and the United Committee who ascribed the alleged
deterioration of the coastal societies to European
tg1fl, were in the van of temperance movements. But
when the Royal Niger Company and its supporters
openly endorsed these campaigns for increased
duties on spirits, for their restriction and
eventual proh ib it ion, the disinterested humanitarian
ethics cooperated with the opportunism of a Company
whose opposition was merely a reflection of its
commercial and political strategy.
The policy of the Niger Company was consistent
with the dubious role of satisfying humanitarian ideals
by public pronouncements, while privately it tried to
maintain its commercial supremacy which was threatened
by the opposition of Liverpool 'gin traders.' A a
demonstration of its 'humanitarian' considerations)
Taubman Goldie at the Berlin Conference bad urged
his colleagues to bring the liquor traffic before the
powers.' In July l9O Lord Aberdare in a speech to the
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shareholders of the Niger Company had praised the
humane role of the Company. Moreover in l95, Goldie
had publicly advocated the total prohibition of
the trade spirits into West Africa from the
Southern frontiers of Morocco to the Northern
frontiers of the Cape Colony, suggesting methods of
practically dealing with any smuggling that might
arise. His argument for proposing prohibition was
that it was better for the commerce of West Africa
to suffer temporary dimunition with the prospect
of reaping the permanent benefit which must acrue
from putting commerce on a sounder foundation. In
the same year the Company had legally prohibited
the importation of spiritous liquors, for sale or
barter into any place within its jurisdiction,
1
north of 7th parallel of North latitude.
These pronouncements and actions might
have been commendable were it not that the Company
itself was engaged in the trade. Although Goldie
had apparently pressurised his colleagues to bring
the liquor traffic to the attention of Europe, by
l6, he was asking the British Government to
1. Sir George T. Goldie,
--	 .	 .1.	 .	 .
e 27th Feb.. 1895.
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compensate his company for its financial sacritices
and service to keep the Niger British by granting
the Company a complete monopoly of the importation
of war materials and alcoholic liquor into th Niger.
Moreover, the effect of the Company's measure in
Northern Nigeria was not really revolutionary.
Although Moslems were not always practical
abstainers, the absence ofLtraders in that part of
West Africa meant that trade in spirits or in arms
there was well within manageable proportions. By
publicising the abolition of liquor traffic in an
area where the trade was minusele, the Company
played up its humanitarian pretensions to a public
which was progressively becoming restive over the
persistent rumours thaZ the Company had terrorised
its African commercial competitors. On the other
hand, the action in Northern Nigeria could be
understood also as a strategical defence from the
economic war of those days. As Lugard pointed out,
the illicit traffic in gin which reached Jebba,
Egga and Lokoja from form and towns in the
Western province, supplied the basis of trade to
Lagos in its hinterland, and wdefrauded the Royal
1. Goldie to J, Paunceforte Dec. l6,
FO/4/179. cited by Flint Go1di, '.79.
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Niger Company of a portion of its legitimate trade
in its own territories." His promise that he would
see to it that the Directors of the Company would
take action to protect their own commercial
interests not only indicates the primary position
of economic interest in the Company's policy but
also reflected Lugard's determination to shut out
traders from Northern Nigeria.
The view that the action of the Company was
directed towards Its own economic interests was
justified by accusations, not convincingly disproved,
that the Company itself indulged in the trade It
publicly condemned. The Royal Niger Company must
be judged more by its alleged reluctance to
extinguish the trade in the lower Niger where
liquor was most useful for its trade than in Northern
Nigeria where few, if any, traders went in or
competed with it. In January	 John Holt alleged
that the company had been shipping out "enormous
quantities" of spirits during the highwater of
197 to avoid any duties which (as the charter was
expected to be withdrawn) a new administration might
1. In Sir George T. Goldie, The West Afric
LiqorTraffi, op. cit. 	 --
156.
impose. Towards the end of the same year, James
Pinnock, who had earlier beers a Director of the
Niger Company, also alleged that in the first
three months of the year, the Company had
shipped "enormous quantity of common, fiery,
continental gin recently imported into the Niger
Territories, which some of the highest authorities
and writers have declared to have more injurious
effect than the evils attendant on the slave
2
trade of the past." He had earlier announced
in the press that the quantity of gin shipped by
the Company was "too serious to be facetious".
When the complicity of the Royal Niger
Company in the liquor trade came up in Parliament,
the specious arguments which Goldie had given the
Colonial Office in defence of its commercial
activi1es failed to convince people who now saw
that they had been deluded. Goldie had tried "to
1. Flint, Goldie, op. cit. P.302.
2. J. Pirinock to CO. l Nov. l89, CO 79/lOO
3. Journal of Commerce, 15 Nov.
4. For the action in Parliament see Flint Goldie.
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blind" the Missionary party, including the African
clergy, into conniving at the seamy aspects of the
Company's administration "in the Imperial interest."
But the Aborigines' Protection Society, while it
allowed itself to be deceived by the Company's
denials, never relaxed its criticism of its
trade monopoly. Since l7, when the AP3 countenanced
the complaints coming from African and European traders
in Lagos, to l92 when Liverpool and the Niger
Company virtually fused together, the activity of
the Niger Company had worried the Society. It had
opposed the manner in which the Company handled the
Brass disturbance of l95,and was quietly moving
towards demanding a complete withdrawal of the
charter. In l97, in a House of Commons debate,
Sidney Buxton had confessed that the control of the
Foreign Office over the Niger Company was practically
nil, "whereas If it were placed under the Colonial
Office, we should then be able to bring to bear on
its administration that public opinion and public
control which at present were entirely lacking."2
1. Ayne1.e, op.cit.
2. A.?., May 1897.
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When the cumulative pressures brought upon the
Government led to the loss of the Company's
Charter, the APS was jubilant over "the improved
system of government" for the Niger Territories,
"To be controlled from the Colonial Office
3.
instead of from the Foreign Office as heretofore's
The dubious altruism of the Niger Company during the
Liquor crisis was reflected in a duality of attitudes:
while the Company proclaimed humanitarian idealism
to a public already sensitive of the implications
of its trade monopoly, it at the same time privately
deprecated it by engaging in a traffic which it
recognised as one of the necessary guarantees of Its
commercial predominance.
The attitude of the Third Party was no less
interested, though redeemed by its pragmatic caution.
Mary Kingsley joined battle i favour of the
merchants engaged in the liquor trade to West Africa
because	 believed that they had been unjustly
misrepresented and caluinnised by Exeter Hall. In
spite (f the unpopularity of the traffic, Kingsley
courageously stood for it and publicly championed
1. Fox Bourne, AP	 P.51.
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what she regarded as the cause of truth and commonsense.
She was neither impressed by the moral issues which the
APS and, the Missionary alliance raised nor interested in the
so-called "gentlemanly" life which it was alleged the
"grog shop" threatened in West Africa. 1 Her attitude
was influenced by two considerations. She was of the
opinion that the liquor sent out to West Africa was not
poison and produced no "awful consequences" on the Africans.2
Even if it was later proved that the liquor was not of the
best quality, Kingsley maintained that when she went to the
West Coast, she failed to find, the Africans "a set of
drunken children". 3 Moreover, she believed that the
liquor traffic benefited English commerce, regarding as
untrue the argument advanced by some members of the liquor
and anti-liquor parties to the contrary. In January 1898
she wrote to Holt to verify this point:
"Would you tell me if I say that there is an
an advantage to the English trader if he sells a case
of foreign gin value 2/3d., for African stuff of twice
that value.	 One of these anti-liquor arguments is
that the sale of foreign liquor is a loss to British
trade; this seems to me untrue....." k.
Convinced that the trade was neither deleterious to the
1. Kingsley to Holt, 27 Nov. 1897, 16/1, JEP.
2. Ibid.
3. Kingsley to Edt, 6 Dec. 1897, 16/1, JHP.
LI. Kingsley to Holt, 29 Jan. 1898, 16/1, JHP.
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African nor unprofitable to British merchants, Nary
Kingsley tried (even when her friends advised her not to
damage herself in the public eye by defending the liquor
traffic) to save English trade from the impending wreck
that threatened it 11on the rock faddism".1
Her attitude was particularly influenced by the
involvement of her colleague in the traffic. But although
John Holt was actively engaged in the liquor trade, be
never ceased to consider	 African welfare. Although
he was never impressed by exaggerated reports about the
deinoralising effects of liquor on Africans, he nevertheless
wanted the African to drink liquor "of a moderate strength
and an age that would make it a safe beverage". 2 In
1899, he had asked the Colonial Office to urge at the
Brussels Conference that a basis of strength might be
agreed to so that the import of all spirits above that
strength might be prohibited, everywhere, except in methy-
lated form. 3 When he was informed that the Brussels
Conference concluded that the best solution of the difficulty
was to give greater facilities for diluting spirits while
in bond, arid increased duties, 4 bit argued that this
1. Kingsley to bolt, 1 Jan. 1898, 16/1, JHP..
Kingsley to bolt, 3 March 1898, 16/1, JHP.
2. bolt to C.0. 13 May 1899 (Copy) 9/1, JHP..
3. Ibid.
li. R.L. .ntrobus to bolt, 19 July, 1899, 9/1, JHP.
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method would not efficaciously protect the African. lie
wrote to Axitrobus:
"....The facilities for diluting spirits in bond.
and. proportionate increase of duty in relation to
strength will not prevent the native being supplied with
this liquor fire. In the interest of the native we
should give him old spirit of a strength fit to be
drunk without the admixture of water sold to him as
he never wishes for the addition of water whatever
the strength of the spirit offered. 	 Unless there
can be a law preventing the import and sale of new
and, strong spirit, competition will compel importers
to buy the cheapest stuff for West Coast markets.
I am sorry to find the Brussels Conference has no
other remedy to enforce for the native good, than
that of an increase of duties. 	 These cannot provide
him with spirits of good quality or of safe strength.'
Much as he was concerned with the quality of the liquor
sent to Africa, Holt nevertheless viewed. with contempt the
"extreme disposition of mad prejudice" which the "madcap
teetotallers" demonstrated. on the issue.2
The position which Morel adopted. was the very
antithesis of the Royal Niger Company's role. The Company
had announced that the trade was immoral and uneconomic
and. had proved. the fatuity of its position by surreptiously
indulging in it. Norel had announced that the trade was
inherently bad., had even disagreed with Kingsley on some
of her arguments; 3 but he supported the traffic openly
because it was not practical politics to oppose it.	 In
1. Holt to Antrobus, 20 July 1899 (Copy) 9/1, JHP.
2. Holt to Morel, 1 Oct. 1900, P8/i, EDMP..
3. Morel, Affairs of West Africa Pp. 23L._.
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the one, humanitarianism was proclaimed even when it did
not exist; in the other, it was reduced to mundane
proportions to serve a more immediate necessity. Morel
was also opposed to the undiscriminating fervour with
which the missionaries denounced the trade, in not
distinguishing between harmful and. uninjurious species.
He realised, that the revenues of West African Colonies
came largely from this traffic; and although this was no
matter for congratulation on the part of the Colonial
officials, yet Morel saw this trade as "the backbone of
revenue" to the local administrations.	 If the trade was
prohibited, direct taxation would be substituted; but
since neither the merchants nor the Third Party wanted to
see a repetition of the Sierra Leone revolt, they supported
the trade in spirits as the lesser ol' the two evils.1 	 Thus
when in May 1903 at the annual meeting of the United
Committee for the Prevention of Demoralization of Native
Races by the Liquor Traffic, Bishop Oluwale of Lagos
moved that the Governor of Lagos should "put a stop to the
evil with a stroke of the pen", Morel asked the Bishop to
show how. 2
 Apart from the economic implications of
abolishing the traffic in the West Coast, Morel's attitude
1. Ibid.
2. West African Mail, 22 May 1903.
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was also influenced by the very nature of his relation
with the gin traders. In view of the economic position
of the West African Mail, it was surely not in its best
interest that Iiorel should be antagonistic to the liquor
traffic which all the principal supporters ci' the paper
indulged in. 1 Gradually, he made the most convincing
case against the arguments of the anti-liquor party.2
The official attitude progressively yielded
to the importunate demands of the APE and its allies for
increased duties on spirits, for restriction, and. for the
regulation of their quality and. strength. Nevertheless
in stopping short of prohibition It not only took into
account the practical arguments of the Third Party which
pointed to the economic, social and political exigencies
of the West African situation. 	 The APE was so much
concerned with the liquor trade that at the Brussels
Conference of 1889-90, which had been convened with the
principal object of devising measures for the suppression
of slavery and the slave trade in Africa, it took an active
part in inducing it to extend its enquiries to the supDly
1. Morel to Holt,	 April, 1909, 18/6, JHP.
Morel reports to Holt his answer to Dr Harford-Batterby's
efforts to make him support the United Committee.
2. See Morel, E.D., Native Races and the Liquor Traffic
United Committee (Liquor Traffic in Southern Nigeria).
(Pamphlet); Attack upon the Commission of Inquiry into
the Spirit trade in Southern Nigeria (1910). This is
a compilation of West African Mail articles on the role
of the Anti-Liquor party after the Commission reported.
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of alcoholic liquors and, arms and amtnunit]-ons to kfricans.1
In 1895, the APS memorialised. Chamberlain, urging an
augmentation of the duty in a portion of the Gold Coast,
in Lagos, and in the Niger Coast Protectorate. 2 In
September 1896, In a reply to an anti-liquor memorial,
the Narquis of Salisbury informed the committee of the
APS. that negotiations were tln progress for imposing
onthe British, French and German protectorates and. Colonies
in West Africa a uniform duty on spirits higher than the
minimum provided by the Brussels Act."3
1. Pox Bourne, APS P. 53. Pox Bourne gave an address
on "The Liquor Traffic with Native Races in Africa"
at a meeting convened by the Holy Trinity Church
of Jngland Temperance Society at Barnabury.
$ee A.P. Dec. 1896.
2. Fox Bourne, APS, P. 54.
3. ,	 Dec. 1896,
May 1897.
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The Colonial Office was so pestered by these
anti-liquor campaigns 1 that Chamberlain in February 1897
asked the West .&frican Governors to send home samples of
the trade spirits imported into each Colony. 2 When these
samples arrived, he requested the Board of Inland Revenue
to analyse them in their laboratory in order to discover
if the stuff sent to West Africa contained deleterious matter
i. From the time the United Committee was formed, Liquor
Deputations were sent to the F.O. and C.O. The first
deputation, led by the Duke of westminster was received
by Lord Salisbury on 14 Dec. 1888, and probably influenced
the Liquor C]aises of the Brussels General Act, which
again probably influenced the sale of spirits to natives
in vast areas of Africa. A second deputation was
received by Joseph Chamberlain, on 4 Ipril 1899. Since
this coincided with the Centenary week of the CM "a
most representative deputation filled the large reception
room at the C.O. and. listened to one of the strongest
condemnations of the traffic which has ever been
delivered".	 It is also claimed by the United Committee
that following this deputation, the Brussels Conference
agreed to a general raising of duties on important
spirits. The third deputation was a private one,
received by Chamberlain, who was accompanied by Lord
Mimer, in July 1901 and related to the Liquor Traffic
in South Africa. The fourth was received by the Earl
of Crewe, on 6 July 1908, the special object being to
allow Bishop TugwellandAast. Bishops Oluwale and Johnson
to express their views, winch probably also influenced
the Liquor Committee of Inquiry. A fifth deputation
was to meet Lewis Harcourt on 11 July 1911.
Vide London Record 30 June 1911; Alliance News 13 July 1911
2. Chamberlain to West African Governors 9 feb. 1897
Circular CO 879/58 CF.
3. CO to Board of Inland Revenue, 3 April 1897,
00879/58 OP.
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The principal medical officer to the laboratory, Dr T.E.
Thorpe, found after elaborate analysis that the bulk of
the gins were of an inferior quality though be could not
pronounce on whether they were injurious.	 Dr Thorpe's
report concluded as follows:
"While the great bulk of these samples, considered
from a commercial and potable point of view, are of a
distinctly inferior class, and have either been
imperfectly rectified or have, in some instances, been
preDared. from crude or residual saccharine materials,
naturally yielding a rather harsh spirit, none of the
samples contain anything except small quantities of
flavouring and colouring matters in addition to more
or less of those by-products always present to some
extent in commercial spirits.
"The presence of these by-products is important
as indicative of the general character and mode of
manufacture of the spirit, but their total quantity
is small, and it is an oten question to what extent
the presence of a more than usual proportion of these
by-products may injuriously affect consumers or add
to the toxic effects when drunk in excess." 	 I
The surprising lack of positive action, on the part of the
Colonial Office on this disclosure shows its unwillingness
to act unilaterally. Chamberlain believed that it was
only an international conference that could satisfactorily
regulate the trade •2 But it was also a reflection of
its support for the opinions expreseed. by the Colonial
Officials on the traffic.
With the exception of Sir Ralph Noor, who was
I. Board of Inland Revenue to CO 12 July 1897, Dr Thorpe's
Report, End. 33, CO 879/58 CF.
2. Chamberlain to United Committee 22 July 1898,
CO 879/58 CP.
167.
of the opinion that the spirit trade was crude, dangerous
and ought to be prohibited1 , most of the Governors, for
one reason or another, justified the trade. 	 In his annual
report for 1892, Sir Brandfort Griffith stated that the
consumption of alcoholic drinks on the Gold Coast compared
very favourably with that of the United Kingdom. Because
drunkenness was uncommon on the Gold Coast, Griffith felt
that the "West African native was not without a proper
appreciation of the advantages of temperate habits."2
The following year, Hesketh J. Bell, who was then Senior
Assistant Treasurer to the Gold Coast Colony, told the
Liverpool Chanber of Commerce that there was less drunkenness
on the Gold Coast than there was in Great Britain, and
that the sight of a man in a hopelessly intoxicated
condition was very rare in the former place. He made an
important anthropological point when he remarked that it
would take two or three times as much alcohol to inebriate
a negro than was necessary to put the white man into a
similar condition.	 And in any case, since "to get really
drunk would cost a native more than he could often afford
(for to fuddle a black is an expensive operation)", it
meant that only coastal chiefs and other men of means
1. hacCallum to Chamberlain, 6 Oct. 1897, End, in CO 879/5g.
2. Gold Coast Annual Report 1892, rendered by Sir Brandford
Griffith, K.C.Ii.G.
168.
probably drank in excess. Bell was unable to perceive
the terrible effects alleged being caused by the large
importation of spirits on the habits, conditions or
physique of the West Africans. 1 Sir Claude MacDonald,
the Consul-General of the Niger Coast Protectorate
justified the trade with economic considerations reinforced
by his experience in the area. 	 The liquor trade, he said,
bad formed a very considerable part of the import trade
of the West Coast for over a century, and to suddenly
put a stop to it would very seriously affect the entire
conditions of trade, if it did not paralyse it altogether.
In any case, he maintained that its prohibition would not
assist the cause of temperance to any appreciable degree
since the Africans manufactured a liquor from the palm
tree which was potent enough under certain conditions of
fermentation.	 Even with this, MacDonald said be had
seen more drunkenness in one Fast-day in Glasgow than he
had seen during his thirteen years' experience of Africa.2
1. See 'Extract from Address by Mr Hesketh 1. Bell,
Senior kast. Treasurer, Gold Coast Colony, to the
African Trade Section of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce,
1 May 1893' in Miscellaneous Facts relating to the
Extent of the Consumption of Spirits in the Colonies....
by the African Trade Section of the Liverpool Chamber,
1895, Box 23/Pamphlet 5 . JHP.
2. African Trade Section, Liverpool, Trade in Spirits
with West Africa, 1896, Box 23 Pamphlet 7a JHP.
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Since Sir Ralph Noor, who succeeded acDonald,
had condemned the trade, MacCalluni of Lagos immediately
wrote to Chamberlain defending tne trade and mollifying
the charges made by floor. MacCallum had entertained
Dr Hartford-Batterbee when he visited the west Coast for
the United Committee, and had given him all assistance
possible in connection with his enquiries into the evils
of the drink trade in West Africa, but he felt unable to
oppose the traffic. His opinion was re-inforced by
several circumstances. According to MacCallum returns
from officers of long residence in West Africa and from
Supreme Courts were 11 a matter both of surprise and
congratulation", for contrary to the assertion of many
temperance enthusiasts, these reports showed a high
standard of sobriety. He maintained that imported spirits
were after constant dilution made so weak that by the time
they reached the consumer they did little harm compared
with the palm wine of the country. MacCallum then accused
the missionary bodies of making constant assertions in the
abstract that intemperance was prevalent but failing to
follow it up by actively fighting the evil by forming
temperance associations and guilds for the promotion of
sobriety. For example, a great field for such an effort
and organisation would be Abeokuta, which the Governor
alleged, had the reputation of overindulgence in drink
although it bad. had the advantage of prolonged missionary
170.
effort. Other preventive measures were even inadmissible
to him in so far as the foreign neighbours of Lagos
adhered to a low duty on imported spirits (6-i-a per gallon
as against 2s. per gallon in Lagos). Commenting on
Moor's charges, MacCallum told Chamberlain that the
present state of the law of the colony did not allow of
the prohibition of import or sale of "raw spirits", and
if it did it wou]4mly give an additional advantage to
Porto Novo, since the liquor would be landed at Kotonou,
smuggled into the Lagos Colony, and find their way in due
course to Benin territory.1
In west Africa, the missionary crusade against
the trade was most significant in Nigeria where the trade
was most predominant. It was led by Herbert Tugwell, an
Anglican bishop of West Equatorial Africa, who is said tok-
beaustere, gaunt and devoted but vociferous and theatrical.2
With his religious co-adjutors, James Johnson and Oluwale,
Tugwell's aim was to induce the local administration to
cooperate with the Church in attaining the Christian ideal
of "purity and righteousness". 3
 Yet in striving to show
1. hacCallum to Chamberlain, 6 Oct. 1897, CD 879/58.
MacCallum to Chamberlain, 13 Dec. 1897, CO 879/58.
2. For the agitation in Nigeria, in particular the role of
Tugwell and other missionaries, vide E.A. Ayandele,
The Political and Social Implications of Missionary
nterDrise in the Evolution of hodern Ni geria.. 1875-191
3. Vide London Record, 30 Oct. 1896.
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his wards that the raison d'tre of human society should
be morality and honesty, he became emotional and, wanted
prudence; some of his tactics eveli degenerated into
'shocking vanity' 1 . He led. the anti-liquor agitation
in Nigeria with such misplaced enthusiasm that even some
of his colleagues doubted the wisdom of 	 his
utterances, which were at times so wild that they even
undermined the credence that some of them deserved. He
went into the interior niaking speeches to chiefs 2 , and
collecting sgnatuies for petitions to the Government.
He published profusely in the papers. 3 He wanted
increased duties on spirits but snifted his grounds to
restriction and, then ultimate prohibition.
Apart from his general support for the points
which the British delegate urged at the Brussels Conference
(i.e. increased duty), the new Governor of Lagos, Sir
William MacGregor however believed that incXeased duty on
1. Kingsley to Lugard, 31 Dec. 1897. MSS Brit. Emp.S.71.L.P.
2. Holt to Morel, 15 Dec. 1899, F8/1, EDMP.
Morel to Holt, 1 April 1909, 18/6, JUP.
3. e.g. in the Times of 1 L4, Nov. 1908.
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sp:Lrits was futile to prevent drunkenness. 1 Quoting
from his own experience, he declared
"A thty of lOs. a gallon on spirits does not
prevent people from getting drunk in Glasgow on any
Saturday; a .uty of 14s. a gallon in British New
Guinea does not in any way tend to make the drinking
part of the community to any appreciable extent more
temperate....." 2.
MacGregor felt that, though not a practical proposition,
prohibition would be most effective in checking drunkanness.
But he pointed out that this step would unwittingly ruin
the trade in imported spirits without in any way making
the people more sober. It would mean the promotion of
the palm wine industry, which, according to Dr Albert
Chalmers, Assistant Colonial Surgeon on the Gold Coast,
possessed about the same intoxicating properties as beer,
and caused as much inebriation, under certain conditions,
as the more expensive gin or ruin.3
1. He sug rests methods of dealing with concentrated alcohol4
This involved loading the duty in arithmetical progression
for each degree above proof to such an extent as to make
the importation on a large scale of highly concentrated
alcohol unprofitable, confiscating all overproof alcohol
not to be used in the arts or sciences, and compelling
all over-proof alcohol to pass throug1 the Queen's ware-
house or through a licensed boarded warehouse.
Nra Suzanne Niers is working on the Brussels Conferences
dealin with the liquor and the Slave trade; the inter-
national aspect of these agitations is therefore
deliberately ommitted here.
2. MacGregor to Chamberlain 15 Sept. 1899, CO 879/58 CP.
3. in Hodgson to Chamberlain, 16 Oct. 1899, End. CO 879/58
CP.	 In MornlnR Post, 18 Dec. 1901, MacGregor Is
reported to have scornfully referred to the vigorous
campaigns by the missionaries against what he calls
"the liquor will-o'-the-wisp."
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When the anti-liquor party saw that increased
duties on spirits did not produce the desired end, they
fell on restriction.	 In July 1901, the Native Races
and liquor Traffic United Committee told Chamberlain that
if liquor was allowed to be carried by railway in West
Africa without strict limitations, it would increase the
difficulty of protecting hinterland ifrican races from
the liquor traffic. 1 Much as this point might be valid
theoretically, it was not enough to force the local
adininistrationt ruin the railway by denying it of its
goods. Although he was himself a total abstainer,
MacGregor could not see his way to destroy the ordinary
course of trade carried on 1n. Lagos. Moreover, he
defended the carriage of liquor by rail because it would
practically make no difference to the trade in spirits
whether liquor was carried by rail or on ments heads.
The transport chargea, which he quoted, would explain the
futility of not using the railway to carry spirits. The
cost of carrying spirits by rail from Lagos to Aro was
15 shillings a ton. But Aro is 3 miles from Abeokuta.
And, since the cost from Lagos to .theokuta otherwise than
by rail was l6s. ld., the charge was practically the same
either way. Moreover, the cost of carriage of spirits
1. United Committee to Co. 15 July 1901, CO 879/100.
They also urged increased duty in view of the
alleged increase in wages in West Africa.
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from Lagos to Ibadan by rail was 4-7 shillings a ton as
compared to 4-Os. 4--d. by canoes and carriers.	 MacGregor
declared that he saw no reason to change these charges
It would be senseless folly to build a railway
at enormous expense and to force goods of any kind.
the importation of which is allowed into the Colony
to be carried alongside of it on men's heads when
we know perfectly well that the goods will, in any
case, be taken to their destination...." 1.
The practical considerations of the local
administration, which had in 1905 also regulated the quality
and strength of the liquor sent into Nigeria, commended
itself neither to the missionary party in Lagos nor
Exeter Hall in Britain, In August of the same year,
the United. Committee, in a memorial to Lyttleton, the
Colonial Secretary, wondered why Government railways
constructed with public funds should be used for carrying
"dangerous" liquor into the interior. 	 dvocating a
1. MacGregor to Chamberlain, 21 Sept. 1901, CO 879/100 CP.
2. In 1905 the Lagos Govt. regulated the quality and strength
of liquor, the tariff rising to 4s. a gallon in 1905 and5s. in 1908. So as to reduce the consumption of potent
.liquors, a sliding scale of duty was imposed. For every
degree or part of degree over 50% Trailles there was an
extra charge of 2-id. and a rebate of 1d. for every
degree under strength, subject to a minimum of 3s. 6d.
in 1905 and 4-s. in 1908.	 Thus the liauor imported
gradually declined in strength until 90% of the imports
were a.bout 28 degrees under proof. 	 C.P. Lucas
A Historical Geography of British Colonies, Vol. III
(Oxford, 1913), pp. 210-213,	 Also Ayandele, P. 315.
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suitable system of licensing in all the vIest African
territories, (especially as liquor was used as an article
of barter and currency), it suggested a uniform duty of
five shillings a gallon of strength l2° underproof.1
These opinions reverberated in Parliament. The liquor
question which the Archbishop of Canterbury bad raised in
the Lords on 6 June, l9O5 Samuel Smith and. Sir Mark
Stewart also in the Commons, was continued in August 1907
by Charles Roberts who wanted the rate of carriage by
railway to Ibeokuta and Ibadan increased. Winston
Churchill, the TJnder-Becretary for the Colonies, told the
Commons that the policy of the Government was to keep the
rates as high as possible without driving the trade to other
carriers. He pointed. out that between Lagos and. Abeokuta
the railway was in acute competition with the canoe trans-
port on the River Ogun, which ran from Abeokuta to the
Lagos Lagoon. A larger increase in the railway rates than
was reasonable would merely divert the carriage to the
river, thus economically depriving the railway of its
revenue without preventing the liquor from reaching its
destination.	 Moreover, since all spirits brought into
Abeokuta and. Ibadan was subject to a local tax of 9d. and
is. a gallon restectively, payable in addition to duties
1. United Committee to CO. 11 Lug. 1905, Memorial Lncl.No LI..
CO 879/100.
See Also APS to CO 1k Oct. 1898, CO 87A/58.
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paid on importation, Churchill was of the opinion that
the price of spirits in the interior was correspondingly
high. In. any case Cathcart Nason, who was on the side
of the Third Party 1 at the same time pointed out that the
r.c-ers already carried spirits at cheapei rates than the
railway. 1 Yet xeter Hall was unconvinced.	 It believed
that the railway bad. led to the increase of liquor in the
interior and. even alleged that the tonnage of spirits
carried over the railway exceeded that of other branches
of trade carried by the same means, Although these charges.
were proved to be false, 2 the Anti-Liquor members of
Parlianient rather than relent, forced the Colonial Office
to continue to seek ,eports on the subject.
In September 1907, Sir Walter Egerton in reply
to the Oolonial Office request for ais opinion on
e.pproprite nethods for dealing 1,ath the traffic, ruled
out prohibitive laws as hardly practicable. His remedy,
which took cognisance of the inability of trying to enfoxce
unenforcable laws, was an increase of duty, extension of the
Lagos Spirit Licence Ordinance of 1893 to large interior
towns, and the effective implementation of the South Nigeria
-	 -
1. See Hansard, No. 7. Vol. CXVVII, 1905, 826.
Also CO 8'79/100.
2. Ag. Gov. J.J. Thornburn to C.O. 21 Sept. 1905 and. End.
No. 5 Report of Birtwistle, Commercial Intelligence
Officer, CO 879/100.
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Proclamation (No. 2 of 1901) within the towns of Calabar
and Warn and other places.	 The limitations of these
remedies were recognised by Egerton, but the impracticability
of lmpoaing the license system indiscriminately pointed
to the inadequacies of the Colonial machinery.	 As he
told. the Colonial Office:
"It does not seem to be understood in .ng1and
that we are not in a position to fully adinter
the country. As much of the details of Government
as possible are left in the hands of the Chiefs of
the different districts.	 The police force is very
small, and only attempts to control serious crime.
A. large portion of the country is dense forest.
The whole of it is unroaded......It is undesirable
to introduce any regulations which cannot be
enforced...... Tt	 I
At the same time, he opposed the Humanitarian
proposal for "buffer zones" to be extended (i.e. from
Northern Nigeria), if a strip of Southern Nigeria was
made a "buffer zone" to prevent the introduction of liquor
will
into Northern Nigeria, this/not only enlarge the area of
prohibition, but also shift the responsibility for its
enforcement on the Southern Nigerian Administration. It
would in turn, Egerton contended, mean that another
"buffer zone'1 would be required to protect this strip.
Like other Governors, Egerton would not conclude without
considering alternative means of revenue. If a large
part of Colonial revenue was obtained from duties on spirits,
1. Egerton. to CO, 29 Sept. 1907, CO 879/100.
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it meant that before taking any steps that might stop
that revenue, other expeclients easily workable without
hardship to the people, should be considered. Egerton
felt it was tiery difficult to find such a source of
revenue without recourse to the contentious novelty -
direct taxation. 1 The Colonial Office was influenced
by these weighty arguments.2
But the Anti-Liquor Party were now bent on
total prohibition. In a speech made at the Pan-Anglican
Congress on 18 June 1908, Bishop Tugwell condemned the
liquor traffic in West Africa as "commercially unsound,
socially destructive and morally indefensible." He
referred to the 1907 Annual Report of Southern Nigeria
to show that liquor importation was destroying other
legitimate commerce.	 Out of the revenue of £1,088,717
for 1907, £600,000 was raised on spirits alone, whereas
only £75,000 came from importation of cotton goods.
Moreover, the increase of imported spirits compared with
1905 was £96,759, whilst cotton revenue had decreased by
£7,833. There seemed also to have been a decrease in
importation of hardware, provision and other useful
articles amounting to £17,000. He argued that if this
process continued, legitimate trade would be destroyed
1. Ibid.
2. Crewe to Gov. of Southern Nigeria, 22 April 1908,
CO 879/100.
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and Lancashire ruined. Secondly, he surveyed the
dernoralising and destructive effect of the trade on
society. In earlier days in West Africa when one man
visited another, Tugwell said, the symbol of friendship
and. hospitality was the Kola nut; "today it is the gin
bottle", and the "evil" was spreading into the interior.
Morally, he contended that if Britain did. not allow
Hamburg spirits tO enter her own ports but allowed millions
of gallons of these into West Mricaxi ports without an
effective licensing system, then Britain was untrue to
her imperial trust and merited the Frenchman's gibe that
'thè nglish are a nation of hypocrites".1
The fire from Tugwell's speeches and articles
in the Times glowed in Parliament; and hastened the
formal submission by the United Committee of its case
for prohibition. Against the argwnents which the
Committee put forward, Walter Egerton reiterated his
earlier opinions.	 He pointed out that although the
liquor traffic was an evl, considerable benefits accrued
from it "in spreading by settled government and the
maintenance of British law and. order throughout our
possession". Apart from the powerful argument on revenue,
1. 'Speech by Bishop Tugwell at the Pan-Anglican Congress,
June 18, 1908' entitled 'The Liquor Traffic in West
Africa' in CO 879/100.
Sir John Kennaway continued Q's in the Commons.
2. United Committee to CO 6 July 1908 CO 879/100 CP.
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Egerton pointed out that some members of the Pan-.&Uaglican
Conference had admitted that prohibition was bound to
fail; the Bishop of Kensington at instance was reported.
to have said that "prohibition has failed in this country,
and he did not think it would ever succeed.". 	 Egerton,
therefore, advised the Colonial Office against "the
futility of the attempt to make people moral by legis-
lation. ,	 • t11
After examining the various information it had
received on the subject, the Colonial Office concluded
that although there was divergence of opinion among
qualified judges on the matter, the widespread dernoral-
isation which was alleged, had been disputed by many
persons of great West African experience and high respon-
sibility. It wrote to the United Committee:
".....These authorities maintain that the
statistics show that the consumption of imported
liquor in West Africa is relatively small, that
drunkenness is exceptional among the natives, and
that the spirits imported, though objectionable to
the European palate by reason of their crudity,
are free from noxious ingredients...... 2.
As a necessary preliminary to any measure which might be
adopted, the Colonial Office gave the hint of the necessity
for an investigation. Persistent questions in Parliament,
1. Egerton to 00 6 July 1908, 00 879/100.
2. CO to United Committee, 18 July 1908 CO 879/100.
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and a favourable reaction from the Anti-Liquor Party to
this necessity, led the Colonial Office to institute a
Commission of Enquiry the result of which practically
repudiated the arguments advanced by the Anti-Liquor Party
as wholly unsubstantiated by the facts of the West African
situation.1
1. In 1909 Lord Crewe appointed a Commission to enquire
into the al1eations made by the Anti-Liquor Party that
African natives were deteriorating as a result of the
vile 'fire-water' sold to them by gin traders. Sir
MacKenzie Chalmers, a public servant of' distinction,
was Chajrman.	 He had had previous extensive and.
peculiar experience in the taking and sifting of evidence,
The Commissioners, who were unpaid for their services,
rendered a unanimous report in Oct. 1909 that the
allegations of the missionary party were unsubstantiated
and particularly that the trade spirit imported was not
of deleterious quality. The report was published in
October 1909 as (cd. 4.906) : Report of Committee of
Inauirv into the Liauor Trade in Southern NiRerla Part I
and. ud.. 14O'/: .t'art jj: IVaflutes Oi vicLence.
The Commission visited the principal centres in the
Protectorate and examined orally 88 Europeans and 83
Africans, including 31 witnesses put forward by the
various missionary societies.	 The answers of' 6'4-
d.istrict, police and. medical officers, who could not
attend the Commission's sittings, to a series of questions
circulated by the Commission, were also obtained.
	 175
samples of spirits imported were analysed by Sir Edward
Thorpe, F.R.B., then Principal of the British Govt.
Laboratory, the analyses showing that there was nothing
to complain of as regards quality of the imported spirits.
Major Bedford, Director of the Central Excise Laboratory
for India, examined by the Commission on its return,
was of the opinion that, assuming the accuracy of the
analysis, these imported spirits contained nothing of a
physiolopical1y incurious character.
See the Times, 7 July 1911.
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Exeter Hall was utterly disgraced1 after the
report of the Liquor Commission was published, though
it continued to fight a rearguard action. 2
 The
Missionary party, probably smarting under the danger
1. Even before the report was published the sorry figure
cut by the missionaries when presez.ting their
unimpressive evidence was already known in Britain.
On 28 June 1909, bit triunrnhantly wrote to Morel,
") hear Tugwell and all his set have failed to
substantiate anything before the Liquor Commission",
and then bumourously added, "L tale is told of a
dinner at Govt. House at which 'Welsh Cream' was
served a a liqueur - the 'Welsh Cream' being relished
by the company, although made out of trade gin bought
for the occasion in Iagos.'t
And when the report was published, to the discomfort
Of missionary dignitaries who had misled themselves
so stubbornly, bolt wrote to Morel with cynical cheer..
"....For the BishoDs, tbey are getting it bot.....You
will be hearing from them in due course. I wonder
what the Duke of Westminster will have to say to his
sources of information. 	 They have made a fool of b.im
and I wbuld give much to hear what he has to say about
the report.....'
bolt to More], LI- Nov. 1909,
	
EDMP.
2. Although, no complaint r vrotest was offically proferred.
by the N.E. and L.T.U.C.tathe Q.0., they continued
to criticise the report. An nternationa1 Federation
for the Proteetiozi. of bative &aces from Alcohol formed
in. 1887 at Zurich now collaborated more with N.E. and
L..U.C..	 evera1 Policies of World Federation were
discussed.	 Times 20 Aug. 1911.	 But the collapse
of the African Liauor Traffic Conterence held in
Brussels on 4 Jan. 1912 added to the embarrassment of
the United Committee. Times Jan. 1912, 2imes 6 Feb.
1912; YorkshirePost 7 Feb. 1912;	 frican Maii,,
19 Feb. 1912.	 !et the United Committee continued to
raise the matter in Parliament.
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of decline which threatened it, 1
 had tried to justify
its existence by hammering on an issue whi©h it knew had.
always shaken the ethical foundations of English Society.
But statesmanship demanded that the social and commercial
implications of the liquor traffic in est Africa should
be judged not 3y the emotional and psychological processes
of traditional conscience, but in the background of West
African exigency. 2 For the borigines' Protection
Society to insist on the abolition ol' the liquor traffic
even wiien it was not practical politics in West Africa
not only demonstrates its forlorn tenacity to early
ideals, but also shows to what extent it could be misled
by its missionary allies.
It was this reluctance to depart from traditional
ideals which led the AP5 always to re-state its perennial
views on the issues of the time. At the International
Congress on Colonial sociology held in Paris in 1900,
1. At the Brussels Conference, the German dele''ate, Dr
Gohrirag, while denying the allegations made about the
quality of trade spirits, said that the accounts of
the horrors alleged due to the liquor traffic in Africa
came generally from British missionaries. He pointed
out that tithey were disappointed at the small number
of converts they made, and sought to throw the blame
on the liquor traffic."
See the Report of the Proceedings of the Commission of
the Conference on the African Liquor Trade at Brussels,
End, in No. 1k6, P.O. to C.O. 2 May 1899. CO 879/58.
2. African Mail, 19 Feb. 1912, See also E.D.Morel, An Attac
on the Commission of Inguiry into the Liquor Traffic
in Southern Nigeria. op. cit.
1. H.R. Fox Bourne, The Claim
Paper submitted
£ociolo g v. held in taris in
6.






Fox Bourne lucidly expounded the contemporary attitude
of the APS to Colonial questions. Of primary importance
to the aborigines was "a right to the land of which they
are the prior occupants and to its use in ways approved
by them, or at any rate to so much thereof as may be
requisite for their sustenance and. prosperity under
conditions not Less favourable to them than those which
they enjoyed when they were its sole owners." 1
 This
explaiias the stand of the APS during the crisis of the
Gold. Coast Land Ordinance of March 1897 which, it said,
ought "to have been modified in tne interest of the Natives'.'2
Its protest against a proposed Forestry Ordinance intro-
duced. in September 1901 in the Lagos Legislative Council
also owes something to this principle, apart from its
alleged breach of treaty obligations with African chiefs.3
Secondly, the APA$ believed in the right of Africans
"to the maintenance of the social, religious, political,
and other institutions they have established among themselves,
subject only to such changes as they may voluntarily agree
2. A.F. July 1897. See Chap. V.
3. Annual Report for 1901, also A.F. April 1901.
Also Chap. VI.
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to under the guidance of the more civilised visitors
and residents whom they have intelligently admitted to
partnership or supremacy in the occupation or use of
their country." 1 This belief was behind. the APS memorial
to Chamberlain on 28 1'tarch 1896 against a "rigid. avoidance
of meddling with native institutions, even if they are
ob,jectionable in themselves, unless arid, until tby- can be
replaced by or gradually developed into something manifestly
better'. 2 This idea explains not only its protest against
punitive raids but also its action in October1901 against
the Lagos Native Councils' Bill which the Society saw
as capable of undermining local institutions of government
which were essential to African prosperity.3
It stressed the right of Africans "to partici-
pation, on equitable terms, in all the beneficial
arrangements introduced into their country.' This
principle underlay the APS support for african partici-
pation In the Civil Service, in municipal governments
and representation in Leçislative Councils, which was
1. Fox Bourne, The Claims of Uncivilized Races P.6.
2. k.F. Dec. 1896.
3. Annual Report for 1901; A.F. .Lpril 1901.For the details of the Bill see B.M. Tamuno: British
Administrative Control ol' Southern Nigeria: A Study in
the Administrations of Sir Ralph Moor, William NacGregor
and. Sir Walter Egerton, 1900-1912, (Unpublisned. London
Ph.D. thesis, 1962).
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hoped would guarantee that ".judicious contact" and
"just and wise control" which the Society always insisted
on. 1 But this support was made ineffective by two other
attitudes.	 The APS. was not composed of "Little nglanders"
but of Imperialists. The anti-Imperial attitude implicit
in Fox Bourne's demand for gyptian self-government is
more apparent than real. It was a temporary deviation
from the imperial philosophy of the APS, but one in
conformity with the Liberal tradition which had in 1877
opposed British presence in Egypt but foutid itself
occupying it in 1881.2 ..s will be seen in the next
chapter, new influences were to modify the attitude of
the Society to Colonial rule. Its imperialism is seen
in its ultimate insistence that such a programme as the
demand for self-government by the Colonies did not come
within its aims; a position which found it not always
supporting other political agitations not necessarily
or immediately directed to this, and inevitably disaffected
many educated Africans who might have helped it in its
need for accurate intelligence. Moreover, the unfavourable
disposition shown towards this class of educated à.fricans
greatly undermined the ideal of harmonious relationship.
1. Fox Bourne, The Claims of Uncivilized Races, p.6.
2. For a discussion of this historical irony, see John
1iorley, The Life of' William Ewart Gladstone Vol. III
Q880-1898) (London, 1903) Pp. 72-85.
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For the Aborigines' Friend to maintain that "there is too
much imitation. of English maimers and, customs amongst
them, too much desire, by showy dressing and stylish
deportment, to adopt what may be only the veneer of
civilization, not the thing itself," 1
 was as urrfortunate
as Kingsley's gibe on those he called the 'curse of the
Coast", who "cheat the black and. mislead the white".2
It indicates a psychological attitude to cultural contacts
which would claim that the Romans were. probably more
envious than gratified because the people of England
acquired some of their cu1tue.
However, in contrast wibh this particular
negative attitude, the APS was principally and. energetioa11y
concerned with calli yig popular and. oi'ficial attention to.
other errors in polIcy, administrative abuses, and instances
of wrong-doing by irresponsible adventurers in West Africa.3
But since the organisation of the Society centred mainly
on the ability of its 6ecretary and as so much of its
work was done by means of' memorials and. personal
communications with the official autliorities, it meant
that the personal qualities and accurate information 'of
1. A.P. Dec. 1896.
2. Nary Kingsley, West Afx'ican Studies, passim.
3. See Chaps. 1V and. VI
k. Fox Bourne, lIPS, P.2.
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its functionaries counted far more than in a mass
movement.	 At tives, however, enthusiasm outran knowledge,
and. credibility was given to every colonial information
however hare-brained. The practice of not releasing
the names of the Society's correspondents (in spite of
repeated demands by the Colonial Office) must have
convinced that office that much of the evidence was
fabricated. 1 As ever, lack of adeauate funds2 meant
that the Society ought to have concentrated within its
means. But it was lack of accurate intelligence, more
than anything, which greatly militated against the work
of the Society.	 As its President, &.E. Pease 3 , told
Governor MacGregor in 1902, "we, as a Society, find
1. Minute on 21 Sept. by R.L. Antrobus on H.R. Pox Bourne
to CO 19 Sept. 1906, CO 520/40.
when the CO insisted on this occasion, however,
according to Antrobus, "Fox Bourne called here and
gave me confidentially the name of his correspondent."
I'inute of 4 Oct. by Antrobus on the same letter.
2. The Amival Reports and the ccount books of the Society
always complained of adverse balances, e.g. in 1907,
while te Society's expenditure amounted to £57 14 ; 10
en-t*dverse balance of £108 : 10 : 8d. was left 'to be
carried forward to the account of 1908.'
(MSS Brit. Emp. S.20, E4/6.)
3. Pease, Arthur, E., J.P., MP. (Liberal Unionist)
Darlington from 1895; born at Darlington 12 Sept.
1837, 4th son, of Joseph Pease of Darlington. Educated
privately.
	 Was Liberal N.F. for iihitby earlier,
1880-95. Member of the Royal Commission on Opium,
1893.	 Died 27 Aug. 1898.
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ourselves often handicapped for want of local knowledge".1
MacGregor himself acknowledged that it must indeed have
been an extremely difficult thing for the APS "to keep
the threads of comolicated native problems in its hands".2
This handicap must have placed the Society at
a disadvantage when its views came to be considered by
officials and other humanitarians 3
 in the period. The
bociety seems to have been much more regarded in official
circles, during the two decades before the period covered
by this study. In 1875, when he was Secretary of State
for India, the Marquis of Salisbury had publicly acknow-
ledged. that "in all matters where conflicting interests
have to be reconciled, the operations of a Society like
the APS must prove beneficial by disseminating sound
principles and strengthening the hands of the authorities
who have to deal with people in distant parts whose
interests come sharply into conflict." 4 In contrast, Ripon
in 1894 did "not attach much importance to their opinions -
1. A.P. July 1902. Pease and Fox Bourne had an interview
with William MacGregor (during his leave) and.
discussed the Forest and Native Councils Ordinances
that were being criticised by the APS and opposed in
Lagos.
2. A.F. July 1902.
3. As was shown in Chap. I, Morel and Bolt thought very
little of the APS and less of the ASS. As already
pointed out a10 Mary Kingsley bad disseminated the
idea that John Bolt alone was worth more than ten
APS. men.
4. Quoted in Pox Bourne, the APS, P.2.
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knowing bow they are manufactured."	 During this time,
the strong hostility which Hemming displayed 2 later
contributed to the Colonial Office view that the APS
information was hardly 'reliabl' 3 ; and led. that Office
always to insist on having the names of their informants.
Although the Colonial Office at the same time was of the
opinion that Morel was also 11 apt to make rather wild
assertions",4 it seems certain that as pressure-groups,
the Third. Parts counted. far more than the APS in official
policy on West Africa during the Imperial era.
But one outstanding quality of the AP$L was its
efforts always to 3ustlfy itself when the belief was
current that humanitarianism was in decline. 5
 In May 1897,
Sir Charles Duke asked. the APS to "justify itself - for
1. Ripon, Cabinet Memo, the Swazi Crisis, 21 May 1894,
CO Mric.an (South) '-1-66, 3-4; Ripon to Roseberry,
4 Sept. 1894. Q. in Wolf, The Marquess of Ripon, also
vid.e Robinson and. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorious,
(London, 1961) P. '-144.
2. In 1892, Hemming had minuted that "Mr Pox Bourne ought
to be ashamed of inviting complaints and. accusations
against the Colonial authorities from ignorant and
mendacious people like the natives of West Africa."
Minute of 7 Feb. 1892 by Hemming, CO 196/219.
3. Minute of 20 Sept. 1906 'by S. Olivier on Fox Bourne to
C.O. 19 Sept. 1906, CO 520/40.
4. 1"anute of 21 Sept. 1906 on W.A.M. 21 Sept. 1906, CO 520/4O
5. See Sir Charles Duke, Sixty Years of Empire,(1897)
Pp. 97 ..8, and of G,P. Gooch in The Heart of mpire (1901)
P. 328 •
 Also A.F. Madden, Cbangung ..ttitudes', op. cit.
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at no time had its principles been more directly challenged
by the leading classes in large parts of the world than
very lately. He observed that 11in former days the doctrines
of the Society bad been far more generally recognised than
they were at the moment, and, it was time that a stand
should be made for the principles which had been so
widely laid down.....by the grandfathers of the present
generation of the Society." 1
 Although G.P. Gooch was to
consider this view too pessimistic 2 , the new President,
Sir W. Brampton Gurdon3 , at a meeting held at Caxton Hall
on 21 March 1906, referred to '1 the decline, the deterioration
the debasement of public sentiment in relation to
slavery t' and, allied questions!!' At the annual meeting of
1907, Dilke declared:"this is the centenary of the abolition
of the Slave Trade, and we all of us cannot but feel, as
we have in a melancholy fashion declared at our two last
1. A.F. May 1897.
2. Annual Report, A.F. 1906.
3. Gurdon, Sir W. Brampton, Liberal NP. for Norfolk since
1889. J.P. & C.C. for Suffolk; Lord-Lt. Suffolk, 1907;
Born 5 Sept. 1840, youngest son of Brampton Gurdon M.P.,
Letton, Norfolk and Henrietta, daughter of 1st Lord
Colborne; educated Eton & Trinity, Cambridge. Appointed
Clerk in Treasury in 1863 by competition; private
secretary to Gladstone as ('hancellor of Exchequer 1865-6,
and, as P.M. 1868-7k , served on special missions to S.
Africa, 1879, 1881; Chairman of Committee of belection,
House of Commons, 1906. Owned about 3000 acres. Died.
31 May 1911.
k. A.F. April 1906.
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annual meetings, that we have rather gone backwards than
forwards in the last two or three years - that we have
retrograded than progressed, as we were doing almost
uninterruptedly until, ten or twenty years ago." 1 In
spite ol' the activity of its secretary and the freauent
of
pronouncements/ideals, members at annual meetings always
lamented that the APS had retrogressed in the ideas which
were before accepted and practised. 2 This state of affairs
was all the more irksome when it was at the same time
recognised that tt the range of work devolving upon it is
now far greater than it was when the Society was founded
in l837."
This immense task might have been shared by the
Anti-Slavery Society, but it had also become obvious that
the ASS itself was almost spent force. 	 Rosebery might
flatter an Anti-Slavery delegation 0±' 1892 by referring to
"that continuity of moral policy which Great Britain could
not afford to disregard." 4 In contrast, Sir William
Harcourt warned him against "these philanthropic -
1. Report of Annual Meeting in A.F. May 1907.
2. Ibid.
3. A.P. Nay 1908.
4. Marquess of Crewe, Lord Roseber, Vol. II (London,l9l), P. 405. Roseberry to kS delegation comprising
many leading b.P.s, on 20 Oct. 1892 attended at the P0
with the special object of pressing the construction of
a railway from Mombassa to the Victoria Nyanza.
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missionary - civilizing pretenders" since he was of the
opinion that much of these humanitarian pressures were a
sham facade masking the commerci8.1 and. political interests
of their economic suppoters and. other ,jingoistic officials.1
Although it bad procured one or two Brussels Conferences,
and, as wi],1 be seen, seized on a slavery issue in Nigeria,
an outstanding f,atu'e of th Anti-Slavery ociety was
its failure to command official attention as of old.
ADart from the general decline i..n humanitarianism
of which this fficia1 indiffereiice was symptomatic, the
records of the ASS. until 1909 show that it suffered from
its own peculiar weaknesses which contributed to its
ineffectiveness.	 In 189?, the President of the Society
lamented ts decline. The old ae of its Secretary,
Charles Allen2 , the failure in health and. eventual death
of Eastoe TealI 3 , his very active Assistant, exIaustion
1. A.G. Gardiner, The Life of Sir William Harourt, Vol.11(London, 1923), pp. 194-5.
Rarcourt was opposed to the Uganda adventure and the
railway and. thought that these pressures merely tnasked
the commercial. interests of Sir Win. MacKinnori. and The
Imperial British East Africa Company and other officials
Lugard, who had ttworked up ax agitation on Uganda
along these lines.
2. Minutes, ASS Committee, 30 July 189?, NS Brit. Emp. S.20
E2/l1 Vol. VI.
3. Minutes, ASS.. Committee, 30 July 1897 (ibid.).
Eastoe ¶Pea.11 died. on 9 Nov. 1897, vide Minutes of ASS.
Committee, 3 Dec. 1897. M3S. Brit. Emp. 5.20 E2/ll,
Vol. VI.
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of funds, cessation of slavery and the slave trade
strictly in the old. form, left the President worried as
to the future of the ociety. 1 He asked the £SS
Committee to d.iscuss this crucial point for it "seems to
me that the first consideration is the work to which ucb
a society can devote itself in the future." 2 In the
Committee meeting of November 1901, the Eecretary stated
that "the work of the office had for majiy months past been
so light as not nearly to occupy the six days' attendance
required". 3 His suggestion "that he should. regularly attend
on fixed days in the week only, unless increase of
business demanded further attendance" was apDroved by the
Committee.4 In fact, the fortunes of the ASS were so low
that discussions were held on winding it up. 5
 But the
courage to take this epoch-making decision was lacking,
and, in any case, sympatbisers were still many whose
immediate show of enthusiasm succeeded in carrying the
1. Minutes of ASS Committee, 3 Dec. 1897 (ibid.).
2. Ibid.
3. Minutes, ASS. Committee, 	 Nov. 1901, IISS Brit L'mp. 5.20,
E2/12, Vol. VIL.
4. Minutes, S5 Committee, 6 Dec. 1901 (ibid.).
5. Minutes of ABE Committee, 30 July 1897 MSS Brit. Emp.
S.20, E2/ll, Vol. VI.
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Society on.1
It was this respective weakness of the two
Societies, more thail anything, which led. to the amalgam-
ation of 1909. After the death of F.W. Chesson in 1888,
the Executive Committee of the Al'S had. considered it
"expedient to unite the APS with the ASS." 2
	Negotiations
proceeded along these lines, but ultimately the ASS
"concluded that it is inexpedient to add to their duties
the important work of the Al'S."3 Hence Fox Bourne was
appointed the APS Secretary; yet it never escaped from
the mind of the APS Committee that, as the two societies
had. much in common, it would. be greatly to their
advantage if they could at length 3oin forces. On the
1. For example, a letter from Birmingham, signed by Arthur
Albright, William White J.P., Cephas Butler, Joel
Cadbury, Samuel Price end John Henry Lloyd., greatly
regretted 'to hear the critical condition in which the
Society ia placed by the dangerous illness of the Under-
SecretaDy, Estoe Teall, and other difficulties, so that
the lapse of the Society has been s poken of." &lthough
these enthusiasts were themselves prevented. from
attending by their own "illness, intirmit and. other
causes", they tt greatly deplored, the cessaton of this
Society". As townsmen of Joseph bturge, a founder
and upholder of the principles of the ASS, their
romantic attachment to the past of the Society is
understandable.
See Ninutes of ASS Committee, 30 July 1897, E2/1l,Vol. V
2. s.F. May 1909.
3. Ibid.
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ASb side, many members had found the independent existence
of the ASS unjustifiable.1
Therefore, although officially both societies
were apt to emphasize their individual identities and.
importance, there was much overlapping of function and.
membership. 2
 As years went on, it became increasingly
felt that "one strong society representing the cause of
the native races of mankind could more effectively serve
their interests than two sepsrate organizations working
indeDendently, and often handicapped. by want of adequate
1. A letter of July 1897 from Dr Cust and Richard. Shore
questioned whether it was necessary any longer to
keep up a special Agency to stamp out the dying embers
of slavery.	 It asked if it would not be possible to
effect an amalgamation with the APS.
Minutes, £98 Committee, O July, 1897, E2/l1, Vol. VI.
op. cit.
2. For example, (Sir) T.F. Buxton who was President of
the ASS from 1699 was a Vice-President of the APS in
1900, while J.A. Peaser President of APS. was a Vice-
President of the ASS.	 Also others, like W.&. Albright
and Henry Gurney, to name a few, were on both committees.
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resources. 1 Several circumstances within the years,
therefore, combined to make amalgamation almost inevitable.
The internal weakness of both meant that combination was
necessary for strength. 	 Their traditional affinity, marked
by overlapping membership, was progressively tightened by
periodic deaths on both sides. 2 The nature of their
1. A.F. May 1909.
Although the ASS often received legacies and donations
which it invested, subscriptions always fell off; thus
the Society's normal administration was always in adverse
financial circumstances. For instance, according to
the Minutes of 6 Dec. 1901, legacies were received to
the tune of £753 2 : 6th from a certain T. Graham
Young,
and invested in £2000 New Zealand Stock. 	 In 1908, a.
legacy of £300 came from a certain Miss M.L. Hewitson
of Leeds, and was invested in the purchase of £3 LI6 : 15 :
lid. Victoria 3% Stock at 89*. But the Minutes of
6 Nov. of the same year had complained that "subscriptions
had fallen due to deaths and other causes", and no
fresh subscribers came forward. Two years previously,
the 1906 Annual Report had complained that "amounts
raised by contributions is not always adequate to meet
the ordinary expenditure of th Society". The report
had also asked "friends to make up for the losses suffered
each year by the deaths of subscribers, and to endeavour
to interest others in a work for which the need
certainly does not grow less." This weak financial
situation of both Societies compares with the rickety e
position of the West African ?'Iai1. For the ASS accounts
see M55 Brit. Emp. S.20, EL4/3, E4/Li..
2. A very regular feature in both the Aborigines' Record and
the Anti-Slavery Reporter is the frequent report of
deaths. Most members were born around 1840 and had
shared in the keen enthusiasm of traditional conscience.
Towards the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th
centuries, they were growing old, some very old, and
deaths by natural causes were very regular. The
ineffectiveness of both Societies became almost as
assured as new enrolments fell off during the period
covered by this study. After the jingo spirit had
played its full course, and was somewhat in decline, there
was again a corresponding re-dedication to imperial
responsibility.
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present problem (there was little difference between
slavery and its new forms), 1 inadequate funds, and the
immensity of their task in the face of an apparent decline
in humanitarian conscience, forced earnest men to advocate
amalgamation. Moreover, the Third Party bad become a
great influence in West African policy, and a challenge
to the older humanitarian bodies. This meant that the
traditional Exeter Hall really had to justify itself.
The wish for amalgamation which hd hung fire
since the close of the 19th century became a bufzaing issue
in 1908. Negotiations were begun, but amalgamation was
a]ways deferred by personal equations on both sides. In
particular, on the APS side, Fox Bourne had. so reorganised.
arid represented it that the Society recovered its lost
force and escaped a threatened dissolution,
	
The evidence
suggests that the move within the A. to unite with the
ASS was killed by his personality, and. the ASS knowing that
the man, would accept no iost other than Secretary of the
amalgamated Society preferred to postpone the inevitable.
1. See Chap. IV.
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On 3 January 1908, Sir T. we11 Buxton1 told the
Ant-Slavery Committee that "he had always been in favour
of an ultimate union of the two aocieties, which he
thought would be for the benefit of those whom they were
meant to serve, but be was not sure whether the time had.
yet come for this.' 2 At that meeting, Henry Gurney3
told the Committee that a sub-committee had been constituted
1. Buxton, Sir Thomas Powell, 3rd. Bt. (1837-1915. Born
26 Jan. 1637, eldest son of Sir Edward. North Buxton,
2nd Bt., by his wife, Catherine, 2nd. daughter of Samuel
Gurney of Upton, Essex. His grandfather, Sr Thomas
Powell Buxton, author of The African Slave Trade and
Remedy, was the friend of Sir James MacKintosh, William
1ilberforce, and Zachary Macaulay and. succeeded Wilberforce
as the leader of the anti-slavery movement.
Educated at Harrow and Trinity, Cambridge;
succeeded his father in 1858 as 3rd Bt. In 1865, was
returned to Parliament in the Liberal interest as one of
the members for King's Lynn, and he represented that
constituency until 1868.	 His subsequent attempts to
enter Parliament in 1871- (Westminster), 1876, 1879
(North Norfolk), 1880, (West Essex) were unsuccessful.
Had a multitude of social interests: elected
President of the Br. & Foreign Ass. in 1899; interested
in the volimteer movement,	 the welfare
of African Natives, better elementary schools, the CMS,
Missions to Seamen, and the Commons Preservation Soc1ety
In 1895, was appointed Governor of S. Australia.
Retired as Gov. on completion of his tenure in 1898;
created G.C.M.. in 1899 in recognition of his services.
Became President of AS & APS in 1909. Died at Cromer,
28 Oct. 1915.
2. Minutes, ASS Committee, 3 Jan. 1908, MSS Brit. Emp.
5.20, E2/12, Vol. VII.
3. The Gurneys, like the Buxton were traditionally
associated with Exeter Hall.
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by the APS to consider the question, and, the ASS Secretary,
Travers Buxton, spoke of "interviews which he had held
with Mr F.W. Fox and Mr J.H. Harris," 1
 on the issue.	 A
resolution was thus carried. on the moticn of J.G. Alexander,
seconded 'by Dr Felkin, "that a sub-committee of the ASS
be appointed. to consider the policy of amalgamation, to
confer if necessary with the sub-committee of the APS,
and, report."2
On 7 February 1908, the sub-committee reported
to the ASS Committee that they had, met on the 22 January
and, recommended 'that a working union between the two
Societies be aimed at, care being taken that the identity
of each Society be not lost."3 Moreover, a letter from
Fox Bourne and 'F.W. Fox informed the ABS that a similar
sub-committee of the APS had reported to their Committee
where it bad. been resolved "that the sub-committee be
empowered to enter into negotiations with British and
Foreign Anti-Slavery Society with a view for amalgamation,
on the understanding that Mr Fox Bourne be Secretary or
Joint-Secretary, and. that the title of the APS be preserved
1. Minutes, .SS Committee, 3 Jan. 1908, E2/12, VOL.VII,
OP. cit. See Chap. IV.
2. Ilinutes, ASS Committee, 3 Jan. 1908, (ibid). The sub-
committee to consist of Sir T.P. Buxton, J.G.Alexander,
Dr Pelkin, a certain Clark, H. Gurney and W.Fi.Wilberforce.
3. Minutes, ASS Committee, 7 Feb. 1908, E2/12, Vol. VII.
Ibid.
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Even, at the ASS Committee, the view was expressed that "at
the present moment amalgamation would not be opportune,"
the President proposing that "a friendly discussion
should be arranged between the two sub-committees, with
the understandng that the sub-committee of the ASS should
not commit itself to any definite change without consulting
the Commi-ttee."1
On LI- December 1908 Fox Bourne told the AS that
't at a meeting of the sub-committee of the APS which bad
been appointed to consider the above Question, held on
26 November, it had been resolved that it is best for the
present to postpone negotiations in. furtherance of the
suggested amalgamation of the two Societies.h12 The ASS
Committee not only "resolved to concur in the conclusion
by the IFS Committee", but also went a step further to
discharge their sub-committee.3
But on the 29 February 1909, Fox Bourne
suddenly died at Torquay. The arranement for amalgamation
purnose.
began again, this time with greater speed. and/The two
sub-committees were once more resuscitated and became
active. Their meeting of 3 March 1909 discussed various
1. Ibid.
2. inutes, ASS Committee, LI. Dec. 1908, E2/12, Vol. VII.
3. Ibid.
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tangible recommendations for ainalganiation. 1 A few days
later the APS Committee, apparently in disarray and
embarrassment, approved, of the recommendations, in
particular the appointment of Lord Nonkswell 2
 as chairman,
who "as an outsider would be satisfactory to both Societies'.!3
On the 24 June 1909, the union was officially sealed.4
1. It was recommended that
(1) The APS office be retained. (2) the joint Society
be called the £ti-S1avery and Aborigines' protection
Society.
(3) Sir T. Powell Buxton be President, and Rt. Hon.
Lord Monkswell Chairman, while .rancis William iox
be Vice_Chairman.
(4) The present Vice-Presidents and. Conimittee be
re-appointed for the joint Society.
(5) ir Cohn Scott-Monscrieff, K.C.M.G., C.S.I. and.
E. Wright Brooks, J.P. be reasurers.
(6) Travers Buxton, M.A., be aDpolnted Secretary.
(7) Offices of the Society to be transferred to Denison
House, Vauxhall Bridge Road, London, S.W. (the Office
of the ASS).	 Since Rt. Sir W. Brampton Gurdon,
President of the APS was ailing in health, he became
an honorific Vice-President.
2. Monkswell, 2nd Baron, (Cr.1885); was Robert Collier
D.L. J.P.; was Poor Law Officer, and afterwards member of
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
Born in London 26 March 1845; went to ton and. Trinity,
Cambridge, where he took 1st class Law Tripos inE66;
Lord-in waiting, 1892-5; Under-Sec. for War 1895,
National Liberal; Associated with the CRL. (See ChaD. II
for relation with Morel),	 Died. 22 Dec. 1909.
3. Minutes, ASS Committee, item 1650, April 1909. E2/12, VolVI
4. Minutes, ASS Committee, item 1651, 7 May 1909. (ibid.).
Since "the Secretary reported that June 24 appeared to
be a suitable date for bringing about the Union", "the
Committee of the APS had arranged. for the removal of
their furniture to Denison House before that date."
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During this period, the Anti-Slavery Society
never abandoned its original duty to its wards though the
feeling was becominc' general that slavery was almost
extinct.	 Yet there still Drevalled in the imainations
of men the idea that Africa was the great centre and home of
the slave trade and slavery which must be suppressed..1
Gradually, however, the AS became faced not only with the
problem of "brutal inequality",, but also with the feelings
of aboriginal races, to which the average rough white man
was impervious or did not realize. 2 It had become obvious
that by aoparent degrees the nature of the ASS problem had
merged with that of the APS.3
The primary function of the APS as a watch-dog
for aboriginal rights, and a pressure-group in Impierial
affairs is admirably summarized by Leonard Courtney. 4-
1. Sixty Years Against Slavery: A brief Record of the Work
2. Dr Gilbert Murray, A Comparison of the Aims of the Anti-
Slavery Society, (the ASS, Denison house, Oct.1955) P.7.
3. See Chao. Br.
LI . . Courtney, Leonard Henry (1st Bt.1906) P.C.N.A.(l832-
1918), Son of Sampson Courtney of Alverton House,
Penzarice; Ethic. at St John's Coil. Carnbride, B,L.;
Prof. of Political Econ., Univ. Coil. London 1872-75;
Under-Sec. Home Office 1880-81; in the C.O. 1881-82,
Financial Sec. to Treasury, resigned. 1884-; Chairman
0±' Committee and Deputy Soeaker, 1886-92; NP. (Unionist)
for Bodmin Div., Cornwall, 1885-1900.	 Of him it was
said that "he was a supreme example of the type of good
citizen on whom in the last resort the welfare state
depends".	 Vide G.P. Gooch, Life of Lord. Courtney (London,
1920) P.617.
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"The APS, which, by a fine apostolical succession,
is the inheritor of the spirit of Wilberforce and.
Clarkson, is a soft of appellate court to which
complaints may come from any colony - comolainants
whose rights as such are attacked by he conduct of
those amongst whom they reside, and who aopeal for
assistance in the straits in which they find tnemselves.
The Society is also a sort of advisory body, which
every Colonial Minister who is seriously bent on
discharging the duties of his office is glad to call
to his aid, on whose intelligence he relies, and on
whose cooperation he trusts for securing a continual
suoervision of local aency, a continual maintenance
of the true spirit, of the true conduct, which should
be observed towards our depend.ants in those distant
lands.'	 1.
This continual supervision of the local agency was of
paramount importance to the Society tecaus,e it believed
that "with a few exceptions, which merely prove the rule,
the worst offenders against ignorant and more or less
barbarous races in Africa, as elsewhere", were not "the
superior officials at home", who formulated the rules of
government and issued orders, but "their agents and others
on the spot", who, so long as they did. not "too openly
disregard the letter of their instructions" were "free to
misread and pervert them," and who "could easily find
1. A.F. Nay 1897, Quoted in Fox Bourne, The APS, Pp. 58-59.
A public meeting was held. on Wednesday 7 April 1897 "to
call attention to the arbitrary and oopressive measures
by which European control is being established over
native races in Africa and elsewhere1'. 	 Leonard Courtney,
.P. presided and was supported by such other Liberal M.P..s -
as John Morley, DUke, Arnold Forster, k. Birrell, Q.C,
Thomas Bayley and Reginald NcKenna. Courtney's speech
referred to was delivered on this public occasion.
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excuses for the gratification of their vanity and love
of power - not rarely of their lust and. greed.- in conduct
obnoxious enough in itself - and far more obnoxious and.
pernicious in its provocation of the little wars" which
made up "so large a part of the history of European
dominion in Africa....."1
The APS, believing in a different civilizing
process, advocated. reasonable persuasion as a way of
suppressing barbaric institutions including slavery,
because "ignorant and barbaric communities, like undisci-
plined. or perverse children", required "patient and
judicious education to enable them to associate satis-
factorily with people more intelligent and capable than
themselves."2
 It regarded as an abuse of c\vilization,
"the old. assumDtion that might was the only right, that the
aggressor's strength was sufficient warrant for any conquest
he was able to make and for any tyranny he was willing to
impose. 3
 Like the Anti-blavery Society, the APE was an
Imperialist movement, but it was the morality of Imperialism
that they stood for. They maintained that in the extension
of British settlements among "uncvilized communities",
1. H.R. Fox Bourne, European Rivalries end Native Rights in
Africa A Paper read at the Universal Peace Congress
held at Budapest in Sept. 1896. (endorsed. by the APS,London
2. Fox Bourne, The Claims 0±' Uncivilized. Races, P.8.
3. Ibid., P.9.
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"the moral advantage of the latter should not be less
aimed at than the material advantage aIthe former.$hl
It was in no spirit of opposition to colonies or coloni-
zation, in no attempt to prevent the growth and the
outspread of the English race, but with a desire to make
that movement better than it had been, and, with a hope
to brinc into the distant parts of the world the standard
which it was so easy to preserve in words, if not to carry
out in deeds, that the APE was animated.2
In the discharge of this imperial mission, the
role of Fox Bourne was pre-eminent. He never went out
to Africa, yet Pox Bourne made himself familiar with the
affairs of its tribes. He was obviously an Imperialist,
but not of the "baser sort", for indeed, the Nigerian
Chronicle referred to him as belonging to the type of men
"who reproduce the spirit of Christ in their lives - real
Empire-makers, for they establish it in the hearts of the
oeople..... (men who are) buffers between the crushing
despotism of tyrannical overlords and the zmsophisticated
and helpless Natives."	 As a vital link in the great
chain of English philanthropists, beginning with the
1. Ibid. P. 10.
2. Leonard Courtney in LF. May 1897.
3. Daily Mail, 10 Feb. 1909.
4. Nigerian Chronicle, 12 March 1909,
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"Friends" of the 17th century to his own time, Fox
Bourne's work was in fact "a necessary part of (the)
Imperial mission.
Indeed, few men in England could claim to have
fought so steadily in the unpopular side as Fox Bourne.
Practically without fee or reward, he devoted himself to
the welfare of the people who never knew him personally.
Denounced by some British newspapers as a Radical
sentimentalist, as an enemy of his country, as an agitator
and stirrer-up of trouble, lie never wavered from his own
theory of Imperialism - that no Empire could permanently
exist on injustice, and organised or spasmodic oppression42
The one chance of the British Empire standing the assault
of time and the inroads of decay, in his view, was that
"the Empire should be purified of the commercial exploit-
ation of the natives, the unpunished crimes of personal
lust and. cruelty, and the horror of what are known as the
"D1st1nguishedOrder t', "nigger-huntin campaigns." 3
'i.e Daily . Mail, 10 Feb. 1909.
2.- 0.11. jorman in Justice, 20 Feb. 1909.
3. See Fox Bourne's views on punitive expeditions which are
discussed earlier in this Chapter. He was of the
opinion that Colonial officials provoked, wars against
unarmed natives of Africa, defeated them and then hoped
to be awarded medals for distinguished services. In
point of fact, in Parliament during the period covered
by thiS study, there were regular questions by interested
Individuals, mainly Conservatives, about whether medals
had been awrd.ed to	 those who defeated one
African chief or the other. See also Justice 20 Feb. 1909.
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He hated the hypocrisy which was obvious to him in t1'e
activity and doctrine of such a socialist body as the Fabiai
Society - "superior people who dub themselves refoxmers"
without having"been guilty of passing a humane resolution
or collectively doing a humane action."1
Fox Bourne's influeilce in the APS was decisive.
He held. decided views on issues and expressed them strongly,
at times with annoying rigidity, but without sensationalism.
Some of his tactics were probably positively unrewarding,
but his writings won him the respect and regard of those
who differed from him. As a writer of marked fluency and
ability, he was disinterested and trustworthy, though
difficult to work with when his views did not prevail.
Yet he was not egotistical; and his modesty probably
prevented him from taking the place in the public eye
occupied. by several persons of inferior talents who did not
object to self-advertisement. 2 He glowed with a steady
and humane indignation, which be fed. laboriously with Blue
Books and 4Colonlal facts sifted and verified. By his
auiet manner and. catholicity of mind, his suggestion of
1. Fox Bourne's opposition to the Fabians was possibly due
to the fact that he was a Liberal and they were Socialists.
More probably it was due to the Fabian attitude to
Empire. The Fabian Imperialists came to believe that
"inferior nations' t should not be allowed to stand in the
way of progress. See Chap. IV. also Justice 20 Feb.1909.
2. The Athenaeum, l Feb. 1909.
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pity even in his most severe denunciations, be commanded the
respect of his candid followers, many of whom accepted
his conclusions upon trust. 1 The evidence of his
sincerity was convincing; but he never seemed to have
realised that more than sincere gusto was needed to convince
those in power.
The relationship between the ADS. and the ASS, on
the one band, and their West african wards on the other,
was one of sincerity and candidness. Yet they seemed to
have over-simplified difficult issues, and- tended to
advocate straight-forward solutions which were hardly
practicable at the time. 2 Moreover, their influence at
this time was greatly undermined by the Colonial Office
suspicion of the quality of its intelligence, bearing in
mind prejudice against those it called the "mendacious"
people on the West Coast of Africa. 3 But the tact that
the true temper of the Empire came to be regarded as a
temper which mingled wisely and. in fit vroportion the
sovereignty of the central authority with the liberty of
the consitiuent areas', indicate that Exeter Hall
. The Times, 6 Feb. 1909.
2. Vide W.M. MacMillan, The Road to Self-Rule, (London, 1959)
P. 60. Aithougn he makes this point in Chap. II of this
book, with respect to the role of xeter Hall in an
earlier period, MacIvallan nevertheless adds the unaccept-
able view that they contributed little or nothing to the
development of changes which their activities had
helped to brin° about.
3. Minute of 7 Feb.1892 by Hemming, oo.cit., CO 92/219.
Lj	 Charles Bruce,	 e True Temper of Empire, (MacMillan,
-L/L2. also Bacon's Essay
 on Emôire ouoted by Bruce.
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contributed something to the imprial idea of trusteeship
which even their action in earlier days had made imperative.
As is to be expected the motives of members were
varied. There were some businessmen who probably tried
to use the movements as an imperial agency for the
iDromotion of their indj.vidual economic motives.	 There
were ex-officials who were either disillusioned with the
new tendencies which the current ingo Jayzteria had. bred
for the Empire or wanted. to use the societies to maintain
connection with the power that had deserted them.
Cumulatively, however, unlike the Third Party, Exeter Hall
at this time had no real economic or vested interests.
The bulk of the leadership and followership were religiously
inspired. They were greatly supported by the Quaker clans,
and this probably gave them that indomitable spirit which
always carried, thtn forward even when it had. become clear
that there was a marked general decline in humanitarian
conscience. Their traditional ideals were at this time
no longer a deposit of popular hopes and attitudes, but
their penetration into all parties in Parliament, gave
sirength and breadth to their Liberal core. A.fter the
amalgamation, the new Society underwent a speedy course
of reorganization, inaugurated a strong Parliamentary
Committee in. 1910, and proceeded to organise the 'est





The amalgamation of 1909 forged into a more
compact body what was left of the traditional Exeter
Hall.	 It was, in a sense, a reflection of the new
spirit of sober dedication to imperial duty following
the hysterical jingoism of the "braggart years".1
But, in a more intimate sense, amalgamation was a
product of internal questionings; it was hoped that
with amalgamation effective organisation would bestir
humanitarian conscience. This immediately produced
concentrated economies, led to the expansion of the
Society's headquarter8, provided for an organising
Secretary, and encouraged the creation of a Parliamen-
tary Committee and Colonial Auxiliaries.2
A prospectuU of the new Society issued
soon after the amalgamation epitomized this leavened
idealism. A distinctly humanitarian organisation,
1. See A.P.Madden, 'Changing Attitudes', op. cit. p. 340
2. Minutes, Sub-Committee, ASS 8 Dec. 1909, MSS Brit.
Emp. 20 E2/12, vol. VII
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it claimed to be non-party and undenominational.
And since it held rigidly to the view that the
relation between the Imperial Government and the
Colonies, Protectorates and spheres of inifluence,
was that of trustee whose supreme duty it was to
secure the moral and material advancement of its
wards, it meant that the Society did not always regard
as within its legitimate province whether and when
that trusteeship should be terminated. Rather, by
addressing itself to the task of combatting hasty laws
and. decrees which curtailed the liberty of colonial
peoples, and other individual acts which often dis-
graced the Imperial Government and compromised the
ideal of British rule, the Society professed its
resolute readiness "to facilitate the march of progress
by all constitutional means at its disposal" and."to
uphold those Christian ideals and traditions of free-
dom" which had bred the earlier humanitarians.
In a presidential or tion before the in-
augual meeting held on 26 April 1910, Powell Buxton
emphasized the continuity of this moral policy. But
he had also warned against imprudence. For the new
. Lagos Standard, 20 Aug. 1910,
2society to operate within the frontiers of honesty and
responsibility, Buxton implied, it needed mature caution
in its sifting and presentation of evidence. Important
as this point was, however, Buxton's preoccupation with
accurate intelligence was submerged in the general feel-
ing that more vigilance was the issue of the hour. In
a chorus disapproving of the activities of many Colonial
officials in the Empire, 1 Dilke's controlled die-
1. The Society was soon concerned with the activities of
some colonial officials. Thts the Committee took up
in Parliament most recent cases. On 4 July Joseph
King told the Commons how H. Tressing, a mechanic in
the P.W.D. Lagos had shot a native watchman, presumably
by accident. The Society saw to it that his appoint-
ment was terminated, though according to Seeley "not
on the ground of culpability, but because the result
of his action had impaired his value as an efficient
servant of the Govt" HO - Debs. 58 Vol XVIII, 1910,
1307. Again on 28 July 1910, King told the Commons
of another case involving a certain Dr. Brand Kent,
a Govt. official, who broke into church congregations
at Imuku. and Isere (S. Nig.), forced them to go out
of church on Sunday and carry loads for him. HO. 'ebs
58. Vol. XIX 1910, 2344.	 Also there were cases of
illegal actions like the arrest of the Oloye of Oye
in July 1910, and illegal floggings in Lagos in 1906
and in Zaria in 1912.	 See HO. Debs: 5s. Vol. XIX 1910;
also Vol. HYII, p. 1016.
Minutes, of Sub-Committee, A88. 3 June 1910, E.2"l2,
Vol. VII.
Minutes, Sub-Committee, Ass, 1 July 1910, (Ibid.
rc. bt )
Minutes, Sub-Committee Ass. 5 Aug. 1910, (Ibid)
Minutes, Sub-Committee Ass, 1 Nov. 1912, E2/13,
Vol. VIII
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satisfaction with "the application of ordinances
which could hardly be equally suitable to Lagos
and to Munshi country" was given greater weight when
no less than the Lord Bishop of Hereford spoke against
the constant danger of individual officials deterio-
rating in their offices in distant lands.1
Pre-occupation with ideals, however, did
not blind men to the necessity of immediate reorg-
anisation.	 As already indicated, a three-pronged
plan, involving the improvement of the home adminis-
trative machinery, the creation of a versatile
parliamentary committee, and the inauguration of
Colonial Auxiliaries, was expected to strengthen
the Society. 2 But since achievement of the latter
two aims depended on the excellence of the main
secretarial and administrative bureau, this objective
was immediately pursued. It was directly bound up
1. Nigerian Chronicle, 5 July 1910.
2. A London Correspondent in Nigerian Times,
9 Aug. 1910.
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with the appointment of John Harris 1 as the organising
secretary.
This choice was neither curious nor
questionable. A man of considerable energy and
almost infectious humanitarian touch, Hgrris had
been to Africa as a missionary and could be relied
upon to face African problems with authoritative
insight and broadmindedness. 2 As organising See-
retary of the Congo Reform Association, personal
equations had led to disagreements with Morel who
could iot "like the man; 3 but Harris had played a
1. Harris, (Sir) John It, in 1933. Born at Wantage
on 2July 1874. Married Alice, 2nd daughter of
A Seeley Frome, Spent some years in tropical
Africa, in the Congo), first as missionary,
later as traveller in other parts of West Africa
as well. Was an organising Sec. of the C R A,
and Organising Sec. of the AS and APS after amal-
gamation.	 Later contested Camberwell N.W. 1922
as Liberal; North Hackney, 1924; We8t Wilts, 1931;
M.P. (L.) North Hackney, 1923-4.
	
Died 30 April,1940
2. Ii his book Dawn in Darkest Africa (1912) Harris,
though a Christian minister, looks at African
social institutions with friendly tolerance.
Thus he did not condemn such a practice as polygamy.
3, Morel to Holt, 7 Oct. 1912, 18/8, JHP
216
dynamic and commendable role and never lost fidelity
to the humanitarian cause. When on 7 January 1910,
Harris agreed to organise the new Society, it was
clear that he would bring to it the same crusading
zeal which had characterised his Congo work. 1 His
arrival occasioned invigorating transformations.
Home auxiliaries were either inaugurated or improved,
two sub-committees now supplemented the general
committee, 2 and by coordinating the traditional
loyalty of Travers Buxton (the corresponding secretary)
with his own unalloyed, though salaried 3 devotion,
Harris launched the Society into a new vista of
vigorous efficiency.
This robust reorganisation was reflected
in another manifestation - the formation of a
Parliamentary Committee.	 Following the example
of the APS in 1906, the Committee of the Society,
1. Minutes, Sub-Committee, ASS, 3 Dec. 1909, E2/12,
Vol VII
Minutes, Sub-Committee, Ass, 8 Dec. 1909, 7 Jan,
1910 (ibid !
2. Minutes, Sub-Committee, 7 Jan. 1910
	
(ibid)
3. Harris had agreed to organise the Society on a
Salary of £500 p.a.
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on 4 Pebruary 1910, resolved to enlist the interest
and sympathy of Members of Parliament. 1 At a meeting
held in the House of Commons on 6 March 1910 to
"consider the question of forming a Committee of
M.Ps. interested in the work of the Anti-SlaVery
and Aborigines' Protection Society, who would use
their influence, In co-operation with the Society,
for the promotion of the objects at which it aims",
the Parliamentary Committee was launched. 2	Until
he was succeeded y J.W.Wilson, 3 Sir Charles Duke4
presided over this Committee, and, probably because
of pitiful respect which all sides of the House had
for him, he helped to rescue the Committee from that
wayward perversity into which excess enthusiasm might
have led it. The formation of this Committee, however,
1. Minutes, Sub-Committee, ASS, 4 Peb, 1910, E2/12,
Vol VII
2. ASR and AP, April 1911
3. Wilson, Rt. Hon. John William, P.C. 1911, Liberal
LP. North Worcestershlre, 1895-1922; Chemical
manufacturer; born at Edgbaston, 22 Oct. 1858;
elest son of J.E.Wilson of Wyddringtèn, Edgbaston.
Ed. at Grove House School, Tottenham; and abroad;
J.P. Worcestershire and Herefordshire. Clubs:
Reform, National Liberal. Died 18 June 1932.
4. See Gwy]t1 and Tuckwell, op. cit.
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owed much to the ubiquitous efforts of Noel Buxton1
whose transparent idealism transcended imperial
horizons: his far-fetched and forlorn hope "that
the formation of the Parliamentary Committee would
lead to the inauguration of an inter-Parliamentary
group embracing all Christian Europe", 2was, however,
merely one of these ephemeral oddities.
The Society claimed that membership of
this Committee rose from 70 in February 1910 to 100
by April 1911,	 yet it does not seem that regular
membership constituted a very compact or compulsive
body. It ws mainly permeated by Liberal, Radical
and Iris members, who, although they canvassed
1. Noel-Buxton, Noel Edward; (1869-1948); 2nd eon of
Sir P. owe11 Buxton, 3rd Bt: Educ: Harrow; Trinity,
Cambridge; History Honours 1889; A.D.C. in
Austr*lia to his father (the Governor), 1896;
served on Whitechapel Board of Guardians and
Central Unemployment Body; was Member of Home
Office Departmental Committee on Lead Poisoning;
wounded by political assassin, Oct. 1914, while
on mission to secure adhesion of Balkan States
in the war; Liberal M.P. for Whitby, 1905-6;
Labour M.P. for N. Norfolk 1910-18, 1922-30;
Minister of Agric. and Fisheries, Jan- Nov 1924,
and 1929-1930.	 Later joint President of the
Anti-Slavery Soc., 1931-34; Published books on
Europe.
2. N.tnutes, Sub-Committee, ASAPS, 3 March, 1911, Vol. VII
Nigerian ChroniclQ, 5 Aug. 1910
3. ASR and AF. April 1911
The most important members of this Committee are
mentioned and their careers sketched in appropriate
places in this study.
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African rights, were in most cases also ventilating
individual or party grievances. But by soliciting
and gaining the adhesion of Labour members, the
Society broadened its base in the Commons. During
a recruitment drive in 1912, John Harris held inter-
views with J. Ramsay Nacdonald and Arthur Henderson
"as to the creating of greater interest in the
Society's work among the Labour Party in Parliament
and their supporters" in the country. 1 But the
Labour Novement itself was only beginning to achieve
a certain amount of cohesiveness without which
concerted action wa impossible. 	 Composed of dis-
contented groups superficially united by hatred of
laissez-faire, the representatives of Labour had
been torn asunder by personal feuds and pedantic
ideologies. However, the Boer War, the close of
which somehow stemmed the violent tide of destruct-
ive Imperialism, had brought the Labour leadership
together with pro-Boer Radicals, and in the new
spirited revulsion against militarism they had some
semblance of unity in pacifism. Moreover, dis-
satisfaction with the opportunist leadership of the
1. Minutes, Sub-Committee, ASS, 6 Dec. 1912 item
2248, Vol. VIII.
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Fabian Imperialists (who, it seemed, were too
impatient of native rights if they obstructed gen-
eral progress) had thrown Macdonald and his supporters
into closer unity with Keir Hardie and the Independent
Labour Party. 1
 They did not deny the general belief
that British rule was the most enlightened of all,
except that with them this faith was almost nullified
by too wary alertness lest another vicious form of
capitalist imperialism would engulf the empire in
another, and perhaps more savage, warfare.
This understanding between Exeter Hall and
the Labour and Liberal parties proved a useful expedient;
at least, it could be shown that the humanitarian
movement was becoming part of the whole movement
tewards democracy and freedom. 2 Macdonald always
pointed at the administrative inadequacies of the
"men on the spot", maintaining that the same standards
of morality traditional to British Society should be
extended to far away lands. 3 The Independent Labour
Party, for its part, was •fficialy opposed to the
1. See A.P.Madden in New Cambridge History of the
British Epire, Vol III, 'Cliiñging Attitudes and
Widening Reionsibilities, pp. 348-350.
2. Leonard Barnes, The Duty of Empire, p.8
3. See J. Ramsay Macdonald, in Labour and the Empire,
(1907), pp. 26-27, 39-41, 44.
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exploitation of the economically backward rces by
the more advanced and the introduction of capitalism
as a substitute for the economic structure of native
society.' And Gilbert Murray represented the Liberal
ideal when he reminded Britain of "the duty of
endeavouring by strenuous and honest sympathy, justice,
and even magnanimity, to obliterate our cruel conquests,
and justify our world-wide usurpatiorr. 2	But the
professions of political parties did not always
represent an actual performance. 3 Even then, it was
not always easy to harmonise a party programme which
declared for a relationship with the less-developed
races which would prepare them "as speedily as possible
for self-governinent", 4with another creed which held
1. Prom The Constitution of the Independent Labour
Party; Also citeâ in Charles Rowden Buxton, Bick
!iie Rights, p.13
2. Gilbert Murray, 'The Exploitation of Inferior Races
in Ancient and Modern Times', pp. 119-20 in
Heart of the Empire, (London, 1902)
3. See R. Paine Dutt, The Crisis of Britain and the
British Empire, (Lawrence and Wishart, l95) pp.
317-47.
4. The Constitution of the I.L.P. also cited in
C.R.Buxton, op. cit.
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that this did not come within its competence.1
In the event, the two philosophies nutua]3 under-
mined themselves.
The Colonial O:ffice Vote had always been
an opportune moment to harry the government on West
African questions. Also, it had almost always
betrayed refflarkable ignorance amongst the defenders
of African interests. A steady and sure supply of
accurate colonial intelligence was very vital if the
Parliamentary front was to operate with responsibility
and confidence. Buxton's incessant emphasis on this
requirement perhaps reflected his own personal failings
since his characteristic patience and act was at
this time degenerating into laxity. But 1t was also
symptomatic of tactical questionings. Prudence had
a great asset - it could convince the public and the
Government that the movement was led by responsible
men.
It might, therefore, b argued that the
West African Auxiliaries came into being to provide
that incontrovertible evidence which Buxton consid-
ered most vital to its advocacy. Yet, the idea of
1. See Lagos Standard, 20 Aug. 1910 for the prospect us
of the aaalgamd society which stated the continuity
of the previous policy, i.e. that the Society would
not be involved in political actions. Note that with
the arrival of ohn Harris this creed was no longer
sacrosant.
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forming Colonial Auxiliaries, as distinct from those
in Britain, had always been an implicit faith of the
two Societies ptior to amalgamation. The original
CnStittitio of the ASS, drawn up in 1839, had
recommended to the Anti-Slavery friends throughout
the world to form Auxiliary Societies,' And on the
APS side, a much more positive expression had been
given to the idea. As late as 1891, rae we have
seen, Pox Bourne had called on the "patriotic resi-
dents" on the West Coast to form local communities
in order to give useful information to his Society,2
But insufficient finances tended to check exhuberant
hopes; and, in any case, the period before amalgamation
1. 1839 Constitution of the Ass, Sectian IX; for a
quick reference, see the ASS Annual Report
for 1906.
2. Letters of 13 Nov. 1801 from Pox Bourne to the
Gold Coast Chronicle, 21 and 28 Dec. 1891. Also
see reference in David Kimble, A Political History
of Ghana (Oxford, 1963) . 330.
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had seen a remarkable decline in colonial conscience.'
In an era of salaried humanitarians, an extensive
project like the formation of Colonial Auxiliaries
needed extraordinary enthusiasm to carry it through.
In this sense, therefore3 the inauguration of the
Auxiliaries was a function of the amalgamation itself.
But these circumstances do not explain why
West Africa was the first colonial ground where this
experiment was tried. And, in another sense, the
formation of the West African Auxiliaries was a
West African phenomenon. Early involvement of
West Africans in sophisticated political actions
antecedent to any other in the Continent, is, more
or less, well-known. The political agitations of
South Atrican natives under the aegis of American
negro missionaries, and the more important but
theatrical "Ethiopianism", 2 were later developments.
1. G.P.Gooch doubted whether Governor Eyre would have
been brought to book if he had hanged Gordon in 1901
instead of 1865; and then told how the destruction
of African natives was both the business and pleasure
of Kipling's heroes: "When Blind Dick Heldar in the
Sudan heard the fire of a gun shot at Africans he
exclaimed rapturously: "Give 'em hell! Oh, give
hell!'". See Gooch, 'Imperialism' in The Heart o
the	 ire (London, 1902) pp. 308-397.
2. For the then importance of 'Ethiopianism', See
London Standard, 29 June, 1906, 'Ethiopionism:
Equality claims - Africa for Africans'.
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Not implying that West Africans were more "permanently
factious and persistently disloyal"1 than other
colonial peoples in Africa, these agitations, which
could be traced to the 1850's, socially reflected the
ecnomic position of political Creoldoni.	 Social
and economic ascendancy (however limited) by the
liberated slaves had been reflected in a keen parti-
cipation in missionary and commercial life of the
West African Colonies; but, as clerks in the admini-
strations, they had also done yeoman service to the
Imperial Government at a time when 'Coast' mortality
was high.	 By the 1880's, however, this position of
confidence had been undermined, first by improved
medical services which dispensed with this African
'clerkly' class; and, secondly, by the educated
Africsn attempt to gain unlimited political and
religious ascendancy.
	
Novel ideas of church inde-
pendence and curious political creeds acquired in
Sierra Leone, which were given literary and polit-
ical piquancy by men like Edward Blyden, alarmed the
Colonial authorities.	 They not only ueedspurioua
1. Cf. E.D.MOrel, Nigeria: Its Peoples and Problems
(1912) pp. 81, 220. Also Perhani, Lua, Vol. II,
p. 587.
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racist arguments to question the ability, but also
severèy curtailed the functions, of this educated
African elite. This producedi frustrations which
were immediately translated into protests. 1 Then,
therefore, on 4th July, 1910, Powell Buxton made
his 'Appeal' 2 to WeSt Africans to form Aivxlliaries,
1. Por the details of these developments See Jean
Herekovitta Kopittof.f, A Preface to Modern Nigeria:
The 'Sierra Lelonians' in Yoruba, (Wisconsin, 1965),
Davi&Kimble,op. cit; J.P.A.TZ5ayi, Christian
Missions in Nigeria (Ibodan, 1965), Ayendele, Ph.D.
thesii op. cit; and J.B. Webster: The African
Churches among the Ybbas, 1888-1922 (oxford:, 1964.
2. This famous 'Appeal', made on 14 July, 1910 and
directed particularly to Nigerians, publicly announced
the wish of the Home Committee fr West African
Auxiliaries to be formed. Buxton remarked that "in
certain parts of Africa frequent acts of injustice
are constantly occurring which bring the British
administration into contempt; systems of unmit1gated
slavery and slave trade prevail, and we fear are
increasing	 Therefore, "the time has come to
invite the enlightened and humane British subjects
on the Africai continent to organise themselves
into responsible committees, with the object of
watching over the liberties of local British
subjects; assisting the Home Committee in their
work of maintaining such rights and securing
freedom for those unfortunate n tives whose liberties
are at present taken fzi them, and their persons
subjected to barbarous and inhuman treatment in
the economic interest of organised speculators".
See Nigerian_Times, 9 Aug. 1910
Por iscuesion on the establisbment of the
Auxiliaries, see Minutes, Sub-Committee, ASS,
5 Aug. 1910. item 199.
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there were aggrieved enthusiasts1 ready to answer the
call.
This favourable reaction to Buxton's
message was reflected in attempts to organise the
Auxiliaries even before the representatives of the
Society arrived to formally institute them. On
6th April 1911, Harris and his wife arrived at Accra
and launched the Gold Coast Auxiliary amidst festivi-
ties. 2 It would seem that the affairs of the
Auxiliary were in responsible hands. Its first
President was Philip C. Randolph, a barrister who
1. Lagthsions, in particular, were also already greatly
involved in agitations against some measures adopted
by the Colonial government. They had protested
against Deportation and Sedition Ordinances, were
protesting against the establishment 6 a separate
church for white men in Lagos, and against racial
discrimination generally. See, Kimble, op. cit.
Ajayi , op. cit; and. Ayandale, op. cit.
For Pan, discussion of the Colonial Church, see
also HC Dels. 58 Vol XV, 1910, 741-743; 1036-7.
Vol. XVII, 1910, lal?, HC Deba 58. Vol. XXI, 1911, 1017;
HO Debs. 5e Vol. XIX, 1910, 34;
For protests in Britain against the Sedition
Ordinance See HC Debs. 58. Vol. XV, 1910, 1035-6
HO Debs. 58 Vol. XVI 1910, 3.
2. At Accra, they were met by several local merchants
and others interested in the Colony. They lunched
at the Castle with the Ag. Governor, Major Bryan,
and the Secretary of Native Affairs P.W.Crowther,
and were reported to have discussed native welfare
with them.	 They v-tsited, Bai Shebro, a Sierra
Leone Chief exiled for his complicity in the Hut
Tax insurrection, and saw the cocoa farms in the





had been among the deputation which was appointed
by the educated Africans of Accra to wait on the Gold
Coast Governor and "impress upon him the oppo8ltion
of the people" to both the Town Councils Ordinance
and the Crown Lands Bill of 1894. With the support
it got from other 1emInent lawyers In Accra, 1 the
1. Other officers of the Aecra Auxiliary were as follows:
1st. Vice-President: Chief John Vanderpuye, 'the
educated divisional chief of tlssher Town who'
according to limble, 'lived comfortably in
European style'. It is said of him that at a
time when there were several scandals, he was
unblemished. Thus early in 1894 Ag. Gay.
Hodgeon had appointed him as the third member
of the LegCo, where In 1897 he had opposed the
Lands Bills of that year with Cheetham.
Vice-President: Dr. E.W,Quartey-Papafio, who
had edited Hogba - Skul Ngnialo, a paper for
the Methodists, before the tun of the 19th
Century, and who was related to other educated
members of the loeal leadership.
Vice-President: J.W.Sawyr.
Sec: Charles J. Bannerman: Barrister of Accra;
later he became the president of the Aecra
branch of the ARPS in 1912. When he was away
another Accra lawyer, V.J.Buckle acted for him.
Asst. See: G.L.E.Smith
Pin. Sec: J.D.Garshong
Hon. Treasurer: S.O.Akinwumi, a member of Lagos
commiiity In Accra; and. a native merchant of
some standing.
Other executive members included:
A].haji Alli - one of the Headmen or chiefs of the
Hausa Community, and son of former officer AU
of the Gold Coast Regiment of the WAPP and ADO
to HE Gov. Nathan and Gov. Rodger;
Okai Nensah Tackle - of the Abola Quarters of Acera,
and the grandson of Yaote, one of the Mentsemei
of Accra;
George Mettle - a Goldsmith and one of the principal




Axiliary might have been expected to devoWe itself
to vigorous pursuits. After inaugurating the Gold
Coast Auxiliary, Harris and his wife left Accra
for Lagos.
In response to Buxton's appeal, Lagosians
had held meetings to discuss the formation of an
auxiliary.
	
At a meeting held on 30th Aug. 1910,
Bishop James yoihson, who had been a corresponding
member of the iFS and the ASS, openly canvassed the
formation of a Lagos Auxiliary. Johnson's attitude
represented a typical African reactiont61tco1onia1
situation.	 To Johnson, as with others, the fact
of the Partition which had treated Africa as 'no
man's land', the role of the various commercial
Footnote 1. continued from previous page.
John Tettah Morton - a master carpenter and one of
the principal councillors of the Mantse of
Gbese Quarters of Accra.
Timothy Laing - a member of the Panti community;
editor of Eastern Star and Akapim Chronicle,
was among the editoriwho had attended tEi
inaugural meeting of the West African Congress
in London later in 1921.	 In 1889, he was one
of these who had proposed a formal scheme for
municipal govt. that left officials and chiefs
out of account; Vide Kimble, op. cit. p.417
for the latter:
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companies in Africa, revival of slavery in San Thome'
and Principe, domestic slavery in Yorubaland and Slave
Trade in Iboland, rough practices of colonial officials,
incidence of forced labour and oppressive legislation -
all these meant that there ought to exist a local agency
to supply information to friends in Britain whose
supposed personal influence and representation with
the Colonial Office might have been expected to have
some weight. Though primarily concerned with
protecting African welfare, Johnson hoped that coz-
nection with the parent society with its cosmopolitan
character would broaden the African interest and
sympathy in the wider humanity.' Its claim that
rather than oppose the Government, it would help to
prevent British rule from degenerating into an oppression
which might taint its prestige in the African mind,
tempted some of its fire-eating critics to regard
the Auxiliary as an agent of British imperialism.
This was merely commonsensatactics in those difficult
colonial days.	 What particularly worried the men
1. Nigerian Times, 6 Sept. 1910.
Those presenat the meeting included Hon. C.A.
Sapara Williams, W.R.Harding, S.H.Pearse, Chris
Johnson, C.J. de Rocha, wealthy merchant and financier,
A.Nichol, J.Bright Davies, J.T.Munis, J.Osho Davies,
Rev. S.A.Coker, Dr. Nojola Agbebi, and Herbert
Nacaulay who at that instance acted as Secretary.
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who listened to Bishop Johnson (apart from dis-
satisfaction with uncomfortable ordinances which fell
on them month after month) was how to bring to bay
those he called the "heartless and conscienceless
money&grabbers" whom in their zeal for great profits
cared nothing for African misery. On the motion of
Dr. Agbebl, that meeting in fact transformed itself
into an Auxiliary. 1 !herefore, before Harris finally
arrived on 3 May 1911 to sanctioi it, the Auxiliary
was already 1nagurated and membership canvassed.
The earlier adhesion of prominent Christians, Moslems
and. even pagans was significant of the spontaneity of
1. Ibid.
Officers of the Lagos Auxiliary as originally
constituted were as follows:
Bishop James Johnson - President: Bishop O1uble,
Dr. Mojola Agbebi and Hon. C.A.Sapara Williams -
Vice-Presidnnte; C.A. da Rooha - Treasurer; S.H.Pearse
F.R.G.S. - Local Sec; T.Lloyd. Harrison - Asst.
Local Sec; J. Bright Davies - Correep. Sec;
Chris Johnson - Aset. Corresponding Sec.
The objectbof the Auxiliary as in Paragraph 4
of the Auxiliary Constitution were:
(a) "to supply the Home Committee with carefully
considered information upon which it may take
action with the Home Govt.
(b) to educate and organise public opinion upon
principles which govern the activities of
the Society:
(c) to secure and administer the local financial
assistance which is so nevessary to successful
propaganda". It also stressed that local
expenses must be met from local income.
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Lagos opinion.1 After a splendid banquet at
George's Hall,2 highly enlivened by bouts of self-
congratulations, 3 Harris and his wife left Lagos
for the Congo and the "islands" from where they
returned to England.
This meant that the Sierra Leone Auxiliary
was inaugurated without their formal sanction.4
1. Nigerian Times, 6 Sept. 1910.
2. In a speech delivered at the banquet, Harris
showed moderate good sense when he reminded his
audience that opposition to Colonial officials
should be restrained because, as he said, they
"are not free agents" and "the Governor is not
superior to the King". Although he advised the
Lagosians to fight for their rights constitutionally
and responsibly, the white officials in Lagos were
apparently unimpressed. They were conspicuously
absent from the reception. Even Gov. Egeton, who
had been specifically invited, did not attend on the
pretect of a pre-engagement for that evening.
Lloyd Harrison to Prayers Buxton, 31 May 1911 NSS.
Brit. Emp. S.19 )2/2 Nigerian Times, 6 June, 1911;
Lagos Weekly Record, 15 May 1911, ENigerian Chronicle,
26 May 1911.
3, According to Lloyd Harrison, the occasion was "a
complete success as far as the entire native pop-
ulation wqs concerned, without any discordant note -
all was jubilation and gratitude towards the great
society for the amelioration of the subject races
under the protection of The Great Powers of Europe"
Harris is also said to have had a private audience
with Dr. Randle and Dr. Obasa of Ikija, the
President and Secretary respectively of the Lagos
People's Union, one of the most dynamic political
groups in the Colony. Llo yd Harrison to Prayers
Buxton, 31 May, 1911.
gos Standard, 10 Nay, 1911
4, W.P.Smith to Edward Hughes, April, 1912 MSS. Brit.
Enip. S.22. G 244
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The formation of this Auxiliary featured a ding-dong
struggle for recognition between two competing groups,
respectively led by C.D.Hotobah-During, a lawyer and
a former corresponding member of the Society, and
Rev. J.P.Roherts, acting principal of the Wesleyan
Boys' High School, Freetown. Divided by local
politics and personal animosities,' the leaders only
managed to compose the schism in July 19122 with the
1. It appears that During was supported by local
organisations, namely the Eastward Ratepayers'
Association led by Rev. S.T.Peacock, and. the
Women's Progressive Union led by Mrs. Rose Palmer.
During claimed that these were "two of the best
Societies in Sierra Leone of sincere Africans".
But it is clear that this represented the lower
ranks of the Society. For the views of this
faction see:
During to Buxton, 9 Aug. 1911, MSS. Brit. Emp. S.22
G.244
During to Buxton, 7 Feb. 1912 ibid also Dl/lO
Buxton tD During, 19 Feb. 1912 ibid, also D2/3
See MSS. Brit. Emp. S.19
2. For steps towards amalgamation,
During to Buxton, 5 March 1912, MSS. Brit. Emp. S.22
G. 244.
During to Buxton, 20 March 1912, ibid
Roberts to Buxton, 13 April 1912 Ibid
Buxton to During, 22 July, 1912, Ibid.
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triumph of Roberts'factionnow led by E.H.Cuminings,
a Justice of the Peace and one of the Charity
Commissioners of the city of Freetown, A branch
Auxiliary was organised at Bonthe, 2
 but the existence
of the Sierra Leone Auxiliaries was never more than
fitful.3
One of the things which struck Harris when
he visited the Gold Coast in April 1911 was that in
1. On 10 April 1912, .&&oberts told Buxton that the
inaugural meeting of his Auxiliary was to take place
in Wilberforce Hall; and that although membership
was not large, it included "some of the most influen-
tial members of the community as the Mayor, the
Archdeacon, and the Editor of the Weekly News".
Roberts' faction was certainly the more impotant,
having in its fold such important men as C.May,
Editor of the Weekly News,who had in fact invited
others to form the Auxiliary, Rev. J.R.Nicholas of
the UiM.C. who always spoke of the necessity of unity
and civic responsibility and the formation of "a
whole front".	 J.T.Roberts became Secretary.
Roberts to Buxton, 13 April 1912, MSS. Brit. Eznp. S.22
G.244. Sierra Leone Weekly News, 13 April 1912,
Roberts to Buxton, l2Aug. 1912. MSS. S.22. G.244.
Also, D2/3 of MSS Brit. Iup. S.19
2. On 12 Aug. 1913, Roberts told Buxton that ministers
and leading natives joined with enthusiasm; it
seemed, however, that Roberts had exaggerated the
importance of these Auxiliaries; especially in view
of the fact that he was still at that date worried by
the luke-warmness of During and his confederates.
See Roberts to Buxton, 12 Aug. 1912. 322. G.244
Buxton to During 22 July 1912.
	
ibid
3. Note that the Gambian Auxiliary was not really
inaugurated until 1917. (For this auxiliary see Nsa.
Brit. Emp. S.22. G.207 and 208.
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spite of the availability of many trained African
medical doctors there, none of them was employed in
the Government Service. This disability was rend-
ered, more irritating to the African medical coinmtmity
because several Government doctors were permitted to
engage in outside practice, were even allowed to
purchase their drugs from the Government Stores at
cost price, which meant that they obtained them duty
free, whereas an African practitioner did not enjoy
this privilege. Harris was of the opinion that the
exclusion of Gold Coast Africans from the Medical
Service was unjustified. There were Africans, he
pointed out, with higher degrees than white doctors
engaged in Government Service. 	 Secondly he felt
there was justification for the anger of the Africans
who had incurred great expenditure in going to England
and Scotland to obtain their education only to find
at the last moment that the Government discriminated
against them. This discrimination was economically
unwise for, as Harris pointed out, the employment of
a greater portion of African doctors would consider-
ably reduce expenditure by reducing the possibility
of freciuent furloughe to England, which were so
necessary in the case of white doctors. Moreover
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African doctors had told him that they were not much
worried about the salary structure, that they were
willing to accept quite moderate remuneration, provi-
ded they were allowed to augment their incomes by
private practice. The point might, on the other
hand, be made that white men and women would object
to coloured medical attendance. Harris agreed that
the argument might have weight if such a situation
were likely to arise; he found that such circumstances
were inconceivable in the Gold Coast. Even if such
objection existed, there was still an abundance of
wQrk amongst African soldiers, policemen and Govern-
ment employeeB, where the services of African medical
men with command of native languages and, customs would
seem to be invaluable. He told the Committee of the
Society that unless the existing unsatisfactory condi-
tions were changed, Africans would refuse to spend
large sums in preparing for a medical profession,
and would probably devote their activities to other
spheres less useful, or even inimical, to the welfare
of the colony.1
1. Harris to Committee of the Society, 9 April, 1911,
MSS. Brit. Emp. S.19. D3/].. . See also Report by
Harris in ASR and AF, July 1911.
237
When he returned to England, Harris took
up vigorously with the Colonial Office and members of
parliament, the treatment given to the )ledical frater .
-nity, particularly in the Gold Coast. On 5 June,
he led a Society deputation to the Colonial Office
where they discussed with Lewis Harcourt 'the question
of the disability imposed upon the medical profession'
in the Gold Coast, the deputation urging that 'a
proportionate number of native doctors qualified for
practice should be employed in Government positions'.
Although Harcourt admitted that the points advanced
by Harris were sound, he nevertheless, pointed out
that there were several. "dLf'ficulties" with which
the question was surrounded. 1 Travers Buxton there...
after urged on the Gold Coast Auxiliary to summon a
meeting immediately, inviting all the African medical
men in Aocra to discuss the matter, and to prepare a
short petition to the Gbvernor for transmission to
the Secretay of State. He advised Bannerman to
lay special emphasis upon opening the hospitals to
African doctors, and to insist that 'in all ordinary
outside practice of a private nature the drugs used
1, Minutes of Sub—Corn ittee, ASS, 7 June 1912 item
F2!/l3, Vol. VIII. Buxton b Bannerman,
10 June, 19L2, MSS. Brit. np. 5.22, G.210, also
S.19. ia/il.
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should bear the duty which outside practitioners"
usually paid. 1
 On the 28 June 1912, the Auxiliary
convened the meeting as advised and instructed Dr.
Quartey-Papaflo, who was a member of a Deputation from
the Gold Coast to the Secretary of State in connection
with the Forest Ordinance, to give the Committee the
assistance required on this question. 2
 But in spite of
repeated requests, Dr. Quartey-Papaflo, who was now angry
with the Committee for the views of some of its members
on the Forest Ordinance and Land Policy in general,
refused to see the Committee or give them the benefit of
his advice and. knowledge.3
Nt discouraged by this apparent lack of
enthusiasm shown by a representative of its wards,
the Committee sent another deputation to Harcourt
and caused questions to be put in Parliament. On
7 October 1912, NacCallum Scott took Harcourt to
task over the refusal by the Colonial Office to
appoint Dr. NC.P,Easmon4 to the Gold Coast because he
1. Buxton to Bannerman, 10 June 1912 MSS. Brit. Emp.
5.22 G.21
2. Bannerman to Burton, 28 3une 1912	 (ibid)
3. Buxton to Bannerman, 6 Aug. 1912 	 (ibid)
4. ?I.B.B.S. (London), ?4.R.C.S. (England) L,R,C.P.
(London), Until then House Surgeon to the Hunting-
don County Hospital, MSS. Brit. Emp. S.22 G.248.
239
was ta person of native African descent". Harcourt
in his reply confirmed that Dr. Easmon "recently
applied for an appointment in the West African Medical
Staff", but was not selected "as only candidates of
iiropean parentage" were "eligible under the Regula-
tions"
The special circumstances of the Gold. Coast
medical men, however, gave members of the Parliamentary
Committee of the Society an opportunity to examine
other aspects of medical administration in West Africa.
On 20 November 1912, P.W.Jowell, a Labour M.P., had
asked the Secretary of State whether in Calabar there
were hospitals for the exclusive use of Africans and
non-Africans respectively, and whether African doctors,
no matter how high their qualifications, were "die-.
qualified by reason of their colour from ministering
to the sick of either of these institutions' both of
which were maintained, to a considerable extent, by
revenue drawn from the Africans themselves. Harcourt
ad*itted that there was an African and a European
hospital at Calabar, adminietred. by Government medical
officers, but could not say whether any of the officers
1. ASR and AF Jan 1913. also Harris to D. Sackey Quarco-
ome, 23 Sept. 1912. S.22. G.210. Also S.l9. D3/6.
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in charge were Africans. The true 8tate of affairs,
was, however, revealed to Parliament on 4 December
of the same year, when in answer to Edmund Harvey's
question as to what public appointments in the Gold
Coast, Sierra Leone and Lagos were open to "coloured
medical men of African descent", Colonel Seeley, the
Parliamentary Under-Secretary, said that three African
Medical Officers were employed by the Government of
Sierra Leone, four by the Government of Southern
Nigeria, but none was employed in the Gold Coast.1
1. ASR. and AF Jan. 1913.
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On 6 December of the same year, the Committee
of the Society discussed the medical question and re-
viewed Its activity in the House of Commons and came
to the conclusion that "the Colonial Office persisted
in its attitude'. 1 Articles in the Reporter dealing
with the same subject had produced no marked result.
A publicised petition to the Colonial Office on the
matter produced no changes. 2 Although by May 1913,
Travers Buxton was still hoping that the Society would
"get a debate on the Colonial Office Vote with the
disabilities imposed on native medical men", the
Society, had only succeeded"after a good deal of
slogging" to make some people begin to "thinabout
this question". 3 One of these was Morel.
1. Minutes Sub-Committee, 6 Dec. 1912, E2/13, Vol. VIII
2. Quarco-Pome to Buxton, 24 Jan. 1913. Brit. Enip. MSS.
5.22 G.2l0
3. Buxton to Quarco-Pome, 15 May 1913. (ibid.)
(For the general role of the Society on the
Medical question vide MSS. Brit. Enip. S.22.
G.247.)
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On the 28 March, 1913, E.D.Morel in a long
editorial in the African_Mail, criticised the official
attitude on the question as unsatisfactory, unjust
and shortsighted. Giving a list of Africans who
had distinguished temselves in the medical field,
Morel wondered by the experiment in employing them
was stopped. He regarded the objection that European
doctors should never be "junioz' to Africans or that
Europeans should not be attended to by Africans as
"singularly puerile" to justify "banning" African
doctors from service. He regarded as "candidly"
unfair and unstatesmanlike the current practice of
sending Africans to act as dispensers in the Interior.
He advocated the establishment of a Native Medical
Service if it was still the determinedi policy of the
Government to exclude Africans from the West African
Service. Morel declared:
"Apart from the law, this is the only field where
the ambitious coast native has recourse to; but
even then it is unfair and unstatesmanlike to deny
service to people who could help check and cure
the diseases rife in that part: it is a duty to
the protected to give them all benefits of medical
care....." 1
1. African_Mail, 28 March 1913 Editorial: 'Native
Medical Men and the West African Colonial Service'.
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The importance which the Colonial Office attached to
these views expressed by Morel is seen in the long
minutes and memoranda submitted on this editorial.1
But these views explain the existing attitudes of
the Colonial Office to this question.
Up to 1902, when the medical services of
West African Colonies and Protectorates were amal-
gainated to form the the West African Medical Staff,
there appeared to have been no definite rules as
to the number or proportion of African Medical Officers
to be appointed to the service of each dependency.
It would appear that the question depended to some
extent on whether a suitable African medical man
was available. But as a rule they were appointed to
lower rates of salary than those of their European
colleagues. However a Committee of 1901 which
included the Principal Medical Officers of the three
West African dependencies examined the question and
concluded that it was dissatisfied with the services
given by African doctors. According to their report:
1. See CO 554/15.
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"The Committee are strongly of opinion that it is,
in general, inadvisable to employ natives of West
Africa as medical officers in the Government service....
they do not believe either that in professional
capabilities West African native doctors are on a par,
except in very rare Instances, with European doctors,
or that they possess the confidence of European
patients on the Coast... They have already been tried
in Southern Nigeria without success. It is pos-
sible that in a few isolated cases, fOr example,
at hospitals where the patients are always or practi-
clly always natives, it may be desirable to employ
a native doctor, but such cases may be regarded as
exceptional, and may be left to the discretion of
the local Governments...."l
It was accordingly laid down by Chamberlain in 1902
that while African medical men might continue to be
appointed to the Government Service, they should not
be admitted to the West African Medical Staff. This
principle was adhered to ever since. The subsequent
attitude of the Colonial Office therefore was that
possession of British medical qualifications did not
enable a doctor to an automatic appointment; and th there
was not such ailarge number of West Africans with
medical qualifications anxious to enter the Service.
A. Fiddion felt that it was inadvisable to encourage
Africans to come to Britain to study medicine: "the
1. Quoted In C.O. Memo by A. Fiddion, 28 April 1913,
on African Mall Editorial by E.D.1ore1 on "Native
medical officers in West Africa' CO 554/15
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native of West Africa will make a good deal more money
by going into trade at a comparatively early age
as soon as he has learned the three Rsw, he declared.
He emphasised the fact that racial feeling was
running high in West Africa and must be reckoned
with as a fact. European Officers, PiddiLn pointed
out, objected strongly to being looked after by
African medical men, and the difficulty would be
intensified as more officers took their wives out
1
with them.
This question was continuously kept before
the Colonial Office since it was dealt with by another
departmental Committee on the West African Medical
Staff in 1908. As a result of the findings of that
Committee, and the opinions expressed by a Conference
of Principal Medical Officers at Accra in 1909, the
Advisory Medical and Sanitary Committee for Tropical
Africa was invited to consider the question in 1911.
They expressed the opinion that the exclusion of
Africans from the West African Medical Staff should
be maintained, and that there was not sufficient
demand to justify the institution of a locally trained
service of licensed medical practitioners.
1. CO Memo by A.Fiddian, 28 April,1913, CO 554/15
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They recommended, however, the institution of a more
systematic training of carefully selected natives
for the work of sanitary inspectors, vaccinators,
hospital assistants, and. other suhordinate posts.
They were of opinion that the existing arrangements
for Th employment of native medical officers need
not be disturbed. Their views were received with
active sympathy by the Governors and the medical
and sanitary authorities.1
The persistence by the Colonial Office
in this policy was responsible for its negative
attitude to all suggestions that came before it
regarding the claims of the African doctors. When on
6 November,l909, the Sierra Leone Weekly News in a
leading article criticised the exclusion of African
practioners from the West African Medical Service,
contested the position taken upon the question
by the Departmental Committee of that year, and
suggested competitive examinations as test of fitness
for appointment, 2 A Piddian minuted: "I do not
1. 0.0. memo by A Piddion 28 April 1913 ibid
2. The Sierra Leone Weekly News, 6 Nov. 1909.
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think it Is necessary to comment in detail on this
refreshingly outspoken article. There is no question
that West African opinion is against admitting natives
to the W,A,M.S...Whatever may be said in their favour
as medical practitioners and men of scientific
attainments, I should think that replacing a European
M.O. by a native would almost certainly mean a set-
back to sanitation in the locality concerned..."
He did "not see any good grounds for reopening"
the issue.'	 Although W.D.Ellis2 was not convinced
by the arguments and evidence before the W.A.M.S. for
excluding "Natives permanently from the WAMS*,3
Charles Strachey minuted: "The West AfricaL Medical
Staff is primarily intended to look after the health
of Europeans, who would not go to West Africans....
And it is useless to ignore the fact that by medical
attendance they mean European medical attention..,."4
1. Minute of 1 Dec. 1909 by A. PiddIn on the Sierra
Leone Weekly News editorial on 'African Doctors'
267/520.
2. Ellis, Walter Devonshire, C.LG. born 1871; son of
Alexander Ellis. Educated at Winchester and New
College Oxford (Scholar). 1st class Literae Humaniores,
1894; B.A. 1894; LA. 1897; Entered Colonial
Office, 1895; Principal Clerk, 1909; Aest. Sec.1920;
retired 1931; Lived in Devon; Died 10 Aug. 1957.
3. ?inute of 1 Dec. 1909 by W.D.Elli Q 26?/5O
4, Minute of 2 Dec. 1909 by C.Strachey (in ibid.)
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When in May 1912, the Society Bent the
Colonial Office, the views embodied in the report
of the visit to West Africa, by Harris, which was
to serve as a basis of discussion with Harcourt in
the deputation which followed, a Colonial Office
memorandum prepared for Harcourt on th occasion
explained the adamant attitude he adopted at that
meeting.
	 According to Flood, "...The Society has
been listening to the Gold Coast Leader.... The Gov-
erment is systematically denounced because native
doctors are not admitted to the W.A.M.S. and the
denunciation is carried on in the same breadth with
paragraphs about the 'mosquito trash', and violent
attacks on the sanitary authorities. The only
disabilities imposed on native medical men are that
they are not eligible for appointment to the W.A.M,S.,
a service which is confined to doctors of pure European
descent"
With the publication of Morel's leader
which greatly activated the Colonial Office, the
prevailing attitude had not changed but officials
now tried to give a more reasoned argument for their
1. Memo of 1 May 1912 by Flood on The Report of the
vidit to West Africa by John Harris. AS and APS




views in conformity with the powerful case made
by ?lorel)	 Fiddian carefully refuted the points
made by Morel one by one, in particular the argument
that the African doctors were never guilty of profee-
sional incompetence. He pointed out that after
having been interdicted Dr. Easmon was allowed to
resign and died of alcoholism; that "Dr. Spi2Thburg"
was a dispenser at £100 a year and therefore it was
unlikely that he was a qualified medical man; that
Dr. Randle was dismissed from the service; that Dr.
0. 1ohnson, after five years' service, was unfavour-
ably reported on, two years after heiwas refused a
personal allowance on the ground of "insubordination
1. In the editorial of 28 March 1913, Morel had
given details of Africans who had served in the
medical service as doctors and wondered why the
experiment was discontinued. According to him,
Dr. Jarret became Aest. Colonial Surgeon at
Sherbro and served for many years in that capacity;
Dr. Easmon became PMO in the Gold Coast; Dr. King
acted as Colonial Surgeon in Lagos. Dr. Smith
was placed in charge of the hospital at Freetown
and held the post until he died; Dr. Spillsburg
was appointed to Gambia; Dr. Cole to the Gold
Coast (both died on active service); Dr. Renner,
who was then at Freetown, acted as PMO in S.L.
on several occasions.	 Dr.Paris assisted Dr.
Renner at Freetown and died at his post; Dr.
Campbell was placed in charge of the lunatic
asylum in Freetown. Dr. Randle, Dr. 0. Johnson,
Dr. Leigh-Dodipe, Dr. Sapara, etc. had served in
Lagos.
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and incompetency", arid in 1897 he resigned. Morel
had said that there were "black sheep" in every fold,
both black and white. Fiddian concluded his minute
with a racist note:	 It is true that "black sheep"
(an unfortunate metaphor) occur in every fold...;
but If one has to select sheep from a new fold, one
likes to have one's choice and only pick the white
ones.	 This will be a very difficult thing to ensure,
if there is to be any wholesale employment of native
medical men. The AdenIyi Jones 1 case shows some
of the risks of employing a low class practitioner".2
Moreover Strachey at the same time expressed the
view that with the increase of African population,
the African medical man had a lucrative future.
"The population of Nigeria alone is about 17 millions",
he minuted, "and apart from questions of humanity, public
spirit, local patriotism and scientific enthusiasm,
pactice among them should be lucrative... It Is
the obvious duty of the African to undertake medical
work among their own people, and not to go about
whining for jobs under goyerflefl 	 Sir Frederick
1. Dr. Crispin Curtin AdenIyi Jones (1876-1957)
M.B.B.S. (Dunheim); graduated 1901. MedIcal
Practitioner, Lagos, Nigeria.
2. Minute of 10 April 1915 by A.FIddian on AM Editorial
of 28 March 1913, Co 554/15.
3. Minute of 11 April,19l3 by C.Strachey (on Ibid)
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Sir Frederick Lugard, who was on leave, clinched
the argument, saying that it would be "indadvisable
to Introduce the educated native of the coast into
the Northern Thi.trates, either as a Government
official or as a private practitioner...."1
Apart from the ugly circumstances which
had earlier characterized public service in the
Gold Coast, 2 the real source of official hostility
towards the African doctors was the race prejudice
which prevailed at the time. The prevalence of
this phenomenon was the feature which had greatly
"impressed" Harris and his wife when they visited
West Africa. Harris had told the Committee of
the Society that "the increase of race prejudice"
was one of the features which had "forced Itself
upon us more than another in our journeys",
regretting that If that race prejudice was allowed
to grow, a very severe strain would "be placed
upon the loyalty of the natives of West Africa".3
Although the Society was now concerned
with this phenomenon, race prejudice was not
1.Ninute of 25 April by Sir F. Lugard (ibid)
2.Vide David Kimple, op. cit. for discussion of the
various cases of corruption in the Gold Coast
public service.
3.Harris' Report to the Committee, NSS. Brit. Emp.
S.19. D5/1 also A.S.R. and AS, July 1912.
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new in West Africa. As has already been indicated,
one of the reasons
	 Buxton's 'Appeal' met with
spontaneous response in West Africa was the fact that
the Africans were already frustrated with a colonial
situation which used racist arguments to prove their
inability to man responsible posts.
	 There were some
Africans like Henry Carr of Lagos, and J.C.Parkes of
Sierra Leone, and others on the Gold Coast who had
been elevated to responsible posts, but it was already
clear that the Colonial Officials neither tried nor
trusted other competent Africans. Even among those
that were elevated, complaints soon began to show
that there was discrimination against them.
In July 1899, James Johnson, who was to
become the Assistant bishop in the diocese of
Western Equatorial Africa, in an Interview with
R.L.Antrobus had urged the enlistment of native
cooperation In working the machinery of Government.
Later he suggested to Chamberlain that if an African
had the requisite "intellectual capacity, a good
character and general fitness", it was not justi-
fiable to bar him from government appointments
merely because of "race or colour"	 F.G.A.Butler,
1. J. Johnson to Chamberlain, 27 Dec. 1899, CO 147/147
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who minuted onthis letter was of opinion that the
experience with Africans in Government employment
had been unsatisfactory: "When a first class native
does appear, such as Mr. Ferguson of the Gold Coast,
and Dr. Blyden and Mr. Carr of Lagos, he gets
reasonable recognition, but our experience of natives
in high position has not been of undiluted satis-
faction. It would be impossible to explain this
to Mr. Johnson, but I don't think his appeal on this
score need cause so much searching of heart". 1 In
1909, Henry Carr himself told Colonel Seeley that
the appointment of E.G.Rowden as Director of Educa-
tion in Southern Nigeria over his head. amounted to
racial discrimination, against him. Although
Seeley had told him "that, broadly speaking, this
Office was opposed to the imposition of a colour
bar", he also minuted: "I am aware that the colour
bar does exist to some extent in West Africa... It
may be that the prejudice is increasing, as Mr. Carr
fears" 2 Charles Strachey, then a principal cleric
after explaining the special circumstances of Carr's
1. Minute by F.G.A.Butler, on J. Johnson to Chamber-
lain,7 Dee. 1899, CO 147/146
2. Minute of 2 Dec. 1909 by Col. Seeley, CO520/87
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case, minuted with regard to the general policy: "on
the general question, it is necessary to recognise
that the administration of the West African Colonies
is British and that as long as this is the case no
native African can expect (sic) to be appointed to
any but subordinate posts".1
Discrimination at administrative level,
however, merely reflected the official antagonism
towards the African educated classes. 	 Harris had
told his Committee that the attitude of the British
officials, particularly young ones, towards Africans
and British merchants had become very different from
what it was a decade or two before. He had suggested
to the Committee that the only remedy which he saw in
improving that state of affairs was to give African
and merchant communities who, as he said were "very
important elements in our colonies", a greater shire
in the administration of these colonies. 2 When tu
Nay 1912, the Society sent to Harcourt the report of
the visit to West Africa by Harris, in preparation
for the interview of the 15th June, it therefore
1. Minute O. 10 Dec. 1909 by Charles Strachey, CO 520/87
2. Harris' Report to the Committee, D5/1, also in
ASR and A?. Af 1912.
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urged among other things the desirability of giving
the merchant and African communities a greater share
in the government of the Gold Coast and Southern
Nigeria.1
The Colonial Office viewed this suggestion
1. Harris to CO, 1 May 1912, Co 554/10.
Harris also urged the CO
(a) to consider the "financial position to which
Prince Eleko and the white cap chiefs of Southern
Nigeria have been reduced in consequence of the
cession of Lagos to the Crown" (Actually this
request was unnecessary because the Govt. had in
that year increased Eleko's allowance from £250 to
£300 p.a; and doubled the total paid to the
other chiefs i.e. from £200 to £460 p.a.)
(b) the liberation of Bal heboro or Gbabah
Louisy then in exile in the Gold Coast. (In his
memo on this Flood said that there was no reason
for reversing a decision based on the advice of
the local authorities, aid added that "Gbanah Lewis
Is very lucky In that there was not evidence enough
to hang him',)
(c) that steps be taken to deal with questions
arising from the relations between white men and
coloured women (the Colonial Office was Inclined
to believe that the black women tended to black-
mail white men. In his memo on this Flood said
"In Sierra Leone 'Women palaers' were a recognised
source of revenue among natives and they are
indignant at the partial suppression of the more
outrageous tofthIs institution. 	 Similar cases
occur In the Gold Coast where natives sometimes
set a concubine to seduce a white man with a view
to blackmail".)
Memo of 1 May by J.E.W.Flood on AS and APS to CO
1 May 1912, CO 54/l0.
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with hostility.	 In his memorandum on this, Flood said
that although In 1898 and 1911 there had been memorials
from the Gold Coast asking for more representation
in the Legislative Council, the Colonial Office had
agreed with the then Gold Coast Governor that "no
development had taken place in the educational stand-
dard of the natives or in their capacity for self-
government 8uch as might invalidate in any way, the
grave objections to such a change". With reference to
the memorial of 1911, he said, the Governor had told
the Colonial Office that the signatories to it
did not take enough interest in their own affairs
to find out what was the composition of the existing
Legislative and Executive Councils, and that three-
quarters of the signatories could not write their
names. Moreover he claimed that mercantile
communities on the Gold Coast had given no complaints
on the subject of representation. The memorandum
contlnues:..."I don't t.Liink that the big trading
firms would care to see their representatives engag-
ing largely in local politics instead of attending
to trade.	 In any case the mercantile ominunity
don't require the ASS to speak for them.
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I very much doubt that the Society were asked to do
so.	 It is also arguable whether the Constitution
of the Colonies comes within the scope of the
Society's work.....I have assumed that the Society
don't ask for popular representation. The objec-
tions to that system in West Africa are so numerous
that it is not necessary to state them. We don't
want the local agitators sitting in our Councils...."
Flood concluded by saying that the vast majority of
the inhabitants of the Gold Coast were wholly
uneducated; those few who were to some extent edu-
cated often had interests opposed to those of the
bulk of their race; and, were apt to become "the
tools of European speculators". He did notthink
it was "possible to give effective representation
to natives".	 The Maltese and Cypriots were, he
claimed, "infinitely better educated than the West
African....yet their representatives imperfectly
reflected the feelings of their constituents".1
Lord Emniott, the Parliamentary Under-
Secretary, was of the opinion that "there iB much
force in some of the objections but that which states
1. !eñi. of 1 Nay by Flood on AS and APS to 00,
1 May 1912, Co 554/10
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that it is difficult to choose native representatives
who really represent the country they are chosen from
is one constantly used nowadays with reference to
our own LPs." He said that the chief objection
against giving more representation on the Gold Coast
was "that the merchant community don't ask for more
representation and that so few of the natives are
educated and when they are educated, are often
declasss. . •1
In his memorandum prepared on Southern
Nigeria, Charles Strachey pointed out that the
Colonial Office had "never, so far as can be ascer-
tamed, had any commuiiication of any kind from
Southern Nigeria suggesting an increase in the
Council", and that it was difficult "to see who wu1d
be benefitted by our acting on the Society's recom-
mendation". He believed, in other words, that
Flood's minute on the Gold Coast applied mutatis
mutandis to Southern Nigeria. Strachey was of the
opinion that the merchants already had "a consider-
able voice in the Council", and that it was "by no
means certain that they ought to have any more power
over the administration" than they already had. He
held the view that since they were the agents of
86. Minute of 13 May 1909 by Lord Emmott (ibid)
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Manchester and Liverpool firms whose first duty was
to their principals in England, they were unlikely
to be "a tower of strength if advice were required
on such subjects as education, 'concessions', mis-
sionary enterprise and agricultural or scientific
work. . .
With regard to the Africans, Strachey
maintained the view "realised here for some time past"
that "the educated native barrister at Lagos was
just as much a "foreigner" to the Efik or Ibo people
and chiefs of the Central and Eastern provinces as
an Englishman was.
	
According to him, the educa-
ted African talked a different 1nguage, and had
nothing in inmon with the men in the interior except
perhaps the colour of his skin. He pointed out that
the problem was "how to get the un-Europeanised native
represented", since he could not "be brought up to
Lagos to sit at a table with gentlemen in frock coats",
and, if he could, he would be too shy to talk".
Strachey's solution was "to diminish" rather than
"to extend the powers of the Lagos Legislative Council,
and to continue the present policy of governing the
protectorate through chiefs and the Native Councils
1. Minute of 9 May 1909 by Charles Strachey (ibid)
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which have been established".'
	 G.V.Fiddes,
however sat on the fence. 	 Since considerable
changes might be involved, he minuted, "the matter
must, therefore, be handled with caution. 2 Sir
John Anderson, on the other hand, agreed with
Strachey and opposed any extension of the represen-
tation:	 "the Lagos Lawyer is not a fit represen-
tative of the Protectorate native, and the mercantile
agents are men of an inferior stamp who cannot be
expected to take a broad view of things. 	 The
position in Africa is quite different from what
it is in the East where the business of the European
merchant fIirms is carried on by Europeans who are
or are looking forward to becoming partners, and
are men of education and standing." 3	When on 5
June L912, Harcourt received the society deputation
hue negative attitude to any idea of increased
1. Minute by Strachey 9 May 1909 on AS and iFS to
CO 1 May 1912, CO 554/10
2. Minute of 10 May 1909 by G,V.Fiddes (ibid)
3. Minute of 10 May 1909 by J.Anderson (ibid)
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representation, 1 could therefore be understood
in the light of the official views.
This failure by the Society to influence
the Colonial Office towards increased represen-
tation for Africans and merchants in the West
African colonies might have been unnoticed were it
not for the fact that almost immediately, the
extreme views expressed by Strachey in his minutes
began to be applied in Nigeria. Before his arrival
to effect the amalgamation of Northern and Southern
Nigerial, Lugard's activities, in particular,
his punitive measures in Northern Nigeria, were al-
ready well-known to the Lagos elite. Thus while
the Committee of the Society were congratulating
him for his lack of colour prejudice, 2 a large
number of educated Lagosians had already unfairly
given him a bad reputation as a negrophobist.3
1. Minutes, of Committee, ASS, 7 June 1912, item
2173
Buxton to Bannerman 10 June 1912.
2. Minutes, Committee, 7 June 1912, Vol. VIII
3. Lagos Weekly Record, 8 March 1913.
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It was, however, the educated elements that Lugard
was against, and not the whole race. As he told
his wife, "his loud and arrogant conceit are dis-
tasteful to me, his lack of natural dignity, of
courtesy antagonise me". 1 	 It seems more probable
that it was their education, and not merely their
social manners that Lugard disliked. Education
gave them a liberal outlook to politics, which al-
though it was not always shown in their own political
relationships, nevertheless led to demands for more
and more rights. This libertarian tendency was
galling to Lugard's severê authoritarian and mili-
tary mind; administrative changes were in fact
aimed at crippling the aspirations and pretentious
of the educated Africans of Lagos.
Lugard had incurred the justified sue-
picion of these Lagosians by his desire to reduce
the status of Lagos by placing its Secretariat
under that of the Government of Southern Nigeria,
1. Q. in Perhain, Lugard, Vol. II p. 586
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and then to confine the scope of the Legislative
Council to Lagos alone, rather than to all Southern
Nigeria as previously. Then he had hoped to
remove the Capital of the amalgamated country to
Kaduna, and to remove the provincial capital from
the island to Yaba on the mainland of Lagos. The
suspicions which greeted the mooting of these
changes became a vigorous opposition when his plan
for the Provincial System of Legal administration
in Southern Nigeria became generally known. This
system simply aimed at substituting the Northern
Nigerian system of native justice dispensed by
the District Commissioners for the common law
system with the necessary right of appeal to
the Nigerian Supreme Court which had existed in
the South.1
These schemes were actually intended
to deal a great blow on the Lagos Lawyers whose
1. For the details of these plans see K. Ezera,
ConstitutionalDevelpments in Nigeria,
(Uibridge, l96ö); Perham,	 gard: Yars of
Authority, Vol. II (Collins, 196U).
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manners 'antagonised' Lugard. 	 Their opposition
to the measures are therefore understandable.
They had built up through the years a close con-
nection and good legal practice with the interior
and the new move threatened not only their economic
prosperity but also their social and professional
prestige with the interior Africans. Moreover,
there was no mention of compensation for the lawyers
to be affected, either in the form of appointing
some of them as magistrates or in the nature of
financial assistance to stave off the initial
period of economic ruin. Apart from this legi-
timate self-interest, the lawyers had a genuine
love for the Common Law and English system of
justice. As J. Osho Davies later wrote to the
Home Committee, British Justice was "the Indes-
tructible palladium of his (African's) liberty,
his shelter and safeguard against the insolence
of officialdom and his impregnable bulwark against
patrician insolence")'	 Even as far away as
1. J. Osho Davies to Buxton, 20 Oct. 1914, MSS Brit.
Emp. S. 22. G. 236.
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Calabar, there was sustained opposition to the
new judicial arrangement. In a petition which
crystaflised the main elements of this opposition,
the Calabar people expressed their preference for
the existing machinery of Justice: "All sections
of the community have a preference for British
justice - appeal to the highest tribunal has ever
been the privilege of even semi-civilized peoples...;
if a plebiscite were taken, the whole country
would be for the retention of The Supreme Courts".'
There is no doubt that the Common Law gave the
petitioners status as persons rather than as mere
"natives", 2 but for those lawyers who were
threatened with disastrous redundancy, these plans
must have spelled literal ruin.
Since prominent members of the Lagos Auxil-
iary were lawyers,series of mass meetings were arranged
by them, culminating in that of 3 February 1914 when
1. Calabar Petition to CO. 25 Oct. 1913 copy (in ibid)
2. Perham, Lugard Vol. II, p.589.
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several resolutions condemning the changes were
unanimously passed. 	 A deputation of the Auxiliary
saw Lugard who promised a possibility of amendments
to this scheme. 1	This then encouraged the Auxil-
iary and other Lagos political groups to send letters
to the parent Society which provided materials for
questions in the Commos. A Committee meeting of
1 January 1915 considered "the recent reconstruction
of the Courts of Southern Nigeria.....to be of a
retrograde character and had caused grave local dis-
satisfaction"; 2 yet its correspondence with the Col-
onial Office on the subject produced no change of
policy. Although the agitation in Lagos was so
serious that some members of the Auxiliary tried to
launch a Nigerian Reform Association, 3 Lugard, in
spite of the disturbance this gave him, was prepared
to defend the measure which, however, became law.
The disaffection of the Lagosians with
some of Lugard's schemes did not, however, obliterate
his popularity with the parent Society. 	 Ever since
1. Lagos Standard, ?8 Narch 1913
2jinutes, Committee, ASS, 1 Jan 1915, E2/13, Vol. VIII.
3. See Perham, Lugard Vol. II, p. 590.
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Goldie's proclamation against slavery on 19 June
1897,1 the Anti-Slavery Society had always watched
with growing interest and sati8faction the measures
which Lugard adopted against the same evil in
Northern Nigeria. 2 But the applause with which
the Society received these activities was disturbed
irz 1906 by alarming information from a correspondent
in Edinburgh alleging that slavery persisted in a big
way in Southern Nigeria. 3 When the Society enquired
into this allegation it was mortified to discover




Goldie to ASS, 30 July 1897	 (ibid
2. Minutes, Committee, ASS, 4 July 1902, E2/l2, Vo. VII
Minutes, Committee, ASS 9 Nov. 1903,	 ibid
Minutes, Committee, ASS 5 Feb. 1904	 ibid
Minutes, Committee, ASS, 4 Aug, 1905	 ibid
Minutes, Committee, ASS, 1 Feb. 1907 	 ibid
See also Anti-Slavery Reporter, April 1904
3. Minutes, Committee, ASS, 5 Oct. 1906, E2/12 Vol. VII
See Lagos Weekly Record, 11 Aug. 1906.
that the particular circumstances alluded to
were in fact given legal validity by a House Rule
Ordinance passed by Sir Ralph Moor in 1901.2
The background to this Ordinance was
the special circumstances which confronted Sir
Ralph Moorien he proclaimed against slavery in the
Niger Coast Protectorate. 	 The old House Rule system
1. It appears that in 1906 two slaves who had des-
erted their House in the central province of
Nigeria, were arrested at Igbotu and taken ta
Warn for trial where one of them was imprisoned
by the native auzthorities in the absence of the
D.C. When Egerton hears of these proceedings,
he instructed that the prisoner be released, and
the untried man allowed to return to his house
at Igbotu.
Egerton to Elgin, 7 Dec. 1906, CO 520/38.
T. Buxton to Elgin, 10 Oct. 1906, CO520/38
Lagos Weekly Record, 11 Aug. 1906.
The case of Eyitooh (alias Jimmy Johnson) was
another example. Eyitoyoh was a slave who ran
away from his owner in the central province of
Nigeria in 1910, and was emp'oyed on a British
steam-dredger in Lagos harbour. When one day
his vessel came to the Central province where
the House Rule Ordinance was operative, he was
reclaimed by Chief Magbemi, the husband of his
owner.	 Taken to Porcados, he was given twelve
strokes of the cane, by the order of the D.C.;
and forced to enter into an agreement to pay his
master 15/- per month for life from his monthly
wage of £2. The ASS took strong exception to
this traneaction which was rightly stigmatised
as 'a contract of slavery'.
J.H.Harris to Crewe, 20 Sept. 1910, CO 520/99.
Minutes, Committee, ASS, 7 Oct. 1910.
P. Buxton to Harcourt, 11 Jan. 1911, CO 520/110.
For the details of these cases see Tamuno, op. cit.
2. No. 26 of 1901, CO 588/1..
269
which had guaranteed the economic existence and local
government of the riverain states of Southern Nigeria
stood the danger of being disorganised by the proc-
lamation against slave-dealing. 1
	With increased
developments, Moor quickly discovered that he was faced
with the problem of maintaining undisturbed the labour
relations operative under the House Rule, and of keep-
ing this labour supply stable after the abolition of
slavery which had undermined the integrity of the
House Rule structure,	 The House system had been a
feature of Coastal towns, and had been reinforced by
slavery, but Moor made the mistake of extending the
scope of the Ordinance to inland towns where the
system either did not exist or was not tolerated.2
Even before the harmful existence of this
Ordinance was recognised, both the APS and the ASS
had criticised the way and manner labour had been
obtained and treated in West Africa. 	 In April 1901,
Pox Bourne had protested against the forcible com-
pulsion of chiefs to supply labour, for military
and civil work, railway construction and gold-mining
1. Moor to CO, 7 July 1901, CO 520/12
2. Moor to 00 28 May 1902, 00 520/14.
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operations. 1
 Persistent agitation by the APS and
West African Governors against the recruitment of
labour from one country to another, in particular
to the Gold Coast mines, forced ClwibeiELain in 1901
to issue regulations against the emigration of labour
from West African countries, in particular from the
Sierra Leone protectorate, 2
 The labour problem
was accentuated, not only by the new economic develop-
ments which were taking place in West Africa, but
also by the reluctance of Africans to be employed
by Europeans in the mines, 3
 and as carriers during
punitive expeditions and official tours. Africans
persistently complained against the inhuman treat-
ment they received at the mines, 4
 and"the iniquitous
system" by which the Colonial officials deprived them
of their earnings by alleging insubordination and
1. West African News, 3 April, 1901
2. See Lagos Weekly Record, 26 Oct. 1961 applauding
Chamber1ainr action.
3. African Times, 7 Dec. 1901
4. A. Renner to Harris, 14 Nov. 1910, MSS. Brit. Emp.
S. 22. G. 244.
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and dismissing them unremunerated before the end
of a journey.1
Allegations that Africans were forced to
supply labour either through their chiefs or by rough
Colonial officials were followed up by the huinanitar-
ians in parliament. On 30 March, Herbert Samuel
drew the attention of the Commons to the proclamation
issued in Southern Nigeria which empowered a Governor
to order a chief to attend to the cleaning of any
creek, and to call on the natives to do the work
without any pay, while any man who refused to work
was liable to imprisonment. He said that such a
1. The Lagos Weekly Record of 26 Oct. 1901 describes
the system then in vogue:"..., as a rule, the
labourers engaged to accompany an officer or
official on a journey to the interior seldom
received any remuneration beyond the 3d. per
day given him as subsistence money. After start-
ing with a gang of carriers from Accra or Cape
Coast, the officer invariably managed, after
having travelled some 3 or 4 days, to find fault
with and dispense with the services of his carr-
iers who would be turned away without receiving
any pay for the or 4 days labour. He would
then press a fresh gang of carriers into the
service, and who in turn would be treated in the
same way. And the process goes on until he
reaches his destination, while the vouchers for
the pay of the carriers employed would be duly
filled up and forwarded to headquarters, but the
money taken by the officer to be disbursed in
respect to this particular account, never left
the coffers in which it was deposited..."
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system which amounted to forced labour or corvie,
was undesirable in British Colonies, especially as
it might be applied to the making of roads and rail-
ways and therefore produce social injustice of great
magnitude. 1	On 5 November of the following year,
Cathcart Wason had alleged that forced labour was
imposed upon West Africans In lieu of the imposition
of money rates. He had at the same time told the
House that the Incident culminating in the death
of Crew Read2 was attributable to knpaid demands
for forced labour being insolently enforced by him.3
The amalgamated Society which never relented
in its protests against these incidents, particularly
1. HO Deba. 4s Vol. 143 1905, 1770
2. This D.C. was killed by natives of Agbor inthe
Central province of Nigeria during a rising in
1906. This insurrection is ascribed to Crewe-
Read's forcible requiSitions for labour on a
locality apparently hit by economic regress.
But when he caused the old and venerable chief
of Agbor to be flogged, while allowing, the police
to loot the area, the entire population rose fld in
the turmoil that ensued, Crewe Read was killed.
Although, he doubted whether the APS protest
against the practice of forced labour, which it
alleged had brought this about, was based on
'reliable	 0. Olivier
yet minuted, N.It is essential that road.making
and other administrative zeal should not be
allowed to go too far in its demands for forced
labour..." APS to CO; 19 Sept. 1906, Minute of
20 Sept. by 0. Olivier, CO 520/40
3. HO Debs. Vol. 143, 1906, 116-7
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the decoying of West African labour to Fernando Po
and the Portuguese Islands,' concentrated its
attack on the House Rule Ordinance. The vigorous
action which the Anti-Slavery Society had taken in
regard to the Igbotu and Eyitoyo}a cases was eclipsed
by the view of the amalgamated Society that the
general question of the operation of the Ordinance
itself was an urgent one. After considering the
evidence received, the Society in a letter to the
Colonial Office etigmatised the Ordinance as up-.
holding slavery and promised to furnish that Office,
with reasons for its repeal. 2 The Colonial Office
could not, however, accept the view that the enact-
ment of 1901 was a revival of slavery. It told the
Society that "the object in view was to provide a
means of gradual transition from domestic slavery
to a system of free labour", that it was a measure
directed to the enforcement of the obligations, as
wwll as the right, of a Head of a House, and that
it abolished once and for all the difference in status
between free-born members of a House and. domestic
slaves". There was, however, an encouraging adjunct
1. AS and APS to 00, 1 Sept. 1913, CO 96/540
2. Harris to Crew, 20 Sept. 1910, CO 520/99
P. Buxton to Harcourt, 11 Jan. 1911, CO 520/110
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to the effect that Harcourt had ordered an enquiry
into its working with a view to determining whether
the time had come for a further advance in the same
direction.
	
But in considering the question, the
Colonial Office, however always kept "in view the
danger of undermining by a hasty measure the trad-
itional authority of the Chiefs, on which the whole
social and administrative system of the country is based".1
Having learnt that Harcourt had enquired
into the working of the Ordinance from the "man on
the spot", Harris, therefore, suggested to Walter
Egerton certain reforms which were most necessary if
it was not intended to repeal it immediately.
Harris pointed out that since the words "or in any
other manner" which was used to define a "member of
a House" appeared to leave the door open to purchase
or transfer of the persons or slaves, and would
justify any system of peonage which might develop,
under it should be deleted. He contended that the
time had come when "freedom of contract" should be
extended to all adults without reference to any
1. CO to ASS and APS, 12 Dec. 1910, draft CO 520/95




third party, arguing that the labour problems of the
Colony would be facilitated by encouraging the.
individual to enter into labour engagements. He then
contended that a clause should be inserted in a new
Ordinance rendering illegal the separation of domestic
slave families either bn the death of their owner or
at any other period, and. that provision shouLd be
made whereby a slave might obtain his freedom, either
by monetary or labour redemption. On the other
hand, It was urged that the machinery of Government
should no longer be used, to force either men or
women back to the control of their masters or "Heads
of Houses". Moreover, since it was not always clear
whher a man or woman could marry outside the limits
of the House without their respective owners' consent,
not
which might/be given, Harris added that safeguards
should be provided for liberty of marriage. 1 A
few weeks afterwards, Harris, who was no in West
Africa, wrote again to Egerton imploring him to use
his influence to bring about his suggested reforms
1. Harris to Egerton, 28 April, 1911, MSS. Brit. Enip.
S.19, D3/5 See also MSS Brit. Emp. S.22 G.224.
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in order to render impossible a recurrence of
incidents similar to Eyitoyah's) But Egerton's
confidence in the House system was not even under-
mined by the severity of the Ordinance which propped
it up. "The House Rule", he wrote to Harris, "is
only part of the native tribal system... Under that
system the Head is a trustee for the "tribe' s here
more correctly described as rcornmunityl... All the
property, land, etc. belong 10 the community and
each member has a right to share in it. He alsO
has certain obligations to his community... The System
on the sold Coast is very similar although different
in details...." 2
It is clear from Egerton's reply that he
was either confusing the House Rule Ordinance with
the House Rule itself or deliberately watering down
even the moderate demands made by Harris. But these
advocated reforms, were for other reasons unaccept-
able as well to many members of the Society, in
particular, Herbert Tugwell. Tugwell who had
canvassed the case against the Liquor traffic,
1. Harris to Egerton, 4 May 1911 (ibid)
2. Egerton to Harris, 5 May 1911, MSS. rit. Emp. S.19,
D4/l, also in MSS Brit. Emp. S.22 G.224.
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brought the same zeal to the question of slavery in
Southern Nigeria. He could not regard the reforms
demanded by Harris as constituting a solution to the
problem. Arguing the case for immediate repeal,
Tugwell told the Society that as long as the Ordinance
stood unrepealed, the system of providing "forced
labour" through the medium of the Chiefs would. con-
tinue. Moreover, he claimed that this injustice
would extend to other places since the operation of
the Ordinance which was in earlier years confined
to the Delta of the Niger and its immediate neigh-
bourhood, had begun to extend into the Interior to
include such districts as Onitaha. He argued. that
the Ordinance operated against the interests of
Education since Chiefs were able to forbid children
from attending schools even though their parents
might desire them to do so. Boys who had been
trained by individual missionaries as Pupil teachers
were liable to be recalled by the Chief of the House
apart from any wish of the parents In the matter, he
alleged .
On the other hand, Tugwell told the Society
1. Tugwell to T. Buxton, 7 June 1911, MSS. Brit. Emp.
22. G. 224.
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that under the Ordinance chiefs who lived with the
people in isolated plantations were practically a
law unto themselves. No person could leave those
plantations without the knowledge and consent of the
Chiefs. Tugwell cited a place like Opobo, where he
said, the people lived on islands under most d.egrad-
ing conditions huddled together in huts which stood
on swampy lands; although better sites were availahie
close by on the main land, Tugwell alleged the Chiefs
refused to allow them to move since this would involve
the loss of many slaves. He, therefore, made an
economic case against the system under which progress
on the part of the people was practically impossible.
A man could not accumulate capital without arousimg
the suspicions of his Chief; he could not trade on
his own account; he traded in the interests of the
House.	 Tugwell argued that this hindered rather
than encouraged the development of trade. He con-
cluded by advising that it was strategically wise
and expedient to repeal the Ordinance. He claimed
that such a procedure would neither lead to any
unrest since the people knew already that the day
of its abolition was up and the young men had prayed
that that day might speedily come, nor restrict
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commercial prosperity in the area, since the "merchants
who have urged me to take action in the matter assure
me that the House system seriously interferes with
trade,,.
In the Committee itself, opinions were now
divided; but the two policies - immediate reform but
ultimate repeal and immediate repeal - were reconciled
by a sub-committee 2 which recommended to the Committee
that the British Government should be asked to repeal
the Ordinance, and that the reforms suggested by
Harris should be immediately pressed for as leading
up to, and not a substitute for, the abolition of
the Ordinance. 3 However, Harris who was in Southern
Nigeria at this time organising the Lagos Auxiliary,
had sent a report to the Committee in which he des-
cribed the operation of the Ordinance in the Eastern
province of Nigeria. He contended that the Ordinance
which tended to force British labour to flee the
1, Tugwell to T.Buxton, 7 June 1911, MSS. Brit. Emp. 22
G.224.
2. This sub-committee consisted of Sir C. Scott
Moncrieff, Rev. R.C.Gillie, LJ.Elliot, F.W.Fox,
Mrs. SoloniOn and Mrs. Unwin.
Minutes, Committee, A3 and Al'S, 2 June, 1911, E2/12,
Vol. VII
3. Minutes, Committee, AS and Al'S, 12 June 1911, ibid.
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the colony was economically unsound, and that it was
derogratory to the British Crown that in order to
enjoy personal freedom British subjects of good charac-
ter were compelled to seek their liberty under Spanish
and other flags.1
The Society published this report in a
pamphlet form2 and a memorial based on it was sent to
Harcourt. Citing the case of Eyitoyoh and Jabez
Linette as illustrative of the baleful operation of
the Ordinance, the Society had come to the conclusion
that the Ordinance was accompanied by such undoubted
features of slavery as the loss of personal liberty
and the denial of freedom of contract, separation
of families, restriction on marriage and forced
labour through the medium of the chiefs. It advised
Harcourt to accept the points of reforms advocated
by Harris since to uphold and sanction a revival of
1. Harris to Buxton, 6 May 1911, MSS. Brit. Emp. S. 19
D5/l also S. 22 G. 224. Harris reported the case
of Jabez Linett, a slave who escaped from Calabar
to Fernando Pa because he was required to give
service to his master whom he regarded as wicked.
For details of this episode, See Tamuno, o. cit.
2. Domestic Slagery in Southern Nigeria. (1911)
Minutes, CommItee, ASS 7 July 1911, item 1938
E2/12, Vol. VII.
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domestic slavery was an attitude entirely counter to
the British traditions. Such an attitude must be
repudiated root and branch by public opinion.1
Meanwhile members of the Parliamentary Committee bad
been asking questions in the Commons. On 13 February
1911, Joseph King and Josiah Wedgwood wanted facts
from Harcourt on the operations of the Ordinance,
Joseph King insisting on knowing whether under the
Ordinance it was possible to separate (against their
will) husband and wife who had been married under
Christian rites. Harcourt's denials were ineffective
since it . is obvious that he was not in possession
of the facts. Two days after, the same King took
him to task on the details of the arrest of "Joe of
Lagos", another deserter from a House in Warn.2
Since Harcourt had told the House, in reply to a
1. ASS to Co. 11 July 1911, CO 520/110
2. HG Debs. 5s Vol. XXI, 1911, 670-1, 1037
King, Joseph, eldest son of Joseph King, M.R.C.S.
of Liverpool; born 31 March, 1863, Educ. at
Uppinghain School, Trinity Coil. Oxford Giessen and
Berlin Univs; Liberal M.P. N. Somerset 1910-18;
Clubs: Reform, National Trade Union; Died 25 Aug. 1943.
Byles, Wir William Pollard, Kt. Born 9 Feb. 1849;
son of William Byles, founder of Bradford Observer.
Educated in private schools; M.P. Yorkshire (Shipley
Div) 1892-95. Radical M.P. for N. Salford since 1906.
A strong Radical and Social Reformer. Belonged to the
National Liberal and eform Clubs. Died 15 Oct. 1917.
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question by King, that the status of slavery was not
recognised in Southern Nigeria, Sir William Byles,
some weeks after, referred Parliament to the report
by Harris which had been published and other letters
written from Southern Nigeria. Byles alleged that
ev the officers who administered the law did not
approve of the things they did. According to him, a
young man who went ut as a District Commissioner
after a short experience in Southern Nigeria wrote
home: "People in England would be horrified if they
knew the decisions which are given in these courts".'
Pressure from Parliament and the Society
forced Harcourt to order another investigation into
the working of the Ordinance. 2 He had told Parliament
that it "had worked on the whole fairly well", but
that it was "not one which ought to be maintained".3
1. 1W Debs. 5s Vol. XXVIII, 1911, 1312-13.
2. In April of that year he had been told by Egerton
that the investigations of the DCs showed that the
allegations made against the operation of the
Ordinance were "unfounded" Egerton to Harcourt,
20 April, 1911, CO 520/102
3, HO Debs. 58. Vol. XXVIII, 1911, 1347.
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When a few days later the Society was informed that
the Colonial Office was enquiring into the operation
of the Ordinance, 1 it at once recommended its im-
mediate repeal, bringing to the fore all the extremist
arguments hitherto advanced by Tugwell. Tugwel].
like Egerton, had argued as if the House Rule system
was a result of the Ordinance under criticism.2
The Colonial Office now pointed out to the Society,that
House Rule was the basis of the Social organisation
of the area before the Ordinance was passed; thatiit
was in force in the districts to which the Ordinance
did not apply, and. would remain even after the
Ordinance was abolished.	 It at the same time pointed
out that the system in its original form presented
certain very undesirable features, and that the
Ordinance under attack even removed somecx the least
desirable of these features; for example, that it
rendered unlawful the former practice of recruiting
households by the purchase of slaves, abolished in
the sight of the law the distinction of classes by
1. O to ASS, 23 July 1911, }ISS. Brit. Emp. D2/2
2. For these arguments see also the Times, 24 July, 1911.
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which a social grade of domestic slaves was reCOgfli8ed,
and set up a very important safeguard against oppression
by requiring that all proceedings for the enforcement
of the rights of the Head of a House should be ins-
tituted before a European officer, instead of in the
native courts, in which the influence of the ruling
class was necessarily predominant. The Colonial
Office, however, believed that the Secretary of State
would determine how far the traditional system of the
country might with safety be further modified in the
direction of individual liberty; but it added that,
to establish by law complete individual liberty In
Eastern and Central Nigeria would be in existing
circumstances a cmplete social revolution which
would only court failure and probably disaster.1
Although Morel and Holt seemed to agree
with these views It was clear that that office did
1. CO to ASS, 12 Aug. 1911, MSS. Brit. Emp. S 19, D2/2
2. Morel, Nigeria, op. cit. pp. 62-3.
Holt to Morel, 22 May 1911, P8/4. EDNP
Morel was of the view that "to destroy the authority
of the heads Xof Houses) would be to create an army
of wastrels ad ne'er-do-wells. Native Society
would fall to pieces and endless 'punitive expedi-
tions' would be the result..." Nigeria, p . 63
For a similar attitude see, R.E. Dennett in Journl
of the Royal Colonial Institute, Sept. 1911.
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Lot always bring out the evils in the system of
House Rule since the Ordinance was passed. Prom
other reports, the House System seemed to have been
more oppressive since 1901 than previously. 1 More-
over, letters from missionaries on the subject
indicated that while for generations the House System
was the custom in the greater part of the Niger Delta
districts, the Government in 1901 legislated as if
the custom were universal in the Eastern and Central
provinces, and thus made a distinctly local custom
apply to the whole country. 2 Moreover, if Tugwell
is to be believed, "it would not be difficult to
prove that the practice of 'recruiting households by
the purchase of slaves" persisted: 	 Girls were still
purchased in the Ibo markets, nominally as wives,
but actually as slaves, Tugwell alleged.3
Fortunately for the Society the reports
from local officials were this time very critical
of the administration of the Ordinance in Eastern and
1. Rev. George Basden to T. Buxton, 10 Aug. 1911,
MSS. Brit. Emp. S. 22 G. 224
2. ASS to CO; 18 Aug. 1911, MSS. Brit. Emp. 5.19.
D6/l; also S1 22. G. 224.
3. Tugwe]..1 to Buxton, 22 Aug. 1911, MSS. Brit. Emp.
S. 22. Gr. 224.
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Central provinces where it was said to be "lax".
Moreover, the Ordinance had been applied to areas
outside its legitimate coastal scope, and had not
even improved the relations between the so-called
"free-born" and. "servile" members which it was
alleged was one of its merits. 1 Although certain
chiefs in the Niger Delta wanted the Ordinance to
remain, 2 Harcourt was thoroughly shocked by these
reports: "1 am amazed to find that we have a
condition existing in Southern Nigeria so little
removed from slavery not only under our flag but
under the authority of our own Ordinance. It Is
quite clear that the House Rule Ordinance is valued
and maintained by the Government officials there
mainly as a thinly veiled system of forced labour
which enables them to obtain porterage and canoe h
haulage free of cost and probably other services
besides. The native chiefs naturally support It
for the considerable advantages which it gives to
them 3 A few months after, therefore, the Ordinance
1. Egerton to Harcourt, 19 Oct. 1911, CO 520/107
2. End. I (a) and Appendix I: Petition dated 4 April
and 27 July, 1911, in ibid.
3. Minute of 31 Dee. 1911 by L. Harcourt on Egerton
to Harcourt, 19 Oct. 1911, CO 520/107.
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was amended1 in the light of this high-powered
criticism.
This amendment, however, did not satisfy
the Society which wanted total repeal. Egged on
by Tugwell, who had earlier given the hint that the
Colonial Office did not contemplate abolition of
the Ordinance, but a modification of "the tradit-
ional system", 2 the Society began to collect more
facts on the operation of the Ordinance and to send
deputations to officials.	 The subject once again
came up in Par1iament. On 27 June 1912, Harcourt
told. a Committee of the Commons, that he had "exam-
ined the matter very carefully, and I am by no means
satisfied with the existing situation". He could
not however tell whether it would be "possible
eventually to abolish this system altogether",
though it could be confined to a restricted coastal
strip. He had asked Lugard to report
1. For the amended House Rule Ordinance No. 1 of
1912 dated 8 Feb. 1912 see CO 588/4
2. Tugwell to Buxton, 22 Aug. 1911, NSS. Brit.
Emp.- S.22 . 244; also Mss. Brit. Emp. S.19. D2/2
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specially to him. 1
 However, at an interview with
Lugard before he went out to Nigeria, Travers
Buxton and Harris had told him the Society's yearning
that the Ordinance be repealed. 2
 Lugard had promised
that he would look into th question when he reached
Nigeria. 3 By December 1913, the Society was
jubilant over rumours which were later confirmed,
that the "Native House Rule Ordinance" of 1901.
and the Amended Ordinance of 1912 would be repealed
from the let January l9l5.
This successful agitation against the House Rule
Ordinance represented the climax of integrated effort,
1. 110 Debs. 5s Vol. XL 1912, 535
2. Buxton to A. NacCalluin, N.P., 21 June 1912 Copy
S.19. Dl/ll also in MSS. Brit. Emp. S.22 G.22
3. Lugard to Buxton, 11 Ilay 1912. MSS. Brit. Emp.
S.22. G. 224. also S.19. D2/3
4 Buxton to Harcourt, 1 Dec. 1913, Copy MSS. Brit.
Emp. 22. G. 224.
CO to Buxton, 6 Dec. 1913,	 ibid;
Minutes, Committee, ASS, 2 Jan. 1914, E2/l3,
Vol. VIII.
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within the Society. Prior to amalgamation the
two societies had, protested respectively against
rudiments of slavery and incidence of forced labour.
Under new conditions, of which the House Rule Ordinance
was a mere reflection, it had become clear that old-
world slavery was indistinguishable from new forms,
and this discovery gave the amalgamated Society
a greater tnity a! purpose. This crusa4e against
slavery supplemented the antt-. liquor cry, and by
crystallising the most provocative elements of
humanitarian ethics, helped to justify the existence
of the Society.	 It demonstrated that the Colonial
Office was not always totally indisposed to take
into account the traditional efforts of Exeter Hall
to provide colonial rule with a humanitarian conscience.
It provided the Society with another justification
for its vigorous and efficient organisation since
amalgamation, and a source of self-congratulation
in face of other failures.
The Society was, therefore, prone to revel
in the after-glow of this triumph. Yet with very
special exceptions, the results of other combined
efforts by the parent Society and its Auxiliaries
could only be described in negative terms. They
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failed to carry tI'e repeal of the notorious Infectious
Diseases Ordinance of 1908, invoked in the Gold Coast
in Nay 1911 as quarantine measures were adopted to
check the outbreak of Yellow Fever, but which led to
the indiscriminate demolition of African houses with-
out apparent cause or reason, while inadequate provi-
sion for the life and property of the evicted had
been made. 1 They failed after sustained efforts to
convince the Colonial Office to repeal the 'savage'
Sedition and Prisoners' Deportations Ordinances
which had been passed in Nigeria to check press
criticism of the Government and to discipline diso-
bedient chiefs. 2 The pathetic petition of the kitis
against a merger which subjected half of their kins-
folk (Yoruba) to barbarou8 treatments from their
"ancient enemies" (the Ilorin Fu1ant), in spite of
1. Ordinance No. 2 of 1908.
See Petition of the Gold Coast Auxiliary to
Harcourt, 12 June 1911. Also
V.J.Buckle to Prayers Buxton, 13 June 1911
MSS. Brit. Emp. S.22 G.210
CO to Buxton, 15 June,19l1 ibid
W.C.F.Roberts to Bannerman, 29 Dec. 1911 ibid
H,Bryan to Bannerman 22 Feb. 1912 (copy) ibid
2. HC Deb. 5s Vol. XV l9lO 1O3..6; Vol 1'I,i9lO, 3
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the efforts of the Society in Parliament, failed
to achieve more	 an unctious assurance from the
British Resident at Ilorin. 1 Moreover, the unhappy
experience of Ifawibe who had been Installed by the
Owa of Ijeshaland to be the Onibon of Ibon, but was
illegally deposed by his enemies at the instigation
of Captain Blair, the Irascible British Resident at
1. See Petition of the lioffa (of Ekiti), 25 Feb. 1911
to the Sec. of State Copy NSS. Brit. Emp. S. 22
G. 215
Petition of the Chiefs and Elders of Ekiti,
24 July 1911, to the Sec. of State. 	 (in ibid)
African Mail 28 April 1911
HC Debs. 5s Vol. XXIV, 1911 1359-1360
Minutes Committee, ASS, 6 Oct. 1911, E2/l2, Vol. VII
Lloyd Harrison to Buxton, 20 Sept. 1911 MSS. Brit.
Emp. S.22. G.215
Lloyd Harrison to Buxton 9 Oct. 1911	 (Ibid)
Buxton to J.Bright Davies, 13 Oct. 1911 	 (ibid)
Buxton to Lloyd HarrIson, 20 Oct. 1911 ?4SS. BrIt
Emp. 8.22. G.215
Lagos Weekly Record, 2 Dec. 1911
1oyd Harrison to Buxton 7 Feb. 1912 S.22. G.215
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llesha, 1 echoed in the Commons, 2 but was not rescued
from the facetious comic it degenerated into.3
1. Lloyd Harrison summarised the position in a letter
of 29 Nay 1912 to T. Buxton: "It is the same thing
again; although the Owa is recognised as the Ruler
of Ijeshaland, the Commissioner sent to his country
for the bare purpose of advising him, must needs
thwart and set aside his actions and waysi in what
does not in any way concern him, and when the Owa
ad his Chiefs complain, the Government must back
up their man at any cost..." I'ISS. Brit. Enp. S.22
G. 217
2. HO Debs. 5e. Vol. XLII, 1912, 22-3
revious1y the Society had caused a question to
be put in the Commons asking the Sec. of State
"whether his attention has been called to the
dispute which arose in Southern Nigeria over the
appointment of one Ifawibe to be Chief or Onibon
of Ibon, who was in 1909 elected by the authority
of Owa and Council of Ileeha, but his appointment
having been opposed by the Chief and people of
Ibokun, bewas forced to leave the country and make
representations to the Governor of Lagos; whether,
and on what grounds the District Commissioner sup-
ported the Chief of Ibokun in his hostile attitude
and in 1911 refused the Onibon any assistance to
return to the Chiefdom of Ibón to which he was ap-
pointed by the Owa and Council, according to the
authority conferred upon them by law for the inter-
nal administration of the district".
See !4SS. Brit. Emp. S.22. G. 217
3. For the severe measures against Onibon (one of which
even refused his request to enter Ibon to bury his
dead mother). See
Onibon'slçetition to Harcourt, 24 Oct. 1911
MSS. Brit. Emp. S.22 G.217
J. Bright Davies to Buxton, 13 Jan. 1912 	 (ibid)
Resolution of the Lagos Auxiliary of 13 han.
1912 (ibid
Lloyd Harrison to Buxton, 29 Nay, 1912	 (ibid
The official view was that Ifawibe had no right to
the chieftainship he claimed; it would seem, however,
that he was merely a victim of Captain Blair's high-
handed meddling withthe internal admin. of Ilesha.
293
Protests against the deportation of some
individual chiefs met with limited success, but other
issues involving personalities met wtth less enthusiasm
and failed perhaps more ignominously. When Mike
1Peters-Osoko appealed to the Society against a high-
handed dismissal by Adegboyega Edun from his judicial
service ii the Egba United Government, it pleaded non
Ossumus:	 the Society lacked the courage to ihterfere
in the affairs of a Native 'Independent' Government.2
Madame Adeline, head of a 'House' at Calabar, who had
suffered great economic and inhuman treatment and false
imprisonment through the excessive zeal of the D.C.
1. Mike Peters-Osoko was in the service of the Egba
United Govt. as Political Officer at Iro from April
1907 to 19 August 1909 when his appointment was
terminated at the instigation of A. Edun, the
Secretary of the E.U.GI, owing, as alleged to "the
people and chiefs of Iro refusi4g to have him as
Political Officer". But Peters-Osoko claimed that
his discharge was aimed at forestalling charges of
bribery and corruption which he intended to make
against some members of the E.U.G., including Edun
himself. MSS. Brit. Emp. 8.22 G,216.
2. Wheeler to Peters-Osoko, 27 March, 1912, MSS. Brit.
Emp. S.22. G.216.
Buxton to Messrs Taylor & Co. 11 July, 1912 	 (ibid)
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C. W. Partridge, 1 even tiL 1920 found the Society "unable
to carry the matter any further". 2 Circumstances of
venality and gross malversation of funds might rightly
have inhibited the Society from urging the reinstatement
1. It appers that Adeline of Duke Town, Calabar and
her husband Plange, had complained to the Govt. of
Southern Nigeria of the capture and enslavement of
certain members of	 household by the Aros
at Itu. When in 1905 she wanted to recapture them,
her rights over then) were denied by the slaves who
apparently had pledged loyalty to another House.
The Govt. made enquiries but could not go further
in the matter. When Adeline attempted to pursue
it further she was arrested with her husband in 1905
and imprisoned for six months because, according to
Partridge, she was trying to subvert the House Rule
Ordinance. When in 1906 they were released they
were forbidden for a time to proceed to Calabar
withi the result that Adeline's goods and trade were
ruined.	 She then petitioned the Colonial Office
which although it found "that Adeline 'Warn' has
a grievance against the Government", felt that her
petition was involved and by no means clear".
H.P.Plange to 00, 31 Dec. 1905, CO 520/34
Minute of 3 Feb. 1906 by J.R.W.R.
J. Bright Davies to Buxton, 16 Oct. 1912. For her
case see MSS. Bnit. Emp. S.22 0. 211.
2. Adeline to Buxton and Harris, 24 Feb. 1920 MSS.
Bnit. Emp. S. 22. 0.211.
Buxton and Harris to Adeline, 29 March 1920.
(There is no evidence, however, that the Society
did anything at all about this matter. There is
no comment on it in the ASR_and_A?, and was not
mentioned in the minutes &Lf Commi'ttee meetings as
having been discussed. Adeline had asked for
compensation; but the Society probably regarded
her as a slave dealer)
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of Philip Coker of Lagos to his ±ormer office, 1 but
even a prolonged protest might never have been more
rewarding. Although the return of Nana of the Benin
River from his exile2 and the release of the Oloye of
Oye from his illegal arrest in July 1910 by the same
1. Philip Coker was a native Accountant of Lagos who
had been sentenced in Jan.1910 to 9 months"
imprisonment on a charge of stealing. He had
however been released in June of the same year,
apparently on the ground of a wrongful cznviction
but really because he had worked up a large section
of Lagos population to petition on his behalf.
But he was refused a free pardon and reinstatement
in Govt. service. The Lagos Auxiliary forwarded
a resolution of its sub-committee urging that the
Society should see to it that Coker was re-habili-
tated. It appears however, that several members
of the Lagos Auxiliary believed that Coker was
actually a rogue, and had opposed the resolution.
MSS. Brit. &np. S.22. G.225
See Minutes, Committee, ASS 3 Nov. 1911, E2/12,
Vol. VII.
HO Debs. 5s Vol. XXXVIII, 1912 Sir Wv'. Byles, 1737-8
2. Minutes, Sub-Committee, ASS, 3 Oct. 1913, E2/13,
Vol. VIII.








Captain Blair, 1 owed much to the Societ y , it was
unsuccessful to secure the return of 0varrei of
Benin, 2 Chief Okun3 and Gbanah Loulsy of Sierra
1. It appears that on 25 March 1910, a Govt. messenger
brought before the D,C. Capt. Blair a man arrested
near Oye for illegal rubber tapping. He had caught
anotherman, but as he was unable to bring that one
with him, he sent the 2nd man to the Oloye, and
asked the latter to send the prisoner to the D.C.
at Oke Imo (i.e. Imo Hills). 	 The Oloye is reported
to have failed to do this, although he came to the
place himself when sent for. He was told that he
would have to remain at the town of Ilesha until
he produced the man. This, he did on 19 April,
and. was allowed to leave; 	 The Society had written
the CO and asked questions in Parliament about tbls
native Chief.
Minutes, Committee, ASS, 3 June, 1910, E2/l2, Vol. VII
HC Debs. 58 Vol. XVII, 1910, Cathcart Wason, 1016
HC Debs. 58 Vol. XIX, 1910, J.King; Col. Seeley,
2341, 2342.
3. Chief Okun from the eastern border of the Western
province of Nigeria, wa deported thn July 5 1911
to Calabar for not co-operating with the D.C. Tabor
in the latter's demand for native labour. MSS. Brit.
Enp. S.22. G.218.
J. Bright Davies to Buxton, 30 Nov. 1911 MSS. Brit. Emp
8.22 G.218
Buxton to Bright Davies, 1 Dec. 1911	 ibId.
Buxton to Byles, 7 Dec. 1911, 11 Dec. 1911 Ibid
Harcourt to Byles, 13 Dec. 1911	 copy	 ibid
Buxton to J.Brlght Davts, 21 Dec. 1911 	 ibid.
Minutes of Committee ASS, 5 Jan. 1912 item 2116,
E2/l3,Vol. VIII
cf with the case of the Akgbo of Ijebu Remo who
was arrested and. later released at this time. Vide
gos Weekly Record, 16 Dec. 1912
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Leone1
 from their exiles. In Its genuine fight
against racial discrimination which was sweeping
across West Africa, the Society succeeded in keeping
the issue of employing more educated Africans in
administrative positions before the public gaze;
but, as we have seen, It did not succeed with the
Colonial Office to remove the disability suffered
by African medical men. Its most signal victory
was, of course, when it secured the abolitj:on of
the House Rule Ordinance; but even here the role
of Lord Lugard should never be minimised.
In 1917, A.P.Newton ascribed no wholesome
influence to the mid-Victorian humanitarians when
he wrote:.....
The wire-pulling linfluenee of the philan-
thropists of Exeter Hall over the British Govern-
ment in the middle Victorian period led the
Colonial Office into many unfortunate mistakes,
and its indulgence in much uninformed inter-
ference with local administrations as regards
the negro imbued the white cOlonists with that
contempt and dislike for 'Dowting Street' that
made them regard it as characterized mainly by
theddlesome Ineptitude and pharisaical fussiness
about matters It neither troubled to examine
nor understand...."	 2
1. A85 to CO 1 Nay 1912, CO 554/10; Memo of 1 May 1912
by Flood.
2. A.P.Newton, Old Empire and the New (London and
Toronto, 1917) p. 1O.
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It is probable that awareness of these alleged mistakes
might have inhibited the Colonial Office from officially
associating itself with schemes, however, humanitarian,
which Exeter Hall advocated during the period under
study. But In curbing the direct influence of the
Society on official policy the Colonial Office at the same
time could not have innoculated itself against other
wholesome, though indirect, results of humanitarian
pressure. Through incessant questions in parliament,
by persistent correspondence, memorials and personal
relations with the Colonial Office and its officials,
the Society probably exerted an intangible influence
on policy.	 The Colonial Office began to anticipate
the reactions of pressure-groups to circumstances and
in thus modifying official policy in a way that would
make humanitarian protests innocuous, it gradually
and imperceptibly took on a disposition which was to
provide colonial rule with a humanitarian conscience.
Yet in unfairly dismissing much of the Society's
advocacy as uninformed, confused or exaggerated, the
Colonial Office not only determined that rather than
share power with an extraneous body like the Society,
it would confide in the 'man on the spot' who, except
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with rare lapses, that Office believed, reflected
the benign and paternal intentions of the British
Government to its West African wards.
As will be seen in the next chapter, the
relationship between the parent Society and its West
African allies was not always smooth-sailing. During
The controversial land deba1e, when it was misled by
the Auxiliaries, the Society adopted a line of action
which nearly led to a policy harmful to its more
numerous wards, but not before internal reflections,
and the persistent advocacy of Morel for protection
of land by the Crown forced the Society to modify its
philanthropic lessons.	 In the event, the 'Coast'
elite virtually lost confidence in the Home Committee.
In Lagos internal dissensions led. to a schism and
dissolution of the Auxiliary until it was salvaged
again.	 In the Gold. Coast, the land controversy
provided most prominent members of the Auxiliary
(who like other auxiliaries had found Section 2, Par.5
of the Auxiliary Constitution most embarrassing)1
with an excuse to decamp into more vigorous, and
perhaps more opportunistic movements. 2 The Sierra
Leone Auxiliary, as already indicated, existed even
1. The controversial par. 5 of the Auxiliary Constitution
which was, however, later amended, after co'onial
protests, reads as follows: "In order to secure
harmonious action, the Society shall not take
any public or official action locally as an Auxiliary
to or kuder the auspices or authority of the Society
in England without first consulting the Committee
of the said Society, but this regulation is not
intended to prevent the Committee of the Auxiliary
(acting in its own name and fin its own authority)
from placing before the local authorities, or
otherwise dealing with cases of emergency where
prompt action is considered necessary by the majority
of the Auxiliary Committee provided that that
Committee makes it quite clear(when emergencies do
arise) that their independent action is being taken
upon the sole responsibility of the Auxiliary and
that it in no way commits the Parent Body". (See
MSS. Brit. Emp. S.22. G. 210, 230, 245.)
The implication of this is obvious, and the
effects, in spite of later amendm.nnts, far-reaching:
people began to feel that the Auxiliary was a
powerless organisation; and utany members were
gradually disillusioned and resigned.
2. The Gold Coast MiPS and the Native Conservation
Society told their supporters that the Auxiliary
had no independent existence and was therefore of
no account in Gold Coast issues.
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more precariously. Its faith in the parent Society
was never totally undermined, but its failure with
the Committee to have the Colonial Office repeal
the oppressive Human Leopard and Alligator Society
(Amendment) Ordinance disheartened its rank and file.1
1. Ordinances 5 of 1895 and 9 of 1896 amended in
1911 to checked increased incidence of murders
and cannibalism connected with these Societies
in the Imperri area of Sierra Leone. For early
history of the Societies Vide C. Fyfe: A Histoy
of Sierra Leone (Oxford 1962) p. 545.
	
lso
TNotes on The objects and proceedings of the Society
which is purely a murder Society' in W.B.Griffith
to CO 5 June, 1913, CO 267/555.	 For the harsh
operation of this Ordinance and fruitless efforts
to repeal It, see
Harris to Buxton, 13 Jan.1911 MSS.Brit. Emp. 8.19
ri5/1
Roberts to Buxton, 12 Nov. 1912 MSS. Brit. Emp.
3.22. G. 245
Minutes, Committee, ASS, 14 Nov. 1912 E2/l13,
Vol. VIII.
Buxton to Harcourt, 12 Dec. 1912 MSS. Brit.Exnp.
5.19. D1/12
CO to Buxton, 30 Dec. 1912 MSS. Brit. Emp. S.19
D2/3
Roberts to Buxton, 14 Jan. 1913. MSS. Brit. Emp.
S,22. G. 245
ASS to Emmott, 10 Jan. 1913.
	
ibid
Harris to Roberts, 3 Feb.1913 Copy ibid
Minutes, Committee, ASS, 7 Feb.Ti3, E2/13, Vol. VIII.
CO to Buxton, 19 Feb. 1913. MSS Brit. Emp. S.22,
G. 245
The Society's contention was that the retrospective
powers of the Ordinance would oppress people who
were perhaps members of the Society but had since
led a respectful life. But the CO could "scarcely
imagine that they want murderers to get &ff on the
ground that the murder was an old one..."
Vinute of 12 Feb. 1913 on AS and APS to CO 11 Feb.
1913, CO 267/555
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In spite of the rare sacrifice of members, like
G.M.Domingo, who even came to Britain to rouse the
Home Committee to more fruitful pursuits, 1 the
Sierra Leone Auxiliary was destined, to a half-
forgotten memory.2
1. G.M.Domingo, 'a native merchant of Bompehtoke,
Sheingay, in the Headquarters District and a man
of influence', had urged the Sierra Leone Auxiliary
to do its best to get revoked the expulsion order
by the Governor against Chief Bunting Williams and
others who were tried and. acquitted on a charge of




Roberts to Buxton, 29 July 1913, !ISS. Brit. Emp. S.22
G. 245
Minutes, sub-Committee, ASS, 3rd Jan.1913, E2/13,
Vol. VIV
"	 7 Feb. 1913	 ibid.
Victor Buxton, on his way to Sierra Leone was
asked by the Home Society to help bring the
uxi1iary to more active life.
2. When the present writer visited Sierra Leone in
April 1965, he was at pains in reminding C.D.
Hotobah-During (who was a foundation member) of
the Sierra Leone Auxiliary. When During remembered
at last what it was all about, he remarked







THE d.3T AFRICAN LAND QUESTION AND
NATIVi POLITY.
The land question in West Africa can. only be
understood in relation to the nature of the same question
in the Britain of the time, in. particular, the extraordinary
idealism which had preceded and inspired it. Apart from
Imperialism, another deep but general current which had
swept through Britain was the socialist or social-
reforming demand for a crusade against poverty. 	 This
partly took the form of a revolt which appeared in trade-
union struggles and the birth of a political Labour
movement; but it was also reflected in a corresponding
progression of ideas.	 Theseid.eas, to a great extent,
derived from Henry George.
Henry George was an American land reformer whose
book Progress and Poverty, published in America in 1879,
and which appeared in. a cheap English edition at the end of
2
1881, denounced land monopoly.
	
The arrival of this book
was opportune enough since the land question, which was one
1.	 .C.K. Ensor, Eig1and, l87Ol91 1. (Oxford, 1936) p. 33ff.
S an ?pverty : An iicu1r
eDresslon arid of increase




of the main roots of Irelandts troubles, was inereasiigly
coming to the rore in British politics. The monopolistic
grip of a few thousand landowners was regarded by their
opponents as a great impediment to social and political
progress.	 It was estimated that about one-fifth of the
total area of Great Bntain was the property of only 600
nobles, and about a half was owned by not more than 7,G0
other individuals)" There was already a steady movement
of population from the countryside to the towns, and
the agricultural crisis which began in the niid-1870's was
swelling this exodus. People who were alienated from the
soil became an enthusiastic audience for prophets who told
the& that their fate was due to private monopoly ot' what
should be the heritage of all.	 The greatest of these
prophets was Henry George.
George was said to be 1t essentially a good, earnest,
simple man, possessed of no profundity of thought, but with
a delightful character, who was wholly unspoiled by his
phenomenal literary success, and, believed that he was
working as effectively as he certainly was honestly for
1. T.H.S. Escott	 nlan&. I_PeoDle Polity and Pusu,its
(London, 18793 Vol. I, £. 327.
305.
the benefit of his fellow-men ....	 1hen. he came to
Britain on an organised lecture-tour in 188 1+, he attraCted.
great audiences, but it also gave him an opportunity
to see for himself what a burning issue the land rob1em
had become in British politics. 	 Speaking to his
audience at Bridgeton, he chastised the anomalous
condition of the aritish Society while prophesying the
inevitable doom of landlordism:
"So monstrous is the present condition of
Society, so utLrly unnatu.al is the wrong that
disinherits men, that makes the great majority of
people in a country like this utterly landless-men
really without a country, without any legal rights
to the use of one square Inch of that element without
which men can neither work nor live - so utterly
unnatural, so utterly monstrous, so iitterly opposed to
all clear thought, to all human perceptions of divine
truth, is it, that it cannot enaure when it i faitly
arraigned - No one can travel through this country, no
one can read the newspapers without seeing that
	 LandQuestion is in discussion, hat it is in reality the
burning question of the time; and when the land
question i discussed the days of landlordism are
numbered."
1. HJ. Hyndnian, in Henry George and xLk. Hyndman:
Single-Tax versus Social-Democrac y ; Whichbenefit the Peop le:. Verbatim Re port of th.e Deb
s-I-	 Tnac, L,11	 D	 T,,1-c, 1O 1lv
.it. tiy ncJ.man, t.teprinec1,	 p. 9.
2. Henry George, The 'Sin1e-Tax'
auspices or tne ba-i ±teSuoratlon idea
iled, 3d iay i9. (L k'ghee Tanag	 re, Lurgan,C.
p. 9.
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This theme was sized upon by his adhernts,
among them, Grant Allen, who painted a pathetic, almost
mournful picture of the lot of the young landless Briton
of the time;
".... The young citizer finds himself froni the outset
turned loose upon a world where almost every natural
energy, and almost every kind of raw material, has
been already appropriated and. monopolised. beforehand
by a small and unhappy compact class of squatters
and tabooers.	 Not one solitary square inci of English
soil remains unclaimed on which he can legally lay his
hea, without paying tax and toll to somebody, in other
words, without giving a part of his labour, or the product
of his labour, to one of the squatting and tabooing class,
in exchange fo their pellnlssion (which they can withhold
if they choose) merely to; go on existing upon the ground
which was originally common to all alike, and has been
unjustly seized upon (through what particular process
matters little) by the ancestors or predecessors of the
present monopolists.	 He cannot sleep without paying
rent for the ground he sleeps on. He cannot labour
without buying the raw material of his craft, directly
or indirectly, from the lords of the soil, the
encroachers on the native common rights of everybody.
He cannot make anything of wood or stone: for the
wood and the stone are already fully approp.Liated;
he cannot eat the fruits of the earth, for the earth
itself, and all that grows upon it, is somebody else's.
The very air, the water, and the sunlight are only his
in the public highway: nay more, even there, for a
single day alone.
	
His one right, recognised by the law,
is the right to walk along tile highway till he reels
with fatigue - for he must &eep moving": 	 and, then he
is liable, if he sleeps or faints in the open, to be
brought up before the magistrates charged with heinous
crime and misdemeanour of being a vagabond, without
visible means of support, who has paid no rent to the
lords of the soil for a square yard of room on which to
307.
die comfortably	 1*1.. ..
To end this 1 monstrou.s' anoma1/' 7 , Henry George
advocated the 'single tax" formula.	 He thought that this
method would make it easy to sweep away all private
ownership of land, and convert all occupiers into tenants
of the state, by appropriating rent. Moreover he felt
that this formula admitted of rio complicated laws and
cumbersome machinery. 	 "10 that, and without any infringe-
ment of the just rights of property,, trie land would become
virtually the people's. 	 What under this system was paid
as rent by the tenant would be taken by the state.
	
The
occupiers of land would come to be nominally the owners,
though, in reality, they would be the tenants of the whole
people.... t
	He saw the civi.liation that would arise out
of this as that which God had ordained before mankind
subverted it, for the Creator provided that the natural
advance of mankind shall be an. advance toward a social
State in which not even the weakest need be crowded to
the wall, in. which even for the unfortunate and the cripple
there may be ample provision.	 He concluded that "this
1. Grant Allen,	 dividualism and 3oc1alis (Reprinted from
Contemporary Review,, May 1889. 1903) pp. 56.
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revenue, which arises from the common property, which
represents not the creation of value by the individual,
but the creation by the community as a whole, which
increases just as society develops, affords a common fund,
which, properly used, tends constantly to equalise
conditions, to open the largest opportunities for all,
and to utterly banish want or the fear of want...."1
Although some critics described Henry George as superficial
others saw his doctrine as "consistent with the highest
state of civilization", and in "perfect harmony with the
moral law."3
These land ideas, of which Henry George's formula
was merely an aspect, were not a novelty in British
politico-economic thought. Denunciation of the great
landed estates had. been a Radical tradition.
	 Earlier in
the nineteenth century, RLcardo had formulated a theory
of ground rent according to which it increased automatically
without any expenditure of labour whereas wages always
remained at the same level, and profits continually diminished
1. Henry George, Land and PeoDle p. l+
2. H.M. Hyndman, Debate op. cit. p. 1f.
3. Herbert Spencer, Social Statistics, Chap. X, Section 8.
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He, therefore, concluded that he saw no reason wby the
capitalist and the worker, comrades in. adversity, should
not combine to tax the landlord for the benefit of
society as a whole.	 His disciple, James Mill, had
pushed the suggestion a little further, and John Stuart
Mill, farther still, until the Idea culminated in George t S
radical solution of the social problem by liberating the
capitalist and the labourer at the Same time.1
If George's formula made a Stir in the England
of his day* its influence is clearly discernible even in the
period this study is concerned with. 	 One of the staunchest
adherents to the 'Georgian' economics was Josiah Clement
Wedgewood.	 A Quaker and a teetotaller, he had begun his
parliamentary career as a Liberal and later joined the
Labour Party, but he was essentially independent.
	 By
nature, he was an individualist rather than a partyman.
His perennial principle was hatred of oppression. 	 He
lacked the qualities and possessed the failings which make
for a career within the frame-work of party politics.
Putting justice and the integrity of the individual above
other things, Wedgewood saw politics not as the art of the
1.	 1ie Halevy, The Rule of Democra cZ, p. 295k
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possible, bat as an opportunity to achieve worthy ideals.
If a thing seemed right to him, he did it, the expediency of
it notwithstanding •1
These qualities apart, tt was his views on the
Land question which brought him very close to ore1.
Wedgewood subscribed throughout his life to one political
and economic doctrine - the Taxation of land values as
advocated by Henry George.	 In 1909, he had become the
President of the english League for the Taxation of Land.
Values and toured tne British countryside, making eloquent
speeches In a bid, to gain adnerents to his economic creed.
As with Henry George, against whom the men of property
had organised a "Liberty and Property Defence League"
with the slogan 'Individua1ism versus Soclallsm H , Wedgewood
found immense opposition from the landed interests and In
particular the Conservative hiearchy 2 .	 Within the Liberal
fold, howevcr, the ideas of Henry George gained syinpathlsers.
In 1909, Lloyd George adopted the slogan of
denouncing landlords as a political move to save the
1. C.V. #ledgewood, The Last of The RaIcas	 osia
iledgeiood M	 (Oxford, 1951). oassim.
2. Ibid, Pp. 83-8'+.
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declining fortunes of the Liberal Party. 1 	Iaving seen that
the land was a popular cry in the country, he summoned the
rest of the nation to revolt against the monopoly of the
landowners.	 The new chorus was reminiscent of the almost
lachrymose tenor of Henry George and Grant Allen a çuarter
of a century before: "In the large towns and 1,n the mining
areas the landlord became w..a1ttiy without any action on his
part at the tost of the workers and a^ a result of their york.
In 'the mines the capitalist risked his capital, the miner only
Ins life.	 The landlord ws certain to gain.	 In the towns,
all who needed land for factory shop or lodging, were his
vitirns.
	
Jhen he brought his budget measures in the same
year, Lloyd George began to apply the principles of land tax.
The first of his three new taxes, the unearned increment
value tax, wa a tax of 20 per cent on an increase In the
value of land, to be ascertained every time it changed
hands,	 The second, the determination ol' lease tax, waz a
tax of 10 per cent on the increased value of property
let out On lease, ealcu1ated at the renewal of the lease.
And the third, the undeveloped land and ungotten minerals
tax, was roughly a tax or a half-penny in the pound on the
1. St. Hon. L.S. Amery I'y Political Life, Vol. I. vigpd
Befre the torm, iâ96_ii 1+, Pp. 31+QI3.
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value of land. whien its o ner did not cultivate or subsoil
whose mineral wealth he did not exploit. 	 These taxes were,
however, not onerous; but they could be increased until,
in. the course of time, they might produce a revolutionary
eifect .
This short-lived inroad of Henry George's ideas
into the realm of govcrniient polcy might never have given
his ideas their due importance in British thought were it
not for two other factors closely r1ated.	 The first was
the corresponding idealism which found its maturity in the
Socialist movement; and the other, the transportation of
the modified and. unmodified teachings of Henry George to
West africa, where the great "natural harmonies" of trozress
and Poverty would have full scOpe.
AlthoLgh the Radical tradition in. Britain had
always associated itself with social improvements, it seems
most probable that the Socialist reformism of the late 19th.
and early 20th centuries started directly from Prozress ang
2
Poverr.	 In this connection, however, it must be emphasised
that Henry George himself was not a Socialist. 	 He even
1. ITalevy, op. cit., Pp. 291f-5.
2. R.C.I(. Ensor, &iland, p. 331f.
.
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quarrelled with some Socialists who wanted to use his
attack on the land-lords to attack other means of
capitalist production.	 He was a defender of private
property and enterprise, and always emphasized the
differences between his group of "Single Tax 	 and the
Soc jail sts;
"tJe differ from Socialists in this impOrtant
particular, we do not believe that it is necessary to
construct any complex scheme to right the wrongs of
Society.	 We do not think it necessary to create any
great machine.	 1hat we believe is alone necessary
is to abolish restriction - to give free play to natural
harmonies; .... we see that what is needed to abolish
poverty Is not chrity but justice. 	 What we aim to
give is rreedom.'-
Again, on the relationship between capital and labour,
!enry George was most emphatic:
"We differ from the Socialists of all grades
by attaching far less importance than they do to capital.
We recognise the fact that the two primary factors of all
production are land and labour.
	
4e deny as utterly
absurd the declaratioi made by a certain school of
political economists whom the Socialists have copied,
that Labour cainot be employed until capital is
accumalated.	 We say that it is labour that produces
capital.	 .le say that when, in. any productive occupation
an employer employs men., and pays them wages, that he is
not advancing captal to them, but they are advancing
capital to him."
George's renunciation of &cialism might have
been expedient, but it was ultimately unavailing. 	 His
1. Henry G.-orge, The 'Sing-Tat' Faith, p. 6.
2	 Ibid, Pp. 6-7.
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catch-word, "unearned incrernent (which must be SeiZed by
the State) much more than harx's 'surp1u.s value" tended to
1
fashion the thinking of the Socialist movement in England.
Henry George, therefore, "acted quite unconsciously as a
valuable propagandist for ideas almost entirely in opposition
to his own."2 He contributed in undermining the doctrines
of laissez-faire, itself, and, therefQre paradoxically
helped to launch Socialism, by also hammering with immense
vitality arid conviction the creed that poverty could be
eradicated by political action. 3 However, although
his ideas were indirectly forming the English ocialist
movement, the direct influence of Henry George seems to have
declined, since Lloyd George applied it to resuscitate
declining Liberal fortunes. 	 It had become clear to level-
headed men that the problems of a highly industrialized
country such as Britain could not be solved by eliminating
only one form of monopoly.
But Radicalism has always been a profession
unintimidated by popular denunciation; for indeed, many
1. Ensor, op. cit. P. 33)f. The first work semed to be the
Fabian Essays whose 7 authors were Bernard Shaw, Sidney
Jebo, (afterwards Lord Passfield) Sidney (afterwards Lord)
Olivier, Graham dallas, rlu.bert Bland, William Clarke, and
lrs. Annie Besant.
2. In. Henry George and H.M. Hyndrian, op. cit., p. Li.
3. Keith Hutchin.son, The Decline and Fall of British
Capitalism (Cxford, l95lJ Pp. 32-3tf.
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rdicls even tnd to lose interest in a jinning cause which
seems no lsnger to need then. Moreover, failure to convince
the majority, to the radical, does not foreshadow the
fatuity of his preniise.	 Lt times, he is even undemocratic
in ideas because the real essence of' Radicalism is that the
opinion of the maltitude is not the standard of rectitude,
nd if the radical creed is not acceptable in one part of the
globe, that is no reason why an attempt should not be made
elsewhei'e, particularly in tue Colonies.	 Indeed, "no sincere
Radical, then or later failed to appreciate that the Colonies
provided him with a field for social and political experiment,
with a proving-ground for his theories, which could be put into
practice in an atmosphere unpoisoned by such balefil akid
reactionary traditions as tempered all rforii in England itself
Since Britain did not clearly respond to their
doctrines on land, they felt that the Colonial Empire might
provide a better ground to test the theories of this *Georgiantt
radicalism. Hence in alliance with others, Morel and Wedgewoo
advocated land reforms in West Africa, 	 This advocacy was
timely since it synchronized with the intentions of the
Colonial Officials in Nigeria to put the lana administration
and policy in Northern Nigeria on a permanent basis. The
Northern Nigeria Land Committee, of which Wedgewood serted as a
member, produced a report which 1 although it escaped being
brought under the principles of economic rent advocated by Renr
George,stated the two cardinal principles of public ownership





&lnost immediately after, another
movement, led by Morel and supported by edgewood and
other .ibera1 and Labour parliamentarians, sought to
introduce the principles, though riot the form, of the
Northern Nigerian Land. Law to other West African Colonies.
This led to a welter of educated Afilcan arid, chiefly
opposition, but which could not prevent the movement
from pushing its arguments far enough. to impell the
Colonial Office to appoint a Commissioner to report on
the situation In theGold Coast, and later a West African
Lands Committee with Morel and Wedgewood. among its
members.
Morel's attachment to the economic ideas of
Henry George was acknowledged, iti particular when he tried
to convince ir William Lever to adopt an enlightened
commercial po1ic in Africa. 2 While explaining that
Mary Kingsley had greatly influenced and inspired him,
Morel also claimed that it was Henry George's advocacy that
shaped his land views.	 It was a principle, he said, "advo-
cated by Henry George for humanity at large" and in "so far
1. Compare the accurate view of	 . Hancock:	 blems of
Economic Policy , 1918-1939, Pt. 2, op. cIt., Pp. 186-7 wit,
the erroneous one by C.V. Wedgewood, op. cit., p. 8i.
2. See Chap. VI.
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as it is concerned with practical politics in. West Africa -
it is based, first upon acknowledged fact, secondly upon
convictions arising out of acknowledged fact arid study of
conditions.'1	Jhat he concluded was the best policy arising
out of this study of the West African conditions was to
'1 root" the people in the land and to guarantee this land to
the African through a legislative process.	 de made this
point clear in the same letter to Lever,
"I can best describe that policy as one aiming
at the economic development of West Africa by the people
of the land3 rooting the people in the land: assisting
them by technical and, labour-saving appliances to develop
the land and its resources for the benefits of themselves
and their descendants.	 That policy entails the
fundamental administrative and legislative basis that
the land of Jest Africa belongs to tne people of tlest
Africa whose trustees we are, they being our wards
It is, therefore, clear that horel's first, premise
was a recognition of the importance of the land to the Africaj
Social pelitical and economic life.	 He emphasised this
point almost to a degree of dogmatism:
problem connected with. tropical African
Administration has been more ne1ected and has given rise
to more miscalculations and mistakes than the land
problem, and this notwithst nding the fact - that an
intelligent land policy is the indispensable groundwork
of administrative success - mea.ng by that expression
prosperity and internal peace.	 Failure to grasp that
elemental fact is charactLristic of the superficiality
with which th civilized Powers have, generaly speaking,
treated the entire prob1e. which lies before them in the
African tropics and sub-tropics - the Land uestion in
1. 1ioel to ir William Levr, 19 April, 1911.
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British Jest £fr1ca s in a hopeles1y confused state;
a tangled skein w.icri will take a great deal of
unravelling 1•1•"
Iorel thus found.it impossible to separate the land. uestion
in West Africa from the uestion of administration and treat
it as somettiirig special and apart for, as he put it, "our
entire administration from top to bottom must, in the
ultimate resort, be directed .... in accordance with the
views we take of the future role of the native in west
fricaa economy, and consequently of the Land question •••2
When, therefore, he obsirved that the West African
was threatcned by new and alien forces which undermined his
land rights, Morel warned the Colonial Office 'to be on its
guard against a recrudescence in various quarters of attempts
to influence 1est African legislation affecting economic
development in the direction of introducing European $ysterns
of labour and. industrial expansion.	 }e broadly hinted,
ulth more suspicion than certainty, that I*not a few uropeans
filling various positions in the .st Africa are thoroughly
hostile to the whole idea of economic development by the
iagro as independent land-owner and producer in his Own
right.	 Concluding that a preservation of the dignity of
man could be the only justification of British rule, he urged
the Colonial ffice to set its face "like flint againt the
1. African Mail, 17 Sept. 1909.
2. African Mail, 11 Feb. 11O.
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1 endency to rush things in ?Iest Africa and the introdaction,
with that intent, of artificial, alien systems which can
never lead to p.rmanent healthy growth, can never lead to
that improvement, maturing and unfolding of the native
races which we publicly prOfeSS are the objects ef ur
efforts, and which alone justify our presence in their
country and our interference in their affairs
?Lorel, as may be eLpected, never failed tçi justify
his philosophy on both ethical and economic grounds. For
if, indeed, the morality and utility of a measure must be
considered, it was obviously immoral to adopt measures
calculated to place the economic development of the
nat.iral walth of an aboriginal people in the hands of an
alien people, for this must rob them of the full advantages
they can derive from the economic development of such
natural resources. 	 It was at the same time, "unscientific
to suppose that the economic power of a man can be greater
under conditions which reduce him to the position of
tenant and hired wO.Lkman....'
	
Iore1, rather, saw the true
end of British policy as a strange, but compatible, compound
of altruism and utilitarianism, for,as he said, Britain
could have "business relations with the .fricans, and even
make a profit out of him without robbing him, that we can
govern him without stealing either his land or his property."
1. African Mail, 5 March l9O.
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He supported this legitimate business relationship since he
saw it as "the bulwark of the native and the security
for decent administration against the slave-driver."1
Having indicated what the true policy ought to be,
Morel then considered the means for achiev1n that end.
He contrasted three alternatives. 	 The first was the
preservation of native customary land law; improvement
and maintenance of the natural lines of development;
and the conservation and vitalising of "African nationa1ism."
The second was the gradual elimination of native customary
law in favour of European law; the successive modification
of native tenure towards individual ownership with its
implications; rejection of the principle of development
along indigenous lines and of the principle of "African
Nationa.ism."	 The third was what appeared to him to
be the present policy of drift and shift.	 He was
particularly opposed to this because it might result in
"an lmDa s se of contradictions and incompatibilities,"
leading b a disintegration of the native society without
anY compensating constructive alternative.	 The second
alternative he also oppsed for it would create "a collection
1. African hail, 11 Feb. 1910.
2. B this Morel means African traditional Institutions.
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of units devoid of structural instincts and. incapable of
national growth" He favoured the policy of preserving
native customary land in land stnce in it was
"embodied above all else the economic independence and
security of the African."-
Th report of the Northern Nigeria Land
Committee which had estab1ished, among other thirs, that
land wa inalienable according to native traditioa1
tenure, provided lIorel with a springboarc. for action.
He w nted legislation to embody this work of
research, believing that no such leglslatiQn had.
previously barred illegal alienatioris of land in
the mpire.	 This wish for legislation was expressed.
in terms wbjch now exonerated. the Colonial Officials
he had once condemned
"It would appear therefore that the policy
of the Colonial Office and of the local authorities
has been inspired by the wish to maintain, in effect,
native customary law, and not to e1iminate or
undermine it; but that this polLey has not,
hitherto, become embodieØ in any legislative act
giving it force of 1aw."
1.	 frican Mail, 11 Feb. 1910.
2. African Mail, 18 Feb. 1910.
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Although he was aware t.hat elaborate legal codes had in other
countries not prevented spoliation onLcomprehensive arid.
wholesale scale, Morel, on the other hand, must have
realised that such codes might provide a basis for the
intervention of hu.rnanitarians or interested persons to save
the aggrieved society. 1 He, therefore, felt that the time
had come when, "if we are satisfied that the preservation
of native customary law as to land is the indispensaole
foundation of good. government in the regions of Africa
we cannot colonise but can only supervise ... we must
seriously consider the necessity, not at Some remote
period, but now, of arming our policy against every kind of
encroacIiment ••••
These views were not very mu.ch at variance with
those of John Holt.	 bit's evidence to the Northern
Nigeria Land Committee, indicates his dual position as a
trader and humanitarian. 	 As a trader, bolt would not be
1. The Berlin Act, though in many senses little more than
"a scrap of paper" was nevertheless the basis for British
Intervention in the affairs of the Congo.
	
Vide K.B.
Keith, The Bel g ian Congo d the Berlin ct (Oxford,
1919). , a1s$.J.S. Cookey, Great .ritain and the Congo
Thesis op. cit., Aostract.
2. African Mall, 18 Feb. 1910.
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expected to injure his own interests merely to achieve
theoretical ideals. He wanted the government to make
land grants for trading and agricultural pu.rposes on a
broad basis, on terms not too onerous because the condiltns
of trading in West Africa in those days were always
uncertain and apt to be risky,	 Government policy, he
emphasised, must be based on impartial grounds for no
group of traders should pretend to do more public service
than another.
	
Moreover, it must be pursued along
scientific lines so as to attract capital and, develop the
I
country.
As a merchant, Holt would have j'eferred land in
Nigeria to be hold freehod, on the same terms as his
Company had. secured in German, French, Spanish and Portuguese
possessions in Iest Africa.
	
But because he felt that this
might be abused by unscrupulous people, he stood in favour
"of the Government having control of the land" since he did
"not want to see a number of men getting into 1igeria for
the purpose of holding land in order to speculate with
it .... or .for merely company-promoting purposes •..•
Although he had suspected that the Government itself might
1. Hoit to Antrobus, L1 Nov. 1907, Copy, Box 9/7, J.H.P.
2. Holt's precis of Evidence.
32t.
take on the position of a monopolistic holder exacting
onerous terms, dolt nevertheless wou.ld like the
Government to keep control, but give liberal terms
to those who will actually make use of it."	 He
declared in a tone reminiscent of the 'Georgian1
influence:
"It is land-grabbing for speculative
purposes that can be so largely abused and requires
to be carefully guarded against; ths man who will
use the land anywhere without injustice to the
native communities ought to be encouraged in every
way."1
Halt's evidence was tempered by that common
sense, but humanitarian, instincts which always tL.nded
to vanquish his hated economic motives.	 He made a
great impression on the Land Committee. In a conver-.
sation with Morel, 1edgewood expressed his regards for
Holt;	 and, as is to be expected, Morel quickly informed
Halt o this appreciation:
was teaing with Wedgewood on the terrace
of the douse of Commons; he said you were different
to any merchant he had ever met, or heard of, and if he
	
1. Northern Nigeria Lands Co 	 : Ninutes
pendice, Cd. 5103	 LU). 4..LSO
	Northern Nigeria Lands Co	 ttee. nd
	
Relating thereto, Cd. 51e	 Para. 5ö.
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could place the economic development of Africa in your
hands, he would not trouble about the Native Question..1
As has been indicated, when the Northern Nigeria
Land Report was concluded, Lorel and Holt pressed that Lt
should be given a legal basis. 	 Ivlorel saw the land
settlement as 'that protectorate's safeguard against future
demands which it is easy to forsee will follow the
completion of the railway." 2
 For his part, Holt wished
that their friend Charles Strachey "would get on with the
Land 0rdinnce, for, as he said, it was "about the most
important thing they have yet tackled." 3 And when Morel
gathered from Lord Crewes despatch to Sir Flesketh Bell
thatJleislation required to give effect to the decision
of the Conlnittee would be submitted to the Secretary of
State before being giver the forcG of law in the Protector-
ate, be wrote a very long arid detailed letter to Lord
Crewe, giving his suggestions- before such an eventua1ity.
1. Morel to Halt, 6 July 1910. 18/7, J.H.P.
2. AM,	 March, 1909, also Morel, Nig eria, op. cit. p. 11+3.
3. Halt to Morel, 9 Jan. 1909, FC/3, EDMP.
+. Crewe to Hesketh Bell, 22 March 1910, End IV in Cd.5102.
5. Morel to Crewe, April 1910,	 F. 9. EDMP.
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The main purport of the intended Proclamation
was that the wio1e of the land of the Protectorate should
be declared to be "under the control and, sub3ect to the
disposition of the Government;" and that this control should
be exercised "with due regard to lawful customs." 1 Against
this, 1orel submitted that the latter proviSion was largely
a matter of interpretation on the part of the local
Resident advising the High Commissioner; that questins of
expediency or definite tendencies might arise, under
certain circumstances, operating either in Northern Nigeria
or in Britain, which would further accentuate its debatable
character.	 tie I €lt that without any definition of the
word "Government", "the aims which Hi Majesty's Government
have in view, may, in practice, be imperilled."2
horel did not dispute the fact that conquest
had invested the TBritish Government with overlordship, the
supreme contr 1 of the country having passed into the directin
hands of the conqueror.
	
But "that the Paramount Power
has sxufted would not naturally imply, in the minds of the
people, that the new Government interpreted its rights of
1. Cd. 5102.
2. Morel to Crewe, April 1910, copy 1. 9. EDMP.
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conquest otherwise than conferring upon it the same
obligations of trusteeship towards the people for the land."
Ue rightly held that 0any suspicion attributing to the
8ritish Government control over the land in a sense
differentiating from trusteeship might well give rise to
deplorable consequences, especially if used to his or
their own, ends by certain reactionary influences to which
a period of famine, failure of crops, cattle-disease or
other visitations w3uld provide his r their opportututy..."1
It was, however, the ghost of the Congo State
which always haunted Morel, for .ihat lack of definition
had produced in the one might be avoided in the other by
definition.	 Thus he pointed out to Lord Crewe that the
evils of the Congo had found their "legislative origin"
in a policy which treated all land as belonging to the
"State", and tIthe negotiable products of the land and
demesnial fruits".., as the property of the "State". 	 The
word "State" was never defined, and in practice, the
"State" became the Administration of .r1ng Leopold.
Although he knew that the motives and aims of the British
authorities in intending to declare the land of Northern
1. More]. to Crewe, April, 1910, F.9, EDMP.
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Nigeria to be under the control and at the disposal
of the Government were 'diametrically opposed to the
motive and aims animating the present European rulers of
the congo, yet i the absence of any definition in the
proposed proclamation of the word Government' or Mtat&,
it would be a difficult task publicly to explain that the
policy of' U.N. Government ..... is not vjxtuL1y
identieal with the policy of the Belgian Government?
in claiming to be the owner of the land. of the Congo.
Norel was, of course, aware that tie position of the Congo
was internationally different from that of Northern
Nigeria, nevertheless, he believed that "the upholders of t1
present system on the Continent could hardly fail to take
full advantages, in a diploinatto and. international sense,
of the outward similarity between the declared land policy
o1 the H.h. Government in Notherri Nigeria and thetr
This state of affairs might embarrass the British
Government, but "from the point of' view of the public
treatment of the question on the part of those who for
many years have fought for the sanctity, on theCongo,
i. Ibid. Already soule people had. started to point out that
there was no difference between both systems. For
example, Sir Thomas Barrari, M.P., had, in a reply to
More])s memo, said he could not understand the differeri
between the systems in Northern Nigeria and the Congo.
Sir Thomas Baran to Morel, 25 May 1912, F.9/A-B.
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of the very principles which it is the object of H.N.
Government to promote in West Africa, the embarrassment
would be a very real one
The Congo experience apart, the circumstances of
the Nigerian political arrangement and its inevitable sociL
effects demanded definition. 	 Amalgamation o' Northern
and Southern Nigeria was by now merely a matter of time,
and im the absence of /definitive land legislation iri
Southern Nigeria, Morel advocated that the principles of
the Northcrn Nigeria Committee might be a model for the
whole country when amalgamation took place. He feared
that in the absence of a definition of what "Government"
and "State" meant, many educated natives of the South,
"Some of whom are possessed of considerable influence
with the Native Chiefs of the hInterland," would cause
unrest, especially in the Western Province, where the
special treaties with Abeokuta and Ibadari, were, in fact
producing a very confusing land situation. 	 He warned that
correspondence will certainl ensue between the educated
element in Lagos, and a crtairi Society in this country2and
1. Morel to Crewe, April 1910; coD/ 1. 9 . DMP.
2, Refers to the AS and .PS; and further Illustrates
1orel's attitude to the Society,
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opportunit1eS will occur in the House of Coinmofl.s for persons
n3t thOroughly acquainted with these questions, to represent
the policy o U.N. Goveznrnent
1
satisfactory light ...."
in Nigeria in anything but a
Morel then 'went into fanciful detinitions 2 out
1. Morel to Crewe, April 1910. coD y F. 9.
2.(1) 'Government' 'define& as Imperial Govt., acting as
supre1e protecting power in Nigeria r?pesented by
the Nigerian Administration administering the state
o± Nigeria I
(2) 'Nigerian Administration' - 'defined as being
constituted by the Governor and his Council, acting
in conjunction with the recognised Native Cluefs and
their Coincils.'
(3) 'The State or Nigeria' - 'defined as constituted by
the abori 6inal inhabitants of Nigeria, administered
through their chiefs and COuncil under the Supreme
control and protection of the Govt.'
(1+) 'National' - 'defined as pertaining to the State of
Nigeria.'
(5) 'Native and Natives' - 'defined as descriptive of the
aboriginal inhabitants who under their chiefs and.
Councils, constitute the citizens of the State of
Nigeria under the Supreme control and protection
of the Govt.'
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of which land emerged as "National Land", held in trust and
controlled by the Government in the interests of the State,
control being exercised in accordance with established
native law and custom, with the primary object of securing
the undisturbed occupation, enjoyment and use of the land
for the present arid future generations of natives. Norel
declared:
"The only rampart •.,. which Is capable of
defending the latter policy and of preserving Western-
Central Africa, primarily as a Black-man's country where
the native shall have the opportunity of expanding along
his natural lines and of conserving his economic
Independence, Is legislation which shall place the
African's right in hjs land upon a foundation of
permanent security."
When Holt Saw this correspondence, he encouraged
}Iorel to continue to "be alert and jealous for the rights
of the Natives under British rule." 	 While wishing that
Lord Crewe might be influenced by Morel's counsel in all




"Our responsibilities to the natives under our
rule are vry great, and if we are to enjoy God's2
blessing as a nation, we must be just to them ..."
In the event, Morel's letter was decisive. 	 It contributed
not a little in drawing up the legislation for Northern
1. Morel to Crewe, April 1910, Coj. F. 9. EDfrIP.
2. Holt to 1orel, April, 1910, DJiP.
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Iigeria which embodied the principles recommended by the
Lands Committee, but which phraseology was greatly
determined by Morel's suggestions. lie explained this
achievement to Molt:
"(At my) urgent request, the Colonial Office agreed
to call all the lands "native lands", whicTI means
perhaps more than appears on the surface."
That the phrase "native lands" was included in the draft
leQlslatlon, apart from Girouard's role, was due to
Morel's membership in a small Committee which finally
decided upon it, and to the humane devotion of Charles
Strachey to him - an "earnest, right-thinking man,
absolutely on our lines, and a man too of great influence,
but siamped with over-work."2
Once the land question in Northern Nigeria was
settled, Morel's attention immediately went to the South
where the land problem was more confused. 	 It has been
shown by authorities on land tenure that under native law
and custom land was also inalienable and burdened in
Southern Nigeria. 3 The Chiefs and their Councillors held
1. Morel to Molt, 1 July 1910, 18/7, JHP.
2. Ibid.
3. R.L Dennett, in. ournal of the African Society Vol. IX
No. XXXIV Jan. 1910.
The well-known works of klias and Meek also support this
View.
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the land in trusteeship for the people.	 Sale of the
land was a crime against the native State, and private
property in land was therefore contrary to strict native
customary law. However, largely through the influence
of the educated native class, forms and procedure of
English law progressively began to creep inland from
Lagos, Native customary law began to be gradually
undermined; land was being bought and sold in defiance
of such law, the chiefs being either unwilling or unable
to prevent it.
	 The result was the formation of "a class
of irresponsible land-owners, paying no tribute to the
original owners," due to the presence oi' the British in
the country, and contact with British ideas, laws and
education1 .	 Morel sensed the dangez' that was imminent:
"The land which is now being acquired by
ind1v1dual native owners, will eventually pass out of
their hands into the hands of European or Europeari-cuxn-
native Company promoters and financiers, and the
economic security of the Yoruba native will have
passed away never to return .... As the Westernized
native is undermining the Society from which be sprung,
through the modernising tendency, or rather the
Europeanizing tendencies he has acquired, so will the
European financier buy out the Westernized native.
It is merely a matter of time.
	
Once insert the trin
edge of the wedge and the final result is certain."
4J? illustration of what Morel was trying to
1. j 11 Feb. 1910.	. 18 Feb. 1910.
2. 18 Feb. 1910.
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"... the true policy of the British
Government and its represantatives on the spot is to
place the inalienability of the land upon the surest
foundations, throughout Nigeria, as the cardinal
principle of administration, embodied in law, upon
the basis, as to authority, of supreme trusteeship
for the native people, and as to motive that the
land represents for all time the capital of the whole
people - This policy would word out in its practical
application through the Chiefs and their councils as
trustees for the respective communities owing allegianes
to them, brought together more efficaciously than at
present by the institution of Provincial Councils and
guaranteed in a certain revenue from the rents accruing
from the land ...."
Apart from the establishment of these Provincial
Councils, 2 he advocated the extension of the powers of
the Sapreme Court over the protected States as a way of
resolving the confused land situation. 	 A third alternative,
which he wanted to apply to the ,lcstern province, was a
restoration of the ancient hegemony of the Yoruoa States
under the Alafin of Oyo, "as the surest method of
reconstructing Yoxtha 'Nationalism' upon a proper basis."
Norel wanted the Alafin of Oyo converted "to the necessity
1. ^L . i8 Feb. 1910.
2. In fact, the idea of Provincial Councils was already
opposed by natives and AP as an. erosion of the
'independence' of the native States and a breach of
treaty obligations with natives. 	 See Chap. III for
ref erence.
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of working hand in hand with the British autboilties
to prevent the break-up of native customary law as to land.1
Itdid not occur to Iviorel that it was no longer a
practical proposition to r3duce the various YoIua
chieftains to a feudal acknowledgement of the Alafin's
authority.	 This centralised authority had in fact been
challenged in a process of nineteenth century civil wars,
leaving the Alafin's central position more of a tribal
myth than an economic or political reality. 2 In an
effort therefore to 3ustify his principles Morel ignored
history.	 Having a en that land settlement was a sine qua
non for the formulation of his Indirect Rule ideas, he
enthusiastically mistook a complicated terrain for a
tabula rasa.
Ibit, however, supported Morel's efforts to see
the principles of the Northern Nigeria Law extcnded to
Southern Nigeria. He wished that "Strachey would get
on with the Land Crdinance, and. wanted it extended to
the South "or you will have the land sharks at work
1.	 ., 18 Feb. 1910.
2	 For the Yoiva civil wars seejsmith arid J.j,A. Ajayl,
Yoxua Jars of the Nineteenth Cent ry (Ibadan, 1961+).
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gobbling up the whole countrY.l lle urged 1'Iore1 to
fight on so that "the cosmop Olitan crew of lawyers
and lawyer-guided black Englishmen in Lagos"would not use
"the whitemants methods for robbing the natives of their
land."	 lie felt that most of the educated natives were
"a greedy, selfish lot for the most part and care not
for abstract native land rights and customs;" but
rather would "ise their English mental training to play
the part of sharks on anyone black or white who is not a
match for them in cunning and. unscrupulousness."2 Indeed,
like Morel, Holt wanted the underlying principle of the
Northern. Nigeria Land Legislation extended to all other
Jest Ai'rican Colonies, particularly the Gold Coast where
it se.med tt-icre was a repetition of the experience in
speculations promoted by Cecil Rhodes and the British South
Africa Company.	 He expxessed the need for extending the
Northern Nigerian Law to other Colonies in a letter
praising Percy Girouard:
1 'wish to God we had all Girouard.S in our
Colonies in West Africa. We should then have the land
laws of the Gold Coast put on a proper footing 1 and the
natives protected from being fooled out of their
rights.	 That place requires uncommonly keen watching
1. Holt to horel, 9 Jan. 1910, F8/ 1+, DIP.
2. Holt to Morel, O Jan. 1910., F8/+, DI4P.
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2ust now that all these concession mongers are about.
II' we do not mind, they iill take the whole country
away fron the blacks, and start their infernal
gambling machine in London, which plays havoc
wherever they go, to the poor and he'pless, just
as they have done in tue Congo ...."
Morel, therefore, had Holt's unstin.ted support
in his protracted efforts to direct the attention of the
Colonial Office and the British public at large towards
the state of affairs in the Gold Coast and Southern Nigeria.
At the same time, he appealed to the Liverpool and
Manchester Chambe.cs of Commerce, in the name of their
former spokeswoman, Mary Kingsley, to unite in protest
against the process by which "chief after chief in
the Gold Coast is permitted to barter away the produce
of the lands of his people for generations for a mere song.2
The reaction of the Chambers of Commerce was by no means
encouraging, but Morel's appeal to them was timely. 	 A
few months previously the Associated Chambers of Commerce
had carried a resolution moved by Sir A. Firth, that
reservations ci' Crown Lands sbould be made in British West
Africa with a view to reimbursing British national outlays
on thoprotectorates 3
 - a move which Lord Alfred mmott,
1. Holt to iorel, 5 J.ly 1910, P8/ 1+, E1)IP.
2. ,, 27 Nov. 1910.
3. 27 My 1910.
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:1,
Morel's friend, immediately rejected.
part from persistent articles in the .frican Man,
Morel, continued to memorialise the Colonial Office.
His letter of' June 1910 took the usual form which
demonstrates his maturity as a critic, for while he
aimed at carrying the Colonial office along with him,
he never failed to praise the moral and imperial obligation
of Britain towards her West African wards. 2 Moreover,
his memorials rather than being meze comprehensive drafts
of his philosophical ideas, were often coupled with detailed
information which supported his argument. His attachment,
in this instance, of a very long and irxfoxiiative letter from
a certain "Veritas Interitas" 3 proved most convincingly the
administrative imperfections f the Concessions Ordinance,
and clarified the nature of the land question on the Gold
1. . July 1910;	 . 31 March 1911.
2. Morel to C.O. 21 June 1910 CO 879/109. C.?.
Morel to Crewe 31 June 1910 CO 96/501+.
3. Mensah Sarbah was the real correspondent. Sarbah, John
Mensah, 1861+-1910; son of John Sarbah of Cape Coast;
merchant and Member of Leg Co. Educ. in England; first
Gold Coast barrister; founder-member of the G.C.A.R.P.S4
1897; Member Leg Co. 1900 - 10; author of Fant,
Customary Law (1897) and Fanti National Constitution
U906); educationist and co-founder of Mfantsipim
School, 1901+.
1+. For the background to the Concessions Ordinance See D.




,1.D. Ellis was influenced by the memorial when he
minuted:
"Although the enclosure is an anonymous letter - I
do not think we need scruple to take action upon
it on that ground - especially as the character of
the writer is vouched for by Ir. Ilorel, and it
consists, to a large extent, of statements of fact
which can readily be proved or disproved. 	 I have
been of opinion for some little time that the
administration of the Concession Ordinance b7 the
Supreme Court is not now wholly satisfactory; and
on a question in the House of Commons by Mr.
Macdonald, I have sugested that, the Governor should
be asked to repQrt upon it ,..."
A few days after, orel followed this u.p with
another disarming letter, this time attaching a prospectus
issued by "the Maaia. River ubber Estates Limited , which
typically Illustrated the grounds of complaint made by
Nensah 3arbah in his anonymous lettcr.
	
Some of the
anomalies complained of included claims by that Company
of land rights four times greater than what it was
legally entitled to hold under the Concessions Ordinance,
its payments for those alleged rights of a ridiculous
rental, and its assertion that "the v lidity of the options
are guaranteed", 'wh..ch could not be so if the Concessions
Ordinance held good.	 But, as Lorel pointed out, the
1. Minute of 21 June 1910 by W.D. llis on Morel to
Crewe 21 June 1910, Co 96/5Oh+.
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"Mamia Rivers Estates Ltdo,** as merely one of the
numerous companies springing up every we&c on the Gold,
Coast. He told the Colonj.al Office that he was nOt
opposed to sub-surface rights bein8 granted to
uropeans, since the natives could not "themselves
conduct deep level mining and. develop the mineral
resources of their country", provided that some
supervision was exercised over the expenditure of
money received, that surface rights were not distv.rbed,
and that presure was not exercised .n obtaining native
labour.	 Also, he raised no great objection to the
exploitation of the timber of some of the interior
forests under the same conditions and for the same reason.
But any encroachment by the companies on any produce
which was vital for the social and economic life of the
people found korel's opposition	 spirit deeply aroused:
".4..Froin time imenorial the products of th
palm have been at once a staple article of external
trade and. internal consumption and use; and it
cannot be re garded obherwise than as a grave menace
to the prosperity and. social necessities of the Icatives
that th... control of these articles rid o rubber and
cocoa sho ld be. made over to strangers. 	 So far as
cocoa is concerned, the natives of the Gold Coast have
thems].ves built 'p in a short space of tim a
considerable industry in this article
1. 1Qrel to Crewe, 27 June 1910, Cc 96/501+.
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On the social and economic implications of
this system of 'spurious t' development, Morel's indictment
was not only incisive b1.it also pathetic:
i'.... (It would) rcduce the native of the Gold
Coast from a trader and gricu1turist in. his own
right, to hose increasing wealth and purchasing
capacity the customs revenues of the Dependency must
look for progressively advancing receipts, to the
dead level of the hired labourer t 1/3d, a day
'Development' of this character may enrich a
handful of British Company promoters and share-
holders.	 It must impoverish the protected subject
races of Great Britain in West Africa by paralysing
native initiative, progress and. production, lay the
basis in this region for economic servitude instead
of free expansion, react adversely upon the
British industries concerned in. supplying the
requirements of Wst Africa, and eventually threaten
the prosperity of the British Dependencles.il
Armed with this thica1 and economic argument, Morel
urged Lord Crew to amend the Concessions Ordinance
and to enact some entirely fresh legislation to stop
the activities of the Chiefs, the educated natives and
the Eiropean Company promoters in the Gold Coast.
Within the Colonial Of!ce Norel 1 s letter with
its illustrations was compelling.	 Supporting these
views expressed, Ellis minuted:
	
"2..This is merely
a articularly gross instance of the way under the
Concessions Ordinance land is boing granted a iay by native
1. .Morel to Crewe, 27 June 1910, CO 96/5O4.
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chiefs at absurdly inadequate sum and finally floated
on the British Public at absurdly extravagant ones. 	 The
steps, underlined In the prospectus, by which this
property has changed hands within a year at sums rising
from £100 to £0,000 are instructive....t*l 	 Strachey
agreed with Ellis: "....They seem to reveal a most undesir-
able state of affairs, and it is dust such operations as
theSe which Sir. P, Girouard was determined to prevent being
possible 'for all time' in Northern Nigeria..... The
successive transfers of the ri 5hts over the area, referred
to above by Mr. Ellis, are indeed astonishing....."2
1. }'iinute of 29 June 1910 by J.D. Ellis on Morel to Crewe,
21 Jane 1910, CO 96/50If.
2	 The fol1owin successive transfers as sketched by
Strachey in his minute is illustrative.
flay 1f 1909: Two coloured gentlemen paid £100 to a number
of native chiefs and others for an 'option'.
Mar.15,1910: They sold it for £1,000 cash aM £10 ,00
fully paid shares to J.G. Brown £11,000
Apr.16,1910; (a month later) Brown sells it for £k 500
cash, £10,000 fully paid shares and £10,000
either cash or shares to the 'vending
syndicate' = £21+,500.
Apr. 25,910: (9 days later) They sell it to the Alliance
xploitations for £5,000 cash, £10,000 shares
and. £15,000 cash or shares = £30,000.
Jun.20,1910: A0reement for sale for a total of £6Q,000.
Thus property leased or purchased from natives with £100,
is now promoted and sold for £60,C00 within a year.
(See I'tnute by Strachey (ibidY.
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$trachey, who had the dar before discussed these concessions
with Iorel, commended the good work done by his friend
to the Colonial Office in the same minute: "..... He
is at present oi. very good terms ith this orfice, arid
I think it is jorth our while, as he Is an honest man, to
keep him so.	 I think the F.O. must regret that they
have not ben able to do this in connection with the
Congo"	 The Secretary of State although he minuted
tnat "there is nothing novel about the rise in price",
waS troubled that "the natives should be allowed to make
such a bad bargain....', and doubted "whether the
transaction was within the law" as it then stood.2
few days leter, the Colonial Office received
a memorandum on Gold Coast lands suom.tted by s.C. liot, a
Provincial Commission.er in Ashanti,	 These Notes on the
alienation of 'stool 1 and 'Tribal 1 lands by native purchase
and by grants under the provisions of the Concessions
Ordinance" made charges similar to ore1's. 3 llis minuted:
1. Minute of 30 June 1910 by trchey on (ibid)
2 Minute of t. July 1910 by Creie on ore1 to Crewe 27
June 1910, CO 96/5O+.
3	 .C. 1iot to C.O. 6 July 1910, "Notes on the alienation
of 'too1 and 'Tribal' Lands by nìative purchases and
by grants under the provisions of the Concessions
Ordinance." CO 96/5O+.
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• "This is interesting throughout - though nat new. 	 It Is
the old story - familiar in Fiji and elsewhere - of the
chiefs claiming absolute ownership over tribal lands.
If Sir 14. }'laxwell's Bill vesting all waste and forest
lands In the Crown had been carried all would have been
well - But I understand that it was abandoned owing
to pressure from native lawyers and chiefs. 	 It has been
flow recognised In the case of N. Nigeria that Sir 14.
Maxwell's was the correct policy. 	 It may not be too late
to apply it now to the N. Territories." 1	Just concurred
In this need for urgent attentiOn: "It seems clear that we
shall have to move in the matter before very long."2
Colonel Seeley agreed with him: "Yes, we must not delay
too long."3	The Colonial Office immediately asked the
Gold Coast Governor to give this matter his early attention
nd to furnish it with a report.1,
1. hinute of 8 July 1°lO by J.D. 11is on Eliot to co, 6
July 1910, Co 96/i.
2. Minute of 8 July 1910 by Just	 (ibid)
3. hinute of 8 July 1910 by Seeley 	 (ibid)
1,• Crewe to Rodger, 11 July 1910, Co 879/109. C.p.
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John. iodger, in his reply, accepted that a very
large proportion of land, in the Colony had been alienated
already under the Concessions Ordinance of 1900; but
in respect of those lands not already alienated, he
would wish to secure four objectives aimed at resolving
the problem.	 Re wanted the area alienable to each group
restricted, and disagreed with the interpretation given
by Justice Purcell to the "area" clauses which had the
effect of stultifying the whole intentions of the
Concessions Ordinance. 1
	$econdly, he wanted the
reservation of Native Ri6hts piovided in ectiori 11(6) of the
Ordinance further enforced.	 Thirdly, he advocated a
continuous and effective working of the Concessions, for
there was "at present no rule prescribing this most
necessary conditions of every mining Concession."
Fourthly, he wanted "reasonable payments to be rsasonably
expended", since there was "no provision for the proper
expenditure of these rents which the chiefs and, other
councillors receive on account of tribal land and
cherefore as tribal trustees....." 2
	It would appear
that most of the ob3ectlons raised by Norel and Nensab
oarbah were upheld by Rodge, even the necessity for new
1. For a discussion ol' the Concessions Ordinance, See
Kimble, op. cit.




But the reformism and broad view of John
Rodger was never completely followed up by his
assistants, and in October of the same year, the Acting
Governor, H. Bryan, 'iqot to the ecretary of State,
defending the Colonial Government against the charges
in Iiore1's correspondence and those of "Veritas Interitas.'
While Morel was exposing the Gold Coast scandals
weekly in the African Mail, memorialising and lobbying
the Colonial Office, questions were being asked in
Parliament. On 'f July 1910, RamsYNacdona1d askad
the Under-Secretary of acate for the Colonies whether
he had information on the manner and terms of certain
coneessions alleged ,iven to companies in the Gold Coast
recently, and whether he considered that the public
interest of the Colony was sufficiently safeguarded
a b ainst arrangements of this character which tend to
place the economic development of the native races In
the hands of uropean financial corporations." 	 s1lu1e
MaQd.onald was worried about the social and ecotiomic
effects of these transactions, Wedgewood wanted the-
Colonial Orfice to tae steps to put the land system of the
1. Ag. Gov. H. Bryan to Crewe 5 Oct. 1910,	 879/109.
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Gold Coast on the same footin, as in other British
possessions on that coast."1
The tenacious campains by Morel and members of
Parliament, supported as they were by the evidence of
Rodger and the memorandum of Eliot, might have opened
the eyes of the Colonial Office; but what measure of
hesitancy that was entertained there was dispelled by
new scarfying African lIai1 editorials.	 Blaming the
ColonIal OfUce for being "legislatively unprepared"
to deal with the new situation, Morel went all out against
the stock-jobbing imperialism reminiscent of the
speculative fever which had seized the city of London
ovor the Gold of South africa:
t*Influences have been let loose which aim
undis,uided1y at reducin the role of the native of
West Africa to that of a mere hired labourer; at
capturing his powers of production, at placing him
in such a position, by infringing his proprietary
rights	 land, tiaat presently he shall be forced
Into a position of absolute economic dependence Upon
alien financial interests. 	 Those wrio pull the strings
do so under cover of sonorous platitudes, which have
ever disguised unadulterated selfishness.	 Their
IImperia1ism is the parochialism of their own
packets.	 rogre.s" to thcm spells dividends.
hey play for tei Qwfl hond hile rating of
"development' fo.. the good of the State.
	
Assisted
by the weakness and improvidence of the native
chiefs, they hold. the cards, u less the le6islator
1. H.C. Dabs. 5 . Vol. XVIII 1910 , 1305, 130 5- 6 . See also
Co 879/109. No. 11.
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perceives the danger and. steps in.	 ie ask the
Colonial Office to face the danger, to grapple
with it end, brushing details aside, to deaL
resolutely and promptly with the great principles
at stake - not to wait until these principles can
no longer be disetangled from the mesh of vested
interests fast obscuring their true imports - for
the welfare of these peoples whose future is our
F	 trast, and for the honour o± our rule.'1
Almost imiediately aftext, a Colonial Office
memorandum, drawn up by llis, and which analysed the
grounds for reforms, acknowledged the importance of the
complaints which had corns from Morel, Wadgewood and
Macdonald; and when added to those of Rodger and. eliot,
formed the main basis of reforms intended by the officia1s
The memorandum made four main observations. Although the
Concessions Ordinance and its ameadments seemed fair
and reasonable", their administration by the Supreme
Court had. been unsatisfactory: at lease one of the
judges had been lax in giving effect to their provisions.
eCOfld1y, it was found. vry difficult to ascertain who
really had the .riht to give grants of the lands: 	 "the
chiefs and heads of families might have only fiduciary
rights, and. in the absence of a Doomsday Survey of the
Colony, it was almost impossible for the nudges to go
behind the evidence broubht oefore them by the Chiefs
1.	 29 July 1910. See also AI. + Nov. 1910.
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who were anxious to sell their supposed rights." In
this connection, it was the view of Ellis that the
question that was most important was that "of protecting
the native common people, and especially their posterity
against their chiefs and the native lawyers." Thirdly,
it was observed that the Concessions Ordinance waS drawn
up practically for mining Concessions ('though it included
in its purview other concessions'); but since people
and companies had started acquiring land for growing
rubber and cocoa, it became difficult to see how "the
native rights as to sharing game, shifting cultivation,"
etc. could be protected on such concessions. 	 Fourthly,
it was found that the clause restricting the area at once
acquirable was readily evaded by people and companies
getting grants in different names and then amalgamating.
Although Ellis held that it was in the interest of all
that a reasonable field should be offered to European
enterprise, he, however, found it "certainly not desirable
that any large proportion of the land of the Colony should
pass into private hands, destroying the tribal system,
and the authority of the Chiefs, and reducing the natives
to the position of day labourers." 	 Since there was
uncertainty as to what actually was the amount of land conaed
351.
or was in process of being conceded, Ellis emphasised the
need for investigation.1
Morel was away in West Africa at this time,but
his articles on these scandals appeared weekly in. the African.
Yail.	 On 16th Au.gust 1910, Ellis had minuted: "....Mr.
Morel is on the war path and we may expect a storm when. the
Parliament opens'? The storm which then broke out in
Parliament persisted until the following year • From
February 1911 till December of the same year, Josiah
Jedewood and Ramsay hacdonald especially, continued to
harass the Government with questions on Land legislation
in West Africa and Gold Coast scandals in particular.3
1. Co Memo: 'Complaints as to treatment of Ndtives (Gold
Coast, ierra Leone, arid Gambia) by .D. 11is 22 Nov.
1910, CO 879/109.
2. Iiinute of 16 Aug. 1910 by J.D. 11is on ore1 to Crewe
27 June 1910, CC 96/50+.
3	 Questions were put by edgewood on 29 June 1910, + J.i1y
1910, 15 Feb. 1911, + April 1911; by Macdonald on 11
April 1911, 19 June 1911, 9 Nov. 1911.
See tIC Dabs. 5s. Vol XIX
tIC Debs. 5s. Vol X(I, 1911
tIC Debs. 5s. Vol XXIIL,1911
tIC Debs. 5s. Vol XXIV 1911
tIC Debs. 5s. Vol XXITLi, 1911
tIC Dabs. 5s. Vol XXX, 1911













eptember 1911, the Colonial Office
informed Henry Conway Belfiel&that liarcourt proposed to
appoint him to report on the wor 1cirig of the legislatlLn
governing the alienation of native lands in the Gold
Coast including Ashanti.2 Belfield had much colonial
experience and had also supervised and, examined land
questions in the Far East.
.1
1. Born on 29 Nov. 1855', he was the eldest son of John
Belfield, J.P. of Primley Hill, South Devon, and
.1izabeth Conway, eldest daughter of Captain Gorge
Bridges, .N. After a career at Oriel College, Oxford,
Belfiel4called to Bar at the In'ier Temple in 1880,
whence he practised on the Western Circuit and at the
Devon and Exeter essions. In i88+ he entered Selanger
Civil Service as Magistrate and by 1888 he had become
the Chief Magistrate of Selanaor, and that of Perakin 1892. On the Federation of the Malay States in 1896
Belfield was appointed its just Conuissioner of
Lands and hines; but acted as British Resident at
Selanger between 1897 and 1901 and had undertdken
special missions to Labuàn and Bru.nei iii 1905.
In May 1908, he was made Ag. Resident-General,
Federate ia1ay States to become the Br. Resident
in Perak later in iiL D.N.B.
2. CO to Belfield, 12 Sept. 1911, CC 879/109.
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Belfield.'s terms of reference were basically
seven.	 He was directed to find, out how far the alienation
of native land to Europeans, which was going on in the
Gold Coast, (having regard. to the probable increase of
population), threatened to deprive the natives of
adequate land for their sustn.ance, whether such
alienation was beneficial to the natives by acquthnting
them with new and improved industries or enabling them to
earn higher wages. He WSS to report on whether the
prevalent system under which alienation of native land
was controlled only by the Supreme Court was satisfactory
or whether the control should be transferred to the
xecutive Government; and whether the condition of the
Concessions Ordinance that the proper parties mast have
agreed to the grants was fulfilled.
	 He was also to find
out whether the consideration paid for the concession
was actually adequate or whether it as possible to
lay down any general standard of adequacy; whether the
consideration received was spent by the Chiefs in the
general interest of the tribe, and if not, whether any
steps could be taken to secure this object.	 Lastly,
he was to report on whether it as possible to take any
usebetter measures to secure better/of the lands erartted, and
to prevent them being made mere counters for Company
3 Lf.
promoters.1
Aftr making preliminary enquiries in Britain,
Belfield left Liverpool by S.S. BJrutu on 31 Jan. 1912.
arriving at Accra on 16th February, he began taking his
evidence, which process engaged him for two and, a half
months. The findings of Belfield2 generally confirmed.
the fears of the critics even if he did not always
recommend hat they wished. Apart from his
declaration that the Crown had no general rights over
the lands of the Colony and that any attempt to assert
such rights would be generally and rLhtly resented,
Belfield reported that there was no danger, under
the present system, of so much land being alienated as to
unduly restrict the amount available for the native
population, whicia however he did not oelieve was on the
increase.	 He favoured a retention of supervision
by the Judiciary.	 But he found that the system of
validating concessions by the Supreme Court was unduly
expensive and di1tory and. did not give the natives the
1. CO to Belfield, 2 3ept 1911, CO 879/109.
2. Report on the Leis1ation goveriing the alienation of
1 ative Lands in tne Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti;
with some oos rvations on ne Fore...t Ordinnce, l9l
by H. Conway Belfield, CJi.&. Presented to ar1iaxnent
In 1911. (Cd. 6278).
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asistance they required.
	 He recorninended that there
should. be ubstituted for this system one under which
Commissioners of Lands should advise the chiefs in
concert with the District Provincial Commissioners as
to the fairness of the consideration for a proposed
concession and the desirability of granting it, the
final decision being, however, left to the chiefs.
If a conuession was opposed by third parties, he
recommended that there ioi1d be an appeal to the Supreme
Court, on a payment of a substacitial fee, but not
otherwise.1
On. the other hand, Belfleldts observations
revealed the true state of affairs in the Gold Coast
although he did not followthem up to their logical
end in his recommendations.	 He found that the chiefts'
sense of obligation towards the tribe in respect of
trusteeship was obscured by their greed for money.
In some instances they had misapropriated the proceeds
for personal use, a ractice which was almost
always resari.ted by the people who then. destooled these
chiefs. 2
 1oieovcr, the chiefs and their advisers had no
1. See L.inites of 1; June 1912 by llis on Belfield to
CC 18 June 1912 (enclosing report) which summartse
the most important conclusions of the report.
CO 96/525.
2. Cd. 6278, op. cit., Para. 29.
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proper knowledge of the areas alienated due to
ignorance of standard mensuration.	 It was this, he
observed, not fraud, which on the whole led to over-
lapping of concessions. 	 Belfield also discovered
that the chiefs most involved in concessions were those
most indebted, and that the agricultural distticts
with little or no concessions had few indebted chiefs.
The debts, which in 3ome individual instances showed
a total of four figures in starling, had been incurred,
for the most part, by unnecessary litigation, and the
local lawyers, who charged these fees, encouraged this
proclivity •1
At the same time, Belfield found that the
chiefs disposed these sums in accordance with recognised
conventional practice, but that this practice was a
& variance with traditional norms. 	 They were supposed to
exercise their authority for the common benefit of the
tribe as a body, but they actually pent the money for
purposes from which the ordinary members of the
community drived no advantage.
	
Thus he saw that the
tribe was deprived of a substantial area of itS land for a
1. Ibid.	 Para 33.
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jeriod which left it virtually dispossessed for two or
three generations, and yel got no sort of compensation for
the dimunition of its property. 	 Hie foutid the inability of
the mass of the people to share either directly r
indirectly in the revenues accruing froi concessions as
an objectionable feature of the existing system, and
recommended that an improvemnt would be effected if
part of the money were set aside to be expended on works
for the benefit of the community.1
Three other observations of Belfield are
germane to this isussion.	 Although he wanted this
done in a mariner that would make the people feel that
they still controlled their 1and he yet made a ease
for such official intervention as would put a stop to
the improvident disposal of tribal lands. He saw
that there was nothing in the Concessions Ordinance to
prevent the Concessionaire from practically working iis
cono.essions evefl be.ore he got a Certificate of Validity
for it. And he found that 'those who favoured the
retention of the prevaIling system were in a minority and
their status and. experience was not as a rule such as
would lend substantial weight to their expressed opLnion."
1. Ibid. Para, 35.
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oreover, "those opinions were not always free frOm
the faint of personal bias or oi.' a desire to retain. pecLrniar
advantage to themselves."1
The Colonial Office received Be1flel.'s report
with gracious felicity.	 ir J. Anderson accordingly
minuted: ".... this is a vcry useful and helpful report
and Mr. Belfield should be thanked or it. I agree
generally with tbe conclusions both on the general
questions and tne Forest Ordinance, and there should be
no delay in getting a conirnissiorier of lands and setting
our house in order on the lines recommended?2 Lord
Lmott was glad that tn report would be published
be
since, as/observed, it had been "a subject of apparently
unfounded suspicion in some quarters already." 3 After
Harcourt had read it, ha minuted that "a letter of warm
appreciation should be written to r. Bell ield." 	 Yet
these positive intentions to implement the recommendations
of the report were already rendered nugatory by other forces
1. IbId, Paras. zd-23, 37.
2. Minute of 20 June 1912, by J. Anderson on Belfjeld to
CO 18 June 1912. CC 96/525.
3. Jinute of 2L June 1912 by Lord mmott (ibid) the
suspicion is illustrated later in this chapter.
1 •
 14inute f 1 July 1912 by L. Harcourt. (ibid).
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outside the Office.
Although the Belfield mission was mainly a result
of the importunate demands for inquiry made by Morel and.
others, it appeared tnat even before the arrival of the
report Morel had removed his hopes from it. As has
been seen, Belfie1ds observations confirmed almost
all the allegations which Morel and others had made,
but his recommendations ruled out the logical application
of Morel's thesis.	 Out of moderate good sense, Morel
described the report as "a document of ve7 great value,
conspicuous for temperate fairness," but he was at the
same time of the opinion that "the principles cf native
land tenure existing in our British West African
possesslona should not be left to spasmodic enquiry,
outside investLatlon and chance discovery." 1	If anything,
Morel would have wished that the Colonial Office adopted
his own suggestion of extending the principle of
the Northern Nigeria legislation to other West African
Colonies. Wedgewood had agreed. with Morel that the
best procedure was to have the principle "extcnded to
outhern Nigeria; and theq,I hope, to the Gold Coast."2
---
1. A.I ., 19 July 1912.
2. Wedgewood to Iiore1, 8 Aug. 1911. F.9. EDMP.
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He had previously alerted the Anti-Slavery and. Abrg1nes
Protection Society and had solicited that Society to back
him up in his efforts to induce the Colonial Office to
report on the alienations of land going on in the
Colonies. 1 But even before Belfield reported, as Emott
hinted in hIs minute, rumours became current that
the mining interests "had got hold of him".	 It was
alleged that Giles Hunt's2clerk had become the Commissioner's
clerk, and everybody who was opposed to indiscriminate
alienation of land regarded all the influence of Giles
Hunt as being in. opposition to true native interests.3
Morel, therefore, despite his admiration for
Belfield's observations, felt that this report sat on
the fence. He was too much a believer in the importance
of the land. in the African social and political system
to stop his campaigns because of a report which his
coUeague, Wedewood, later described as calculated to
1. Minutes Committee, ASS, 7 &pril 1911 item 1900;
E2/12, 'o1. VII.
2. Hunt, Giles, An English barrister practisirig in. Cape
Coast; connected with various concessions in which
he acted as legal intermediary; Unofficial Member of
the Gold Coast Legislative Council, 1903-13.
3. Harris to Wedgewood, 20 May 1912; MS5 3rit. np.
5. 19. D 3/5. Co.
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encourage concession-mongers. 	 Morel was convinced
that 'the secret" of all the outrages upon humanity
was to be found in the land; and that 'if the
natives of Tropical Africa could be fixed on the land
and their tenure guaranteed, sri obstacle would have been
put to their exploitation." 2 And he saw the best
way to this "gigantic fight" in appl7ing the principles
of the Northern Nigeria legislation to the other
Colonies.	 He made this point repeatedly but alwayS
in the usual dogmatic tone in. which it appeared that no
other alternative was	 rkable:
"Legislation is required which shall lay
down the cardinal principles that the lands of West
Africa are native lands - whether occupied or
unoccu.pied - over which the British Government
shall exercise supreme control in the interests of
the natives and in accordance with ascertained
native law and custom - Northern Nigeria has led
the way. It is time the other dependencies
followed suit.	 Only in this way can future
generations of test Africans be secured from the
eneiy without and the enemy on. their own hearths ..."
t was dawning on any members of Parliament
also that this extension was vital to the maintenance of
1. African (West) No. 10 1+7. Qs. 135_11+O: Wedgewood to
Belfield.
2. ?iorel to Holt, 12 Apr].l 1911, 18/8; J.d.P.
3. A.M., May 1912.
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native land rights in West Africa. When on Wednesday
15th. May l9l the British Government issued a White
Paper on Colonial Lands, 1 certain Labour and. Liberal
members of Parliament 2 interested in native questions
convened a meeting at which it was suggested that the
only method of preventing alienation was through that
system which had inspired the Northern Nigria Land
Ordinance of 1910,
	 They then called upon Parliament
to urge against the sale of native lands whether by the
Crown or by the chiefs, and proposed to approach the
Government to ask for a Committee to go into the matter
and make recommendations on. the extension of the Northern
Nigeria law and native rights system to the other
African Crown Colonies and Protectorates, exept
perhaps ritish ast Afxica which had white settlers.
The African Mail hailed tiis movement;
"It may not be possible or desirable, to
adopt the same forms of words everywhere.	 But
forms are matters of sna11 Importance compared with
the principle itself. For the free development
of West African commerce and industry - and. the
evolution in security of tenure oi the African races
1. No. 68:	 in Crown Colonies and Protectorates'
printed 15 Kay 1912.
2. il1iam Byles (Liberal MJv.), Noel B4xton (Lab. M.P.),
Philip Morrell (Liocral, M.P.), P.i. Raffan (Liberal
M.P.), J.C. 1edgewood. (Labour M.P.).
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under our protection, it is essential that the
ultimate lordship over the soil shQuld be vested
in the British Government. 	 This is the only
means we can see to prevent the break-up of
African land tenure and the mortgaging of
African rights in the soil arid the soil's
products.	 As in the case of the Northern
Nigeria Ordinance, legislation should establish
beyond dubt that the lands are native lands
held in trust by the Government on behalf of the
African races and controlled in accordance with
native customary laws.
	
Working from that basis,
it should be possible anywhere to Strengthen and
vitalise African ins±itutions and to perfect the
system of native administratlén, without infrining
legitimate European enterprise."1
These land ideas, which had been expressed
either individually or corporately, crystallised in the
famous letter to the Times of 6 June 1912 written by
ii.D. Morel, Noel axton, J. flainsay hacdonald, Philip
Norrell, ir Albert Spicer and J.. Wedgewood.	 After
making several observations on. the nature of land
tenure in dèst africa, this letter made the uiost important
/ recominndation as to land policy whez it declared:
"What is requ.ired in all our tropical
dependencies in west Africa, where there are no white
settlers, are land Acts, which, however they may vary
in their form of wording, and in their application in
accordance with the character of the political
relationship prevailing oetweeri their inhabitants
and the PardmoiXnt Poier, shall secure the threefold
aim of legalizing the rights of the natives to the
occupancy and use of the soil, preventing the
creation of monopolies in the soil's produce, whether
natural or cultivated, and resrving the value of the
land and freedom of access to it for tne future
L. A.M., 31 Nay 1912.
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generations of our protected subjects."1
The letter further suggested that an experienced Committee
should be appointed by the Colonial Office, as was done in
the case of Northern Nigeria, to inquire into the problems
which this letter raised, questions which it claimed went
to "the foundations of sound administration in these tropi-
Ca]. regions under British protection." Exactlybtwo weeks
after this letter, the West African Lands Committee was ap-
pointed by the Colonial Office with Morel and Wedgewood
among its members.2
The appointment of this Committee at the instance
I. The Times, 6 June 1912.
2. The West African Lands Committee was appointed by the
0.0. on 20th June 1912 with the following as members:
Sir Keneim E. Digby, G.C.B., K.C.(Chairinan); Sir N.M.
Hodgson,	 Sir W. Taylor, K.C.M.G; Sir William
Rapier; J.C. Wedgewood MR; LD. Morel; C. Strachey
and W.D. Ellis (both of the 0.0.) H.P. Batterbee of
the 0.0. was its Secretary.
It was "to consider the laws in force in. the West
African Colonies and protectorates (other than Northern
Nigeria) regulating the conditions under which rights
over land o' the produce thereof may be transferred,
and to report whether any, and, if so, what amendment
of the laws is required either on the lines of the
Northern Nigerja Land Proclamation or otherwise."
The Committee sat 52 times for the taking of oral evi-
dence anl 79 witnesses caine before them. In addition a
great deal of evidence was taken on commission in West
Africa. War broke out while revision of Part II of the
report was proceeding and prevented any further discus-
sion of the Report by the Pull Committee as Part I had
been. But the Report was completed in. 1915.
The Report isnpublished as African (West) No.1046;
Minutes of Evidence as African (West) No. 1047; and
Memoranda as African (West) No. 1048.
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bf 1Aorel and his colleagues, however, inspired an.
opposition spirit among inter sted parties, opposition
which, in any case, might have been expected were it
not for the surprising attack on Morel from an important
section of the merchant community itself.	 t the
annual meeting of the West African Trade Section of the
Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, its chairman G.A. Moore1
had criticized the composition of the new Lands Committee
and "could not under any circumstances approve of it."
1'ioore's criticism, hozever, was not always free from
selfish interests, He would have wished to see a
merchant as a member of the Committee to recommend in
favour of that class:
The only laymen who were appointed to it were
Mr. Morel and Mr. Josiah Wedewood, and we know
that both these gentlemen have very decith.d views
on land tenure, and we hardly thought that they could
bring the same unbiased judgernent to consideration of
these questions that we had a right to expect. 	 }r.
Morel, we all know and like, but he has no practical
experience of the African trade, and does nt kncw what
the requ.irernents of the merchants are ...."
1. Moore George Arbuthnot; Born Bir 1 eahead 16 March 18?;
son o1 Charles Moore of asterlands,Somerset. 	 duc. at
Birkenhead School;	 tuttgart and urtenburg; Appointed
member of Advisory Committee of Overseas Trade by Sir AS.
Maitlartd at its inception; a member of the Interim
Provisional-Council to the Board of Trade by Sir.A.
ctanley; Chairman of the Council of the Liverpool
Chamber of Commerce, 1918-19; and of its Afrian Trade
Section from 1909; Chairman of the Taxation & Finance
Committee of the Co..4.ncil of the Association of Br.
Chambers of Commerce, 1921-3 and a Liverpool, represen-
tative on the Council of tha Association. Died 3 Dec.
1923.
2.	 Journal of Commerce,27 May 1913. Morel to Hanhemann Stuartg Mv igi..
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hoore was probably right when he alleged that Morel held
too riid views on land, but his opposition stemmed
mainly from his unwarranted assumption that lwrel was
opposed to merchants getting security of tenure for
their establishments and from his selfish view of the
Committee as though it were merely concerned with matters
of trade 1 Moreover, Morel must have found it extremely
difficult to understdnd how Moore could credit him
exhypothei with sentiments other than those of
friendliness towards legitimate commercial interest,
and antagonism to commercial monopolies of all kinds;
hence he regarded I'ioore's opinion as 'ingu1ar topsy -
As a matter of fact, Morelts career to date
in no way justified Moore's diatribes. 	 For more than
twenty years Morel had consistently opposed. anything
calculated to interfere with the free development of
comierce between European merchants irid Africans.
He took a vigorous line against the monopoly of the
Niger Company and helped to destroy it. He was officially
thanked by the geSt African Trade ction of the Liverpool
1. Morel to G.A. Moore, 29 May, 1913. Copy, F.9.
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Chambers of Coinmece for tas pns1au,ht upon the
Concessionaire reg ime in the French Congo, afld his
writin6 s, and the action in the House of Commons
which these inspired, contributed greatly to compensation
being offered to British firms which had suffered from
that regime.	 For about fifteen years he had been
engaged in a great struggle which finally, nter alia,
had resulted In throwing open the Congo Basin to
British trade and British merchants. He was the first
to deflounce the "Concession-mongery 9 which WaS reducing
the prosperity of Gold Coast. 	 It was largely due to
a series of articles in the African hail and letters
to the Colonial Office tnat Belfield was appointed
to investi 6ate on the spot; and the present Committee
was a result of his tenacity.
	 With this impressive
i'ecord of humanitarian and legitimate mercantile interest,
Morel's lament for Moore's unwarranted criticism was not
without justification:
t1 should have imagined that (this record)
would have entitled me to expect at the hands of
West African merchants not only Immunity fnU criticism -
but a certain amount of satisfaction at my appointment
to a Committee charged with making recominndations
on these questions.	 Criticisms and attacks from Stock
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xchange influences; from concession-mongers;
from a class of educated natives who have Deem
engaged in battoning upon the ignorance and.
cypidity of their illiterate brothers - these I
anticipated.	 But that criticism and attack
should come from the class whose interests I
have done not a little to defend for many years,
I neither anticipated nor have deserved."-
It was a great pity that ioore remained
unconvinced.	 1e stuc to his opinion, that Morels
views were not in agreement with those of the merchants.2
But ioore id not dominate the Chamber though he greatly
influenced it.	 Soe membezs, like Pickering Jones,
acknowledged that Ivlorel had "made a very careful study
of the question from the historical and other points
of view not yet tackled by the merchants," and rejoiced
that horel was in the Committee. 3 Holt was so chagrined
at Moore's pronouncements that he wondered whether
Moore had thought about the land. question at all.
	
He
positively gave orel his support and. the us.al word of
1, J4oreJ. to .A. Moore, 29 May 1913 Cony.., F.9. EDMP
2. Moore to iore1, 30 May 1913, F. 9. DMP.
3. Pickerin0 Jones to Moiel 6 'une 1913, 7. 9. EDMP.
.J. Fontanaz to Morel,	 June 1913, F. 9.	 EDMP.
f. bit to 1iore1, 30 Nov. 1912, F 8/1+, CDIP.
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inspiration:
ttYou are as well fitted as any merchant I
know to set forth the poitiori of the merchants in
outhern Nigeria 1n regard to Land either for the
merchants' use or anybody's; but we merchants
indeed are a slow lot going o the old lines jistead
of wakening up to what is doing on around us, so we
are a prey to jealousies and doubts instead of being
well informed by reading and thinking so as to
qualify ourselves for ttie guidance of up-to-date
people	 U].
Moore's reaction was symptomatic of inner cjuestionings
within the Liverpol Chamber.	 It was, in part, a
reflection of the traditional Chamber of Commerce
attitude of using humanitarian pretensions to achieve
economic advantages. 	 Also it was largely in consonance
with the progressive repudiation by that Chamber of
those ideas which Morel stood for.	 Over the land
çuestin, however, there was no unanimous opposition
to Morel arid his Radical collea 0 ues by that body,
and they right have been expected to direct thcir
energies to the work of the Committee, except that they
now had to contend with educated native oposition which,
in any case, they had anticipated.
A few weeks aft..r the Radical letter to the
Tires, T.F.. Jones, Casel	 Uayford, Z.J.P. Broin and
1. Holt to orel, 5 Jane 1913, F 8/+, LSKP.
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B.W. Quartey-Papafio, all "members of the Deputation
appointed by the Kings and Chiefs of the Gold Coast
to oppose the Forest Bill of 1911," published a reply,
refuting the conclusions and recommendations in the
letter of June.
	
They maintained that since the
Gold Coast land had belonged to its people from time
immemorial, no legislation was necessary to secure this,
They pointed out that the chief was not merely a
"ijjstee" of the land but a joint-owner with the
people, the implication of this being that if the Paramount
Power could manoevre itself into a position of "trustee"
It might then proceed to claim that of "joint-owner".
Moreover, they said that the whole land would not be
controlled b the Governor since the Crown had. never
laid claim to acquisition of lands of their country by
conquest, cession or purchase.	 They then considered as
"superfluous" the point that the Governor's power should
be exercised 'with due regard to native customs.
particularly as the circumstances on the Gold toast were
held by them to be "wholly different" from Northern Nigeria
to warrant the extension of that system.1
1. The Times 18 July 1912. In fairness to Morel and his
fellow raaicais, it must be noted that they merely
wanted the principle, and not the form, of the Northern
Nigerian law to be applied elsewhere.
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1'ore1 immediately became an execrable figure
in the Gold Coast presse
	
Some African witnesses before
Belfield had already described his mind on the land
uestion as a tabula Vasa)	 A few months afterwards,
the old_Coast Leader had described as "odious" the
part he had played iri the land and other recent
questions affecting the weal and prosperity of the
natives of British West Africa in general and this
country in particular;" and had resolved
	
watch and
challenge at every stage the actions of the rnar who has
proved hims1f on of the most formidabl and. cunning
opponent we have had to rekon with in recent times."
While reoicing "that no patriotic native of this
country has an. ounce of confidence in himt, this paper
had emphasized Morel's notoriety as "the dangerous
adversary who adopts in his Welfare Strategy width
hypoeMsy, mellifluous cant with stipendous ignorance2
ven people like Caseley Hayford, who, were self-interest
not involved, xni bht have been expected to know better, took
extreme views and. accused Morel and his colleagues of being
1. M1n.tes of vidsnce, Cd. 6278.
2. ld Coast Leader, 6 Dec. 1913. A.M.a 13 Jan. 1913.
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anti-native • 3.
It must be pointed out, however, that the
elements of African opposition on the Gold Coast were
basically three interested groups. The first were the
chiefs who were avid to gain by concessions and ignorant
or indifferent to the results of their actions. 	 Then,
there were the lawyers and barristers of the Coast tOWnS,
who, like Caseley Hayford, had acted in their professional
capacilies for the uropean concessiorrnire and for the
chiefs 'cading' tbe lands. 	 As Morel put it: 'The
merrier the concession1res dance, the more substantial
the profits of the gentlemen of the law. The greater
the number of concessions, the greater the number of fees
for the legal intermediaries".	 Thirdly, there were other
educated natives or the Coast towns who had joined the
board of directors of some of these quickly promoted
companies when they did nQt play the role of intermediary
which, in any case, was said to be lucrative.2
1. Vid.e Caseley Hayford, The Truth about the ,Jest African
Land Qu.estion, passim.
2 A.N., 26 3ept 1913. In his letter of 1 Fuly 1897,
1iaxwe1l had, told Chamberlain that it was the
intermediaries who fostered the 1897 opposition to
the Land Ordinance of that yar.	 CO 379/15+.
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correspondent of the African Nail regarded the
proclaimed patriotism of these groups of Africans as
phoney when he bitterly denounced them:
"There is something colossal in the efforitery of
these men, appealing to sentiments of racial
"patriotism", to "United Jest Africa", etc. wnile
assisting alien capitalistic enterprise to fasten. a
yoke upon their fellow countrymen.	 The 'liberty'
they demand for their ignorant dpes Is liberty
to sacrifice the inheritance of the West African
peoples; liberty to cornpromife the future so that
a handful may benefit today."
The official attitude to these conflicting
philosophies was still evolving, but even at this point
it was becoming more clarified.	 The Belfield report
provided an opportunity for these questions to be
resolved, but it had been superseded by the West
African Lands Cozn'nittee. 	 Although the report was
presented to Parliament, Co1ona1 Ofiice officials did
not think it was wise to proceed with its recommendations
when the other Committee was situ sitting. 	 Flood
minuted according: ".... I am not sure whether it is
considered desirable that any actin should be taken as
yet to carry out Mr. Belfleld.'s recommendations In view
of the West African Lands Corn ittee's deliberations.
	
It
..	 .i ,, 26 Sept. 1913.	 It is very probable that this
correspondnt was Morel himself.
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might be as well to defer action until they have reported
in order to get the question straight without risk of
interference for some time...."1 	 Ellis later agreed
with him: "There is no need to remind tne Governor
as the proceedings of the Coumiittee have practically
rendered this report obsolete.	 It may be removed from
the arrears list ••••2	 The same fate met the Forest
Ordinance, though discussions on it exposed the tendencies
of the official mind vis-a-vis the arguments published, on
18 July by members of the Gold Coast Forest deputtiori.
In a meroranduni prepared in June l912, W.D.
1lis not only sketched the history of tne Forest
measures but also pointed out the uisparity between the
attitudes of the Colonial Office and those of the Gold
Coast opponents of tnexn.	 In 1907 an Crd.inance had been
passed to prevent the cutting of imxature timber and the
Gold Coast Government obtained the services of H.iI. Thompson,
the Conservator of Forests in Southern Nigeria, to
examine the forest resources of the Goi..d Coast colony and
1. Minute of 30 Aug. 1912 by Flood, on B1field to
18 June 1912, CO 96/25.
2. Minite of 25 April 1913 by t.D. 1lis, ibid.
3. Memo. of 2+ June 1912, by .D. 1lis, CO 96/525.
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Ashanti.
	 The report, presented at the end of l9O,
revealed a very seiious state of affairs1 .	 It was
made clear that the forests were gradually degenerating
and disappearing and that the consequent los.. of water
and. soil was diinirashing the agricultural capacities
of the Colony.	 Forest conservation, therefore,
became necessary.
For this prpose, a bill was introduced in
October 1910, based, in accordance with Thompson's
proposals, on the $outhern Nigerian Ordinance. 	 Ip.
April 1911, the Colonial Office received protests
from the Gold Coast.	 In May of the same year the
bill was withdrawn on the ground that the procedure
laid down in it was inconvenient (no doubt the natwes
believed this withdrawal to be a result of their protest).
In August of that year, a new bill was introduced, but
again met with strong native opposition within and without
the Leislative Council.
	
Before, therefore, the second
reading was take the Governor agreed to substantial
uiodifjcations which satisfied the three native members of the
1. Cd. 993/1O of 1908, Pp. 97-99.
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Le c is1atjve Couacil, so t iat tue bill was passed
without dissent.	 But the opposition outside the
Council did not cease.
	
Acting through heir traditional
allies, the British legal firm of Ashur$t, Morris and
1
Crisp and Company, the Gold Coast elements objected
to any form of Government control and especially to
the provision for Government leases.
It appears that throughotit the whole land
controversy in the Gold Coast from the bill of 189'+
to Belfield's investi bation and the Forest Bill one
argument had constantly recurred which was certainly
considered most important by the Chiefs and African lawyers.
1. 1hen on 3 April 1911 this firm forwarded a petition
on behalf of the	 against the Forest Bill,
llis on C Oct. 1911 minuted:	 **The combination of
this firm of Company o1icitors with local Kings
and Chiefs is characteristic and ominous.	 It was
a Similar combination which defeated Sir W. ?iaxwell's
Bill for vesting uncultivated lands in the Crown
which would have checked the alienation oi' native
lands of which Mr. Morel and others complain. 	 They
are afraid that the 'orest Bill will stop the
proceedings (of which we have had several examples)
by which a chief hands over forest lands, of which
he is only a trustee, to an agent who sells it then
to another agent till they are finally floated on. the
Biltish Public 1or £50,000 or so.	 The lawyers of
course get their toll at every stage from the
inception of the Company till its burial in
Bankruptcy Buildings ....'%	 .shurst, Norris Crisp & Co.,
to CO., 3 April 1911, CC 96/51i-.
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his was to the effect that trie Gold Coast tribes were
not in the same position as other tribes, for example,
in AshantI (or Northern Nigeria) inasmuch as they
had. never been conquered, or ceded their land.
	
They
always maintained that they were merely "protected' t as
the result of voluntary agreement. From this
argument, they inferred that rio legislative interfeience
with their lands was u.stifiable itLut the concurrence
of the Chiefs.1
It j true that before 1901 these districts in
question iere known as "?rotected Territortes. 	 Though
apparently, on the ground of technical convenience,
these territories had nevertueless 1e en. annexed in 1991.
In the memorandum referred to, allis pointed out that it
could. be inferred from the evidence in &lfleld's Report
that the fact of this annexation was not vtry clearly
apprehended by the people of the Gold Coast.
	
It is
probable, as 1lis argued that the letter of 11th
March 1887 (which was so unfortunately worded as to
imply that annexation would take the soil from the
natives) might have caused mistrust in the minds of the
1.	 Memo, of 2+ June 1912 by 11is, CO 96/25.
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natives, but he at the same time pointed out that tnere
was no doubt that the attitide of the Chiefs and their
advisers 'was that the British Government was essentially
a foreign Government and thdt any law briri 5 ing any part
of the land, tribal or otherwise, under Government
administration was confiscatory. 	 1lis concluded:	 'The
governor holds the view that having ainexed the Gold
Coast Colony, His }ajesty has full authority both by law
and. by the custom of nations to deal as he thinks fit with
the lands which, however, they may be said to have an
owner - are in fact state lands which the Cni.iefs hold in
their capacity as petty sovere1gns...."	 Read agreed:
1e caniot admit that the p wer to legislate for peace,
order, and good government does not xtend. to the passing
of general land legislation which does not interfere with
any nation tit1s.1*2	 The specious arguments of the
Gold Coast lawyers were regarded as hardly convincing by
the Colonial Office.
The acrimonious press warfare which had
1...	 Ibid.
. Minute by V.J.R. 26 June, 1912 (ibid).
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also
featured these agitations was/caraied on in Southern
Nigeria where the natives were reacting against the Land
measures of the Lagos Government.
	 The first attempt
made by the La6os Government to legislate with
reference to the lands of the people had been in 1876.
The "Public Lnds 1' Crdinance of that year gave the
Government power to acquire compulsorily any lands
required for public purposes, paying the owner such
compensation as might, in the eyes of the Government, be
deemed ample reimbursement for loss of property. 	 Such
fleislation was obviously needed in the interest of
improving towns, by laying out streets and parks, erecting
offices and other buildings.	 Probably, no great fault
might have been found with this Ordinance but for the
extensive and oppressive use o which the provisions were
later applied.	 By virtue of the Crdinance, huge
expropriations took place in. Lagos, not to make roorri for
any public buildings, such as hospitals or useuins, but to
erect a numbcr of residences for .ur3pean officials,
while hundreds of natives were evicted. 1 It might be
1. Lazos Standard, Wed. 2 Iay 1912 discussed this
grievance at length.
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ar0ued that since compensation was offered therefore the
measures were riot necessarily harsh.	 Yet some of the very
sites from which the people were thus evicted were sub-
divided by the Government arid, either leased or resold,
to the very persons who not more than five years
previously had been. dispossessed. 	 For example, the
former own.rs of the new R3ce-Course had to buy lands
from the Government along the '1Uausa Linest and at
Obalende. 1 On 6 November 1906, Keir Iardie referred
the HOuse of Commons to a petition from Lagos, praying
for the intervention of the British Government in
regard to a Bill passed by the Lagos Lebislative
Council in Au b 1st 1906 whereby about 6,300 persons would
1. There are examples of similar actions on the Gold
Coast. It was reported that at Sekondi In 1912
natives were ousted from a district whtch was
required for uropeans (a district to which they had
been driven in 19O in the same manner).	 It was
also discovered that in other districts in Sekondi
and in Tarkwa, lands expropriated in 1900 and 1902
from the people under the Public Lands Ordinance,
ostensibly for sanitary purposes, were In 1912
being plotted out and rented to Natives.
	
Vide
La.os Standa, 22 May 1912.
The 'Hausa finest were bo&inded on tne North by Igbosere
Rd; on the mast by Thinter Street, on. the South by
Catholic Iission etreet and vacant Govt. land
adjoining the R ce Course; and on the 1est by Glover
Street.	 It was set aside in 1863 by Gov. Glover
as a place where non-commissioned officers and men of
Laos constabulary would build themselves quarters
and reside so loris as thy remained in active service
of the said forca.
	
This later became the Lagos
battalion of the WAFF.
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be dispossessed of their property.	 ae implored the
Colonial Office to protect these people who w aid "be
cast out in their old age, homeless and. helples&' if the
Bill came into operation. 1 Althou.gti in 1910 when the
issue came up a b ain in the Coniinons, Colonel Seeley
defended the Colonial Government by saying that the
claimants were compensated and that the local government
'apeared to err, if anything, on the side of generosity",
Joseph King at the same time had observed that the natives
wcra said only to have "removed from their homes and
holdings ...	 under the presence and menace of the
m11itary.' 2	It appeared that the Government measures
'were nut merely operating severely on. the people, but that
the Government itself was speculatin in land.	 The
La,.os Stptd4 was so obsessed by these transactions that
t 1ndignantly declared that thy all seemed to be
"only another way of carrying out the measure sought
to be introduced earlier by a Governor of Laos, Sir
Henry 1aCalLum, of substituting Crown Grants by a .ystem
of Quit-rents and leases from Government", which measure
1. H.C. Debs. +s. Vol. 161+, 1906, 311, 312. P. Jackson
of Lagos to iLgin (nc1. Petitin) 10 Sept. 1906.
2. H.C. Debs. s. Vol. XV, March 1910, 1035.
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I
never became land, s the paper claimed, because of its
"flagrant and self-evident injustice."
The dissatisfaction which greted the su.bsequ.ent
adrnjiistration of the 'Public Lands' Ordinance of 1876 becena
general opposition wien new tneasu.reS fol1owe.. 	 On
20 September 1911, the tovernnient of Lagos issued a
Public Notice announcing "that the full Court of the
Colony has held in cases recently decided that the Cession
of the 6th day of August i86i, of the Port and Island
of Laos with all the rights, profits, territories and
appurtenances whatever therernto belonging, was a
cession of all lands not subject to pre-existing rights of
private ownrsti1p.' 2
	Soon after, the Nizrian Times
called public attrietion to thi.s notice, pointing out
correctly that it was a dangerous 1naovatio. aimed at an
invasion ol' proprietary rights of both the Chiefs and
private owners.3
As it was to be expected, the La 0os AuxiLlary
of the Anti-Slavery and Abori 0 ines' protection Society
imm..diate1y got involved ii this new situation. 	 ItS
1. Laos Standard,	 May 1912
2. Published in	 Gazet e, No. 68 ol' 20 Sept. 1911.
3. nigerian Times, 3 Oct. 1911.
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annual meetin of 7 November 1911 adopted the motions
which Herbert Hac ulay had moved "in a very forcible
speech" in which he pointed Out the dangerous preoedent
aimed at by the Goverrmaent Notice. From this time
bnwards, the Auxiliary Committee started active propaanda
on the subject, expounding and interpreting the principles
involved in the new policy of the Gov..r1mL.nt, "so es to
bring it home to the intelligent Comprehension of the
1people gnera1iyI•
information
The Auxiliary had disseminated/on the
Government measure among sections of the community in
order to ensure cooperation.	 The people of Laos
showed aont rieous 1nt,rest.	 Prince .leko sent his
symathy and Qoodwill.	 Many	 ,o Chiefs and Moslem
1eadrs qere aid to have attended some of the metiris
called by the Auxiliary and bave S.uoport to the ovemen.t.
Proceedings at meetin0 s wre conducted in the verri cular
•ylfr
(that is Yo%ba), nd this ..ucceeded almost im. ediately
in 0iving wide-spread sl bnlficance to the 1ss1es involved.2
1. J. Biight Davies to T. Buxton (A.iziliary Memo. end.)
19 Juie 1912 h	 Brit.	 22	 G. 252.
2. Ibid.
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then the Auxiliery seaured solid support
arid felt sure of its case, it asked the Governor to receive
a native deputation.	 Since Governor gerton waS
ab.ut to proceed to .ng1and, he advised tie Auxiliary to
let tie question stand over until the arrival of Lord
Lugard.	 But as the Lagos ntives regarded L.igard as
"a perfect stranger to 8uthcrn Nigeria's theQmmittee
of the Axi1iary thou.ht it more expdint and advisable
to approach F. zetori James, the Acting Govrnor, who
already tad years of cxperience i the Country. 	 And
since Acting Governor James at the interview with the
deputation and in a subsequent corres onderice justified
the stand of the Government on the altar of public
iateres, the L os A.xiliary, therefore, memorialised
the London Society, aainst the implication f the
Foreshore Case d.cision of 22 April 1711.
	
It pointed
oit that this decision was not biridin0 to the Chiefs
and people o La bos because, as it rl bhtly maintained,
the Cession of La,os by DosLnn1u to the British arowri
on 6 August i86i was a cession only of his Soveity
over the town and island of Lagos and not of property
in land.	 The A xiliary meniorandun deci red with dis0nstt
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"The present land policy has created a
menace in the Westorn Province of S uthern Nigeria,
where for fifty ye rs after the css1on, Her ha3esty's
Government never at any period under the treaty claimed
the lands of Laos Island and territories th..reunto
belonging as the property of the British Crown
The criticism by the Auxiliary of the notice and
policy of the .aos Government was at the same
directed aainst the parent Society then it became
known th t some members of that Society were signatory
to the famous letter to the Times. And with the
appointment of the West 4frican Lands Co ittee, the
West African land question soon eclipsed, the special one
of Lagos. Members of the La bos Auxiliary openly
criticised the role of the parent Society in the whole
cirsis.	 !iiting in August 1912, John P. 3acson,
the proprietor of the Laos 1 'ekly Record, regretted
thdt the Society was in any 'way associated with the
proposal for the Native L rid Tenure system" wh ch,
according to him, "carried its earang on its fac&'
for "while it puts forw rd. a plea for protecting the
natives, yet it is an adroit scheme to substitute the
native in ownrShip of his land; and whle maintaining
1. Auxiliary Memo, of 19 June 1912, op. cit.
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the outward or suprficia1 form of the System, it
destroys the essential condition of ownership to the
deprivation of the native ....'	 Jackson was all the
more angry with the Society for Its awareness of the
object of the proposal tt since they had the Northern
Nigerian System before them a an exampleU.	 His
condemnation of that ystem and the role of the
Society was entire.
"There can be no question as to the
injustice and iniquity of a system which deliberately
deprives the native of the ownership of land which
he has enjoyed from time imuemorial and converts
him into a tenant liable to pay rent for him for
his own land.
	
The native, ignorant as he is, can
see through the speciousness of the system and
thought the Society would have been alert as to
the injustice fou 6bt to be inflid upon him in
a covert way."
If the Society's involvement in the parliamentary
deputation to Harcou.rt and the letter to the Times was
galling to the auxiliary, the manner in which the Society
worded its correspoadcrice to the Auxiliary with re;ards
to the land a0itation in. BrLtain was misu.ndersto d and
misinterpreted at the La os end.	 "The doubtful action
of the Society in the matter, as Jackson. called it,
seemed to have convinced the Auxiliary that the parent
1. J.P. Jackson to T. Buxton, 21 Au. 1912. I1S Brit.
&ip.	 G. 252.
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oeiety, having involved itself in the conspiracy,
was deterrn1ned to keep then in the dark until a
acconrnli ias achieved.	 Jackson went on;
t1lnstead of informing the latter (i.e.
Auxiliary) at once what the proposal meant and what
action they should take in defence of native rights,
they aim ly informed them that a proposal was being
•	 made that would Vtty concern the Native Land
Tenure System in the vtest Coast of Africa, and
that if they got any information on the proposal
they should suspend actin until they heard further
from the Soc.ety.	 1e can only interprets that
action to mean that it was intended to keep the
native in the dark and cause him to suspend any
action until the proposal became an accomplished
fact as it might have become seeing that only
seven days inquiry wa bestowed upon the North..rn
Nigerian System •..."
This new situation, complicated by rnisunderstand.ing
and misrepresentations, found the Lagos population in
confusion and dismay.	 If J. Osho Davies i to be
believed, "the appointment of the Lands Committee
at the instigation of Mr. Morel, without the faintest
intimation of such a step to this outside world threw
Lagos into a frenzied state, and when a few dayS after it
became apparent that important members of the Society
in London took part ih forcing the hands of the Secretary
of State in the matter, it drove terror into the hearts
o' many.	 As agitations were set in motion, taunts, like
1. LP.. Jackson to T. Buxton, 21 Aug. 1912 MSS Brit Einp.
5.22. G.252
388.
"imperialist stooges", were said to have been ruthlessly
hauled at those members of the Auxiliary who tried to
defend the Society.1
Some of the other obsrvations made by Osho
Davies, however, were worthy of attentlon,althougb.
the rest typified the misrepresentation, deliberate
or not, which Morel's role was subjected to 	 For
example, when he suggested that Morel recommended for
West 1rica the system he justly condemned in the Congo,
"a gross and illogical conclusion", (to apply Davies' own
reasoning) it was clear that Osho Davies either
misunderstood the }iorel thesis or deliberately tried to
misrepresent it. HowevGr, when he suggested tha
although "it might be necessary for the ovornment
to exercise some sort of control to prevent foolish Natives
from alienating their lands to concessionaires from
Europe or America", but that it was no reason why this
ownerhip of native land should be taken away 'sunder the
unmeaning pretence that he does not own the land but
only occupies it", 2 Davies bad some justification.
Moreover, he then cited the t1Native Lands Acquisition
Ordinance" to show that the Southern Nig.ria Government
1. J. Osho Davies to T. Buxton, 23 Oct. 1912. (ibid).
2. Ibid.
389.
already had control over the alienation of lands by
natives to Europeans or alien Africans, 1 and if it was
supposed that this law was not stringent enough, he said,
the only way was to make it more stringent, and not "to
take the ownership from them and vest it on the Governor
absolutely, who might just turn round and barter those
same lands away by leases".	 Davies was of the opinion
that it waS more of "confiscation" than "protection",
"to deprive a man of his property and give it to some
one else stronger than himself....", and expressed the
hope that "the efforts of the Society will succeed to
relieve us from the bu.gbear which like the pallou.r of
death, overshadows all the British Dependencies in West
Africa.
The misguided indictment of the parent Society
by the lagos Auxiliary was a reflection of new tendencies
1. Vide Laws of the Colony of Southern Nigeria, Vol. 2
Section 3, P. 1188.
2. 3. Osho Davies to Buxton, 23 Oct. 1912. Osho Davies
cited the case of the lease of land to Levers
Brothex"s of 31]. sq. miles of Native land in the 3.L.
district, a transaction for %lhich although there
existed a concessions Court, "it was questionaole",
according to J.T. Roberts of the S.L. Auxiliary,
"whether it was this Court that said the last word".
(J.T. Roberts to Harris, 8 Oct. 1912).
	
See Chap. 6.
JYISS. Brit. mp. 5. 22. G. 252.
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within that Society.	 As has bee indicated, the Society
wSs genuinely interested in the movement to prevent
alienation o± land from the native tribes.	 The perennial
creed of the APS had been. its recognition of the primary
importance to natives of their "rights to th? land of
which they are the prior occupants atid its use in ways
approved by them, or at any rate to so much thereof as
may be requisite for their sustenance and prosperity
under conditions not less favourable to them than those
which they enjoyed while they were its sole owners."1
Yet although its criticism of the Gold Coast Ordinance of
1897 was for a modification to prevent hardships to
natives, and not in favour of alienation or abstract
native rights favourable to sacti alienation, 2 the
cumulative effect of the procedure followed by the Society
was to help to render nugatory the efforts of the Colonial
Office to protect tribal lands on the Gold Coast.	 As
time went on, however, the necessity for Crown protecton
of native 1 nds became obvious to iexubers oZ the Society.
1. Fox Bourne, The Claims of Uncivilized Rces, op. cit.
p. 6 See Chap. III.
2. Aborigine's Friend, July 1897, Fox Bourne to CO, 21
J2rle, 1897, CC 879/l.
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Although there was still divergence of opinions on this
crucial point (in particular the method of arriving at
that desirable end)it was nevertheless obvious that the
problem of alienation and Crown protection tiad become
so urgent that within the Society it was felt that
declaration of policy had become imperative. 	 John
Harris expounded the case of his Society In a letter to
Chris. Johnson, the Corresponding Secretary of the Lagos
Auxiliary:
"3ome steps must be taken to prevent the
alienation of land from a whole tribe by a single
individual, and therefore the only plan which
at present Seems to us satisfactory, is that of
dec1ara2a4g Such land the property of the State,
but by the word t%Stat&, we should mean the
ultimate organisation of that State to which we
look lorward.	 As It has been represented to us
on Committee, unless these steps are taken flow,
when we arrive at that date when we have more or
less representative government, the natives will
find, that all their lands have been c9nceded away
from them for a truxnery return....."
justified
He told Johnson that the Society felt its.li/in urging
a Commission of enquiry in Britain, 'as t will be very
important in bringing the whole question to the frorit.2
1. Harris to Chris Johnson, 20 May 1912, MSS. Brit. Lnp.
S. 2. G. 252.
2. Ibid.
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But while Harris was ready to see the
Society support a policy of state ownership of land.,
he desired that declaration of policy to Qo arri passU
with certain constitutional changes. He nurtured a
strong feeling that British rule in nest Africa had
been "so autocratic that a larger share in the
govcrnment of the Colonies - the Gold Coast and Nigeria--
should be given	 cher communities." 	 These views,
which he liIas to also epress to the Colonial Office,
wre embodied in his coimrunication with 1edgewood:
"There are today three sections Government,
Natives and White Nerchants; to be strichy equitable
they should be given proportionate interest with a
supreme Governor possessing the veto of legislation.
We have probably not yet arrived at the stage when this
is practical or advisable, but conditions today are
so disproportionate that they are cusing a good deal
of unrest and dissatisfaction ..,.i
He agreed with Wedgewood "that the alienation of land
must be subject to the sanction of the Crown," but
insisted that the Crown, as such, should in its Ideal
capacity be representative of the entire community, wnose
first duty is that of safe-guarding the rights of the
whole colony".	 uite appropriately, Harris had not
- -t
1. Harris to nedgewood, 31 ay 1912. M3. Brit. £mp.
. 19. D 3/5.	 ee Chap. IV.
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forgotten that an uncontrolled Crown, represented by the
Government officials "on the spot, had 'eon one occasion
at least within recent times subjected the natives to
consid,rable hardships, not for concessions, but to bake
a race-course primarily for the benefit of Government
officials....
Although the parent Committee now knew that
some members of the Auxiliary were championing a cause
opposed to theirs2 , they continued to maintain an urbane
regard for the eLpressed views of the axiliary as if
to lead its members to the true policy in a fit of absence
of mind.	 In July 1912, for example, Buxton told the
£xiliarythat his ComLittee was *vcry glad to find that
the policy which you urge is on the same lines as we
have followed in this matter." 3 Again, in August of the
1. Harris to Wegewood, 31 May 1912 	 D 3/5,
2. For example, Harris disbelieved the evidence of Lloyd
Harrison that all natives and all native chiefs were
"too wary and not easily deceived by unscrupulous
Europeans".	 Harris told him that the Society was
receiving entirely different Information on how
"natives all pver the British Empire are being
r000ed of their 1ands'.
Harris to Lloyd Harrison, 5 Aug. 1912. MSS. Brit. Emp.
3. 22. G. 252.
3. T. Buxton to J. Bright Davies, 15 July 1912. JiS. Brit.
np. 3. 22. G. 252.
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same year, Harris told. F. Lloyd Harrison that the
pol1cr at the Society was exactly the one upon which
the Auxiliary decided ....- 	 Though mutual mistrust
prevailed between London arid Lagos, they managed to
compose their differences by agreeing on a three-point
policy which formed the basis of future agitation.
They wanted no Interference with native tenure.
They maintained that tribal lands must be safeguarded.
Finally, and most important, both believed and preached
the idea that native witnesses must appear before the
Lands Committee, otherwise any decisions arrived at
would rest on a basis entirely 1riuitab1e.2
Thenceforward, the Society brought pressure
to bear on the Colonial Office on the importance of
obtaining native witnesses before formulating any
policy on land. On 6 June 1912 at a deputation to
Harcou.rt the Society had proposed that it endorsed the
views embodied in the radical letter to the T1me "on the
understanding that the steps taken would only apply to
tubal lands and on the vital condition that representative
natives would be heard either locally or in London as
1. Harris to Lloyd Harrison, 5 Aug. 1912 . Cony ibid.
2. Harris to Lloyd Harrison, 1 July 1912. Copy ibid.
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witnesses". 1
 It then sugësted to Digby, the
Chairman o! the Land Committee, that native representation
was a necessity, even volunteering to foot the cost
this would entail if the Colonial governments would
not. 2 Although, as Buxton claimed, Harcourt had earlier
indicated his assent to these proposals "it now
appeared that there were powerful influences at work
against this course". 3 Apart from the inevitable
opposition rrom local officials, the Colonial Cfflce
was already very angry with the Society when on 11 June
of the same year, the oc1ety sent the Colonial Office a
letter it proposed to send to the Auxil1aries.+ Since
this letter tended to prejudge the recoiimendations of
the Committee, which Society claimed might redound
disadaatageously to the natives the Colonial Ofrice
regarded it as tendentious.	 Charles Strachey furiously
minuted:	 "The proposed letter to West Africa &uxi1i.aries
1. Minutes Committee, AS AP, 5 July 1912, Item 2192,
2/13, 3oi. viii
2. buxton to Digby, 27 June 1912, D 1/11.
3. Buxton to Sir. W. N.N. Geary, 2 June 1912, D 1/11.
i. A. APS to CO, 11 June 1912, CO 551+110.
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is most objectionable.	 It is the outcome of ignorance
and peEsirnism ... this society has no influence whatever
except with the press and for them to offer advice
on the subject is ridiculous.	 A moderate official
added:	 ..The letter is ill-informed but well-
meaning." 2 Harcourt agreed with Strachey:	 'I saw
Mr. Harris yesterday; gave him a dressing down and.
told him the letter was mischevious and sllly.L*3
Harris was so worried by the apparent withdrawal
of the promise by Harcourt that he tried to rally
other forces outside the Colonial Office. lie mistakenly
believed that Holt would give support to the idea of
native delegation, and wrote to turn;
1 met Harcourt privately at a later date,
and in a conservation I saw that be was seriously
disturbed about his promise, and It appeared to me
that the permanent officials - or some other
influences - had been at work against natives
coming to this country.	 This Is rather confirmed
by a letter iust received from the Colonial Office,
and therefore unless we can exert private pressure
on tha C.O. authoiities, they will, do this thing
without consulting other than " noiinated' native
witnesses. ULF
1. Nintte of 18 June 1912 by C. Strachey on ibid.
2. Minute of 19 June 1912, (ibid)
3. 11inute of 21 June 191€ by L. Harcourt (ibid.)
+. Harris to bit, 3 Iuly, 1912, 1O/, jap.
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Holt believed that some of the educated natives were
land speculators and was not sympathetic to their
oming to London to give evidence. On + July, Buxton
asked Philip Morrell, one of the signatories to the
letter to the Times and a Liberal Member of Parliament,
to get Harcourt to publicly absolve himselffrom
the report then cuirent that he had withdrawn his
pledge by giving the Committee itself the onus of
decision on the matter. 	 He added that ir this
torecast was finally proved to be correct, it would
'shake confidence in present Colonial Minister1';
and then warnedt	 "It seems to me that he is sowing
to the wind, and he must not be surprised if the
inevitable wairl-wind results.
Although it had. become public knowledge
that Morel himself was bitterly opposed to the idea of
natives coming to Britain to give evidence, Harris
recognised his power and tried to inluence hint to support
the Society's demand.
	 Apart from the equity involved,
Harris felt that it would a lay the fears of the natives
and mollify the disaffection which was already prevalent.
1. Buxton to P. Morrell, 1 July 1912. Cot y , hS. Brit.
&np. S. 2. 0. 252.
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Ac cçdially solicited these points in a long letter
to Morel:
'1No one could more honestly believe In
the principles of protecting tribal lands b
decldring the Crown as trustee, than I do, but
if this is done without giving the natives an
opportunity of expressing their opinions, it is
illiberal and unjust. Apart from equity, such
action will cause widespread unrest and disloyalty
to the Crown.	 There is nothing to lose by three
representatives of each Colony being given the
opportunity of representing the views of the native
corn unity.	 They, like all sections of the community
love to be heard; the chance to express themselves
acts as a safety valve.
	 The natives of West Africa
in Britain are not the type to come before the
Commission - mostly studnts seeking their
education.	 I want the man who is already
educated, artificially ory nature.	 Of course,
no native deputation wou1in the eyes of the
native without a legal man (but it will be only
one from each Colony). 	 I want to see that old
farmer woman from Abeokuta to 1ve the Committee
a good deal of farer kn wled0 e, wh..cri ( a)
don't find in books; Pearse of Lagos who is above
all things a native nercharit; those hard-working
fellows in the cocoa farms of the Gold Coast.
I should	 like P.A. Renner B.L., and 'Lel
ad.viser t to various Gold Coast ConceSsions.-
These ar0urnents mieht have impressed any person with
middJe-of-the-road views on. laud; bu:t to Morel
whose paternalism was vitua11y a religious conviction,
they seemed largely irrelevant.2
1. Hariis to Lorel, July 1912,7.8/Harris EDNP.
2. On 33 Aug. 1912, Harris also tried to gain the
support of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, but
that body was not interested in the question or
native evidence.
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The Society fell back on the Colonial Office.
A letter of 9 July 191'. repeated the arguments in
favour of native witnesses giving evidence either on
the spot or in Britain, emphasising the wish pdrticularly
of the Gold Coast Awuliary to be heard. 1	trachey
once more opposed the sugestion: 	 "This aociety
is very anxious to select our witnesses for us-
a tning they should not be allowed to do, especially
as we know (from native witnesses already exa ined)
that they have very little influence outside Accra.
There is no reason at all .... to show the deSirability
of hearing native witnesses.




It would be to break
The Society then wanted an
interview with Harcourt,3
 but was told that this
would serve no 1iseful purpose.'
1. AS. APS to co. 9 July 1912, CO 55'+/io.
2 Li.nute of 16 July 1912 by Charles Strachey on ibid.
3. Buxton to CD. 15 July 1912 NSS. Brit. Emp. S.19,D6/l.
Buxton to Co. 18 Oct. 1912 ibid., also in i3 Brit.
inp. 3. 2. G. 252.
t. CC& to Harris, 17 July 1912, SS. Bit. Brnp. S..2.G. 25
CO to Harris, 22 Jily 1912 Ibid.
C.i to Buxton,	 Oct. 1912 ibid.
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Perplexed at the attitude of the Colonial
Office and frightened, by tne idea of pleading non
possumus to the Auxiliaries, the ociety then wrote a
detailed statement of its points of view.	 It
informed the Colonial Of.Lice that because of the
serious uneasiness which was entertained by the
natives, as to the intenti na of the Government with
regard to land, the presnt procedure might increase
that tension.	 It pointed out that this misconception
and uneasiness was already so prevalent that the British
Commissioner at Abeokita felt it imperative to make a
public statement asbu.rirlg the	 ba people of the
genuineness of Government's intention in the presence of
the Alake.	 It might n t be possible for the whole
body of the Lands Committee to visit West Africa,
yet the Society felt that some of its members might
do sc.	 One of the chief reasons why the Liquor Traffic
Commiss1n commanded so large a measure of public
confidence, the Society claimed, was that its members
personally vislted tne Colonies; and though the Liquor
Traffic was important, the Land question seemed
"incalculably more important in its bearing on the social
4oi.
ystezn of the native tribes of West uifrica.r	 Criticising
at the same time the official decision to collect local
evidence ttuo ugh the various District Comi issioners
acid other colonial officials, the Society declared:
"The method of ootaining evidence locally
would have been unrestricted in its scope arid
carried out by a Committee of men representative
of all sections of the coununity. 	 Such a procedure
would effectively banish misconception and command
a measure of conficence which would render both
legiElation and administration a much easier or
more acceptable task."1
This argument was powerfal; but Harcourt
was riot yet convinced.
	
He informed the Society
that it is not practicable for the Committee to visit
west africa" since endeavour would be made Uto arrive
at the facts", and, that the Committee would use
whatever means it considered best adapted for the purpose.2
Although the Colonial Office, up to this point, had not
acceded to the Society t S main demand, it was indirectly
influenced by its information,	 At the behest of the
Society, the Colonial Office had sent telegrams to the
higher officials in. the Gold Coast and Nigeria, telling
1. A. .PS to CO, 28 Aug.1912./ iSS. Brit. Emp. S.19.D6/1
2. CD to AS.APS, 10 Sept. 19l. 1iS3. Brit. Eup. S.22.G.2
them to instruct their subordinates to e'cplain to
native witnesses that the Government was anxtôu.s
to prevent natives losing the ri bhts over the land
which they possessed by native law and custom, and
that the ericuiry was to ascertain what that custom
was?
Neither Travers Buxton nor John Harris was
satisfied, with this limited success. They decided.
to undermine the Committee by boycotting it. When
they were called upon to appear before the Committee
they declined; Harris, because he "was not in possession
of any evidence which would justify appearing before the
Committee", although he held "strong opinions on the
subject I ; 2
 and Buxton, because he was "not in a
position to ive personal evidence of any value.U3
Rather than give any evidence which might coinprozise
the Auxiliaries' demands, the Society felt, it caL1ed
upon its Parliamentary Committee to the aparent
inadequacies of the sources from which native testimony
was being drawn1 and threatened the Colonial Office with
1. CO to Buxton, 21+ Sept. 1912 (ibid.)
'. Harris to Batterbee, 25 Sept. 1912.Mo$. Brit. mp.
8.19. D3/7.
3. Buxton to Batterbee, 25 Spet. l9l2,MS.Brit.p, S.19,
+. Buxton to Quarco-Pore, 8 Oct.19l2.NSS.Br1t.np.
S22.G.252, 210.
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Jar1iamentaY qu.eStions on the subject. 1	The
Colonial Office treated this information with amused
scorn:
	
"These people have, I think, put themselves
out of court by refusing to give evidence before the
Committee.	 To speak of 'being refuSed a hearing at the
Colonial Cffice' after declining to give evidence
seem to me scarcely honest. 	 It is impossible to
contifl.ue this interminable correspondence, and. I
would merely acknowledge receipt.	 If the Society proceed
to put questions in Parliament the 5. $. can point out
that Messrs. Buxton and. Flarris were invited to give
vidence, but they declined to do
However, at the beginning of 1913 the official
mind began to change.	 liather than embarrass the Society
by putting questions in Parliament (since its two officials
had boycotted the Committee) members of the Parliamentary
Commjttee strove to achieve an accrnmodation through
private meetiil.gs with. Harcourt. 	 Through the
instrumentality of Sir Til1iam Byles, an active parliamcnta
1. AS APS to	 , Nov. 1912, CO 5ti/1O.
2. 4inute of 8 Nov. 1912 by H.J.R. ibid.
member of the Society, a private interview wS
arranged for Harcourt and Harris.	 Although Harcourt,
at that meeting regretted the tone of the Societyts
letters to his Office, he nevertheless said tnat he
had no reason to complain of its attitude on native
questions and expressed sympathy with its work.1




Harcourt whether he .iou1d consider the reception of a
deputation after the Departmental Committee had
presented its report end before any legislation was
brought forward, to include some natives from West
Africa.	 Harcourt must have assessed the implications
of acceding to this request.	 It w uld imply that he
was a party to the same charge of "pessimism, as
regards the final report, with which the Colonial Office
had taunted the Society. 	 It meant pro1oning the
agitation after the report might have been issued; and
then allowin natives fiom the 1est Coast to stand
between an authoritative report and immediate official
implementation of Its recommendations. 	 Harcourt now agreed
1. Ninutes, sub-Committee, AS AP, 3 Jan. 1913,	 2/13,
Vol. VIII.
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that Africans might appear before tiae Committee.
lie considered that "the object of the Society would
be better served by the attendance before the Committee
of witnesses, either European or native, who may have
information which they desire to impart, rather than by
postponin6
 the expression of their views until the
Committee had issued its report."1	Elated by this
achievement, the Society immediately advised tI
local u.xiliaries to send native witnesses before the
Committee, insisting, however, that the "gentlemen.
chosen for this purpose should represent different
cuLtural intere.ts and possibly someone poSSessi(g 1ea1
knowledge on the question of land tenure."2
The reactions ol' the various Auxiliaries
reflected the pecu]iarities of their localities. 	 The
Gold Coast Auxiliary had recently passed a vote of
coafidence on the London Society but it still felt
uncomfortable with its role in the appointment of
the Latads Cornnu.ttee.
	
Its scepticism of the good
1. Buxton to Qu.arco-Poine, 20 Jan. 1913. NS. Brit. &p.
5. 22. G. 210, 252.
2. Ibid.
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intentions of the parent Society was reinforced by
local propa0 anda. 	 Always pointing at Section 2,
Para.	 of the Auxiliary Constitution which preventd
the Auxiliary from communicating with the local
Government on vital issues, the Gold Coast Aborigines'
Rights Protection Society and the Native Institutions
Conservation Society, impressed the Gold Coast natives
with the impotency of the Auxiliary. 1 Nariy members
of that Auxiliary became disilitisioried with the parent
Society, arid either 3olned the other two vociferous
inovemerts or championed individual causes. 	 Finally on
7 May ]9l3, the GQ. Coast Auxiliary, referring to the
efforts of members of the Forest Deputation, told the
Society that it had. decided not to send its own
delegation since it would "not be advisable or our
a.wci1iary to send another Deputation in a matter where
the first Deputation and the Native authorities themselves
have already delivered, themselves in the light of what
they knew	 This virtually nullified the vote of
confidence already referred to.
-
1. Quarco-Pome to Buxton, 12 Sept. 1912. NSS (Ibid).
2. Quaico-Pome to Buxton, 8 May 1913. (Ibid).
Although. th Sierra Leone Auxiliary showed a
fitful interest in the Lands Committee, 3- it was
ou.thern Nigeria that really witnessed a recrudescence of
discontent over a visit to London.	 According to l.A. ROSS,
the Resident at Oyo and Ibadan, some "of the African
gentlemen were woririg for a free trip to england and
were furious that the evidence would be taken locally."
Apart from the Auxiliary, Ro.s reported that a certain
clique f the People's Union, aided by J.P. Jackson
(wh had coirand of the Union' s funds) took a trip to
Yorubalend. t%where they iisrepresented everything."
They were alleged to have wired Andrew Thomas, a prominent
Ycitha, asking him "to come up and help them througn
Ibadan and Cyo," bj.t he had refused siice he did not
approve of their mission. Many of them refused to gtve
evidence locally despite repeated warnings.2
There can be no doubt that, as always, the land
question gave the local politicians an opportunity to whip
1. The .L. Auxiliary sont a certain lr. Leigh to
represent them at the Lands. Comniitte, but tne
Home Socity told J.. Roberts that tney did not
see this marl.
MbS. Brit. amp. S.-2. G.2 1+5, G. 252.
2. i.A. Ross to 1Lorel, 7 hay 1913, F 9/P-S, EDhPS
'+08.
p emotions in. the uniriforired and to collect funds,
which were diverted to other uses.	 Throu0h the initiative
of Herbert haculay, ho was alleged to be ' s now bent
on exploiting the Itjekris for funds', the Lagos
Auxiliary wrote to the chiefs of the central province
asking that money be donated for the land delegation.
1hen it is realised that each chief was asked to donate
as much as £170, so as to enable the agitators in
addition, as they claimed, to press the Government to
boljsh even sanitary laws, some of which were in reality
made for their own good, it could then be wondered to
what extent unscrupulous tactics could be ised by the
educated to deceive the unwary.	 Dr. 0. Sapera expressed
his dismay to Norel in the letter revealing these facts:
"I am sure that neither the Aborigines'
Parent Committee nor the Commission require anything
but loiterers and neither will they sanction any
movexmnt of exploitation for a few to get oney
to spend by deceiving the illiterate people of
those provinces •,•1
Dr. apara's denançtation of tnis 'movemnt of
exploitation' was a reflection of the plethora of
1. Dr. 0 Sapara to Morel, 29 Nay 1913, F 9/P-3, EDli?.
Dr. Sapara, Cguritola Odunbau (1861-1935). I.S.O.,
L.R.C.P.., L.R.C.. (d.in.), F.R.I.P.H. (Glasgow);
graduate in 1895; a La0osian.
9dissensions which had rent the Lagos Auxiliary1
and which the land a bitation merely promoted.	 Shocked
by this ralaise which had brought the prestige of the
Awciliary to its nadir, Dr. Sapara, wno was specially
antipathetic to Macaulay, wrote do1fu11y in the same
letter to ore1:
1tBesides Mr. Herbert Pearse and Da Rocha,
theres hardly any one in this Auxiliary Society
at prescnt worthy of anything and in the interest
of the good name of the Parent Committee a thorough
investigation ought to be made as to how the funds
were got up; and the Auxiliary be reorgan.ised;
for no one who has a reputation to lose will ally
himself with the Ai..xiliary as it now stands ••ut2
The ab itatlon of some members of the Auxiliary
for a visit to London, their misrepresentation of the true
1. It is not proposed here to go into the details of the
schism within the Lagos Auxiliary. Though Agbebi and
Macaulay did not always a Qree, they seemed to have
found a mutual target in apara 1illiams who had
prooably tried and failed to convert the Auxiliary
into a political forum favourable to himsif.	 Also
having represented the Govt. as prosecutor in certai.r
cases, 'nationalist' factions )ed by hacaulaj and
Aghebi accused him of being 'unpatriotic'.	 The
land question which provi. ded an opportunity for member S
to quarrel over funds necessarily promoted the tendency
towards dissolution.	 Agbebi announced the dissolution
of the Aaxiliary in ept. 1913, but it was reconstituted
by mod,.rate elements in both camps In 1911+.
2. Dr. 0. Sapara to Morel, 29 May 1913, F 9/P-s, JMP.
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intention of the Britisn Government and Morel's ideas,
forced, Iore1 to the donclusion that the native opposition
was not based on genuinely disinterested motives. 	 He
thus wrote to the ditor of the Jeek]. y News;
"The persons who have distorted this recom-
mendation and erected upon it a grotesue edifice of
their own invention are, in the main, persons whpse
interest it is that every African should. be
 a
law unto himself with regard to the land. of his country,
and. that chiefs should for a temporary consideration
be permitted, and encouraged, to barter away th
heritage of their people for generations ....."
This was merely a continuation of Morel's self-defence
against the venomous and persistent attacks and nais-
representations he had suffered at the hands of some
educated natives on the vest Coast.	 A little before,
he had made a stronger defence and restatment of his
beliefs in the form of an open letter to J.S. Davies,
an Assistant Postmaster-General of Freetown, and. a
keen correspondent of his.	 It was a philosophical
and historical reappraisal of the situation in 'Jest
Africa vis-a-vis the current trend of economic imperialism.
According to Morel, certain events had forced
the land question to the front-rank of problems pertaining
1. 1eeklY News, 3 Oct. 1913.
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to West Africa.	 The previous decade had seen an
enormous advance in the activity and in the centralised
character of modern industrial effort and enterprise.
Mechanical invention, concentration and export of
capital, increased facilities of transport, had
revolutionalized the conditions of organized industry.
These had brought the tropics, especially et African
tropics, to the nerve-centres of capital, and in so
doing, they bad placed the tropics within closer reach
of the operations of capitalistic combination. 	 Quick
returns, impatience of delay, competiilon ever keener
and sterner, had become the order of the day.	 The
power of organised capital to influence the policy of
governments and the destinies of peoples, throLigh
personal friendships and party allegiance, were never so
potent and far-reaching.	 These phenomena, Morel claimed,
created a new situation for the inhabitants of the tropical
regions of the globe, and especially West Africa owing
to its proximity to ELcope. 	 **For the first time, West
Africa was brought within the vortex of these immense
fortes of the modern economic world." And since Morel
l3.
believed that the peoples of British protected West
African Colonies were by "themselves powerless to
arrest, to control, to define, or to reglat&' these
irresistible developments, the need for legislation was
therefore more insistent than ever.1
In this crisis, Morel said, the educated West
African had precisely one of three choices to make.
If he chose, he could "stand aside, not troubling to
thin	 too apathetic to interest himself in. anything
which goes beyond his own doorsteps; too conceited to
imagine that he has anything to learn; too afflicted by
jealousy of his neighbour to be capable of common action,
too timid to raise his voice lest he be accused of
pandering to authority.'	 Morel was of the Opinion that
if the educated native chose this course he would rule
himself out of account as a factor to be considered
would
either for good or ill for this/amount to deliberately
choosing the part of the drone.
	
On the other hand,
1. Vide the letter entitled The Future ofthe_PeoDles of
ilest Africa in. Relation to the forces of 	 ropan
Capital	 Industry, with particular reference to the
occupancy and. Enjoyment of the_Land. (London, Aug.
1912) pp. 22 - 3.
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he could allow himself to be bought into acquiescence and
support for a policy whose promoters would cast him
contemptuously aside "like a soiled glove" when he had
served their turn; and he would then be gulled into
opposing, through ingrained suspicion, of "Government", the
very elements in British official and unofficial life
which stood between his race and economic servitude.
Morel told West Africans that if they chose this course,
they would strengthen the hands of those who would reduce
the West African races, not by violence, but by economic
processes,*into land-less serf&; and then alienate and
discourage their true friends.	 A third alternative,
whioh Morel championed, was for the educated native to
rise to the occasion, force himself to loo 1 the position
in the face, and to give outspoken, unstinted and active
encouragement to everi measure and influence which would
tend to check and restrain the forces which sought
to undermine the productive energies of the West African
peoples.	 He believed that by selecting this course,
"The educated native could contribute materially in
securing that the inevitable development of modern.
industrial effort should riot be prosecuted at the expense
of the future liberties, free expansion and progressive
+i 5.
advance of the West African peoples
This powrful letter was circulated throughout
Iest A.frica, bat not before Norel had been. thoroughly
maligned. Even those who had not seenthe letter
imagined that orel advocated oppositepolicies to those
which it contained. For example, even Dr. Obadiah Johnson,
an old friend and correspondent of Morel'shad written
"a long screed" to IIorel, "lull of inaccuracies,
suspicions and absurd assumptions", accusing him of having
given advice to the Impexial Government to deprive the
wnole of West friean peoples of' their lands, and then
citing Norel's open letter to DavieS as proof.2
There can. be no apter proof of the misrepresentations
which seemed to pain )orel greatly.
	
Of this
vilifying slander published against him, the "most
odious remars" were made by the Lagos Standard and
Strachey sympathised witn. huu "very much oer this affair.n
Writing to horel in April, 1913, the Commissioner
of Lands for Southern Nigeria, C.. Alexander, observed
that Morel's "efforts to put land matters on a Sound
1. Ibid. p. 3.
2. Morel to Dr. Henry Strachan, 6 Jan. 1913, F.9/P-S,
3. Strachey to lIorel, 10 Oct. 1913, F.9/P-S,
a 6.
footing" were not greatly appreci ted by the "trousered
tne&' 1
It wo.ild seem th t th.re wcre three main
schools of thought in Lagos on the Land Question.
According to Dr. Stractian, a Government medical official
nd for many years member of the Legislative Council,
there were those who did not want the British
Government to have the alightest powcr in dealing with
the matter of land tenure. 	 ecortdly, there er those
who while admitting the advantage of having an
independent body to settle disputed land questions,
however, had, the usual mistrust, and thouht that
if that body should be the Government, it meant that the
Government would take their land entirely.	 A third
school felt that the Natives sho id have the power,
while due and adequate safeguards should be instituted,
for selling or leasing land for orthy projects to
desirable persons.2
Dr. Strachan confessed his sympathy with the
last school.	 His view was that the Native could never
1. C. I. A1exandr to Lorel, 2 April 1913 . F.9/A..-B, LP
2. Dr. Strachan to Iiorel, 12 Dec. 1713, . 9/P,
4
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itilize the whole of the vast, unused tracts of land u-i
Lagos, not to taLc of the interior. 	 1oreover, he felt
that " hite energy, enterprise and capital, uould change
the area into plantations of cocoa, cotton, corn, coconuts
etc., while giving employment to deserving cerson,
"and advancing the progress of the country." He
thoight that the alienation of an unduly large teritory
could be guarded against and adequata amount of land
preserved for thc use of thc natives without entirly
preventing the establishment of plantations by Europeans..."1
Dr. Strachan's "progressive" views seemed to have
temp ed Morel's idealism, though he never abandoned the
basis of his creed.	 He now saw 'little or no objection
to the lease of land under proper safeguards, and with two
provisos" - nanely, that the lease was not br too long
a period; secondly, that it was not for too large an
area.	 But as to the ef ects of an unrestricted sale of
land either by natives to non-nativs, or between natives
themselves, Morel was too impressive by two exper1nces
to abandon his original premise. 	 He always had in mind
4those evils the regulation of which has cost us such an
1. Dr. tracham to Morel 12 Dec. 1913, F.p/ EDNP.
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ijimense amount of trouble in India and which have borne
so hardly upon the Indian peasant.	 Under such a system,
he said, the land had passed from the hands of the people
into the hands of a restricted number of landlords.
The resuib was that "the independent cultivator sank to
the position of a hired labourer and the health arid vigour
and economic independence of the mass of the people were
irremediably compronn..sed.
But it was the British experience which was rost
telling.	 orel described the situation to Dr. trachan:
"By processçs covering centuries of
operation the small yeoman farmer has practically
dsap eared froni English soil, and today all the three
political parties Ln the State are devising remedies
to cope with the situation which has thus arisen.
'Back to the Land 1 has indeed become one of the
battle rtes of all the political parties; they all
have their diffei ant rostrums to deal with it; but
they all admit that the evil is a pressing one which
must be tackled.'12
horel then pointed out that in Lagos Colony, according
to the informatior he had received, it was becoming
obvious that with few exceptions, the cocoa plantations
were not run by cultivators in their own right but by
1. Morel to Dr. trachan, 6 Jan. 1913, Co y F 9/P-.DMP.
2. Ibid.
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labourers working for native landlords.	 Iith this
discovery, he associated these African landlords
with those who did not want the British Governmeht to
have the slightest power in dealing 'with land tenure
since they wished to foster their own interest aS against
those of the mass.	 He pointed out the danger in the
same letter to Dr. Strachan:
"if they had their way, why the whole
land or the country woild pass into alien hands,
o1 into the hands of a few rich men without any
difficulty; and the native would be reduced to a
landless labourer working for a wage .... It would
mean the entire collapse of native pQlity, and the
shutting down of the native horizon for good and a11..
As Morel was writing to Strachan, the Nierian
land delegation waS getting prepared for the journey to
]3ritain.	 On. 31 May 1913, a group of thirteen Nigerians,2
1. Ibid.
2. The delegation was intended to include the following
though some of them did not ultimately travel:
Shobogun Lisa Kesi and Adegboyeya Edun for Abeokuta
Sanusi kerin Xor Ibadan; Chief Pisawe and Charles
Turton for Ilesha; Fasha and Agbonlefa for Ijebu-ode;
Princes Bassey Duke Ephraii1 IX and James iyo It for
Calabar; Chief Frederick Sunday Jaja for Opobo;
Chief Herbert Jumbo and Chief Walter Banigo for Bonny;
Chief Charles Inko Goodhead for New Calabar.
There were others from Brass y
 Oyo, Ife and Lagos.
See Buxton to Batterbee, l+ kLpril 1913, NSS. Brit.
mp. 5.22. 0. 252.
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clad, in vivid multi-coloured robes, turbans and fez caps,
arrived at Southampton by the liner E1eano' i1oeriron
They had come to give evidence before the Lands Committee.2
According to the
	 ly News and Leader, they were "very
quiet, digrified and courteous, but not inclined to talk",
while &degboyega .Edu.n, Secretary to the gba United
Government was "a man of fine culture, has a presence
and bearing which is superior, though friendly enough,
nd an enunciation possessed. by not too maiy Londoriers."3
Since Morel was against the whole idea of the Africans
coming to give evidence in Britain, particularly as the
impression was given that the delegation was led by his
old enemy and "most dangerous ian1t, Adegboyega Edun,
the African ail tried es much as possible to damage the
delegation in the British eyes; a state of affairs
against which Harris and Buxton complained to Batterbee,
Ifthe Secretary of the Lands Committee.
It must be pointed out, however, that Morel's
1. Daily Chronicle, 31 May 1913.
2. African World, 5 July 1913.
3. Dailv News and Leader, 31 May 1913.
f. Harris and. Buxton to Batterbee, 2 June 1913, MSS. Brit.
amp . 5. 22,	 G. 252.
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campaigns against Edun, ia particular, were not
unjustified.	 It was Edun who had. engineered much of
the iiisrepresentation of Lorel's views to Southern
Nigerians.	 He had circulated a letter alleging that
the Britis-i Government wanted to take away native land,
and that Morel waS in the v'ai. of this movement.	 Since
Morel was already in the aommittee and, would not be
e±pected to air his views Openly on these questions, he
had quicLly appealed to Harcourt to help him dismiss
Eduns strategezn. He did. this in an almost teaTful
note to Harcourt:
"I now take the liberty of sending you
heruwith copy of a letter 'by LA. Edun, Secretary
to the Alake of Abeokuta, which has been arid is
bein6 extensively circulated in al.. the native news-
papers in British West Africa.	 This letter is
substantially to the effect that the suggestion of
transferring the ownership of land from the Native
Communities to the Crown arid of dispossessing the
Natives of their land, was made to you by me, either
in my personal capacity or as a member of the Jest
African Lands Committce.
am necessarily precluded from dealing
with the specific personal charge at present and
I may be so precluded. for some time to come.	 Its
persistence, meantime places me In a somewhat
Invidious position and is calculated to throw
doubts upon my impartiality as a member of the West
African Lands Committee.
"No one knows better than yourself how
wholly devoid of the very shadow Of foundation is
this charge, and a simple word from you would be
1122
enough to dispose of it."1
Harcourt was understandably surprised thst Morel's
position had been misunderstood and misrepresented
through the "misplaced ingenuity" of his critics, and
found it 'difficult to believe that anyone familiar
with your record of work in defence of Native Rights
could entertain for a moment the notion that such a
suggestion could have come from you! 2	dun, however,
thought otherwise. 	 He was still convinced that Morel
was the fons et orl go of the land question.	 He
opined:	 "There was no land question in Southern
Nigeria until he created one; and the 'widespread
misapprehension' he complains of is but a ripple of the
agitation he has set in motion."3
1. iore1 to L. Harcourt, O Oct. 1913, CQPY F 9/-L,EDllP.
i1rcourt, Lewis, 1st Viscount Harcourt (1863-1922),
politician, Son of Sir. Win. Harcourt the statesman;
Private Sec. to father, 1881-6; 189-5, 1895-190'I;
Liberal N.?., Rossendale div. of Lar&cshire, 1901F_16;
helped to found Free Traid Union; 1st Commissioner
of works, 1905-10; With Viscount sher founded
London useum 1911;	 Sec. of State for Colonies,.
1910-15; neturned to office of 1orks, 1915-16;
Viscoint 1917.
2. Harcourt to Morel, 22 Oct. 1913, i 9 /EDMP.
3. A. dun to the ditor of he African World,	 Oct. 1913.
1f23.
This personal factor apart, two other
reasons accounted for Morelts continued hostility to
the Delegation.	 Th...re waS ample evidence from Lagos
that many natives there saw the idea of delegation
to Iondori as useless if not a huge holiday. 	 The
rian Chronicle felt it was no use going to Britain
to corroborate evidence which was already overwhelming;
and in any case, it was not too much worried since the
delegation did not represent Lagos. 1 Moreover, when
they arrived in Britain, the delegates gave the
impression that they had come to protest against some
wrong rather than to give evidence before a fact-finding
Commission.	 Although John Harris would not share this
view, abundant evid.nce denonstrates this attitude.
Almost every paper which reported the visit gave the
view, undenied by the dele 0ates, that Edt.in had led a
protest movement to London.2
But Morel had prepared the minds of the
British public for such an eventuality. From the
-	 expresed. views of his opponents befoie they arrived, he
1. See . f. to the Ni g erian Chronicle criticism in African
}all of 23 Lay 1913.
2. The A.I . € 5 July 1913 in order to prove this quotes
extracts from almost all the newspapers which had
interviewed dun.
knew wtiat to expect when they arrived. 	 He had,
therefore, forestalled dun and, his company tiith a
shattering editorial in the African Mail:
"The idea has been sedulously propagated
that the appointment of the Committee was a preliminary
step to the apropriation of all the land of West
Africa by the Crown, a course falsely stated to have
been recommended by certain members of the Committee.
orne genuine alarm has been occasioned, and some of
the attacks upon the Committee hwe been undouotedly
due to honest cre ulity and ingrained suspicion.
But j.t is difficult to resist the belief that
influences of another kind, and with quite other
ends in view, have been at work. 	 It is a matter
of common knowledge that the break-up of the old.
family and communal system of tenure in the
territories now known as Lagos Colony, has enabled
individual native interests to acquire land at the
expense of the native community in general, and
that a small but active atd noisy group oj natives
who have profitted. by these transactions have been
working for sometime to carry this disintegrating
influence to the great centres of the Western
Province.	 Any co nceivable action of the British
Gov'ernnaerit calculated to arrest this proces would,
naturally be resented by this group, and, no doubt
they and their friends in the Gold Coast, with
similar fish to fry, hope to paralyse such action-
assuming it to be in contempltioA - by appeals to
prejudice and passion
The misguided publicity engineered by dun
notwithstanding, the Dele Q atlon behaved with dinity
while in Britain.	 They gave their evidence before the
Committee.	 They received grcat hospitality from the anti-
1avery and Aborigine's Protection Society wmich prior to
1. - African MaU, 10 Jan. 1913. On 3 Oct.1913, the A.M.
a11ege that dun, like others, were involved In land
transactLons, having leased lands to foreigners on
behalf of the .U.G. in a manner that wasquestionable.
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t cieir arrival had arranged luncheons and educational
visits for them. 1 After visiting such industrial
centres as Birmingham, Sheffield and. Liverpool under
the char;e of John Harris, they sailed for Lagos
on 2 Jily 1913.2
The importance of the native agitation and.
delegation may be indicated only in passing here.
Apart from the assurances ol' good intentions they received
from the British Government, the idea of a delegation,
to be repeated in 1920 and. in 191+7, served to engander
national consciousness. 3 Just as the 1913 delegation
had. drawn representation from far arid wide in southern
Nigeria, that of 1920 was to draw from the whole of
West Africa.
	
The l9+7 delegation also drew representation
from all parts of Nigeria.	 Like the later delegation,
however, the internal recriminations which preceded and
followed that of 1913 were symptomatic of the mutual loss
of confidence in the financial administration of the
1. Ninutes, sub-committee, A APS, 2 Iay 1913 item 319,
2/13, Vol. VIII
2. Minutes, sub-comittee, A3 AP3, 1+ July 1913, item 231+14.
(ibid.)
3. The NCB	 sent a delegation in 1920 , and the NCC in
191+7.
+2 6.
hovement which sponsored it, The unsavoary diatribes
between that idiosyncratic figure, Dr5 Mojola Agbebi, and
the huge policital "wizard of Kirston Hall' t , Herbert
Macaulay, whose private and public image was by no meaas
unqu.estionable, ultimately generated a schism which led
to the dissolution of the Lagos Auxiliary until it was
salvaged again.	 The exampie of unscrupulous ixils-
representation to the illiterate masses by selfish and
elitist agitators in a bid to collect money which was
later never accounted for, serves much to off-set their
claim as defenders of native Society.	 The educational
benefits to the delegation notwithstanding (or even
because of it), the wriole visit seemed to be what tile
erin Chronicle concluded, a big holiday".
From txie Minutes of Evidence and the Report of
the West African Lands Committee, it would appear that
many of the views of Morel and his friends were upheld
by most of the witnesses and the Committee itself.
During the proceedings, Morel had tried to establish his case
for the nece....sity for ultimate protecti,ve control by the
Government of the land. 1 although witnesses like Caseley
1. 1iinutes of vidence; African. (1est) No. lO'-7: lwrel -
Belfield Q. 133; Morel - J.J. Thornburn, Q. 1620; 1832.
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rlayford stubbornly denied ttiis necessity (to the extent
that the Chairman, concluded that no amount of cross-
examination would convince him, "whatever the right or
wrong of his case might be") 1
 Many others confirmed
that there were grounds for
	 fears and that some
of his projects were practicable. A.G. Boyle, the
Colonial Secretary of &uthern Nigeria, told the
Committee that 'a large number of educated natives0
speculated "in land values to the detriment of the more
uneducated natives." 2
 He also pointed out that in
Abeokuta there waS objection to legislation 'because
several of the leading members would wish to have
individual tenure arld"not due to the noti.ve of desiring
in their
to have greater security of tenure/farina", but for
speculative ends.3	 To Ilorel t s Conservative idea of
using the Alafin to establish the basis of a Land Act for
Yonibaland, Boyle did not think it would be terribly
difficult to get the Yxuba chiefs (with the influence of
the Alafin) to admit this necessity, but warned that
1. African (Jest) No. 10 1+7. Digby - C. Hayford. Q . 859.
2. vidence No. 101+7:	 Morel - oyle.	 Q. 2078.
3. evidence No. 101+7: Boyle: Q. 2232-3.
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there are a certain number of people who, on accouiit
of their selfish ends would not like it, and, would do
their u,trnost not to have it.'	 He was referring to the
school of educated natives who wanted rio interference with
the then land. situation.
The observations and recommendations of the
Committee also virtually supported almost everything
the pressure-groups had been agitating for, basing these
conclusions mainly on the evidence before them. 	 Except
in some parts of Gambia and Sierra Leone (where English
law existed), it concluded that natives should have
the benefits of native laws and custonis. 2 Secondly,
it established some leading characteristics of Native
customs on land. Thus the loose talk that there was
land without owners was discredited by the Committee,
after citing the evidence of some witnesses, as out of
place with native custom and contrary to all native
1. Evidence No. 10 1+7:
	 Morel - Boyle:	 . 2251-3;
. 2256.
2. Report: African (Iest) No. 10 1+6;	 Part Ii, Para. 87.
(But they recommended a system of land.
registration).
If 29.
ideas. 1 Very important also was the emphasis which
the Committee laid on the relationship between Nat.ve
Customary tenure and Native policy, which Morel had
s own was the indispensable ground-work of British rule.
The Coflimittee concluded that native polity and social
economy were inseparably connected wIth the preservation
of native tenure.	 In this respect the Committee took
cognisarice of those processes through which the native
polity could be undermined.
	
Thus the native society
would be disorganised either when the native authorities
were deprived of their powecs b the Government or when
native authorities ceased to use their powers as guardians
of the coxnr'iunity's interests and arrogated to themselves
a right of dealing with uriallotted land for their own
pecuniary benefit. 	 Moreover, the Committee added that
1. Report; No. 1046: Part II, Para. 92.
This was aupported by the evidence of R.E. Dennett:
Q. 10,937 in African (West) No. 1047; Cnris JohnSonin African (West) No. 1043 P. 218; the chief of
Ijebu-Od.e who had said: " j conceive that land belongs
to a vast family of whicli. many are dead, few are
living, and countless nembers are yet unbornU
l0 1+6; Pt. II Para. 91); Robertson 2292; Partridge
4,145; I'vine 4,537; alexander, 5031; James
6805; Crowther, 9932A; 10 ,135, Deniett 10,967;
10946 in African (1est) No. 1047.
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then me bers of the community ceased to recognise
the inter-connecte ties of social custom and political
allegiance and arrogated to themselves the right of
disposing of the land they occupied regardless of
1
these ties, the native polity became inoperative.
Almost evcry witness ho was conversant with.
the land question held the same view that the land
was closely connected with tranitional Iative Rule.
C.W. Alex"nder, the Commissioner of Lands for Southern
Nigeria dec1ared	 "Native rule depends upon the land
systen.	 They must statid or fall tdgether.	 If
it is the policy of the Government to Govarn natives
through themselves, subject to uropean supervision,
retaining what is isful in. their institutions, th
native system of land t3nure must be preserved at any
cost." 2 R.. Dennett said that "there is no doubt
that the two things go together," and James, Acting
Govenor of Lagos, areed with all these views.
$trangely enongh, Fuller, Chief Coinissioner of lands in
1. Report: No. 10 1+6: Para. 101, p . 33.
2. Report: No. 101+6: Para. 101; Alexander Q . 363 in.
frican (West) No. 101+7.
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shanti was also of the opinion that it was not
advisable to interfere with native custom.1
In. extolling the virtues of the traditional
structure, howevr, the Committee did not divorce
itself fro the present reality.	 Its study and
recommendations on individual ownership were, thcrefore,
some of the most importart aspects of the Report.
It was not really discovered at what exact time true
sales of stool and La ily land began to tate place
in Test Africa nor was this absolutely necessary.
from
Apart/the evidoncs of land bought by the Siera Leone
Company in 1787, it appears fro, the evidence taken
by the Sciect Committee on 'Tie Lst Coast of Africa"
in 18 1+2 that sales of land to 1ropeans in. the Colony
of Sierra Leone wcre already taking place before l8^2.
Also in a report by Crowthr, Secretary of Native
Affairs in the Gold Coast, it app..ared that between 186O
nd 1870 certain Gold Coast Chiefs had. started se11jn
1. African (.1est) No. 101+7' Dennett, 11,121+; James
67C6 and 6789; Fuller 47 87.	 See also Irvine
1+357; J.C. Maxwell 15,1+1+7, Paras. 21 and 22 of
memo. No. lO Li.8, P, 15; John Maxwell Q. 2 African
(dest) rio. io1+3, P. 17; J. Philips s. 2 and 3 in
African (dest) No. ic'+a, P. 18.
land. in the Densu Valley to Individuals, thouh their
ri 6ht to do so was disputed.	 There wre also a series
of cases corninenein0 in the early l870's, which showed
that the Judicial Assessor sanctioned the practice of
sales, ho1din that t'-ie chief or head of the family
could sell the stool or falliuly land provided the consent
ol' the requisite parties was obtained, ttiou;h in the case
of family land Hensah arbah added that 'the alienation
must be for the bnefit of the family, either t
discharge a family obligation or the roceeds of such
alienation mu.st be added. to the family fund.'	 This
practice of selling lands seamed to have been transferred
to Lagos through the agency of the educated natives
acquainted with uropean ideas, and, from the Gold Coast
and Sierra Leone epericnce.2
The Committee, therefore, recognised "that
conditions n sone of ,irban districts itiin the
deendencieS of the 1est Coast have become so changed
by contact with uropean and uropanized natives, that
customary tenure has been to a lar0 e extent superseded by a
1. Lnsah Sarbah, Faiti C 'stoaz La (1897) P. 171+.
2. African (dest) No. i&+6. Pt. III, Para. 33.
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form with striking esemb1ances. to ng1ish land tenure,
a form which we have called individual tenure. We
consider that it is n longer possible to revert to
the old, system in such arcas and therefore propose
that there should be power in each dependency to declare
any district.1 subjet to these conditions / to be an
excrnpted district wheit facilities would be given for the
creation within of a land tenure on english lines."
For the rest of the bulk o the West African Dependencies,
the Committee proposed that "the rules of native
customary tenure with thoir prohibition of sale and
mortgage shall continue in force within certain
safeguards.lIl
2
With the exception of dun of Nigeria, and
the Gold Coast delegation, every other witness had
opposed the idea of buying and selling of land.
memorandum from Rev. A.J. 1i1kie of the United Free
Church of Scotland working at Calabar had warned that any
1. Ifrican (West) No. 101+6, Pt. III, Para. 323.
2. ,&Iun, A. 13,123 in No. 101+7 depreciated sale of land
to non-,bas, but declared 'that the selling of land
was an established custom, and had been in existence
for 50 years or more.	 The Committee could, not
accept his view.
1,31f
c.iange contemplated with reference to EfIk land
"should be on truly native lines of comr.unal rather
than individual ownership of larid.
	
The Representative
of the 0n.i of Ife thought tnat it was bad for any
member of the community to sell lands to anothr
member of the corrirnuriity; and when. aked the reason
why, he said:
	
"The ground is sacred to the Ifes.
1e conic from the ground and we have to go back o the
ground, and it Is altogether out of place br anot1e
to think of selling the grou.rid.' 2	 A certain Akinsan,
a clerk in. the Government service in Lagos deprecated the
idea of selling land since, as he said, it had a bad
effect on native institutions, and "if it goes on we
might find ourselvs servants in our own countiy instead
of landowners, all lands passing into the nands of
strangers.' 3 	In a personal memorandum, Ion. C.A. Sapara
h1liams, who was not blinded by bourgeois prejudice,
opposed the extcnsion of the system of sale of land:
"I am sure the natives would not like the system of sale
1. A. I. 1ilkie, in African (West) No. 10 1+8, P. 196
2. Asho Eremese, 131+73-1+, African (eJest) No. 101+7.
African (Iest) No. 101+8, P. 21+1.
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extended, he said, I*and I snow that they do appreciate
the Thct that it would adversely affect their iristitutions
Apart from the natives from the Gold Coast,
Crowthr, th ecrctary for Native1 Affairs, also made a
special case providin0 for the difftret localities
there.	 He declared:	 1'The suDstltu.tion of ungoverned
individualism for the communal system in the rural
districts ri my opinion is the signal for poverty and
social disaster for the majority. 	 But it Is equally
clear that the conrnunal system in its simplicity is
inadequate for the needs of the changed and chancing
economic conditions •... The present conditions demand a
greater degree of protection for the rights of the
occupier than can be found in the edsting native custom,
and a greater degree of security for the coni.nunal
character of the land than is offered by existing
legislation ••,,,2	 Against this temperate view, Sir W.
Brandford Griffith, arid Robertson, the Chief Assistant
Colonial Secretary, favoured unrestrained individual
tenure. 3
	The Coiinittee rejected this opinio , as it said,
1. Ibid.	 '. 21+1+.	 -
2. African (We.t) No. 101+6, Para. 311+; Crowther 10,126 In
African (jest) No. 101+7.
3. Griffith, 11+193; Robertson 289, in No. 101+7.
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because such a tenure was alien to native custo'n and
was likely to subvert tue principle of native government
and lead to poverty and social disaster for the
majority.	 I upheld the view expressed by Crowther
when it declared in terms reminiscent of his memorandum:
9 i1e, therefore, consider that, wulist in towns where
commrcialisni has tacen root it is too late to abolish
individual tenure; in the country districts throughout
the whole of the Dependencies ith which we are called
upon to deal, legislation shou.ld have as its aim the
checking of tne progress of individual tenure and the
strengthening of native custom."1
It would seem, therefore, that, though
basically a compromise between two extremes, the Report
of the Lands Committee to a great exLnt justified
the fears entertained by Norel and other land reformers.
An important factor In their advocacy had been an
establishment of a legislative basis for any future
a0itation just as the Berlin Act had been a basis for
humanitarian Intrverition In the affairs of the Congo.
A direct result of th Committee's recommendations was the
1. African (cst) No. iO6, para. 315.
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L nd. and Native Rights Ordiiance (1916) of Northern
t\igeria which, like that of 1910, provided that no
title in Land should be v1id without the consent of the
Governor.	 This provision has met with great criticism
on. the alleged ground that even the native was not secure
in his tenure because the new Ordinance enabled the
Governor to alienate at pleasure. 1 The phraseolDg
might indeed be stretched to bear that interpretation,
but that woald imply a drastic reversal of policy which
was quite improbable. 2 Certainly, the sale of lands
continued after this protracted de1ac1e, but later reports
indicated that legislation against the practice of
alienation tended to minimise the transaction and so reduced
their social and political effects.3
1. See,	 Geary, Nigeria Under British Rule, P. 226.
For Geary's article opposing the setting up on the
'est 4frican Lands Committee see West inster Gazette,
8 Aug. 1912.
	
But the Colonial Office view was that
"air 1. Geary's opinions are not always orth much"
irrnte of Sep13. 1913 by Sir G.V. Fiddes on .S.
CouLson to CO 2 sept 1913, O 267/555.
2. I.P. air, Native Policies in Africa (Lo ndon,1936) P. 13
3. e.g. A 1931 report on Abeokuta said tnat sale of land
for debts was still in operation, but that it had been
checked by the law a 0 ain.st such transactions,
i38.
As will be seen in the next chapter, there
Some
were/genuine grounds why the "Ooast' elite doubted the
bona fides of the British authorities in land matters.
The economic importance of such products as timber,
cotton, palm oil and kernel and rubber tempted the
Britih Governirent and other parties into measures which,
however well-meaning, were seen, in the eyes of Africans
and British h manitarians as uridcrmining the ideal of
imperial trnsteeship.	 But inspite of this common
ground for suspicion, thcre e1isted diffarnces of
emphasis on the particLiar problems posed by land
alienation in each Colony. 	 For example, the
land. question in the Gold. Coast, seen against the
background of the mining scramble and the happy native
paiticipation in. it, was obviously of a different order
from the probl in Lagos, where it would seem that the
Government itself was the QhieI' villian.
	
Fence it
could be arued that thre was a much more tenable ground
for suspici n of Goveriment motives in Laos than there
was in the Gold Coast. horeover, (though probab.y all were
exaggeraed by ressue-Q roups) it would also appear that
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he threat of land alienation to urQpeans, to African
strangers, nd the consequent development of individual
oiinership, was more ininnt in the Gold Coast than in
LaQos.	 On the whole, the educated African involvement
in individual tenure should be seen as tiot only a
natnal development but also as an economic reflex of
those curious political and religious ideas of independence
which had become current from the 1850's.
	
Yet this
independence was not merely SOU bht from the official
colonial struct.re, but also from chifly powr. 	 The
cas for a freehold Africa n yeomanry with individual tenure
as presented by Adegboyega dun, was sur..ly an anti-
Indirect	 le concept, b t One whici might be expected
to have a liberal appeal.
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CHAPT VI.
ECONOMIC EXPlOITATION AND A1IOAT WELFARE.
The protracted arguments over the West African
Land Question might have largely belonged to the realm of
academic theory were it not that the problem of land-use
itself was an integral part of it. The problem of native
welfare incident on the issue of sub-soil exploitation of
West African lands had compelled the humanitarians to insist
on African workers being well treated and adequately remun-
erated f or their labours. At the same time, however, all
seemed to have agreed that European capital alone could
work and develop the mines. In contrast, the exploitation
of arboricultural and sylvan produce was a contentious
q.uestion, generating imilsive reactions to some we 11 .-
meaning official pOlicy, exposing the opportunism of an
Imperial agency, and laying bare the efforts of the Colonial
Office and the lnimanitarians to maintain the Ideal of imperial
duty which was severely threatened by the unscrupulous
activities and arguments of commercial firms and materialist
individuals.
As indicated in the previous chapter, Morel had
admitted that European capital and machinery were also
441.
necessary to exploit the tinber and possibly rubber resources
t ime
of West Africa; but he at the same/felt that Government
guid.ance was necessary if the prosperity of the forest
industry was to be nintained. Ori the otbaz band, the
e:fforts of the Governments of the West African Colonies,
especially these of Southern Nigeria, lagos and the Gold
Coast to regulate forest produce, were not appreciated by
other humanitarians, particularly John Eolt arid the Aborigines
1Protection Society. The proolantion of 11 December 1901
by Sir Haiph Moor, followed by that ci' Sir William TcGregor
of I1agos 2
 regulating the cutting of timber and forest
produce, found Joiln Holt g rvmbling and the APS protesting
against tile measares.
Holt's criticisms stemmed from mans grounds.
Uppermost was Ins fear of loss in his trede of which timber
and rubber were important iten. He had zrastered the art
1. No. 28 of 1901, 00 588/1 which came into force in 11 Dec.
1901 aimed at conserving timber, rubber and other forest
produce. It gave the High Comm. the power "to constitute
forest reserves, to prohibit by order the cutting and
collecting, sale, purchase, and export of any forest
produce except by concessionaires and licenses, and. t
specified periods of the year". Chiefs whose areas were
affected received royalties, "subject to an understanding
to spend rt of this sum in establishing arid nintain2rig
rubber nurseries as directed by the forestry officers".
2. No. 14 of 1902.
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of dealing directly with the natives and therefore felt
that official intervention might well spell the doom of
his commercial prosperity. lie personal involvement can
easily be illustrated from the fact that he was most critical
of the colonial authorities when their measures threatened
his commercial sphere of influence. He bitterly criticised
:Moor and IvoGregor in Southern Nigeria, which was his nin
zone of operation, but when the same measures were later
attempted in the Gold Coast and with more dynamic native
opposition than was shown in Southern Nigeria, Holt d1i
not follow up his criticism with the same zeal. One can
only agree with him, as be told brel, That the reason for
this was because be had no economic interest on the Gold
Coast. :1.	
J
Despite this personal involvement, however, Holt
also ustff led his opposition to the forest measures with
humanitarian considerations. He accused both Moor and.
JcGregor of pursuing forestry policies dlreotto dispossessi
natives of their rights. He complained against the usurpation
of African rights by Moor's Government: "He has in that
Or1inance assumed rights which dispossess the natives of
ownership and make the government a leaseholder. Nothing
1. Holt to Morel, 3 Feb. 1910, P8/4, EDJP.
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can be more retrogressive than such, a policy •.... .] it
the same time, be was worried with the measures adopted
by MacGregor because he felt -tha-t
	 ultimate effect might
be to rob the native of his rights:
"It may be -that our Government is going to rob the
native of his rights in Nigeria by legal chicanery,just as Leopold has robbed them in the Congo, and
this may account for their weakness in upholding our
rights under the Berlin Act. They rry all be thieves.
Certainly the poor have no protector in Government's
West Africa. The voice of reason and rights is not
listened to because of those interested in upholding
wrong, which, of course, they must find words tojustify. Such, however, has always been the case,
and. I suppose il1 ever be. Selfishness is eternal
on earth ...".
He supported. this a rgument in favour of native
rights by pointing out that it was the desire for revenue,
more than anthizig else, which caused these Ordinances and.
financial regulations on forests to be passed. He ruefully
alleged that Moor's Government would "bag the rents, the
claim to the land being set up by the psa of purchase
from the 1iger Comriy ..." Bolt continued, in the same
letter -to &rel:
"... The half of the fine given to thenatives isa
sop to prevent trouble and so represents what the
native will be quite happy to accept as full value
not knowing what -the Government is doing. It Is
1. Bolt to Morel, 21 Oct. 1901, P8/1, EDIP.
2. Bolt to Morel, 22 May 1902, P8/2, EDIP.
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all far more money that Moor is work:lng".1
The admiziistxtion of the rents and fines by MacGregor's
Government was also dubious to Rolt: "WI-th the exception
of half of the fine on entry, given to the natives, the
government is, I believe, pocketing the whole of the annual
rent which it imposes".2 As always, Holt never reconciled
himself with the government's need for more revenue. He
wrote sourly to Morel: "These governors think only of one
thing, that is how to produce revenue; when they have got
revenue they think they have fulfilled the object of their
existence ...", And if he was overcome by the plea for
necessary revenue, Holt complained that the money was being
collected by officials and the native chiefs jointly in the
Lagos hinterland, and that it appeared there was no proper
audit or supevision. He believed that "such a system mast
open great temptations to abuses being brought about
Holt, however, 1new that trade and imports were generally
in decline. Therefore, be was too sentimentally atiched
to his personal fortunes and to his ingri.ned free trede
1. Holt to Morel, 29 June 1900, P8/i, EDLI?.
2. }Iolt to Morel, 1 Feb. 1902, P8/2, EDMF.
3. Holt to Morel, 23 April 1902, F8/2, DMP.
4. Hoit to Morel, 18 June 1901, P6/i, EDtP.
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ideas to realise that a government which lacked financial
resources would be incapable of even protecting life and.
property for which he cared so much.
bit, was, however, guided by other considerations,
in pa rt icula r, the e co no niio a rgurne nt. He was of the op in ion
that these Ordinances prevented the development of the
country's resources and, hampered trade. In September 1900,
he had warned the Colonial Office against the deterrent
effect on trade likely to result from Moor's proclan:iation:
"The truth is that this proolant ion as it stands must
be deterrent to all enterprise in this direction.
Picture to yourself a huge forest covering thousands
of square miles of land unutilised and. say whether
something should not be done to induce capital and
enterprise to enter than land and 2Take something of
its products hitherto rotting. If the whole of that
forest were cut down today in 20 years there would be
another forest equally large and valuable .. .".
He believed that the Forest Ordinance of Lagos was "pernic-
iously" brought about "in iir&itatinn of Moor's stupidity in
1. bolt to CO 21 Sept. 1900, 00 520/6.
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Lower Nigeria, probably at the initiative of Hitchen? who
may 1now a lot about forestry but nothing about as commercial
use". 2
 The commercial disadvantages to these forest regul-
ations were also emphasised in the same letter to Morel:
"There is a country giving a natural supply - without
man s aid. - of these valuable commodities which
constitute the trade of the country. Every inducement
shotild. be given to explore the new products laying unused
and wasted so far as man is concerned, since the creations..
Thank God they have riot yet regulated the use of the Palm
Tree or they might have killed the Trade which after all
is our backbone. T.e no sooner discover bow to work a
new thing and. to get a market for it than down comes Our
intelligent Government to find out bow to hamper, harass
and. stop our eneies. They, of oourse, are on the look
out for our berths for their tribe and. more revenue on
the old style ...".3
Holt at the same time felt that one effect of the conditions
imposed on the "wood trade" was that people who needed timber
-
1. P. Hitchens was a Eurasian Forestry Officer in Southern
Nigeria. It must be noted that the Colonial Office vary
much doubted Hi-tebens' abilities.	 hen Hitohens requested
permission to give an address on forestry to the Liverpool
Geographical Society and Chamber of Commerce, Charles
Strachey minuted: "This as the author of the statements
to which Sir W. Tbrastleton Dyer took strong exception in
a private letter to the Commercial Intelligence Dept. It
made the Director so angry that he thought it must be the
work of an ignorant, pushing black man - - Mr. H. is no
doubt a valuable forestry officer, but it is possible tbat
his botanical knowledge is not profound - Some of his
statements contained in his report (as reported in the
Lagos Standard) are open to very considerable doubt".
Minute of b Dc. 1900 by Charles Strachey on P. Hitchens
to CO, 19 Nov. 1900, 00 520/6.
2. olt to LIorel, 14 Oct. 1901, P8/i, EDI1IP
3. Ibid.
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would procure it :from other territories governed, as he
alleged, by "more intelligent and enterprising people".1
Since the men who in Nigeria formulated "these eternal
ordinances" had. not the haziest ideas of what was good for
the country they governed, Holt would say, they deserved to
be beaten by the adjoining governments which bad more
governing sense. And he was particularly Sore With the
notion that the authors of "all the mischief" were "well paid"
and. earned "much honour whilst their victims have to stand
all the mLsery".2 Ho was very surprised that oGregor
"could be capable of such a retrograde step" 3 as passing
"this abominable forst ordinance" which "is going to be
the means of shutting up the forest for all time if we do
not mind. . . ." .	 wiien his agents at Oxritsha wrote to ham
complaining of the effects of the Porest Ordinances on trade,
Holt believed that these laws "irritated everybody". 5 He
alleged that the Government only wanted "to make a show and
so stop the trade of the country". He grumbled that "the
1. Hotto Morel, 14 Oct. 1901, P8/i, EDL2.
2. Ibid.
3. bit to Morel, 5 Jan. 1902, P8/2, EDI1P.
4. bolt to Morel, 22 April 1902, P8/2, DP.
5. bolt to Morel, 19 Oct. 1905, P8/2, EDMP.
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natives who had been taught after irneb patience how to find
rtll)ber were being successfully encouraged to gather it by
the traders when all o:f	 sudden down oan these soldiers
with their laws and licenses and. all chaos". He lamented
that the people concerned n working the commercial interests
of the country were not consulted as Chamberlain kad romised
"before these revolutionary Ordinances are passed which may
spell ruin to their entire Interest and to the whole o:f the
native community" •1
T1s Holt regarded all the attempts made by the
colonial governments to regulate forest produce as negatve.
He had no ooxifidence In the staff of the Forestry Department
and their ideas. He looked on botanical gardens, used for
experimental purposes, "more as luxuries than necessities
or as not being of any economic value". 2 He wanted to see
in West Mriea "a few practical level headed botanists who
would txvel the districts allotted to them, use their eyes
and exercise their minds not in writing and. forrm.ilating
idiotio ordinances and reports for government digestion,
bu in seeing and oonsidering sensibly the best means of
economically exploit]ng the flora of their districts". 3 lie
1. 19 Qot. 1905, '3/Z, .4D?
2. Holt -to Morel, 4 Oct, 1902, P8/2, ED?i1P.
3. bit to 1orel, 24 Sept. 1906, P8/, EDIIIP.
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alleged that research workers in the Forestry Departments
would, achieve nothing because "they knew nothing of economic
or commercial botany") When he was told. that De Wildeman's
niethod2 of obtaining rubber was in accord. with what the
natives bad. been doing before the Forestry Department
introduced novel tecbniq.ues, Holt flared up against t1*
Forestry Department of Southern Nigeria for introducing a
destra.o-tive method. 3 He wrote accordingly to Morel: "The
Forestry Department in Southern Nigeria Is an abominable
incubus sent by Kew a la India - it creates notlung
To hini, "they could only make laws repressive of human
energy". 5
 Not even the work of H.N. Thompson, the forestry
expert who rendered useful service to Nigeria impressed Holt.
1hen Thompson reported on the Gold Coast Forests, recoimnending
the need f or legislation, Molt alleged that be wanted to
repeat in the Gold Coast what he bad done in Southern Nigeria,
that is to establish "a set of parsI'tes" (in the nature of
1.	 tboreZ.24 Sept. 1906, P8/3, EDMP
2 • De Wilde man held the view that the be et yie id of rubbe r
was obtained by cutting down the vine and beating the
bark; the vine, if cut down, sprouted from the root and
grew again; whereas the usual process of tapping enfeebled
and, in time killed the plant. The Forest experts of
Southern Nigeria preached the tapping method.
3. Holt to Morel, 19 Oct. 1909, P8/3, ED1P.
4. Molt to Morel, 30 Sept. 1909, p8/3, EDIP.
5. Ibid, I c. c.
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forestry officials) on that Colony "similar to what Ke y has
foisteda la India sle on Southern Ni.geria")
Holt, however, was not alone in denouncing these
Ordinances. He bad successfully rallied, the Liverpool
Chamber against them. In a memorandum to Cbntherlaln, the
African Trade Section of that Chamber bad in March 1902
criticised the "absolute powers " which the proclamation
gave to Sir Ralph Moor, also making the economic argument
that the proclamation was more likely to reduce the volume
of the wood trade than to conserve forests. 2 In May of the
same year, the Manchester Chamber of Commerce made similar
charges	 Chamberlain agreed with both Chambers that the
natural resources of the colonies and protectorates should
be developed "as fully and speedily as possible", 'but added
that such developrient must take into account the future needs
of the Government and the natives.4
In April of the same year the APS waded Into the
issue, requesting that sanction should not be given to Moor's
Forestry Proclamation since it saw "very grave objeotons"
to it - objeotions graver than thoe raised against MacGregor's
—n-
1. Holt to Morel, 3 Feb. 1910, F8/4, EDLP.
For Thompson's report see ... Cd 4993/10 of 1908, op. cit.
2. Liverpool C/C to Chamberlain, 27 March. 1902, CO 520/16.
3. Manchester C/C to C1aamber1in, 1 May 1902 (ibid).
4. Chamberlain to Liverpool c/c, 12 April 1902, draft (ibid).
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draft Ordinance w1ich the Society bad alleged was against
the sanctity of the -treaties ude by -the British Government
with native chiefs. 1 The APS contended that Moor's proola-
rnation appeared to assuii a right of ownership over all
'native lands' which it had defined as "waste and forest
lands at the disposal of natives", that it imposed. severe
penalties, and fines on people, and that it thus deprived
the natives "of all proprietary right, tribal and. communal
or individual". The Society, while it recognised the
importance of equitable measures adopted in the interests
of the natives themselves, nevertheless compla med that
"the circumstances of British protection were no warrant
for the contemplated approprtions and disposal of 'native
lands' and their produce". 2 It must be pointed out, however,
that, apart from -the explanation given by the Colonial Office
to the effect that txibal land could not be alienated without
the assent of the Chiefs, the APS was probably right in
criticising the range of Moor's forestry proclamation. This
proclamation, through an extravanant use of such phrases as
"native lands", "waste on forest land at the disposition of
the Governirnt", "forest reserve", or "forestry reserves and.
1. See Chap. III.
2. H.R. Pox Bourne to 0.0. 18 April 1902, 00 520/41.
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native lands", tended to give the impression that there was
likelihood of native rights to land being infringed. 1
 But
for the .APS to persist in its protests after the Colonial
Off ice bad given it a convincing explanation that the
provisions of the Proclarrtion were directed, not against
the use of the land and. its products by the native owners,
but against the exploitation of the forests by traders,
both native and. European, who thought only of making an
immediate profit for themselves and did. not oonsid.er the
pernnent interests of the native owners of the land., 2
 found
the Society repeating the same arguments it 1ad made before
and irritating the officials. A.B. Keith was forced to
declare that the Society was "evidently" foolish; 3 and.
Straohey adviseã that their 1etter on this topic should
be "put by".4
It is possible to argue that açart from the APS
other critics of the forestry measures were more obagrined
by the novelty of governmental interference with comrce
1. For further discussion of this point see Tarnuno, "British
Administrative Control, op. cit.
2. 00 to Fox Bourrie, 2 y 1902, draft, CO 520/41.
3. Minute of 6 ry by A.B. Keith on APS to Go, 6 y 1902,CO 520/41.
4. Minute of 9 y by Strachey, (ibid.).
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than influenced by personal or group economic involvement.
In this case, tbs arguments regard:ing the economic disad-
vantages incident on regulating the exploitation of produce
and other bunitarian coriside rations made, might be given
more weight. Prom the economic angle it is relevant to
point out -that Sir W.I.T. Dyer, director of the Ke y Gardens,
had opposed the "minute and particular" rules which char-
acterised these two Forestry measures. Iking his obser-
vations on the Forestry Proclamation of Southern Nigeria,
Dyer had told the Colonial Office that the general principle
In a legislation of this description was "to endeavour o
atta:in the object in view by the simplest and broadest
expedients". He was of the opinion that "any attempt to
carry regulation into minute detail, the propriety of which
can only be judged by experience", was "open to the risk of
making the whole policy abortive". He contended that if it
was desired to regu te the rubber or timber industry in such
a way as to stop the wholesale destru.otion of the trees which
bad taken place in Southern Nigeria, the assertion of the
primciple that this practice would not be tolerated was
probably the only practical possibility underthe present
circumstances. His conclusion was that -the proper tbing to
do was that "every attempt should be made to make it clear
to the natives that the object is not to hamper the rubber
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industry but to provide for its permanence 	 The
Colonial Office 'was not over-impressed, with. these expressed.
views of Dyer, 2 but the other allegation which stemmed from
Holt's cynical, but sometimes well-founded, belier that the
Colonial Governments kept genuine competitors out of the
forest so that they might ensure obbery and monopoly for
their favourites, 3
 is one that might later be seen to have
more plausibility.
On the other hand, La native protests to these
measures might be said to have justified the criticism that
they invaded native rights. Although there were no recorded
protests to Moor's Forest meqsures in Southern iigeria,
IvoGregor's draft Ordinance met with stiff opposition in
Lagos. In a leader captioned 'Troxblous Tanies', the lagos
Standard bemoaned the drQt Ordinance of September 1901 as
another of the "alarming and appressive legislative enactments"
whoh ained at reducing the people of the Colony and Hinter-
land of lagos to the 'direst straits'. 4 'Monster' meetings
1. W.I.T. Dyer to CO, 31 Oct. 19 01, CO 520/11.
2. Minute of 7 Nov. by PI. Ezekeel (ibid).
3. Holt to Morel, 3 Feb. 1910, P8/4, EDMP.
This point will be referred to later in tins chapter.
4. Lagos Standard, 25 Sept. 19Oj.
The other measure referred to was the Provincial Councils
Bill.
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were bald, culminating In the 'monster petition' frr
seven ndred signatories sent to the Governor and. members
of the Legislative Council. 1 The Petition bad. criticised.
the "too sweeping and far-reaching changes" which the
projected Forest measures might have on land. tenure and
objected to British officials being given jurisdiction in
forestry administration	 These protests probably led, to
the amendment of that draft Ordinance which was later psssed
in y 1902.
It must be pointed, out, however, that these native
protests were nainly inspired by elitist groups both in
Southern Nigeria and. in the Gold Coast, who, either because
of their love of free enterprise untrammelled, by Government
intervention or their fear that Government protection would
inevitably deal a blow to their traditional practice of
exploiting the ignorance of other joint-owners of these
ooTrinunal forests, saw nothing good in the positive and
genuine efforts of the Colonial authorities to find a
solution to the wholesale and unsystezxtic- exploitation
of the forest produce of the Colonies. Sdhatever individual
grievances the natives and the British critics of these
1. Lagos Standard, 18 Sept. 1901.
2. cGregor to 0.0. 10 Feb. 1902 end, petition dated 14 Sept,
1901, 00 147/160.
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nasures, might have had, there can be no doubt that the
Colonial authorities at that time were eagerly engaged in
much experimental work concerned. with the introduction of
new species and the organisation of Forestry Departments
which were very vital both for the guidance of the natives
and the tintenanoe of the prosperity of the lnd.ustry in
Sylvan produce.
bit's rearguard aotionagainst these arboricultu:ral
changes in the Colonial plane was also reflected in his
negative attitude towards the Imperial role of the British
Oottoi Growing Assooiation. But in order to fully under-
stand the motives behind these imperial attitudes, the ideas
which animated the founders of this Cotton movement and the
place of cotton culture n the native economy of West Africa
must be grasped.
It is a commonplace of the economic history of
West Africa that from bme immemorial cotton bad. been an
important item of its home and. export economy. In his famous
Description of Africa, which is probably the first record on
African cotton, Leo Africanus mentions that cotton was grown
in what later became }iger1a. Describing the Kingd.om of
"Ghinea", he says that the place ezoeedingly abounded. in
barley, rice, cattle, fishes and cotton; that they sold
the ir cotton to the me rohants of the Barbary States in
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exchange :f or the cloths of Europe, brass vessels, and.
armour; and. that the inhabitants were clad in black and
blue cotton which covered their faces while their priests
and doctors of the law wore dresses of white oottot 1
The cotton plant (Eriodendron aufractnosum) grew
wild in the West Coast, producing the "Kapok" of commerce,
while the "bombax", which produced a similar floss to "kapok"
also occurred. Although India is the supposed birthplace of
cotton manufacture, the inhabitants of the Western and
Southern Coasts of Africa probably made cbtton garments
long before they were imported into their country. T2ie
beauty of the colours arid design of the native cotton dresses
were frequently commented on by the early explorers. From
the Upper Niger Valley, which was its cradle, cotton culture
and manufature bad spread to other arLs of 1est Africa,
pertioularly to the ne.ghbourhood of Sierra leone, Liberia,
Lagos, the Island of Fernando Po, and into the interior.
From JJcpherson's Annals it appears that cotton
woven on the "Coast of Ghinea", was imported to London from
the Bight of Benin in 1590. But due to the large demand f or
cotton robes created by the Mohammedan tribes who inhabited
No rtlie rn N ig e r].a, this area became a b ig centre of the cotton
1. Leo Africanus, Description of Africa. Ref. in N.M. Peuzer,
Cotton in British est Africa (1920)
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industry. The cotton was ginned by hand, or by very
primitive uans, spurn 2nto yarn and woven on very simple
looms into the so-called "count ry cloths" which were narrow
strips of cloth sewn together to irake cloths of any size.
These stuffs were said. -to be very durable and were ornamented
by the use of dyed yarns. Wbat was not needed. for local
req.uirements was exported by river and. caravan as far north
as the diterranean. Kano which was a great cotton market,
bought up almost all the cotton from the neighbouring countries
often paying twice the prices paid for cotton at Liverpool.1
It 'was, however, Tbous Clegg, a I&chester merchant,
who first carried on a profitable trade in cotton with. West
Africa. He bad encouraged natives to grow cotton and. had
hoped, by giving them employment, to discourage the slave
traffic, as well as increase England's supply of raw niterial.
Iis experiments at first confined to the district around
Sierra Leone, was afterwards extended to other interior
cotton fields, and -the residences of the Chiefs around.
Abeokuta. In 1851 Clegg imported 285 lbs of West African
cotton; by 1853 the imports had risen to 37 bales; and 1859,
-they had soared to 3,500 bales. At the same time, IcGregor
Laird had shown geat Interest in the ootton-prodn.cing
1. Vide IVcpherson, Annals. Ref. in 1LI. Penzer, op. cit.
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potentialities of West Africa. In 1857, be tried to
establish trading stations on the river Ni.ger, but his
enterprise was ruined by bad o1inatio conditions and native
opposition. Nevertheless by 1860, lagos bad become the
largest cotton port of West Africa, since the country around
it was wel]. adapted to the growth of cotton and the natives
skilled in the mysteries of the local trade) An outstanding
characteristic was tba-t cotton culture was organised as a
native i,ndustry.
In spite of this interest in West African cotton,
the British Cotton industries depended largely on the
American supplies. The foundation of the British Cotton
Growing Association was apparently due to certain developnents
in the American sphere of production. In the first years of
the twentieth century, many economists and rranu±'acturers
began to point out that the Lancashire cotton industry was
too dependent on American supplies. The uncertainties of
the American supplies were seen to be implicit in several
episodes which had featured Arzrican development. The
American Civil War which had greatly out down the cotton
supplies to Lancashire, bad acted as a disturbing element
f or the whole cotton industry of lancashire. Moreover, the
1. N.M. Penzer, Cotton in British West Africa (1920) pp. 7-8.
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virtual monopoly of production which America enjoyed had
enabled speculators to nAnipulate the stocks and thus
raised or depressed prices to suit their purposes. At a
time when various commercial combinations were sporadically
promoted, a gigantic syndicating of cotton appeared not
merely as a cont:lngency by no means to be scoffed at, but
a real danger to the British sphere of consumption. 1
 For
example, in 1904, owing to unfavourable clinBtio conditions,
the American crop was oomçaratively a snail one, (being only
10,124,000 bales, which was much short of world. requirements),
this enabled speculators to "corner s' the crop; the most
notorious of these being a certain Sully who was generally
known as tttbe great wheat operetor'. 2 On the other hand,
American official estimates of the o rop for subsequent years
were often faulty and bad, therefore, often misled cotton
consumers. lVbst telling was the fact that the increased
and inc re as ing con sumpt ion by Ame rica of be r own raw nat e na 1,
combined with the increase in the number of continental mills,
threatened the proud position which lancashire held as the
greatest cotton manufacturing centre in the world. This
would mean loss of money, lack of work and therefore social
1. For this background, see West African il, 3 April 1903
Penzer, op. cit, p. 9.	 -
2. Penzer, op. cit., p. 9.
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misery for hundreds of thousands of cotton operatives.1
In January 1901, Benjamin Crapper, a cotton nnate,
hM pointed out to the Oldbam Chamber of Commerce the dang-
e rous position of the Incashire Cotton trade • A committee,
appointed by the Oldbam Chamber to consider the question,
reported in November of that year that various parts of the
Empire were suitable for the cultivation of cotti for the
Lancashire industry. At a meeting of represenitives of
various Chambers of Commerce, held in Febn.ary 1902 another
committee was appointed to discuss the matter. And on 7 May
1902, at a dinner of West African merchants held. in Albion
Hotel in Manchester, the British Cotton Growing Association
was launched. With Sir Alfred Jones, as its first President
and J. Arthur Hutton 2 his deputy, and supported by various
interests animated by similar ideals, the Association was
forn11y inaugurated on 12 June 19 02 with a guarantee Lund
of £50,000. Soon after it was found that this guarantee fund
was inadequate and was accordingly raised to £100,000. But
the extraordinary situation in America in 1904 caused
1. ¶, 3 April 1903.
2, Hutton, James Arthur, Born at Bowdon 1862, 4th Son of James
F. 4ton, formerly LP. for North Manchester; Educ. at St.
Paul's COU. Stony Stratford and Heidelberg. One of the
founders of the BCGA and. its Vice-President; Vice-President
National Ass, of Fisheries Board; Director Atlas Insuranoe
Co; Club: Union (Manchester). Died 28 Feb. 1955.
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considerable anxiety ar&rngst the manufacturers and operatives.
It was, therefore, decided to reconstitute the Association
on a permanent basis, with a capital of £500, 000, and to
apply for a Royal Charter which Was finally sealed on 27
August, 1904.1
An initial drawback was the announcerznt by the
1. Vide Penzer, op. cit. p. 9.BOG-A. Pamphlets
wur a.O Apt1 1903.
an account, see W.F. Tewson: British Cotton Growin
Association. Issued by the Association on its aolden
i3Iee, 1904-1954. Apart from Sir A.I. Jones and J.
Arthur Hutton, other prominent enthusiasts were
John Edward Newton, Sen icr Vice-President of the Oldbain
arnber of oere who usually presided over its delib-
erations. He helped very much to convert the BOG-A into a
powerful, corporate organisation.
Born 1648, eldest son of James Newton J.P. o± Greenacres
Lodge, Oldham. Entered his father's business of cotton
Spinning and manufacturing. A Director of Asa Lees & Co.
Ltd., a large firm of cotton machinists; hold other direct-
orships; Governor of Oldbam Infirmary and J.P. f or the
County Borough of Oldham. Delegate to the Congress of
C/Cs of The Empire held in Paris during the Ex.hibitian year.
John C. Atkins. Sec. of the BOG-A; After learning cotton
usiss, became Chartered Accountant, and in that capacitr
acted as Auditor for some of the largest companies an
Olctham where he lived all his life. F.I.C.A. (1889); Sec.
of the Oldham c/a formed 1883.
Alfred Etrutt: President of the Oldham c/C, and Liberal
M2. for the Borough of Oldham.
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Association that it did not expect any profits from its
work for some time. In fact, it stl411ated. t1t no dividends
should be id for seven years since, as it claimed, pioneer
work would be necessary over a considerable period. Conse-
quently a great difficulty was encountered In raising the
earmarked capital. The B.O.G.A., therefore, was placed in
a position in which it sought and received assistance from
the Government in the way of monetary grants, given, firstly,
b local Governments on condition tl:iat the Association should
spend an equal amount on cotton growing and. exper2mental
work, and later by the Imperial Treasury on condition that
the money should be spent in special districts approved by
the Government. 1 This implied that the Government recognized
the work of the Association as likely to be of value in
developing the resources of the Colonies and i.n supplying the
wants of British commerce. !the success of the movement for
promoting the growth of cotton within the Empire was, therefore
generally hoped f or and encouraged at a time when the economic
exploitation of -the Colonies was succeeding that phase of
territorial acquisitions which bad gratified the political
ambitions of jtgoistic officials. For England, the success
of this cotton movement meant safety for the most important
1. Penzer, op. cit., p. 10; BCGA. Pamp-i1ets Nos. 1-5,
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of her industries, and self-protection against a peril
which might become a national economic disaster. For
Lancashire, it meant cessation of dependence on America
arid, increased prosperity from increased supplies of raw
iraterial. For West Africa, it was hoped that this mi.ght
mean -tbe creation of a new native industry, an increase in
native purchasing power, and consequent advance in its
deve lopment.1
At the outset Morel was so confident that the
BCGA would be another opportunity for the native to prove
his capacity that he advertised the work and aims of -(the
Association, pointing out why West Africa was favourable
for cotton culture. Not only had the West African negro,
he claimed, revolutionized the growth of cotton in America,
but had shown immense caaoity for this and. other industries
in his home also. Had not the natives of West Africa grown
their own cotton, woven and. dyed It with their own indigo as
far back as the 11th Century' Was not the progress of West
Africans within a short time in the export of palm ol]. and
kernel, groundnuts, mahogany, and rubber a sufficient pointer
to their capacity 7 In asking these general questions, Morel,
however, pointed out that of all West African countries,
1.	 , 3 April 1903.
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Nigeria was most favourable for concentration of efforts.
In Northern Nigeria and lagos hinterland were vast fields,
a nati,ve population, numerous and. Intelligent, commercially
apt, and thoroughtly familiarised with the techniques of
the cotton industry. The soil was suitable; large open
purklike expanses existed; heavy annual rainfall and fairly
well-irrigated country abounded. On the other hand, Sierra
Leone and the Gold Coast did not appear to him as attractive.
In Sierra Leone, the population was lacking; there were
stories about emigration from the interior to the Liberian
border due to the unpopularity of the Hut-Tax and other
colonial calamities; the area around was greatly forested;
while the occupation of the people with groundnuts in Gambia
should not be disturbed. In the Gold Coast, mining lnthistries
seemed to have taken a great toll of the available labour
force; and. to further divest it of this labour seemed to
Morel objectionable; it would leave an amount not sufficient
to maintain the cocoa industry. But he had also warned that
the growth of cotton must reln a native industry. He
wanted the crude methods of cultivation by the natives
improved; the natives should be supplied with imported. seed
or taught to select his cwn seed, and furnished with agricul-
tural ample ments superior to the rough hoe; but it must be
de clear to him that he was working for himself for his
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own enrichment in cooperation with the white man, "in a
sort of rartnership of science and muscle".1
In this attempt to bring pressure to bear on the
BOGA to start off its operation according to what was
regarded as the right policy, Morel was not alone • In
June 1905, at the International Cotton Congress held at
Inchester, Alfred Eininott,	 mber of Parliament for Oldham,
keeper of that city's husariitarian conscience, and a close
friend of Morel's, had. made a strong case for the natives
of West Africa to be well treated during this new movement
for Imperial cotton supply. Referring to the Labour question,
Emmott pointed out that cotton as a growth of hot climates
and did not flourish in regions where thltes could give
saximum labour in open fields. Therefore, the problem was
how England could best deal with native labour which alone
could produce cotton satisfactorily. He claimed that the
urgency of this question of the proper treatment of nati'es
under European powers transcended the humanitarian or even
sentimental view-point; it was at once an ethical, economic,
and a psychical question.2
1. A ' 17 April 1903.
2. Speech by A1frd Lrnritt at the International Cotton Congrea8
held at Birmingham between 5 to 9 June, 1905.
Vide BOGA Pamphlets No. 6, 	 rcb 1906.
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rnniott was therefore strongly of the opinion -that
Britain would never procure Large quantities of cotton from
West Africa unless natives there grew i-b as farmers and. not
merely as hired labourers. Best results, be said., could. only
be produced effectively under a system. of free 1bour, and.
under a system by which the natives retained possessiOn of
the soil which had been theirs for long ages past. They
should accordingly be led along the paths of industry and.
commerce without taking from them their human freedom. He
continued:
"1 am perfectly certain that in the solution of this
problem will be found the best solution of the problem.
of increased growth of otton, particularly in Africa -
I say it is an ethical problem; we must remember these
men have rtghts, and we must be careful to eoognise
them. It is an economic problem, because unless we
treat these men proper1 we cannot get the besteconomic
results from. their labour. And it is a psychical problem
because we must try, as far as possible, to get inside
the black's mind, so that we can nxst readily lead him
on the line of his natural developrrnt in order to
become a better being than in the past, arid a man who
freely, willingly, and happily undertakes the regular
work which is 9ecessary for his moral ad material
regene ration".
Impressed by these humane çvessures, the BCGA
always officially dissociated itself from any invasion of
nativ e rights. But when it made its first efforts in West
Africa, the Association did not seem to have heeded -the
1. pioh by Alfred Emmott, op. cit, BOGA Pamphlet No 6.
468.
wartiings sound.ed by Morel and. Errmott. Contrary to the
advice which Morel had given, the BCGA became involved in
efforts to grow cotton in Sierra Leone and. the C-old Coast.
As early as 1905, the Association was already surprised
with the failure of its crops in Sierra Leone; 1 inspi.te of
various grants and government patronages, eveii as late as
1912, the prospects of a successful cotton Industry of any
size an the Gold Coast was extremely doubtful. 2 But the
most disturbing element was the initial attempt by the BGA
to launch its operations on plantation basis. Although the
Council of the Association had agreed with the stiplations
of the Colonial authorities -ttha-t7 farms must be for experimental
purposes, the agents of the Association leased large tracts
of land. from natives, ostensibly for model farms, but in
reality for plantation economy. This measure met with
opposition from nny quarters; nreover the BCGA discovered
by experience and. public protests that peasant production
was generally a more economical proposition than plantation
economy
An apt illustration of the BCGA's admission of
1. BCGA to C.O., 12 Jan. 1905, 00 267/482.
2. BCC-A to 0,0., 15 July 1912, 00 96/525.
3. See Hancock, Problems of Economic Policy Pt. II op. cit.
p. 189.
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its initial, mistake was its surprise at the total failure of
the Sierra Leone's plantations which 1:d been referred to.
In January 1905, the BOGA told the Colonial Office 'that tha
"great disappointment" might "necessitate a complet change
in the policy of the Association". It went on to point out
"that the original policy adopted by the Council, viz, the
establishment of cotton cultivation as a native industry,
was the right one and -that plantations should be avoided as
far as possible, except as a neans of education for the
natives"? P.A.G. Butler found that the BCGA bad raised
"some very serious questions". Having noted, the virtual
admission by the Association that the large plantations
were "a departure from the original p11cy" which 'Was
defined as the "establishment o cotton cultivation as a
native industry", Butler minuted: "The crop of the Associatior
large plantations in Sierra Leone has been a total failure,
and the Association now think that it will be wise to go
back ..... to the system of a few small plantations, coupled
with supervis ion of native planters ... Then we showed some
apprehension that these large plantations might be regarded
'too much as a source of rofit, the Association were very
careful to explain that they were primarily designed f or the
1. BOGA to C.O. 12 Jan. 1905, CO 267/482.
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instruction of the natives just as uoh as sul1 plantations
had. been, and -that only secondarily would -they be run rith a
view to paying expenses or making a pro:f It. This slip on
their part emphasises the necessity of our keeping The idea
of profit-making quite subservient to that of the encouragement
of cot-tan ginning by the natives	 But Sidney Olivier
was pessimistic and ws of the opinion that the Association
was either unwilling or incapable of guiding the natives.
"It Is evident", be minuted, "that at present the BOGA are
not in a position to teach the natives". Re, however, wax!led.
A great deal of harm ny be done by offering to teach
black nn what white men don't know. The black man is always
pretty sceptical as to the value of itheoretical instruction
offered him by the white man, and when the white man's
demonstrations don't work, the private criticism of the
black man is not complimentary. He makes no allowances -
In order to teach him you Im2st show results •,,••2 R.L.
Antr'obus lamented the inability of the BCGA to show these
re suits -to the natives • '... When we began", he minuted.,
"we thought that the British Cotton Growing Association
would be able to command expert advice and assistance; but
1 • Minute of 21 Jan. 1905 by F .G .A. Butler, ibid.
2. Minute of 6 Feb. 1905 by S. Olivier, ibid.
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they can't, and unless we can supply it, the growing of cot-ton
In West Africa will be a failure".'
This inability or unwillingness of the BCGA to
conduct cotton culture as a native industry, led it into
undesirable transactions with native populations. Such a
transaction as was entered into with the people of Ibadan
provoked criticisms from many sources. On 6 Jroh 1905, an
agreement was alleged reached between the Bale of Ibadan
and some members of the Ibadan Council on the one hand and
the &gents of the BCG.A on the other, leasing 5,000 acres of
Ibadan land to the Association for a period of 30 years at
a rental of 3d.. an acre perannurn "subject to a right of
renewal for a second period of 30 years sbou1the BCGA so
8	 2wish at/rental of not less than 6d. per acre".
It seems that the BCGA had. taken advantage of
the Bale's greedy eagerness for rents to dupe him into a
one-sided agreement. When the people of Ibadan, by and
large, knew what had happened, the Ibadari Council, protested
en masse against it. In a memorial to the lagos Governor,
the Council clai.med.Lthat "the appropriation of the land at
1 Minute of 14 Peb. 1905 by R.IJ. Antrobus, ibid.
2. Agreement between the Bale of Ibadan and Thadan Council on
the ône band and agents of the BOGA on the other; 1905
Co i i EDQ, F9/E-L .	
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Toadan by the BOGA, without the cordial aoq .uiescence of the
Chiefs, is ].nconsistan-t with the pledges arid, assurances rrd.e
f roni tine by this Government to the pe o pie of tlia t country" .
Apart from these historical antecedents, the social and.
economic situation in Ibadan riade this tran sact ion curious.
Even at that time, Ibadan was already a large town,
ranking as -the most extensive native city south of the Sahara.
If the whole of its population, half of which were said, to
live in the farms, were at once in the urban area, the
at
population would be estinted/a quarter of a million mark.
Since the country was settling down from the previous civil
wars and military patrols, the cost of living was seen to
have increased and there was the imminent problem of feeding
a large and growing population being thrust on the farms.
"Unde r such c ircumstance s, the ref ore", the pe o pie of Ibadari
asked, "ought we to diminish the area of food-producing
acres". It was at the same time observed that the farms
bad virtually reached the limits of their expansion; in
fact, a few years before the agreement, boundary disputes
between the Ibadans and the Egbas, and between the Ibadans
and the I3ebus, would have led to a renewal of civil wars
but for the intervention of the Res ident at Ibadan. With
1. Petition of the Ibadan Council to Igos Governor
Copy in EDI1P., P.97i-L.
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no room f or the further expansion of a grow3.rlg Population,
who were ready -to fight their neighbours in order to increase
their acres, It seemed unlikely that the people would willingly
have given up so large an extent of the restricted area.1
One feels that the sullen, silent, but greedacq.uiescence
of the Bale and. Council did. not mean a unanimous approval.
Tha most important considerstion of the Ibadan
representation was that the land which the BCGA leased was
land under cultivation and in actual use from which the owners
were to be dispossessed for the benefit of the Association.
A compensation, such as was agreed on, which rrrely was to
go into the general revenue of the town, left in the lurch
tIthe poor farmers with wives and children who would be turned
out of their patrimony to make room for cotton". 2 There
could be no doubt that the effort to improve indigenous
staple and introduce new species of cotton was desirable;
but to starve families in order to increase cotton culti-
vation by plantation methods at Ibadan was surely a bard
and destiiiotive policy. In roh 1905, Catbcart Wason had
told the Commons tha-t individuals and. associations bad nude
remonstrances and. complaints regarding -the terms on which
1. See Ibadan Petition, op. cit, for son of these points.
2. Ibid., :*
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5,000 aores were acquired from the natives of Ibadan, and.
that the natives obeoted to parting with their land.'
'When these criticisms cau to the notice of the
BOGA, it still kept up to its belief that it was "utterl3r
opposed to alienation of land and unfair dealing with Natives
generally". 2 Since Iyttleton had, ]J reply to Cathoart Wason's
observation, said that be bad received no such remonstrance
as referred to, Morel at this point udicious1y sat on the
fence. 3 But Dr. Obadiab Johnson knew where the shoe pinched.
He told. Morel that "those who have been deprived of their
farms and have lost all the rights of inherited ownership for
themselves and their children for one oi two genetatiois
to come, can hardly find any other term for it than
"alienation". He alleged that the Ibadan authorities bad.
pleaded in vain that the land. was not public land.; and. that
even those whose land. was being leased. against their will
bad protested that they "would rather keep thair farms than
accept even £3 an acre raid into their pockets, f or out of
the land. they would support themselves and their families,
and have their double crops of msize, yarns, beans, and the
1. HC Debs. 4, Vol. 142, 2 March 1905, 181.
2. See Morel to Dr. Obadiah Johnson 11 March 1905. Copy P9 EDMPI
3. Morel bad communicated with the B0GJ. on reports he
received but rather warily.
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perennial plantains, etc. in the markets".1
Although the Bale probably 1mev what he was doing/
when be signed the agreenient 7 rt also appears that the BCGA
took d.vantage of the relative illitei'acy o:f the people of
Ibadan as veil. This could be illustrated by poirting to
the different treatment which the BCGA received at Abeokuta.
When the agents approached the Abeokrta authorities according
to Dr. Obadiah Johnson, they refused to ye1d an inch of
ground, fo as they replied, there was "no public land to
spare". Egbaland ha.d a large number of citizens with Sound
nglish education who rnacbed the machinations of the Aso-
o iat ion's agents with their own; relatively Ibadan bad none L
But it nn2st be pointed out, on the other hand, that tIns
unavailability of land to spare at Abeokuta was also largely
due to the activities of its educated natives who bad in the
course of years individualised communal landsthrough their
influence with the Egba Governnnt and because most of theni
bad ready cash with which they bought up lands from others
in debt.2
This Ibadan episode, however, remained as a source
of malignant rancour in the hearts o± the natives who tended
1. Dr. 0. Johnson -to Morel, 22 April 19 05, P9/	 EDIP.
2. This point was mentioned In Qbap. V.
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to ectuate the roles of these commercial associations with
the general ad official attitudes of Englishmen towards
West Africans. Dr. Johnson made this point in the same
letter to Morel:
"The prevailing opin J.OE, in these part a, of ng lishmen
nowadays, so far as we know them, Is that they are
always ust and fair to anyone provided he has nothing
they desIr and must have - personal services or otherwise.
If not always logical, they are at any rate legal, and
would enact a new law to meet the exigencies of any case,
and thus render quite legal an action which otherwise
would be considered of doubtful morality (the equity of
it never comes into consideration). Whatever it may be,
nothing must stand	 their way. iJe can only thank God
that gold in paying quantity has not been discovered
in this country, which would have tempted undesirable
via Ito rs to our shores .. ." 1
Although Morel 'was wont to be sceptical of some
information he received from educated natives on the West
Coast, be acted promptly on this occasion. On 15 Jy 1905,
he wrote Arthur Hutton, laying before bin these complaints
he had received from West Africa. 2 Hutton's defence of his
Association followed the traditional pattern, alleging that
the whole issue bad been exaggerated, and pleading ignorance
of the ill-treatment and hardship alleged inflicted on the
natives. He accused some officials in Nigeria, particularly
Sir William cGregor and. Captain Elgee, the Ibadan Resident,
1. Dr. 0. Johnson to Morel, 22 April 1905, P9/
2. Morel to 3. Arthur Eut-ton, 15 y 1905 Copy P9/A-B, EDLtP.
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of bavin pushed the native land rights to such an extreme
that sentiment rendered it difficult to cope with. He claimed
that if native arguments were followed to their logical
conclusions, not even the local Government itself could
acquire the necessary land for the railway since he saw the
question of land required by the BCGA as exactly on the same
basis, which it was not. His spurious argument that the
Association wanted the land n the interest of the natives
was identical with the creed of the "Radical Imperialists"
who felt -that barbarous race g should not be allowed to
stand. in the way of progress al Hutton argued:
"We want the land for the good of the native, and it
would really be idiotic if we were to follow native
prejudices to stand in the way of all progress. If
you think the nwtter over, you will see that our
plantation is on exactly the same position as the
railway, and I don't think anyone, not even Captain
Elgee, would argue that native prejudices should be
allowed to stand in be way and prevent the cnnstruction
of the railway •..",
It is obvious that Hutton wrote in the vain of
forward-going eoonomiô imperialists who wished to launch
oonmercial bull-dozer operations on the colonies, and who
justified their actions with the cant of progress and native
interest. It is possible, as Hutton alleged, that Elgee was
1. See Madden, op. cit. p. 347.
2. Hutton to Morel, 16 May 1905, F.9/A-B, EDI1P.
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conceited and. stubborn; but in this utter of cotton plant-
ations, Elgee was riot alone in opposing the activity of the
Association. 1 Other government off icials in Southern IIigeria,
with the possible exception of Coupland-Orawford, were
apathetic to cotton growing there since they claimed that
other economic crops should be given priority. 2 It is
probably true that the success of the cotton industry in
Southern IUgeria would have benefited the natives; but
what was relevant at that time was whether the effeots of
prusuing a policy directed towards providing more and more
acresr cotton were not inimical to the overall lives
of the natives. Morel nude this point in a letter to Hutton:
"I recognise the importance of the Assoqiation having
leases of land; the only point is in this case, whether
the farmers on that land had been - without the lcnowledge
of the Association - expropriated from their farms without
adequat compensation, either in land elsewhere or in
money" .-'
Hutton's tu q.uoque directed against the Colonial Governments
was more irrelevant than explanatory, just as merely blaming
the Government off Ic lals for the bad public ity his Assoc lat ion
was receiving was unconvincing. Although be had no great
personal likeness for Elgee, f or example, Morel nevertheless
1. Hutton to Morel, 19 ?y 1905, ibid.
2. Rev. P.A. MoDermott to Morel, 22 Aug. 1906, F9/M4, ED]YtE.
McDermott wrote from the Catholic Mission in Oiitsha.
3. Morel to Hutton, 17 May 1905.	 P9/A-B, EDMP.
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felt that be was doing a good. work in Ibadan.
The BOGA soon earned the reputation of ma1treat,ng
and exploiting natives. The Catholic Herald of August 1905
carried destructive paragraphs which implied that the Asso-
ciation was cheating the natives of West Africa, paying the
African 'abourers little to nothing for a week's wor1. This
public criticism bad one effect; it forced the Council of
the Association to proclani it altruism. in a letter to
the Editor of the Catholic Herald, Hutton pointed out that
the object of the BCGA in West Africa was "the establishnnt
of cotton cultivation as a native industry", arguing that
"it would be very shortsighted if we were to go and injure
on
the very people whom we are looking ,to grow cotton for us
in futux'e years") Although it has been seen 'that the
private business of the Association on the West Coast did
not always correspond with either its crinal policy or
pubilo protestations, yet it appears that some of these
adverse comments were made by those enemies of the BOGA who
1. Hutton to Editor of Catholic_Herald Aug. 1905, copy F9/A-B
EDTQ end, in Hut tono Morel, 1pt. 1905.
See also BCGA Pamphlet No. 157, 1914. Hutton claimed that
the BOGA paid the hijl3est possible price to the natives
which was untrue.
In reh 1904 L.Ptoyn suggested to the 0.0. that the BCGA
should pay the natives 11. per lb • instead of id. The
BOGA arid its agents demurred.
See L. Probyri to C.0., 2 Mroh 1904 and minutes CO 52/28.
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wanted not only b score economic points against it but also
to win a moral victory if the economic one failed them.
The great success which the BCGA had achieved in growing
Sea Island. cotton in the West Indies 1
 had frightened some
American planters who feared that the Association would. daroy
the virtual American monopoly of supply. 2 Some of these
interests, notwitbstandi.ng the iiperections oX the Assoc-
jatlon, were more concerned, wi-tb. inuring the BOGA than with
ameliorating the alleged plight of the natives.
Unlike the other economic enemies of the Association,
1. While lamenting the failure of the BOGA operations in West
Africa, F.Gt .A. Butler paid. glowing tributes to the success
of the Association in the West Indies due to Sir Daniel
Morris: ".. The only part of the world in which so far
the efforts of the new cotton-growing nvement have been
successful is the West Indies. The results there have
been astonishing f or the size of the district, and the
success is by universal consent attributed to the presence
and ability of Sir Daniel Irr18. He is a sort of presid
genius to whom everyone can turn when in doubt; he is full
of energy, always ready and able to give advice and direct
experiment, and most enthusiastic about the movement. He
exhibits, in fact, that combination of skill and force
which I thinkis conspicuous by its absence in the cotton-
growing movement in West Africa . . .".
Minute of 21 Jan. 1905 by P.G.A. Butler, on BCGA to 0.0.,
12 Jan. 1905, 00 267/482.
Morris, Sir Daniel, K.C.M.G. (1908); 0.M.G. (1893); LA.
D.C.L. D.So-LL.D., P.1.5., P.R.H.S.l V.M.H., C.M.Z.S.
born in Glamorgan 26 y 1844; Educ. At Cheltenham; RoyalCoil, of Sciences, S. Ken.; T.C.D. 1st ci. natural Science;
Gold Medailist. Directed Agric. & botanic stations in
many countries. Died 9 Feb. 1933.
2. Hutton to Ire1, 1 Sept. 19 05, P9/A-.B, EDMF.
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Holt's opposition to the BCGA stemmed from other consideration
the validity of which were not so nu&ch undermined by his
personal involvement. Economically, be felt that ha could
not take any interest i a scheme which sought with £50,000
to increase the world's supply of cotton, and. to embrace the
world n its area of experiments. His cramped ecQnomio ideas
gave him no enthusiasm to spend his nriey or tame to cheapen
the price of cotton for the vorid. He expressed his economic
opinion tnged with humanitarian gesture to Morel:
"It is as much as I can do to think of growing cotton in
Africa, not to make it cheap in Europe, but to give the
native another outlet for his energies and provide a new
field f or the use of B'1tis]a capital. Gheacess will not
help that operation. Deamess would be more likely to
give the desired result. The proposed aams of these
philanthropists wou1dustffy the employment of £5,000,000
rather t1n £50,000".
ut Holt regarded the BCGA as a windsoreen shieldi.ng
the personal aggrandisement of Sir .k.L. Jones and his "band-
waggon o flashy imperial patriots", a feeling which was later
justified. He had openly shown his suspicion of the whole
movement when on 26 June 1907 he had, been Invited to a
cotton dinner; to the general praise of the cotton movement
sung by those present, bit said nothing. After the diiner,
he expressed his disgust to Morel:
1. bolt to Morel, 20 June 1905, F8/2, ED1.1ote that the capital of the BOG.A was later raised from
£50, 000 to £500,000
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"I have not associated myself with that movement and.
don 't intend to as I regard. it as another affair of
Jones pronted for his own advertisement chiefly and.
accompanied by the usual hypocritical humbug of
imperialism, patriotism and such-like catchwords,
the purpose of which is personal and material ends".
When, previ.ously, Morel had. advised him to collab-
orate with Jones over the cotton affair, Bolt utterly re:fused.
Be bad great suspicion of everything Jones was engaged in.
Be alleged that he could only "work well enough with him if
it be absolutely for other people's good without any selfish
interest to attain on either side". He cynically brought up
his previous fate at Jones' hands 2 to ustffy his present
negative attitude; he said that he was not so young, inex-
perienced and credulous to believe in the bona f ides of people
whom he did not Imow or whom he 1mev too well because lie
might have suffered through their insinoerty and breach of
faith. He amplified his attitude to the BCGA, waiting Morel
not to be deceived by Jones:
"1 am not with either him or Hutton on it. I do not
object to it, but there is no reason why I should
shouand tell people what I do not believe • It was
the same over the gold. mines.. I am not going to be
1. Bolt to Morel, 26 June 19 07, P8/3, EDMP.
2. Bolt to Morel, 5 Nov. 1902, p8/2, EDLIP.
For the sxrrt game which Jones played on Bolt over the
purchase of a ship from the African Association, see P.N.
Davies, Sir Alfred Jones and the Developnent of West African
Trade, (Unpublished, Liverpool M. T1iéis, 1964.
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dishonest to please anybody I do not want anyone to
put money into Africa and. lose it through my advice.
I am not going to put a bit into attract others to
follow suit. If lancashire was really in earnest, it
would not be £10,000 or £20,000 that would be subscribed
to start this new industry. Would not Jones himself put
£100,000 in it to give his steanre freight if be thought
there was a nrgin even to pay expnses - not to speak
of profit? Don't be deluded ...".'
There is no doubt -that felt's attitude was partly influenced
by his correct economic diagnosis of the weak potentiality
of the BCGA in West Africa. But he was partiou1ar1r convinced
that the Assooiat.on was rrainly an affair of zones titimped up
to serve other ends.
There 15 sorx evidence to support felt's view.
Jones, at the tine when the Association was in Its infancy,
had carried cotton seeds to West Africa tree of freight
charges. It was alleged that a few years after, he proceeded
to charge .fantastic rates to recover economically whatever
public show of miifIcence be had previously nBde. It was
found that whereas the rate of freight on cotton carried by
the Atlantic liners from 1ew York to Liverpool was 24/3d . per
ton; that from lagos to Liverpool by Sir Af red Jones' ships
was 51/4d. per ton. People then suspected that this high
freight rates helped to retard the progress of the cotton
movement which was announced to be a non-profit-making conceni,
1. bit to 1brel, 5 Iov. 1902 P8/2 k EDMP.
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while at the other end of -the line its President was making
fantastic profits on its operation as CJ-airun of another
business. 1 bit's cynicism, therefore, would seem to have
been based on hard facts when he wrote to Morel criticising
this disparity in rates:
any man of common decency can charge such a rate
whilst at the same time proclaiming at his banquets
and through the press at every opportunity, -the wonder-
Lul work he is doing f or the Empire in general and the
development of West Africa in particular, passes one's
comprehension unless be takes the public for fools who
are guided by boasters and. seil-advertisers instead of
by deeds. It is the Congo trick of bad and hypocritical
professions backed by doles of philanthropy sufficiently
important and frequent to attract attention whilst the
real objects are in concealed operat1n - and the end
of all is more wealth and power ...".
If bolt was opposed to the BOGA because of Jones'
involvement in it, he was particularly averse to -the nanner
the Association's work was alleged done in West Africa. He
believed, perhaps, too readily, the evidence which came to
him from Northern Nigeria that Agents of the BOGA resorted
-to a system of forced labour f or growing cotton there. He
advised Morel to Watch out and publish in the West African
Mail rumours that the Association had brutalised natives. He
described this system of native exploitation in the same
letter to Morel:
1. African	 il, 14 Dec. 1906. Also Chap. VII.
2. bolt to Morel, 2 rch 1906, P8/3, EDME'.
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"The men 'who are in the Ni,ger growing cotton	 some
districts, I am credibly inforrd, would on no account
grow the cotton except under comilsion. The people
dare not object to grow it because the Government tell
them to do it. The village chiefs in their turn tell
them that the Government has ordered this to be done,
and out of fear these men go on planting cotton and.
receive no compensation in any way commensurate with
the work done. They complain loudly at the pittance
they get for the work they have put on the cotton
plantations and get what is called their pay
Holt's views, which it may be pointed out, bad some
personal motives, ref].eoted the allegations which other
commercial agents in Northern Nigeria had made, to the effect
that the BCGA forced natives to grow cotton in preference to
Other crops more beneficial to them. An agent of Siegler's
at Baro, in a letter to the African Trade Section Of the
Liverpool Chamber, bad criticised the work of Government
officials in Northerr Nigeria, who, be alleged, migrated
from one province to another, preaching the virtues of cottot-
growing to the natives. He claimed that other agents not
engaged in cotton culture also accused the Government of
Northern Nigeria of forcing the natives to gDow cotton at
the expense of such crops as Groundnu and pain nuts and
kemels, Shea butter and. nuts; and alleged that this applic-
ation of force had directly led to the failure by the natives
to gather Palm Nuts. According to him, the cotton move nnt
1. Ilolt to Mrel, 13 July 1906, P8/3, EDLP.
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there was prosecuted. with such vigo'ur -that other commercial
agents not engaged in cotton (and. Holt's agents were among
these) protested to the officials. This particular agent of
Sieglers had personally protested with the Resident of Nupe
and also with the High Commissioner when they visited. Baro
during their "country wide" tour when they expostulated the
case for the extension of cotton planting before the natives
of that area.1
As vas. to be epeoted, the agents of the BCGA
combat-ted this antagonism. In August 1907, a certain John
Percival, a representative of the Association in Northern
Nigeria, lodged a complaint to Arthur Hutton,tbat trsder's
in Northen Nigeria were opposed to he operstions o the
Association. 2 Conseauently in October of the same year
Hutton sent Edt this correspondence which implied a protest.3
But Holt was still of the opinion that it was "possible that
some of the ofioia1s in Northern Nigeria rry be a bit too
zealous over cotton growing to the neglect of other cultiv-
ated products of greater value to the native worker, the
commerce of the country, and evenutally to the revenue of
1. Ref. to in Button to Bolt, 3 Oct. 1907, 22/1, JBP.
2, John Percival to Hutton 31 Aug. 1907 end • in Hutton to
Bolt, 3 Oct. 1907, 22/1, JHP.
3. Hutton -to Bolt, 3 Oct. 1907, 22/1, JHP.
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the Govemunt. In other word.s, it is possible to overdo
cotton growing like other good things and. to do less than
the greatest good to the bumble tropical worker in our
depend.encles". 1 It should be pointed out that these doubts
were equallr entertained by a few officials in the Colonial
Office. Pr example, Sidney Olivier, although he did not
ile out a better future for the Sierra Leone cotton had
nevertheless minuted, "... It is quite possible that we
ixy find tl:at (as in Gambia) the natives prefer to grow
groundnuts or other products to cotton at the price they
will get
However, whatever might have been the effects on
natives of this excessive zeal shown by the BOGA, one must
not fail to point out that son of these comnroial agents
not prinarily engaged in cotton culture were rirely trumping
up charges against the BOGA in order to feather their own
economic nests. Having virtually failed in its efforts to
grow cotton by plantation methods in Southern Nigeria, the
Association concentrated its activity in Northern Nigeria,
where Lugard had. advised that this could only succeed through
1. Holt to BOGA, (nchester), 3 Oct. 1907, copy, 22/1, JUP.
2. Minute of 6 Feb. 1905, by S. Olivier, on BOG .A to 0.0.,12 Jan. 1905,	 267/482.
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Peasant cultivation . Also unlike in the South, the officials
in the North fully cooperated in convincing natives that
cotton was a most usefulo rop in their economy. It is
probable that the planting of cotton diverted native labour
(even if it could be a rgued that the season for groundnut
planting, and harvesting was distinct from that of cotton),
especially In the light of the vigorous spirit with which
officials and the agents of the Association canvassed the
merits of cotton growing. But the Subversive diatribes
against the BCG.A were not always proved. There is no clear
evidence to show that the Governnnt policy in Northern
Nigeria was one of coercion, It is probable that Residents
merely used their power of persuasion in asking natives to
grow cotton on trial, and not generally at the expense of
other farm crops; though one would also suspect that want
of commensurate official zeal for other crops meant that the
natives would regard the Governrznt's persuasion as an order
which probably carried with it the threat of a punitive
expeditior.
It must be noted, however, that others who wanted
the superiority of British cotton industry maintained were
1. Por the q)eretions of te BCGA in Northern Nigeria, See A.O.
Anjori British Occupation and Development of Northern
Nigeria,	
- 1914, (Unpublished London Th.D. thesis 1966)
pp. l6G2O3.
489.
not in favour of the Imperial grants given to the BOGA.
Thus while the Duke of Ihrlborough and the Earl of Scar-
borough in 19 06 were asking the Earl of Elgin to continue
the work of his predecessor by subsidising the BOGA and.
extending the railway in Northern Iligeria, 1 and G.A. Arbuth-
not in 1910, praising the Government for the annual grant
of £10,000 just given to the BCGA, 2 the demand by the Earl
of Ronaishay that there should be a proper "agreement" for
this subscription 3
 was surely ominous.
reover, the manner in which the BCGA oonduted its
West Af rican ope rat ion s d is illu s lone d even the off ic ia is who
were favourably disposed to the cotton movement. The BCGA
asked the Colonial Office f or one relief after another,
starting from 'all technical reStrictions cxl importation of
cotton implements and appliances, and for relief from import
duties', 4 to free rail transport. 5 It asked for monopoly of
1. 111. Debs., 4s, Vol. 156, 1906, 1428, 1429-35.
2. HO. Debs., 5s, Vol. XV, 1910, 883-7.
Arbuthnot, Gerald Archibald; born 19 Dec. 1872, oldest son
of I]àjor-Gen. Wm. Arbuthnot. Educ. privately. Naval Servic
1892. Private Sec to Rt. Hon. Walter Long M.P. 1894, also
in that capacity 1895, 1900; Vice President Budgetary
Protest league 1909; M.P. (Unionist) Burnley 1910; Vice-.
Chancellor Primrose League, 1912. Belonged to Canton.
Died Sept. 1916.
3. EL. Debs., 5s, Vol. XV, 1910, 892.
The BOGA in 1910 received an Imperial Grant of £10,000 a
year for 3 yrs. See 00 96/503, Treasury to 00, 6 Jan. 1910
. e.g. BOGA to 0.0., 12 Jan. 1905, 00 96/437
5. BOGA to 0.0., 6 Feb. 19 05, Minutes by Butler 17 Feb.,
Antrobus, 21 Feb., 00 96/437.
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ginning 1- and received colonial and imperial grants even when
some colonial officials felt that there was no usti1ication
for them. 2 Persistent letters from the BOG-A soliciting one
exemption after another plagued. and. infuriated. the Colonial
Office officials.3 But it was the !req.uont failures of the
Association's crops that wspecially referred to. On 21
January 1905, F.A.G-. Butler criticised the BOG-A operations
in West Africa: "... We have this failure an Sierra Leone.
1. BOG-A to 0.0., 9 Nov. 1906, 00 520/40.
2. Minute by J.G.A. Eutler o BCGA to CO. 23 rich 1907,
00 267/500 . In this minute, Butler points that 1. Ptàb'jn
"says in his minute on BOG-A that he thinks that there is
no justffication for continuang a grant to the BOG-A ...".
3. On 1 Feb. 1905, plagued by the Association's letters
reminding the 0.0. of its alleged promises O± exemptions
at a conference, Butler angrily minuted: ".. We can not
expect the BOG-A to set the Thames on fire so long as they
prefer to trust their recollections of an Imaginary
conference rather than ioDk up correspondence ..". See
BCGA to 0.0., 12 Jan. 1905, 00 96/437. Gradua1ly BOG-A'sletters became more incessant and more annoying to the
0.0. On 6 Nov. 1907 Strachey minuted to Antrobus, "You
did your best at the meeting to stop the BOG-A (or rather
Mr. Hutton) from sending these foolish letters, but witheut
effect ,." on BOG-A to 0.0,, 17 Oct. 1907, CO 520/55. A
few months after Antrobus was nauseated by repeated demands
from the BOG-A. "This sort of correspondence is a great
waste not only of our time but also of Mr. Hutton's".
On BOG-A to 0.0., 9 Jan. 1906, 00 520/73.
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The re ha a been a similar failure an the Sobo plains an
Southern Nigeria, and the Association have abandoned the
plantation there an order to start another in the untried
district of Uromi, although Professor Dunstan, after a most
elaborate analysis of the soils and conditions of the Sobo
Plains, thinks that the Association have not given the distriol
a fair trial. In Lagos, we have as yet no actual failure,
but manager succeeds manager with bewildering rapidity, and
the task of e ach seems to be to report upon and remedy the
miadoings of his predecessor. I cannot help thinking that
this chaotic state of things betrays the lack of some one
controlling influence capable of mapping out a definite line
of action and of seeing that the various agents employed work
an with the general scheme .... The West African experts and
managers engaged by the Association are mediocre men. They
may be quite good as far as their capabilities go, but their
capabilities do not go far ...") Sidney Oliver was rather
of the opinion that it was the bad organisation inherited
from A.L. Jones that ruined the Association. He scornfully
minuted: "The operations of the Association an West Africa
have the slant of Sir A. Jones' methods. Bag scheme; big
talk - bag capital: and then this thing coming to work itself
1. Minute of 21 Jan. 1905 by F.G.A. Butler, on BOG-A to 0.0.,
12 Jan. 1905, XD 267/482.
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with any one who can be picked up and labelled an "expert".
Results - Lots of money wasted and, no real start iide.
Great cry and little work .. He is to big a n.n for details
and too easily sal4sfied that anyone will do to man his
schemes .. In fact, having served my time as an agrictultural
missionary in the tropics, I find myself amazed at the light-
heartedness of expenditure with which ney have been embarked.
in this business fll
The importance of the movetnetit for colonial cotton
supply was matched by an eq .ually increasing demand for other
tropical products, notably rubber and palm oil and. kernels,
which had the effect of bringing West Africa more into the
economic gaze of the European public. The battle of economic
ideas which1ad loomed large on the imperial horizon since
Cbamberla:lv fired. the imagination of his countrymen with the
abundant potentialities of the tropical "estates" was soon
reduced to two contending philosophies struggling f or mastery.
The crucial issue was whether the trQdltional British policy
in West Afr.ca of allowing natives to develop these produot4
assiSted by teci-zUcal instructions from the colonial admirii-
stratioris should. prevail, or whether the other selfish,
immoral nd eventually uneconomic policy of taking the
1. Minute of 22 Jan. 1905 by S. Olivier, ibid.
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development out of the bands of natives and running the economy
In the interests of European speculators and financial cor-
pora-t ions with hired na tive lab our, would win the day. It
was a gigantic fight maInly directed against huge economic
into rests with power to damage those etandin on their way.
Started as a fight behind, the public scenes, it perrorce came
to the open when the menace of commercial adventurism proved
well-nigh irresistible. Though they did not always see eye
to eye with each other's methods, the Third Party was supported
by the APS and later by the amalgamated society in alerting
the Colonial Office to stand up to the traditional policy.
The unscrupulous drive for arboricultural concessions
which hac rendered the West African land question almost
unanswerable, particularly on the Gold Coast, was so pervasive
t1t native welfare was severely threatened. By discussIng
the role of representative syndicates and the economic ideas
and activities of commercial adventurers, one feels the ethos
of the commercial world of those days. flut it is the insistent
vigilance of British humanitarian conscience that lays bare
the feverish sordidness of theoommercial speculations.
In November 1906, it came to the notice of the
British Parliament that a syndicate, the British West Africa
Produce Company, bad obtained enormous concessions In Sierra
leone. It was a huge monopoly covering over 4000 sq. miles
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of territory , giving the company sole and exclusive rights
to nthie and. procure substances of commercial value, to collect,
plant, and reap vegetable products, to cut timber, erect
buildings, make roads, bridges and railways, while the chiefs
were alleged to have guaranteed labour? In essence, it was
a badly disguised rubber concession. 2 ben it was discovered
that Sir Prederick Cardow, who, as Governor of the Colony
had been venomously attacked by the Third Party and various
Chambers of Cotnrnerce for his alleged blunders and i.xicoinpetence
during the Hut Tax crisis, was Chairman of this new ComjAny,
these transactions were subjected to more intimate and per-
sistent questionings.
It appears that in 19 01, the area concerned had
been granted by the protectorate chiefs to the famous five
Thompson brothers 3 of Sierra Leone. Through the conventional
system of territor:i.al transfers, the concession was sold to
a certain Edward Brunner, who had formed a company, the Sierra
Leone Plantations Company Limited, to purchase and cultivate
vegetable products in the colony arid Protectorate of Sierra
Leone, having acquired, as they alleged, twenty concessions
1. HO. Debs. 4s, Vol. 165, Iov. 1906, 386.
2. Holt to Jiore1, 28 Oct. 1906, P8/3, E1M!P.
3. HO. Debs. 4s, Vol. 165, 190 6 , 386.
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or leases from the Union African Company in 1901.1 In
February 1905, Edward 8runner wrote to the Colonial Office
askiog that certain amendments, favourable to the interpre-
tation of these concessions, might be nude in the laws of
Sierra Leone, and that Certificates of Validity in regard to
their agricultural rights might be granted. 2 The Colonial
Office was not impressed with this demand. Cox was suspicious
of "this concession over lands as big as Yorkshire". 3 Sidney
Oliviev sarcaetiôally remarked that "the prospectus as drafted.
is a document which could ustffy the victory of any such
scheme" and he advised that the office should not give Edward
Bitinner "the slightest encouragement" 4 s:mce to sanction such
concessions would be entirely contrary to sound public policy",
seeing that "the prospectus is a transparent and clumsy
claptrap to catch investors". 5 The Colonial Office told
Brunrier that his request could not be complied with. 6 1[o
further correspondence seems to 1ve passed between the
I. Ibid; also HO. Debs. 4s, Vol. 167, 19 06, 1022.
2. HO. Debs. 4s. Vol. 167, 1906, 1022.
Edward Brunner to 0.0. 18 Jan. 1905, 00 267/482.
3. Minute of 27 Jan. 1905, (ibid).
4. Minute of 21 Jan. 1905 by S. Olivier (ibid).
5. Minute of 17 Feb. 1905 by Olivler (ibid.).
6. C.0. to E. Brunner, 25 Feb. 1905, CO 267/482.
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Concessionaires and the Colonial Office but Edward Brunner
on 25 Feb. 1905 had had interviews with officials who although
they found. it impossible to encourage him to hope that the
concessions he held could be legalised, nevertheless told him
to resubmit an application f' or recognition o± his concession
'on a reasonable scale'.' It appears also that before this
date an application had been rrde, in October 1904, to the
Sierra Leone Concessions Court to have these concessions
declared valid by that Court, but was withdxwn without
any pronouncement being made by the Court upon them. 2
 Since
concessicrns purporting to grant rights in or over land,
minerals, precious stones, timber, rubber or other products
of the soil, mquired the validation of the Concessions Court
of the Colony, it appeared that the concession in question
was illegal. Two other Issues made this concession more
revolting to many members of parliament; the connection of
Frederick Oardew with the Company that ultimately took this
concession over; and the fact that in 1902 the Sierra Leone
Govenor, Leslie Probyns had passed an Ordinance i.,n the
protectorate prohibiting any person from holding concessions
in respect of forest produce in excess of 40 sq. miles, a
1. Minute ci' 25 Feb. by S. Olivier, 00 267/482.
2. 110. Debs. 4s. Vol. 167, 1906, 1022.
497.
revelation which tended to justify Holt's suspicion that
these protective Ordinances merely shut out genuine compet-
itors while opening the forests to favoured monopolists.1
People were, therefore, particularly opposed to
this concession which Rev. J.T. Ioberts of the Sierra Leone
Auxiliary bad seen as very objectionable and irregular.
}Iolt felt bitterly against this affair when he wrote angrily
to Mo:rel:
"Under the pretext of giving the natives plants of new
products, they are to have the disposal of every produce
that may be of value excepting palm tree, kola tree
produce and rice. This is far-reaching. The thing is
not honest I fear. And a Liberal Government is allowing
1t Is this sort of thing to go on in all our Colonies"
If so the whole of them will soon be parcelled out
amongst a lot of London sharks intent on share engineering
and. Stock Exchange gambling. There will soon be no room
left for anybody but the concessionaire after the style
of the French Congo. It all comes because of our des-
perate hurry. Ie have not the patience to develop slowly
as we have done so well on the Coast. Why can we not
follow the example which has worked so well for our trade
in the past, but that we must needs go monopoly bunting"
It is the East African craze which has now crossed the
Continent - originally irnprted from South Africa, we
shall soon see the whole country an the hands of a lot
of barpies on these lines. I am really sorry to see it.
Look out next f or all the same thing in the G11 Coast,
Northern Nigeria etc., and watch your BCGA. I ditrust
much all these patriots and philanthropists ...".'
Supporte& by Holt's moral inspiration, Morel opened
a campaign in the West African_1ii1 against concessions in
1. IIC. Debs. 4s, Vol. 165, 1906, 386.
2. Holt to Morel, 28 Oct. 1906.
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general and the Sierra Leone on in particular. Describing
it as "a most objectionable monopoly", Morel attacked the
ambiguity and -the vagueness of that company's prospectus,
caricatured the tiny sum which it alleged the natives and.
government would receive for these apparently extensive rights
to timber, rubber and other produce for 99 years. He then
exhorted the G-overnraent -to give freedom, protection and
encouragement to capital and enterprise so that trade would
penetzte into the beart of Africa, and. thus decrease the
danger of concessions obtained merely -to attract capital
which were directed more f or Stock Exchange operations than
for real, just and equitable commercial transactions.1
he ntter -was taken up by humanitarians and
Radicals in parliament, notably Sir Charles D.1ke. Duke,
ihose cooperation Morel had sought in the campaign "to keep
the trade monopolists out of British West Africa" ,2 was
already opposed to !nonopolles and concessions. Since his
a 11
unwilling provisos that if granted at/"-these concessions
should. be snll	 area, short in time, and subject to close
scrutiny ....3 were not satisfied by the Sierra leone
1. vest African Mail, 9, 30 Nov. 1906.
2. Morel to Duke, 28 Nov. 1906, copy F.8./EDLTP.
3. See Dilke&s paper on 'Concessions' in Papers of the Native
Races Conference of July 1911. (Ed. . Spiller) pp. 321-322
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concession, he ioined others in asking questions. On the
19 November 19 06, D.M. Sm.eaton, uking his debut as Liberal
LP., ketcbed the history of the dubious transactions in
which Pred Cardew was involved, lampooning the pretensions
of the Company and pointing out its threat to native rights.
He implied that the Colonial Office was guilty of dere-
liction of duty when he insisted that it should have inter-
fered to prevent the "underlings of compQnles" be ing "believed
by "the ignorant natives to be acting with Government author-
i	 another memberity". On the same day 1 .-I suggested that, having regard
to the fact that the person rincipal1y concerned, (now
Chairman and Managing director of the Company) was formerly
the Governor of the Protectorate, a circular should be issued
to all governors advising them not to identify themselves,
after they had ceased to be governors, with commercial under-
takings in the country where they had served. Questions were
so persistent that Chi'chfl1 even agreed that this rather
wide measure Was contemplated. 2 In December o± the same year,
1. EQ. Debs. 4s, Vol. 165, 1906, 386, 387.
Smeaton, Donald Mackenzie, Born 9 Se. 1848, son of n.J.
Smeaton of Abbey Park. Educ. St. Andrews tIniv. (M.A.);
of zidian Civil Service 1867-84; Burrza Leg Co., 1898-1902.
Liberal LP. for Stirlingehire from 1906. Vice-PresIdent
North Hants Liberal Federation; President Basingstoke
Liberal Association. Died 19 April 1910.
2. ff0. Dabs. 4s. Vol. 165, 1906, 386, 387.
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members persisted in their questioninge, searching into the
legal and buixan implications o± these concessions. Churchill
then told the Commons that no opinion had been taken by the
Colonial Office legal advisers on these concessions at the
time when the chiefs sold them or when the prospectus of the
Company name was issued, and that the Governor of Sierra Leone
would be told to watch the operation to prevent any illegal-
ities ol' abuses.1
Members of Parliannt, however, were not conviced.
Other individuals outside Parliament, typically John Ilolt,
believed that Churchill was either ignorant of the details
of these operations or s deliberately xnlslead.2ng Parliament.
1O1t emphasised the likelihood of the latter view:
"The danger is that some of -the Colonial Office people
may be conniving after the thing as the Foreign Office
have done over similar sinister doings in Uganda. 1hen
shall we get honest and strong Ministers who will have
the courage to make a iblic example of a few of these
official sharks? They exist in everyone of our Govern-
nnt Departpents and are a danger and a disgrace to the
State • •
It is, of course, true, a s An trobus privately told
Morel, that it was not always easy to give full explanations
within the limits of the answer to a Parliamentary Question.3
1. HO. Debs. 4s. Vol. 167, 19 06, 1021, 1022.
2. Holt to Morel, 13 Nov. 1906, P6/3, ED?IP.
3. Antrobus to Morel, 4 Fob, 1907, 2vate, P9/A-B, EIThLP.
5 O,
At times, questioners did, not always master their facts and
therefore started from an erroneous stand-point, thus affordin
the Government a means of escape. Though this factor could.
not palliate the gravity of the case against the Colonial
Office for actually conniving at the concession, it as clear
that members were unaware of the fact that the validity of
these concessions rested with the Supreme Court of Sierra
Leone and not the Colonial Office. The Colonial Office iintst
be blamed in the final resort, for knowing that these alleged
concessions were 'objectionable' and 'inexpedient in the
intersts of -the natives of the Colony generally- but allowing
Itself to be hedged in by technicalities. Iripite of
Churchill's studied eloquence, members of parliament persis-
tently pointed at the dubious role of Cardew, "the crankt',
making broad hints of undue influence in these transactions.
Even Antrobu g 7who had told M3re 1 that he be lieved. Cardew was
"nOt influenced by any unworthy motive" by being connected
with the Company, yet seemed very worried. with the whole
thing; his sarcastic view that Cardev's feelings "bad always
been that be was so honest himself that be didn's always
recognise a rougue when he met one", 2 was most revealing.
1. Minute of 7 Jan. 1907 by J. Anderson on Geo. Dickinson
& Co. 28 Dec. 1906, 00 267/91.
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The forlorn humanitarian struggle against -the
honoured. illegality of the British West Africa Produce Company
monopoly was contemporaneous with the reckless attempt made
by a certain Robert Brown to seize tribal forests in Ijebu
Ode under the plea of 'Concessions' agreement with the Awuale
This time it was the APS that alerted the Colonial Office and
the British public. It appears that on 5 October 1906,
Robert Brown had obtained the signature of the Awujale and
Qhiefs of Iebu Ode in the Western Province of Nigeria to an
agreement purporting to assign bin the right of prospecting
for timber, during a term of six months, over an area of,
approximately, 600 square miles, with the option of 1king
possession of such portion of the forested land as he might
hereafter desire to purchase at the rate of £1 per square
mile. It was believed that the Awuale received a present
of £20 in exchange for his present of -two s1eep and a "turkey",
and was understood to imply in the agreement that he did not
grant more than prospecting rights for six months specified
in the "agreement".
Shortly afterwards, ]xwever, Robert Brown attempted
to expell from the forest, over which hehad acquired re
prospecting rights, several native traders who were there
cutting mahogany in accordance with long-established cietom,
and who were assured by Lt. Herne, the D.C. in charge of tha-t
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area, that Brown had no power to interfere with them unless,
at the end of the six months prospecting period, be obtained
a concession on the -term aale1 c ons e n ed to by the .Awujale
on behalf of his people. It appears that on 22 April 1907,
Captain Wood, who had succeeded Lt. Herne, as the local
Comniissioner, had informed the Auja1e that the Governor of
Lagos bad modified the terms of Brown's 1 concession' to the
extent of allotting to him only 1OQ, instead of the 600,
sq.uare miles of forest land, and. that the Awujale must sign
a new document assigning to Brown absolute ownership of this
restricted. (but probably rioheSt) area, evidently without
receiving any payment for the same, even at the former ;
hypothetical rate of £1 per square mile. This the Avujale
declined to do, alleging that be had no power to sign away
the property of others, towards whom he was only in the
05 it ion of a t rs tee. The reu pon, Ca pta in Wood was a liege d.
to have angrily informed -the Avujale and the Chiefs that the
?Coessjo, ihether they signed it or not, would hold good.
Persevering in the same attitude, Captain Wood on 25 April of
the same year, summoned the principal native traders, and
severely reprimanded them for holding meetings calculated to
stop th trade of the district. 1Ihen one of their members
ventured to ustify the native traders' proceedings, be was
alleged to have been struck by Captain Wood, with the result
that in the turmoil that ensued, all the traders were tern-
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porarily arrested and then ignomanously expelled with the
threat of more severe punishment if they made further comp-
laints or offered further resistance to the proceedings of
Robert Brown,
The Awujale immediately lodged his respectful appeal
to Sir Walter Egerton f or protection, but the Lagos Governor
appointed a Commission of Inquiry on 2 May of that year.
The Acting Commissioner for the province, Copeland-Crawford,
who opened the inquiry on 10 ray, did not seem to have visited
13ebu Ode with an open mind. He appeared to have made no
attempt to convince the people of Iebu Ode either that the
sanction of the Awuale and his Chiefs wa& originally
obtained to the so-called 'concession', or that it would be
illegal if the people did iot consent to the transaction.
Rather, he oontented himself with insisting on compliance
with the nstrnction of the British authorities, warning the
protesting natives of the perils they would incur by further
opposition, and inviting them to accept service under Brown
f or what pay he was willing to offer them.1
In August 1907, the .APS memorialised Lord Elgin an
the light of these anomalies, demanding "more searching
investigation" arid. condemmang 1he dictatorial and offensive
1. Aborigi4e's Friend, Oct. 1907.
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conduct of the officials concerned". 1 By however mentioning
that the transaction was a sale or confiscation of land., the
APS raised an agonisang issue, and gave the Colonial Office
an excuse -to temporJ,se in a ratter, as it alleged, that
infringed no native land. rights. ¶]!taus Strachey minuted:
"... There is no question of the traosfer of any rights
of ownership of land, the point an dispute being whether
Il1r. Brown has the sole right to cut timber within an
area of 100 sq. miles subject to certain oond.itions as
to payment to ihe Cbies and -the government on account
of every -tree felled".
The APS in another memorial opposed this academic interpret-
ation of the deal.	 king a practical assessment of the
transaction, it correctly rraantaaned. that a 'concession'
might prove to be a 'sale'. It argued:
"Any concession of exclusive rights to cut timber through-
out a specified area of forest land, without any time
limit, is, if not strictly equivalent to an absolute
concession of that land, similar in its present effects,
and certain to be so regarded in perpetuity or for so
long a time as the property is of any value to the
concessionaire ... .
The APS view carried weight. The Colonial Office was now
beginning -to see -the practical implications of such 'concess-
iOns', although it excused itself from intervention by
pointing at irrelevant technicalities. Butler minuted
1. APS to Elgin, 6 Aug. 1907, 00 520/55.
2. Minute of 7 Aug. by Strachey, ibid.
See also 0.0. to APS, 19 Aug. 1907, CO 520/55.
3. APS to 0.0., 23 Atig. 1907, CO 520/55.
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accordingly:
"so doubt the 4P5 are right. An exclusive concession to
cut timber 1n a forest tract would be a very mich. the
same thing in the eyes o the ordinary native or in 1t53
effects on him as the alienation of the land for the
term of the concession. But as far as we 1now, the
Awujale and Chiefs have not signed the further agreement
which is apparently necessary to make the grant of such
a concession technically effective in this case and it
would seem that they have no 2,ntention of doing so
There can be no doubt that the affair, at least from the
London official view, appeared 'fluid and uncertain', but
what seemed uppermost in the mind of -the Colonial Office was
that Robert Brown had probably satisfied the requirements of
the Forest Ordinance, and was in any case, supported by the
,'men on the spot' who had a tborouh grasp of the transaction.
The I3ebu Ode affair, however, caused much protest in lagos,
and was one of the iSsues cited by Bishop Johnson for the
necessity of a local Auxiliary of the London Society.2
These desperate attempts to procure tropical
products, notably, timber, cotton and rubber, corresponded
with the oormnercial importance of another raw material,
naineyj, palm produce. The Palm fruit consists of a number
of spiky cones. There is a soft tilpy substance insIde of it
1. Minute of 28 Aug. 1907 by F.G.A. Butler, ibid.
2. See Chap. IV. or the impact of the Brown affair on Ijebu
Society see 0.0. Ayantuga, Iebu and Its Neighbours 1851-
(Unpublished, London Ph.D. thesis, 1965) pp. 32&38.
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known as the perloarp which is composed of palm-oil proper,
a thick yellow stuff. Inside this pulpy covering is a nut.
The kernel inside the nut also contains oil of a purer kind.
Palm-oil and the palm-kernel oil were used largely in the
manufacture of soap and candles. But Chemists discovered
that by refining the palm-kernel oil it was also edible, and
So it became the principal base in the manufacture of marg-
erane and various other nut-butters. Consequently, upon the
increasing demand for the product by manufacturers of soap
came the demand f or it by the manufacturers of rxargerine and
nut-butters. The nnufacturers 0±' soap, therefore, bad a
formidable interest to compete with for the raw material, but
f or those who manufactured both soap and butters, tins discov-
ery gave them a greater opportunity for more economic gains
and more incentive to procure these raw materials.
Before European industrialists tried to introduce
new ideas to West Africa, the industry bad operated in a
native way. The natives prepared the palm-oil and brought it
to the merchants who shipped it as palm-oil. They also
cracked the nuts and brought the kernels to the merchants as
kernels. Liverpool used to take most of the palm-oil and the
vast majority of the kernels went to Hamburg to be re-distrib-
uted among the great palm-kernel crushing mills in Europe,
particularly In Gtermany. The revolution which beset this
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economic system was largely due to the comrrcia1 ideas of
Sir William Lever and his opponents.1
Sir William Lever was always in need. of regular raw
materials for his soap manufactires and with the improved.
utility of alm-kemel oil, the scope of his manufactures
was widened. From the time he started searching for raw
materials, he bad always believed that Africa was a potential
supplier. In the early years of 1902 one of his research
workers on the West Coast had reported. to him that there was
"an inexhaustible supply of Palm Oil and Palm ICeniels i the
hinterland there only awaiting development attd the opening
up of markets". lever believed. that there was "ample niarg1n
for lower prices in all these products before the supply i
checked". In 1903, another investigator, Harold Greenholgb,
1. Morel to W. Oadbur, 14 Oct. 1912, copy, P8/ Cadbury etc.
EDME'.
Lever, William Hesketh, 1st Viscount Leverhuln (1851-1925 )
soäp manufacturer; entered father's grocery business In
Bolton, 1867, partner, 1872; with his brother, began to
trade on his own account, specializing in Soap, ±Qr which
be chose the rage 'Sunlight', 1884; began to manuf. it in
1865; inaugurated new town Port Sunlight, on ersey, bearBebirigton, Cheshire, as centre for his works and. work peopl
1888; Lever Bros made Ltd. Co. 1894; by purchase or inter-
change of shares exercised wide control over soap-making
trade; liberal M.P. Wirral Div. of Cheshire 1906-9; brought
and. won libel action against Northoliffe press, 1907;
baronet 1911; baron 1917; Viscount 1922.
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had reported the potentialities of the 1est Coast.1
In order to ip tIiese abundant resources, Lever
tried two methods, namely, to secure concessions from the
Colonial Office for a more effective exploitations of these
potentialities, and, secondly, to enter the ancient and.
harzardous Coast trade if the former approach failed. AS, it
will be shown, the idea of concessions had a serious bearing
on the native question, Levers tried his hand at the old Coast
trade • But he was vir tua lly i.gx oran t of the ins thod of trade
that
which prevailed there, an particular, /in general merchandise
which insured traders against incessant fluctuations in
produce prices, lie, therefore, decided to enter this West
African trade by buying over W.B. cIver and Co. Limited,
a Liverpool firm based in Nigeria, dealing an timber. Though
this firni was in desperate financial circumstances, its take-
over initiated Lever into the complicated and mysterious
Coast trade. Moreover, W.K. Fandlay, Chairman of Maclvers,
who directed Lever's West African operations, had a firm
grasp of the "rascally" trade of those days. Ie also purchased
Peter RatclaIfe and Co. wiuch traded to Sierra Leone, and
another bankrupt company called the Cavalla River Comny
1. See Charles Wilson, The History of the Unii4rer: A Stin economic Growth and Social Change, Vol. 'I (London, 1954),
p. 165. -
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which operated. trnly in Liberia. Before 1914, Findlay bad
launched Lever's vIest African enterprise on a firm basis.'
But these developments were already influenced by new devel-
opments in Lever's economic ideas which had compelled hm to
demand special privileges from the Colonial Office. His aim
was to tap the raw materials at their source, to set up
machinery to treat the palm-oil and. kernels at their place
of pioduction. This led him into protracted negotiations
with the Colonial Office and others, controversy with his
commercial rivals, and heated political and humanrbaraan
protests.
Iegotiations between Lever and the Colonial Office
for Oil Palm concession in Sierra Leone began 5n 19 07 when
Alidridge (a retvired officia]. of 1he Sierra Leone service)
went out on his behalf to negotiate With the Goveroor and the
native chiefs. Alidridge's proposals commended thenelves
xiether to the Governor, Sir leslie Probyn1 nor to the Colonial
Office, since they included proposals for the grant of
exclusive rights of buying the palm fruit from the natives
over extensive areas at the price of £1 per ton 1e1ivered at
a proposed factory. The Governor bad reckoned that tins
proposal would give a payment of only 2d. per day to the
1. Ibid.; pp. 166-7.
511.
natives who petorned the arduous and. dangerous task of
gathering the fruit, while his eon-tracts with the chiefs
for the supply of' native labour for the generel purposes of
the Company at 10 shillings a month (i.e. 3d. a day) was
found. to be too much below the normal price of labour as
carrier which was 7 a. per day. On 23 June 1908, Lever held
an interview with Sir Leslie Probyn, Sir R.L. Antrobus and
others and was told that his proposals were anad.missible,
but that he should ubrnit an amended version, which be did.
in the letter of 6 July 1908. These arinded proposals were
considered by the concessions Committee of the Colonial Office
at a meeting held On 27 October 1908. It was pointed out by
Colonel See ley, the Unde r-Parllamenta ry Secre tary, that what
Lever asked for amounted to a practical monopoly of erecting
mills for expressing oil all through the Protectorate. This
was inadmissible. Lever was advised to submit alternative
proposals which again ha did in his letter of 31 October of
the same year. These proposals were again submitted to the
Concessions Committee, which advised that with certain
alterations they should be submitted to the Governor f or his
consideretions ,1
The Governoxs views were received in January 1909
1.	 mo by W.D. Bilis, Nov. 9ll on Lever Bros to 0.0.
15 Nov. 1911, 00 554/10.
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restricting these demands. Consecluently Lord Crewe, the
then Secretary of State, decided to offer Messrs. Lever the
exclusive right for 2]. years to erect power mills for
expressing oil within an area of 10 miles radius, and also,
with the same area and for the same period, th exclusive
right of e recting means of mechanical traction, except as
against the Government. On 12 February Messrs. Lever replied
that the Colonial Office proposals precluded the successful
operation of their scheme. This was regarded by that office
as havi.ng closed the matter. But in Irch 1910 the same
Alidridge represented to the Colonial Office that Messrs.
Lever wished to reopen the netter. An :Inteview was accord-
:ingly arranged with Messrs. Iever1 but it soon appeared that
A1ldrie's advances were unauthorised and that fresh
proposals were not contemplated by Lever.1
However, in June of the same year, Lever made
private proposals to Lord Crewe for a monopoly in Sierra Leone
for the use of a certain depericarping machine. Lord Crewe
did not consider the suggestion really dmissib1e, but he
promised Lever that he would reconsider the question of
extending to Sierra Leone by Ordinance the privileges of any
patent f or a depericarping macb:Ine which his firm mi.,gbt take
1. Memô.by W.D. Ellis, Nov. 1911 on Lever Bros. to C.O.
15 Nov. 1911, 00 55 4/10.
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out from Britain. Lever was not satisfied with this proposal;
he rather desired that his Own previous proposals should be
reconsidered. But the Concessions Committee, soiiwhat
influenced by the advice of Major Williams, a District
Commissioner, who knew Sierra leone well,and. who considered
even a partial monopoly injurious,advised that "no fresh
proposals made by Messrs Lever or any other firm on the lines
of previous proposals should be accepted without careful
consideration and enquiry". Lever iias therefore told that
negotiations could not be reopened on these lnes, though
this did not preclude the reopening of other proposals. The
matter seemed to have rested there until 2' October 1911 when
Messrs Lever expressed their willingness to accept the terms
offered to them on 6 February 1909. The Secretary of State
therefore decided to continue negotiations on these lines,
subject only to the provisional definition of the area, and
to a clear statenen-t that no grant of property in the palms
or their fruit would be allowed; in other words, the nuts
would have to be purchased from the natives at current prices,1
As these Sierra leone negotiations were going on,
Lever Brothers were 1so carrying on different transactions
with the Goveniment of Southern Nigeria. On 21 October 1910,
1. ibmà.by
 W.D. E11is, Nov. 1911 on Lever Bros to 0.0.
15 Nov. 1911, CO 55 4/10
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they informed the Colonial Office that they were already
established in Southern Nigeria, having obtained sites in
three places on -t1 Coast (namely lagos, Opobo, and Calabar)
for the erection of oil mills for crushing Palm Kernels, and.
secondly that they were desirous of erecting, in the palm
country of Southern Nigeria, depericarping nchinery for the
trieatnnt of the whole fruit of the palm. As regards the
first part of their intimation, i.e • erection of mills for
crushing Palm Kernels, Lever Bros bad gone ahead, their
building at lagos approaching completion by this date. It
seemed, therefore, that this part of their enterprise was
independerit of the other.1
As regards the second part, Lever Bros made it a
condition that the distance of 20 miles round the location of
each instalment of depericarping machinery should te considered
as reservations f or the special purpose of their proposed new
enterprise, i.e. "that rio other firm should be allowed to
erect and establish machinery for the treatment of the whole
fruit within 20 miles of our location". This proposal was
sent out to the Governorfor his observation. Egerton was,
with certain conditions, in favour of acceding to their
application. One of these conditions was that the "privileged
1. C.O. mo by Charles Strachey 17 Nov. 1911 on Lever Bros
to 0.0. 15 Nov. 1911, co 554/10.
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sites" should be limited to three.1
On 7 Pebrary 1911, The Concessions Committee
considered the rratter. Its members did not like the idea of
subecting such a large area to the conditions asked for by
Lever Bros. They pointed out that three a/reas of 20 miles
radius would amount to 1/20th of the total area of Southern
N:i,geria, of which only a certain portion was palm bearimg.
Eventually, Lever Brothers were offered facilities, subject
to the conditions laid down by the Governor, for 20 years in
respect of one area of 5 mIles radius. No other reply,
beyond an ac1now1edgernent, was received from Messrs. Lever
by the Colonial Office, but on 14 June of the same year, it
appears that Sir William lever had an interview with the
Secretary of State, when be stated that be did not propose
to proceed with his application. On 20 June, however, 1ssrs
Lever wrote to say that the alternative proposal which the
Colonial Office nude (in its letter o± 24 Feb.) would not
justify the large expenditure necessary in erecting a mill.
They added that they believed that their proposals had never
been properly understood, and then referred the Oolonial Office
to their letter of 31 October 1908 on the Sierra Leone project
1. ei1è-hy Charles Strachey 17 Nov. 1911 on lever Bros. to
0.0. 15 Nov. 1911, 00 554/10
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as containing a "fuller explanation".'
On 15 Novethber 1911, Lever wrote a very long but
general letter to Harcourt referring to the greatly increasing
demand. for oils and fats for aritficial butter and. soap-
making and to the fact that the major portion of the tropical
zone was in non-British hands. lie pointed out that the bulk
of the artificial butter produced came from foreign countries,
that British firms had not raid the same attention to the
cultivation of oil-bearing plants and. seeds as bad foreigners,
arid that without energetic action the whole business might
rass into foreign hands. He then criticised. the attitude of
the Colonial Office towards Lever Brothers' proposals for
developing this business in West Africa. 2 The power of this
economic argument was undermined by Lever's extrQvagent demands
and, ungracious remarks, and found officials not wholle support-
ing him. Sir H. Just minuted: "I should be agreeable to take
the II. of Comrrons as arbitrator: tell them what Lever
demanded, and what we replied and. why and leave them to say if
the C.Q. deserve the remarks in this letter. But I fear Sir
W.H. wouldn't be agreeable". 3 Sir Johe Anderson, although ha
1. m4'by Strachey, 17 Nov. 1911 on Lever Bros. to 0.0. 15 Nov
1911, CO 554/10.2. Lever Bros to C.O., 15 Nov, 1911, CO 554/10.
3. Minute of 18 Nov. 1911, ibid.
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found. I4ever's allusions "amusing", at the same time minuted:
"... There is some force in his contentions, and if only he
were not so exacting we might come -to terms with him. But
he always wants better terms than anyone else, and forgets
-that our roads and. railways have got to be paid. for, and also
the better security of enterprise under British rule. After
all we profess to be in the iz'opics mainly for the benefit of
the natives and nterial development is too often at their
expense, while our roads and railway help him to get a better
price for his produce and bring him within reach of
civilization" •1
Following an interview with Earcourt, Lever on 30
1iovemer of the same year, wrote to the Colonial Office,
requestlng ..,reservations of areas in the Sierra Leone protect-
orate, (larger than the area promised him :izi February 1909) and
suggesting that delimitation of the areas would. be settled
locally after inspection by his firm representatives •2
new development chagrined the permanent officials. Ellis
minuted with asperity:
"I do not Imow what passed at the interview. I have
only to point out that Messrs, Lever are now opening
-their mouth wider. On 2nd October they agreed to
1. Minute of 18 Nov. 1911, ibid.
2 Lever Bros to 0.0. 30 1ov. 1911, 00 267/537.
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accept the area of 10 miles radius as sufficient for their
purposes. This was the area which, after the long nego-t-
aat ions .. was fixed as the maximum which ought to be
granted. Mow they ask, in addition, for an area, 10 miles
radius round Little Bumbar. I wo1d only point out that
while Yonni Station is on the route of the Central Rail-
way which is being built, Little Bur4ba is close
Rowalla and Makene to which it as proposed to carry the
lines, so that with these two areas Messrs. Lever will
practically monopolise the 'rich palm belt which the
Railway was designed to open up'".l
Piddes agreed with Ellis: "Unless the S/S gave any promise2
to Sir W. Lever as to (2) I th2.nk it should not be granted
There are others :izi the field, and we don't want to give a
practical monopoly to anyone. 3 Sir 3. Anderson supported
Piddes, saying that "there are other Richmonds almost as
poweiul in the field ...".4 in spite of Emmott's view,- i
1. Minute of 2 Dec. 1911 by W.D. Ellis, ibid.
2. On 7 Dec. 1912 Harcourt minuted "Lord Ernmott and I made no
promise of any kind to Sir W. Lever", CO 267/537.
3. Minute of 5 Dec. 1912 by Piddes, CO 2.67/537
4. Minute of 5 Dec. 1912 by 3. Anderson, ibid.As Ellis pointed out in another minute o± 11 Dec., there
were about three other sets of people interested an the palm
oil industry in Sierra Leone other than Lever: The Cros-
fields, soap manufacturers who had a representative thin in
IT; The S ie rra Leone Dove lo pne nt Syndicate in which S ir
Phillips, Brunner Mond, orton Gri±'fiths and Co. were
interested. A certain Colonel Patterson was in the Prot-
ectorate on their behalf. Major Craster, who in 1908 was
establishing nutcracklng mills at Manjahum and Mafakoya
in the neighbourhood of the Central Railway an Sierra Leone.
519.
favourable to Lever -that "deve1opnnt will not take place at
all if every bird in the band. is rejeoted for one in the bushy
the pernnent officials succeeded in previ.nting Levet from
having his new proposals.
On 20 December, therefore, Lever Brothers applied
to the Colonial Office for grant of areas in Southern Nigeria
and the o1d Coast for establishing depericarping nchinery.
Like the Sierra Leone one it ias vaguely stated that the
precise local.ties would. be settled. later, and that as soon
as selections were approved, it was proposed to ship mcbinery
and begin operations without delay. 2 It must be remembered
that the terms proposed to be granted. in Sierra Leone were
those embodied	 the Colonial Office letter of 6 Feb. 1909
to lever Bros., with a special proviso that the concession
was to convey no property in the palm trees or their nuts
which would have to be purchased from natives in the ordinary
way. The unusual nature of Lever's application soon involved
the Colonial Office in legal tangles. Although W.D. Ellis
was "in favour of faci'ities to ssrs. Lever 0 since "the
resources of' the oil palm are being a great deal neglected.
by the natives", be nevertheless felt th the position In
1. M.nute of 5 Dec. 1911 by Emniott, on Lever Bros. to 0.0.,30 Nov. 1911, CO 267/537.
2. Lever Bros. to 0.0,, 20 Dec. 1911, CO 554/10.
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the a-old Coast as regards such a concession as Lever wanted
was "not very clear". In the first p1ce, Ellis was of the
opinion that such a proposed concession '1omes prima fade
under the Concessions Ordinance" because the site f or the
factory and the vayleaves for the Trmways Were "rights over
land". If this was considered a trifling area, Ellis argued
that the que s tion uld a rise whe the r the right to e xlude
others from do:ing the same thing witb:in the area proposed
(10 miles radius from a point i.e. 314 sq. . m1.) was not
itself a concession of that area, in which case it was in
excess of the grantable area of 20 sq.. miles according to
the Concessions Ordinance. Secondly, he pointed out that
be
Lever's proposals did not seem to/either agricultural or
aboricul-tural ooncession5 (in which case they would 1ve
specifically required the Governor's assent) but a "menufact-
uring concession", and therefore
	 subject to the approval
of the Supreme Court, which, however, he felt "could not be
given owing to the excessive area". Thirdly Ellis argued
that the word "fore st" Wa s a touchy one which c ou id exo Ito
native animosities since the whole question of the treatment
of forest lands was then sub jud ice. He concluded a.n the
same minute:
"., I think we had better teli Issrs. Lever that the
grant of concessions in the Gold. Coast is largely
regulated by the Concessions Ordinance under which
grants of rights over land by natives require to be
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validated by the Supreme Court, and. that it seeme to
be a somewhat doubtful question of law whether Such a
concession as they propose would. require such validation,
and if so whether it could. under the existing law be
validated •.t,.l
But Sir J. Anderson did not fee 1.that the Concessions
Ordinance was "at all applicable to this matter". He pointed
out that all that Levers wanted was that no one else should
be allowed to get up a factory within a radius of 10 miles
of their own, and. not rights as regards the products of the
soil or the soil itself except what was covered by the factory
and by their tramways. He was of the opinion that if the
consent of the Government (not the Court) was required before
any one could set up a factory, then all that was necessary
was an agreement with the Government that 'they would not give
their consent to any other factory within the area (though
it was possible that the assent of the Court might be required
for the factory site and the land required for the Tramway).
He, therefore, suggested that if it was necessary to remove
doubts, "we should have short Ordinances passed saying that
no one may establish a factory without a license from the
Government which may be issued subject to such condtpns and
limitations as may from time to time be prescribed by the
1. Minute of 23 Dec. 1911 by W.D, Ellis, .Leve.r Bros to 0.0.,
20 Dec. 1U, CO 554/10
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Governor in Council') Harcourt also surveyed the legal
implications of Lever's application and supported Anderson's
view of the ne Ce ss ity for an Ordinance • He minuted: "..
Under th circurntances there seems no way of 	 nting them
the e*uslve right except by an Ordinance .. • Anderson
was gratified and minuted: "Then we must have an Ordinance
a soon as possible and the Governor should be so 2ns-tructed".3
When the Governor of the Gold Coast received this
instructions, he opposed the idea and wrote to Harcourt:
".. While I fully recognise the great impetus which the
enterprise of a firm of the standing of Messrs. Lever
Bros would, no doubt, give to the palm oil industry,
while I earnestly desire to see that industry developed
In order that the agricultural prosperity of the Colony
should not be So dependent on cocoa as it is at present,
and while I admit that if the economic methods of
obtaining oil which hessrs. lever Bros. propose to
introduce were adopted elsewhere the local method of
preparation of palm oil would probably become unremi-
nerative, I view with sorr apprehension, as a rrtter
of principle, the introduction of an Ordinance which
in effect enables the Government to grant monopoly, and
this view has been endorsed by the members of my Executive
1. Minute of 29 Dec. 1911 by Sir J. Anderson, ev' Bros. to
2. lte ooP 	 i? 'll 1 "ircourt, lb id.
3. Minute of 29 Dec. 1911 by Anderson, ibid.
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UCouncil ...
Earoourt's reply was, surely, a non seq.uitur:
".. I share your view that the grant of such privileges
ought to be expre ssly author ised by leg is lation, and. I
have to enclose herewith a copy of a draft Ordinance
which I have caused to be prepared, and which will, I
am advised, confer the neoessay powers upon the
Governor of the Colony .....".'
When this transaction came to light the proposed concessions
were severely attacked by Tory members of ParUarr6nt, by
interested parties and. by the humanitarians. The surprising
thing was that 1brel supported Lever. This novel attitude
on the part of Morel, therefore ! demands that his exact
relationship with Lever should be probed and the nature of
the Lever experainent, which Morel alleged would be beneficial
to natives, examined.
In the summer of 1910, when Sir William lever was
closely concerned with, his African enterprise, he had. nOticed
that orel was a great force to be reckoned with in West
African matters. Therefore, he approached More], and then
1. For details of these communications see: Correndence
respecting the Grant of Exclusive rights for the extraction
of oil from Palm Fruits: Presented 10 both houses of
Parliament by Comrxndf His	 Jan • 1913. (Cd. 6561).
For the opposition to the meáure in Gold Coast Legco see
G.E. tca]1e: Great Britain and Ghana: Documents of




sought an interview. "As we are becornng 5nterested 	 the
West Coast of Africa", Lever wrote to Morel, "I recognise
that you have, probably, more than any other man an int]mate
knowledge of matters connected therewith". 1 Morel could not
understand why Lever (who had regarded the action of the Congo
Reform Association as hypocritical) should now seek his co-
operation in African questions. It might be that Lever had
come to know that it s Morel who had framed questions which
Sir Charles Duke had put in the Commons to the effect that
Soap manufacturers weie grabbing palm tree products in the
Gold Coast and Sierra Leone. 2 Lever might also have been
worried by Morel's publicised view that the Government should
lini-t the Gold Coast Concessions to mixing only.
On 17 August 1910, at the interview which lever bad
arranged, be had informed Morel that he wanted a grant for a
term of years £ or a crushing plant an Southern Nigeria where
he would have exclusive rights within a twenty miles radius.
It is not known exactly the whole story of what happened at
the interview, but it is clear that Lever wanted to know
whether Lre1 bad anything to do with the Colonial Office
opposition to his scheme; Lever also probably induced him to
1. Iever to Morel, 28 July 1910, P8/Lever, EDMP.
2. U.K. Hudson to Morel, 28 July 1910, F9/E-L, EDLIP.
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promote his application by pressurising his friends at the
Colonial Office.
Morel began to impress officials with Lever's
venture and its utility to the Empire. He claimed that
Lever's scheme was not difrerent from the BOGA, except that
Lever in this case obtained no £10,000 annual subsidy from
the Government. He pointed out to Strachey that by with-
drawing the cracking industry from the banks of the Rhine
to tl:ie banks of -the Niger, Lever would open up "tremendous
future possibilities for Southern Nigeria without in any way
doing an injustice to the native races. He claimed, in the
same letter, that Lever was "a decent, honest, and most
powerful capitalistic force", who would be "good, for British
West Mrica".1
Charles Strachey, howevor, was not over impressed
with Lever's methods and schemes. He told Morel that in 1909,
Lever had asked the Colonial Office not for one but five or
six different concessions, including an exclusive oil mill
and a rai.lway, which would have given him a quasi-monopoly
for purchasing nuts in his area, Strachey added that Lever
bad "also asked for practically all his things to be free of
duty, .. and wanted peculiarly favourable rates on -the railway
1. Morel to Strachey, 17 Aug. 1910, co P9/2-5, EDP.
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and, several other things". The Colonial Office, according
to Strachey, had. offered lever a circle of quasi-monopolistic
incfluence half the diameter he requested and for 10 years,
1
and Lever had declined.
When Lever heard of these expressed views of Strachey,
he wanted Morel to arrange an interview between Strachey, Sir
Walter Egerton (who 1was then on leave) and himself. 2 Morel,
however, adivsed lever to start making peace with other big
merchants i.n Southern Nigeria who might oppose him, and. the
German merchants who had vested interests in lhe Rhineland
crushing industry. He had advised lever that British firms
would ohallenge his attenipts to procure special privileges.
At the same time, however, Morel agreed to act as a contact
man f or Lever during his trip to 1'Iest Africa, as be alleged.
"all for the good. of West Africa". 3 On 7 September 1910,
Morel and Lever bad another meeting.4
Three weeks later, however, it appeared to Morel
that be was g-iving Lever too nn.ich support without ensuring
-that he would toe the Third Party Line; theref ore be made
1. Strachey to Morel, 20 Aug. 1910, private, P9/P.-S, EDIP.
2. Morel to Straohey, 27 Aug. 1910, copy, F9/P-S, EDP.
3. Morel to lever, 1 Sept. 1910, copy, P8/Lever, EDrP.
4. lever to Morel, 2 Sept. 1910, P8/Lever, EDME.
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the first attempt to convert Lever to his creed • He wrote
to Lever: "I wonder if you have ever read the late Mass
Kngsley's 'West African Studies' published by lYhcMillan?
As you are now going to become a great power in Ivest African
Affairs, I so much. wish you would read, that book, written
by one of the finest women that ever lived". 1 Lever1 vho had
cannily expressed his :mterest in West African Colonial
reforms, 2 now pro:fessed respect for ry Kingsley as well.3
Therefore, 1Vkre1 arranged an interview between Lever and.
Egerton which took place on 19 October4 virtually two weeks
after the Morels had dined with Lever's family at "The Hill",
Lever's home at Ilamps-tead . Af-te r this interview with
Governor Egorton, Lever felt all was well with has 11geria
enterprise.	 He assured Morel that
	 his proposed Nigerian
was added
concession/a free trade clause which would prevent "Lever
Brothers at the present time (and) I hope for all t:une from
departing from the lines I had laid down", He at the same
1. Morel to Lever, 23 Sept. 1910, copy, P8/Lever, EDIIIP.
2. Lever to Morel, 22 Sept.. 1910, P8/lever, ED
3. Lever -to Morel, 29 Sept. 1910, P8/lever, EDMP.
4. Lever to Morel, 29 Sept. 1910, P8/Lever, EDMF.
5. Lever to Morel, 4 Oct. 1910, F8/Lever, EDiT.
6. Lever to Morel, 19 Oct. 1910, P8/Lever, ED1.
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time deceptively assured Morel that "we have never seriously
entertained plantation propositions on the lest Coast of
1Africa". And, alas, be gave Morel a cheque for £100 for
2his African ouneyL
The energetic rrnner with which Morel took up the
cause of a monopolistic firm like Lever Brothers would
suggest that there was an arrire-pense. Although this
cannot specifically be pioved, the documents suggest that
money probably changed hands. A more :unportant consideration
must have been pc1itica1. It was already becoming very
certain that Morel wanted to stand for Parliament, and the
politioal support of William Lever was very vital for his
nonnnation a Liberal Candidate for Birkenhead. Apart from
this political solidarity whiqh Lever's power could promote
for him, Morel was of the opinion that it was better to be
on good tern with such a poverf'ul man as Lever as and then
reform him from within, than -to openly challenge hm and get
crushed. The validity of this view is illustrated in Morel's
protracted attempt to reform Lever in-to embracing Wt Morel
regarded as the right policy; but it was also an exercise
which clearly betrayed the true economic ideas of Sir William
1. Lever to Morel, 17 Oct. 1910, F8/Lever, EDITP.
2. Lever to Morel, 24 1ov. 1910, 24 July 1911, P8/Lever EDMP.
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Leve r.
In April 1910, Lever announced. his intention of
gog into the Congo where he had been invited by the Belgian
authorities to open up plantations. In his letter of 7 April
to Lre1, he had referred to African civilization wltht.
derisive sarcasm+ but a few days later, be requested. Morel
to give him "any hints and suggestions with a view to our
better understanding of the native, so that we may be better
able to prove -of service to him as well as ourselves •,,,i•2
More1' advice was to the point. He told lever that lie was
"q.uite satisfied -that the native of tropical Africa eve rywhere'
was "a being, under jus-b rule, of further developing the
excellent qualities he already possessed", and maintained
his "fundamental conviction" that the future and happiness
of the native depended "entirely upon his being able to retain
possession of his land ad his free unfettered right to buy
and sell in the produce thereof". He added "I should feel
much 1ppier than I do now, because I am quite satisfied that
your intentions towards him are dust and humane".3
With these excellent views, Lever was perplexed; he
1. Lever to Morel, 7 April 1911. P8/Lever, DL1P.
2 Lever to Morel, 11 April 1911. P8/Lever, EDLP.
3. Morel to Lever, 12 April 1911. copy P8/Lever, EDME'.
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began to show his true colours. He did not believe that the
black-man bad anywl-isre shown the requisite organ ising ability
to use his land, lie was o:r the opinion, for example, that
Cotton planting :in Tigeria would bQa hopeless failure unless
the white nn owned the 1an as a jplanter as in America. He
was particularly opposed to Morel's idea of the black-man's
happiness. To William Lever, happiness did. not aepend. on
"the possession of something" one could. not develop; he
endorsed John Bright's definition of happiness as "a congenial
occupation with a sense of progress", and he saw no progress
in the negro's natural methods. In his view, the negro in
I,iberia and. Haiti, had not shown any organising ability and
"developing and opening up large tracts of country" was not
a congenial occupation for the black-man. lie even quoted
Miss Kingsley to support his contention against the so-called
halo built on the negro: "We are apt to forget in England
that it has taken us nearly two thousand years to raise
ourselves from the wood and fur-skin clothing ante-Roman period
to the silk hat and frock-coat", and. we have not nlide a
better nn of the 1ative in West Africa by enabling him in
less than one generation to jump to the silk hat and frock-
coat period. We have trade him a worse iran In my opinion".
Lever, at the same time, believed that the land of the world
ought to be an the possession of those people who could develo
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it and. its resources. He felt that a un should be nudged
by his ability and wil:Ungness to nke use of "God's earth";
"it would serve no useful purpose for the whiternan to go and.
reverse the Divine Order under which intellect and rxtftal
power" ruled, developed, protected and benefitted "inferior
nations"
With this type of idea, Morel's disagreennt could
not have been more emphatic. Morel Soon became very sus pi-
c bus of Lever's course; when a dinner was arranged at
Lever's Hampstead home, to enable Roger Casement, who,
according to Morel, had a "power of persuasion and a person-
ality, an individuality, and a way of putting th:ings which I
2
altogether lack", to help bring Lever to the right policy,
Morel advised Casement beforehand to be on his guard. 3 And
in his reply to Lever's letter of 18 April, Morel prolested
against Lever's attempt to group him with, the Thilanthropic
School, a result of which, he alleged, waS "a combination of
ill-guided. educational effort and missionary teaching", which
bad produced and. was producing the denatbonalised African -
the "silk bat and. frock coat product". But he was particularly
1. Lever to Morel, 18 April 1911. P8/Lever, EDM.
. Morel to Casennt, 12 April 1911. P8/Casement, EDLP.
For Casement see Rena Jocoll, Rogr Casement (1956).
3. Morel to Casennt, 20 April 1911. P8/Casement, EDME'.
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opposed to Lever's views about tropical development. He told
Lever that the only justificat1on of British assumption of
control over the tropics was that it should lead to the
enrichment and moral and material bettement of their peoples.
Such a rule should be directed towards making their land more
valuable and more productive to them by giving them markets,
b npsrting to them the main requirements of forestry con-
servation and scientific agriculture. Morel summarized with
a disarming logic:
".. That we should take advantage of their ignorance of
what science has taught us, and take their land away
from thorn in order to develop it for ourselves, leaving
them in a position for all time of 2 hired labourers,
is a policy with which I could never agree. The same
logic would have justified the seizure of England 250
years ago by the Chinese because they understood the
rotation of crops which we did not, and therefore could
get more out of the land. than we were able to do at that
time. Sicce then we have leamed. the rotation of crops
and many other things, largely through ideas we have
borrowed from other peoples. There is no,reason why the
West African should not do the same ...".
Lever bad contended that the above policy was an impracticable
utopianism, failing in economic perspective and unfair to the
progressive world. He had charged Morel with expressing a
mere literary and theoretical view, since he did not "possess
the commercial sense 	 But rather than shift from his thesis,
1. Morel to Lever, 19 April 1911. copy F8/Lever, EDT.
2. Lever to Morel, 18 April 1911. P8/Lever, EDMP.
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Morel amplified, it; he told Lever that where a nn owned his
land and was his own riaster, he would make that land produce
tenfold more than irj cases where it belonged, to son'body else
and he was a nre labourer upon it working at a fixed. wage;
therefore, Morel claimed that lus system was better for
1humanity at ]arge since It also ensured larger productions.
It must be pointed out, however, that much of Lever's
illustrations from West Africa were erroneous. The case of
Liberia was certainly disnl; but then as, Morel also pointed
out to him, Liberia certainly was an obect lesson, which
strengthened rather than weakened the Morel thesis. %That
ssed. under the name of Liberia was a collection of 40,000
descendants of slaves shipped back from the United Stat9s to
Africa, divorced from their race, Europeanized, dumped. down
on the West Coast, and. then expected. to be anything else but
what -they were. Liberia was not a failure of the policy which
Morel advocated; if any-thing, it was a testimony to the
failure of the Philanthropic School, being, as Morel believed.,
an artificial product which had nothing to do with African
life and stood wholly outside it.
If Liberia was a negative example of the truism of
-the 'Third Party' creed, other positive instances belied. the
1. Morel to Lever, 19 April 1911. copy P8/Lever EDItlP.
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assumptions of Sir William Lever. In Senegal, the native,
his OWl] landowner, covered vast stretches of country with
groundnut cultivation, exporting that product to the value
of veil over £1 million sterling annually,ad extending this
crop annually as railway faoltities for marketing increased.
In the Gambia, under the same condit1on, a similar industry
bad sprung up. In the Gold Coast, the native, again his own
landowner, had in a few years built up an export industry in
cocoa which developed virtually from nothing to well over £1
million sterling per annum. Moreover, in Southern Nigeria,
hundreds of thousands of ratives, themselves landowners, were
employed in the palm oil and kernel industry, exporting nearly
£4 Million sterling annually. In the Benin District of
Southern Nigeria, in no fewer than 700 villages, at the
suggestion and with the technical help of the Forestry Depart-
ment, the natives established communal plantations of
Funtumia Elas-tica which in 191]. was estinated, at £200,000.
From the revenues derived from tapping rubber and other
licenses on forest exploitation, Benin natives supplied Benin
City with water at a cost of £5, 000, built a splendid Court-
house, and improved the city generally. ' The fate of the
cotton industry, as already shown, was due to Other £aotors,
1. Morel, N1g ria, op. cit. pp.
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if not due to the policy Lever was now advocatiag. While the
price of other tropical products which the Ifl.gerian native
was produciag bad been'ascendg'at the time, the price of
cotton (that as paid to the native) was kept at the same
low level under the system of monopoly then in vogue. The
absence of competition, more than anything, was detrimental
although
to the cotton industry because/1e demand hitherto bad
exceeded the supply,. a the price offered -was :insufficient
to encourage further production. Moreover, the high freight
rates paid to a monopolistic shipping system under Sir A.L.
Jones, took a heavy toll from the cotton industry, not to
mention the sad mismanagement of the BOG-A's West A:frican
operations,'
When Sir William Lever alleged that Morel had no
commercial sense, his 3udgement was faulty. Like G.A. Moore
of the Liverpool Chamber of Comma roe, Lever thought that the
esserce of commerce was a severe restriction of its affairs
-to pounds, shillings and pence. The human elements involved
in this quest f or more profits never seemed to have mattered
to him. For him to imply or insinuate that Irel's critic isrn
of his economic ideas stemmed from an ingrained antagonism to
the commercial develoment of West Africa, even from the
1. See Chap. VII
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Personal point of view of the business man', 1 was a curious
absurdity. Morel's attitude to Lever's Congo concessions
was based on several considerations; he as favourable to
Lever, but feared the effect such an example might have in
other parts of tropical Africa. In the Congo, the natural
conditions of -the natives bad been so ruthlessly destroyed
for a quarter of a century by the Leopoldian system that
Morel saw the Lever enterprise which was about to start there
in a different light; from any such scheme which might be
started in British West Africa where natural conditions still
existed. So long as Lever was alive to direct it, Morel felt
that his Congo enterprise might even be good for the Congo
humanity, and compared wi-tb the conditions which bad existed
under Leopold, might even be "elysian".2
But more than anything, Morel was haunted by
philosophical doubts. The principle of vast areas of land
in uninhabited tropical Africa passing under the control of
a European company was to him a 'bad' one; any active sanction
of it might lead to the initiation f similar schemes run by
men perhaps even worse than Lever himself. The people of the
Congo had been so battered, broken and pulverized by misdirec-
1. Morel to Lever, 19 April 1911, copy P8/Lever EDMP.
2 Morel to Lever, 25 April 1911, copy P8/Lever EDLfP.
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ted capitalistic effort that Lever's advent amongst them,
might never lead to anything worse. Nevertheless, the
ultimate development of Such a scheme, in which half the
personnel was to be Belgian, when Lever was no longer there
to direct it, must be a heart-searching issue for a nn like
Morel who }d the interest of African natives at heart.
Morel could not therefore but conclude that it would have been
better, more just, profitable and. practicable, had lever
started his scheme on entirely different lines.1
William Lever was so convinced of the purity of
his ideas that he jettisoned Morel's suggestions as either
not practical or worse. He was ready to believe, as ias
true "of universal nature" that the African could "cultivate
the soil and produce the products of the soil" when best he
was interested in his labour. In fact, Lever conceded. that
the cultivation of groundnuts, the making of A lm oil and.
the cracking of palm kernels by band could only be done in
the peasant way. It was, according to him, when one stepped.
out of this primitive field and tried to produce raim oil by
uchinery and express the oil from the groundnuts that be
found that he bad already travelled the full range of the
1. Morel to Lever, 19 April 1911, oop P8/Lever ED1P.
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Afrioa ability) He ustffied his scheme with. other
economic arguments.
Lever bad. asked the Belgian and. British G-overnrnents
to see that factories were not erected within 20 miles of
each other. His idea, as be explained, was that the native
was free to supply whichever factory paid him the best prices
for the fruit. He claimed that he was content with the
geographical advantage each factory would. enjoy under which
the native would be at a disadvantage of porterage to carry
his fruit to the distant market. He pointed out that this
theory had, In fact, prevailed practically throughout the
very districts in Southern l'Iigeria which Morel had pointed
out as prosperous, because the iran who 'irde' the palm oil near
a certain market -took his products to that market and sold it
to the buyers for either John bit and Company or the African
Association, whoever was in the market. All other distant
markets, Lever said, were out of competition. Moreover, those
buyers in one market, neither having nachinery (which might
be rustIng) nor large capital in perishable machinery, could.
afford to buy or not to buy as their orders from Europe
required. Lever, therefore, pointed out that with this
arrangement, competition would respond to the ordinary
1. Lever to Morel, 21 April 1911, cop P8/Lever LDL.
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commercial rule which prevailed in Liverpool or London)
One imist agree with Lever, however, that once a
real factory was put up in one area, the whole structure of
trade came under a entirely different :footing. A :Cactory
was like a baby that imist be fed; the proprietor was at the
mercy of the nrket. Because of uncertaintj.es of rw nterial
factories bad primarily beenjiilt only in European centres
(like Marseilles, Hamburg and Liverpool) since these could
draw supplies of kernels from as far north and south of the
globe as they wished; which meant also that they paid world
price for these products. Moreover, if the price of palm
kernels in Africa was above the parity for coconuts in the
Phillipines, Singapore or the South Sea Islands, the factory
in Liverpool, hamburg or Lrseilles, could cease crushing
palm kernels and could commence to crush oopra; therefore,
there would be no great variation in the oil e qu iva lent • It
would appear that the oil crusher in Europe was in a strong
position under these circumstances. Lever, therefore, was of
the opinion that it was quite impossible to put capiil into
mills for dealing with palm fruit in Africa and still enjoy
this advantage if the proprietor did not get his fruit from
at least 10 miles radius of the factozy; if the factories
1. er -to Morel, 21 April 191], 	 py 18/Lever, EDMP.
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were serarted. 20 miles from each other, each factory would
have at least a zone of 10 miles round the factory; that
distance whilst sufficient to ensure each mill its on supply
at a fair price was not so great that natives could be in any
way exploited. "They would still be sure of that reward
which sweeter1abour, the market price for their product".
He regarded it as an "impossible" proposition that nnufact-
urers should put up mills or factories on modern lines in
Africa without ensuring a base of operations in the supply
of their ra materials.1
Yet it must be observed at the sane time that Lever
always emphasized his difficulties as if he was compelled to
put up factories in Africa. If the other &tropean manui'acturier
were so much at an advantage, that was the more reason why
Lever should lve "stayed put" in Europe and continued the
business in the old way. He actually believed that coming
to Africa would place him at an advantage. He could procure
this advantage in two main ways. Possibly, he could have
profitted. by cutting out the European middleman and still
paid slightly more for the fruit. It was more probable that
he would have used the geographical disadvantage the native
would suffer to ray him a smaller price for his labour. But
1.	 to Morel, 21 April, 1911, cp F8/Lever, EDMP.
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Lever might even have combined elements in the two methods:
cut off the European competitors and yet id the African
less and then build up an economic empire. However, innocuous
Lever's scheme 'ooked on paper, Morel 1ew i.ts implications;
it would in praQtioe lead to forcing natives one Way or the
other. For these "awful theories", Morel could only express
a "thousand pities" -that lever was "surrounded by evil
counsellors". 1 He never gave up this battle for Lever's
conversion.
It should. never be understood that Morel was really
opposed to Lever, He bad even inyolved. himself so muQb in
the Lever negotiations that some Gold. Coast educated nativeS,
then smarting under his support for the Porest Bill and. his
role in the West African lands Committee, had. accused. him a
reoeiving bribes from .uterested capitalist firms. 2	money
changed hands between lever and Morel, as some evidence
indicates, it appears that Morel did, not really fulfil his
own part of the quid ro quo, at least to -the extent Lever
would have wished. Lever even began to suspect that Morel
had damaged some of his Nigerian projeots. Inspite of Lever's
financial and political influence, Morel was always wary lest
1. Morel to Holt, 21 April 1911, 18/8, J?.
2. Gold Coast Leader 6 Dec. 1913.
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the great principle he was fgbting for be weakened. He
told Lever that if the native wag free to sell or not to
sell his fruit according to the attraction of a particular
price offered him, his enterprise in tropical Afraoa would.
be
 mutually beneficial to him and the natLves. But if
pressure Wag brought to bear upon the native and he was
looked upon merely-as a wage-earner who must be coerced
if he refused to ern wages or be given lines of labour,
then the enterprise was ruined. If, for example, the native
of a given area in which Lever had acquired rights thought
be could rrake more money by gathering rubber or other articles,
or that he thought that the price offered for his lm fruit
was insufficient, or at a given moment wished to attend to
the sowing and harvesting of his food crops (a much more
vital affair in the life of the native than most white-men
inagined at this tine); if under these hypothetical oirourn-.
stances, the rtives' objections and difficulties were swept
aside by the method of coercion, Morel believed it would lead
to an unsatisfactory end. He asserted:
'.. J1y firm conviction is that, from the purely titilitarian
standpoint, the Western world will get and is getting
inf in ite ly more out of the West African native by studying
his methods of labour and. by keeping barn a free man rooted
in his soil, rather than by trying to deal with him as
with the Eastern races and. passing the steam-roller of
uniniaginative sameness over his idiosyncracies. The
immense vitality of the West African negro militates
against his being mere mechanical labourer, which is
the characteristic of the Asiatic. But deal with him
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tactfully and. ke him feel he is working for himself
as veil as for you, and. there is no finer material in
the world. ...".-
Morel was not only troubled lest Lever would ignore
these maxims; he, as already indicated, also felt that the
Oongo arrangement had other dangers. The fact that Lever
had become a large land owner in tropical Africa might
stimulate other men who were trying to acquire the land and
resources of West Africa - speculators and land monopolists
In Britain, who would exploit the native and make waste of
his country "in order to acquire temporary )1cbes at the
expense of the piblic i.nterest'. But Morel was always
worried with the acute question of the nature of the ultimate
society that would evolve: "What would be the position of
the native, half a century hence, in the area in which Lever's
Cotnany bad become, not the lessee, but the owner, in view of
the Inevitable increase of population there?"2
These well-reasoned and burrAne argurr nts, aid not
convince William Lever. He still entertained the ingrained
belief that the Nego bad not the requisite "organising"
ability to use his land. The negro could take 311 hand only
a 'atch of land and cultivate it, he alleged; "but if you
1. Morel to Lever, 25 April 1911, P8/Lever, EDP.
2. Ibid.
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take the millions of square miles of land in West Africa
under the control of European nations, you will see that
under a policy of restricting the land entirely to the
Native it is actica1ly leaving Adrica an undeveloped
country for centuries". He claimed that "these regions of
Africa require something more than freedom of the Natives
to nke his contracts and engagements", "if they are to be
opened up and de useful either to the present generation
or to inimediately succeeding gene rations". Moreover "It is
only by utilization o the land that the agreement can be
made profitable to Lever Brothers".1
ot only did. Lever claim a right to the eoi]. and
justified the claim by economic necessity and urgency, lao
even also won-b so far as to prove that his economic method
was n fact quite suitable to the nature of the negro: that
a deperioarping machine or mill for treatment of the fruit
from the palm trees would exactly suit African native
characteristics. His view of the situation was that the
native would be able to gather the fruit in his way and bring
it to the mill at his own time within reasonable limits and
polnts. Thus, Lever claimed, the native might work very bard
f or a week or a day and do nothing for the nex-t week or next
1. Lever to Morel, 27 AprIl 1911, P8/lever, EDITP.
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day and still ma ke plenty of money to ke e p Jiimse If. The
machinery would do the methodical work which, he alleged,
the African native found irksome. The new mechanized industry
was also very congenial to native habits, and, of course,
according to Lever, the policy of plantations would be
congenial to the native. These absurdities apart, Lever
was never concerned with the position of the African native
half a century after his country would have passed to foreign
private corporations; Lever never found it possible "to put
a dead man's hand oi the future")
Aitheugh John Holt had hoped that Lever's Congo
scheme might, with safeguards, prove beneficial to African
natives, 2 he supported Morel's efforts to convert Lever when
it had. become clear that Lever was obdurate and bad refused
to see the rath of humane policy. 3 Holt wrote at length to
Morel in a manner which lifts other corners	 the veil:
"I am glad to see your views so well expressed on this
subject, and the warning you have given Lever, as what
may be the result of his experiment n the Congo. There
is great danger in that direction, and there is great
danger elsewhere, if men seek to obtain a monopoly of
anything - It appears to me that you are thinking how
to protect and improve the native ? whilst lever is
thinking how ha can make the native a mere economical
1. Ive to Morel, 27 April 1911, F8/Lever, EDLIP.
2. Holt to Morel, 6 Sept. 1910, P8/4, EDLP.
3. Holt -to Morel, 17 March 1911, F8/4, ED.
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producer of grease by means of economical inventions,
to be introducted from Europe, the object of which is
prinarily to obtain grease at a lower price for con-
sumption in Europe, than it can be got by the present
primitive methods of obtaining grease (by the natives).
My own feeling is that lever Is going too fast in that
direction; he woul1 be doing greater good to the native,
if be would instruct him first of all, by simple machinery,
to be invented f or the purpose, how to produce a larger
amount of grease products, by hand labour, than be has
hitherto been able to produce without such. mechanical
help. I doubt, however, if Lever is likely to make his
main object that of helping or improving the native. He
wants to obtain grease by utilising grease products on
the spot, where grown naturally, by means of European
machinery, nd the organisatlon of labour on European
lines
However he might have admired. Lever's foresight, ingenuity
and. originality, 2 Holt was always puzzled as to why Lever
only wanted to get grease products in Africa cheaper than
he could buy them in Europe; lever could as well have gone
a step further and produced soap in Africa, insteaLof at
Port SunlIghts "Why did he not build up an industry, complete
in every respect, and not confine it to one department of his
industry?" Eolt asked. He concluded that "there is great
danger in it". 3 "I do ot 1nov if I care f or his ideas in
British Colonies", Holt told Morel.4
1. Holt to Morel, 26 April 1911, P8/4, EDE?.
2. Holt to Morel, 17 Nov. 1912, P8/4, EDMP.
bit to Morei, 15 Jan. 1913, P8/4, EDP.
3. bolt to Morel, 26 April 1911, P8/4, EDMP.
4. bolt to Mrel, 15 Jan. 1913, P8/4, EDMP.
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Opposition to Lever's economic ithods was already
reflected in the activities of his economic opponents. After
Brunner Mond. and Coniny had bought up two other oil concerns,
the two greatest rival firms of soap manufacturers in Britain
at the time were lever Brothers under Sir William Hesketh
Lever and Brunner Mond and Co. under Sir John Brunner.1
Lever had acquired enormous concession in the Congo; he had
also tried to acquire similar concessions in British West
Africa where his efforts were blocked,but his company had
succeeded in getting out of Harcourt a promise of a grant
within
of mills a'ivileges and monopoly of transport 	 a specified
2
area. Fearing to be swamped, Bruriner Mond. floated. a syndicate
and proceeded to obtain 99 years leases of oil-palm bearing
1. Brunner, Hon. Sir John Tomlison, 1st Bt. creatü-d 1895.
]Y.L; £P. (Liberal) 1ortbwich 1885-86; and 1887-1909.
PC. 1906; LI.D. (Hon.) and Pro-Chancellor Liverpool
University, 1909; Chairman of Brunner Mond and Co. Ltd.,
alkali manufacturers.
Born at Everton, liverpool, 8 Feb. 1842; Son of Rev. John
Brunner of Canton Zurich, Switzerland, Schoolmaster at
Everton; married 1st 1864 Salorne Cd. 1874) daughter of
Jazres Iavies of Liverpool; 2nd 1875 Jane Cd. 1910).
Educated in his father's school. Entered merchantile life
at Liverpool in 1857; Served ohn Hutchinson and Co.,
alkali manufacturers of Widnes, 1661-7 2 ; in company with
Ludwig Mond, P.R.S., be established in 1873 the Alkali
works at Nor-tbvich, which was one of the largest in the
wo rid.
2. This syndicate which operated their Gold Coast Concessions
was laiovn as the 'Apo1 a
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lands from the native chiefs in various places in the Gold
Coast, the whole area a:ffeoted being about 300 to 400 square
miles.
'When the facts concerning these concessions came
up in evidence before the West African Lands Committee, Morel
was so upset about them that he at once protested most
vehemently to the Chairman, Di.gby, and endeavoured to
influence him to see Harcourt, saying that it was "a monstrous
thing" that while the Committee was discussing these questions
a thing of that sort should take place, . I since according
to hin, it was 'absolutely contrary" to the policy which bad
brought the Committee into being. It appears that Digby was
unable to do what More]. ad'rzsed, since, as be said, he was
not entit]e d to interfere in rrtters of administration.
Morel alleged also that Digby 'was backed up in his refusal
by W.D. Ellis, a member of the Committee who was also in
charge of -the Gold Coast Department at the Colonial Office;
and that Ellis knew all about this .Apol business and had
2
given it his personal blessing.
1. J.H. Batty -to 0.0. 25 July 1912, CO 96/525.
2. Morel to Cadbury, 14 Oct. 1912, oppy, FS/Cadbury EDIVJP.
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Acting on this soriwbat erroneous impression 1
 ad
having failed with Digby, Morel obtained through Wedgewood
(another member of the Committee) details of these leases
which confirmed the evidence which had inadve reritly slipped.
out from Gi1es Hunt in the course of cross-examination.
Morel then went to see Strachey and demanded one of these
three things: either Strachey must take up the matter at
once with Harcourt, or Morel must see Harcourt Iaanise]1, or
he would denounce the whole thing in the Tines and then resign
from the Committee. 2 Strachey was as incensed as Morel. He
1. Minutes by Ellis on Giles Hunt to 0.0. 2 1Tov. 1912, CO
96/526 would indicate that Morel's impression that Ellis
had given Brunner Mond his blessing was unfounded.
B runne r Mon d and. Co • had amended the ag roe me t of the ir
Concessions to bring them within the Concessions Ordinance
of 1900, Ellis found the agreement "self-contradictory"
and added: "The concession is rather a nullity, Or an
attempt to cheat the devil behind his back: and no self-
respecting Court would validate it ..".
2. Morel to Cad.bury, 14 Oct. 1912, copy, F8/Cadbury.
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wrote a strong minute 1 which was endorsed by Sir John
Anderson and Alfred Emrxiott 3 and sent up to Haroou.rt. The
1. On 31 July 1912, Strachey minuted ".. An inspection of
the terms of this Concession completely justifies Mr.
Belfield 'S views as expressed in iiis report and his
letters. W1..thout ant1ciQting the reomrindations o±
the Committee, I feel quite certain that this sort of
concession is precisely one of the abuses which they
desire to abolish. It is not for mining or for planting,
but practically for absolute rights over the natural
produce of the land for 99 years. - The concessionaires
tray remove villages if they like, or even sell -the land -
the inhabitants become tenants at will. ... I and some
of the other members of the Committee feel very strongly
that it will put us into a very foolish position to allow
concessions of this sort -to proceed, especially as we
have been told by Mr. Hunt (the Solicitor who drew up
these concessions) that they do niot wait for "validation"
of the Concessions 1x begin working on the assumption
that they will be validated ...".
Minute on J.H. Batty to 0.0., 25 July 1912, 00 96/525.
2. According to Anderson, "This concession goes much further
than the Gazette notice, and is practically a grant of
the land and everything now growing or that rry be grown
on it. It is certainly open to grave objection, but as
the law stands, the only thing that we can do to prevent
Its being validated is to amend the law, so as to forbid
the grsnting of such rights, i.e. the right to collect
produce to the exclusion of the natives of the district,
and to remove the natives from the district ...".
Minute of 1 Aug. 1912 (ibid).
3. Emmott minuted: "I entirely agree. We must take every
step - and immediately - to prevent such a concession as
this being validated.
Minute of 1 Aug. 1912 (ibid).
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Secretary of State thereupon cabled out to the Gold Coast
that all these and similar concessions r!n2st be held up until
the Committee bad given its recommendations, and that, if
necessary, special legislation must be passed at once to
prevent this grant.1
Whe xi G ile a Hunt lcn ew that it Wa More 1 Who bad
danaged the Apol concessions, he went up to him, bringing
along the draft Ordinance about the Lever Concessions in
the Gold Coast Gazette, to prove that Lever's scheme would
jeopard.ise the interests of Other commercial firms. At the
same time Sir John Brunner complained of Morel's partiality
and. then visited Morel to find, out why he favoured one group
and an-tagonised another firm engaged	 an almost similar
2busixiess. Lbrel was always of the opinion that Lever's
privileges were not concessions. However he complained to
-the Colonial Office and induced it to revoke the monopoly
of mechanical traction promised to lever because it was
1. C.O • -to OAG. Gold Coast, 5 Aug. 1912 (Tel.) CO 96/525C.O. to OAG. Gold Coast, 10 Aug. 1912, CO 96/525.
2. Morel to Cadbury, 14 Oct. 1912, cppy, 8/Cadbury.
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1detrimental to native interest. But Brunner Mond and
Cornany, he alleged took the undesirable line of end.eavouring
to procure concessionS through the usual rrthod of deceiving
the Concessions Court, ac-tang through -the anstrimentality o:f
"the cleverest man on the Gold Coast", 2 Giles Eunt. Since
Morel believed that Lever's monopoly of mechanical traction
was dangerous to native economic independence, he bad
protested to the Colonial Office; and having also seen -that
the whole operation of the Apol was not only dangerous to
-the native survival but also subversive of the very intentions
of the lands Committee, be had protested to the Colonial
Office which had forced them to modify their concessions.
But Morel was rather -too severe with the .Apol; Lever's whole
scheme was not really less dangerous than Brunner's. It
might be that Morel still cherished his pid. antagonism towards
Edward B run ne r ,vho n 1906 wa s involved in the Sierra Le one
conoessions and ho was probably related to the present
1. E.D. ]orel to Earcourt, 18 Sept. 1912, 00 96/526.
Harcourt to Morel, 27 Sept. 1912, Ibid.
Morel to Earcourt, 6 Oct. 1912, ibid.
On 22 Oct. 1912, Harcourt minuted ".. I am keeping an open
mind as to any future grant of exclusive transport rights"(lb id)
On 17 Dec. 1912, the 0.0. decided to 'withdraw' Lever's
'monopoly' of transport because Tjt would be contrary to
b1io policy'. 0.0. to Lever Bros, 17 Dec. 1912, CO 96/526
2. Morel to Cad.bury, 14 Oct. 1912, copy P8/Cadbury.
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Brunner, but even at that time, Morel had been accused of
not necessarily writing from "In.gher motive", but "to aim
at somebody"1
Since Ilolt had. defended. Morel against the charge
of prejudice and regarded Edward Brunner (who might be
related. to Sir John Brunner) as "an un1own ]ndlvldual",2
Morel's attitude -towards Sir John Brunner's enterprise
seemed to bve been influenced by two rrain considerations.
Sir John Brunner, according to Morel, was "a fine iran"
possessing "a lot of influence with the G-overnment". Moreover,
as the President of the National liberal Federation who had
also thrown his influence consistently into the lines of an
Anglo-German rapprochement, Morel felt that it WS of enormous
importance that such a nn should be won over to the right
policy; be should be made to see the economical advantage
as well as the justice involved in a policy and. "principle
which liberals mist uphold". Apart from this personal merit
of winning Brunner to the cause of reform, Iorel saw that
since official policy itself was in danger of capitalist
subversion, i1 was necessary to block this commercial
1. In a letter of 15 Nov. 1906 Holt told. Morel that a certain
Deuss (a nn of Liberal views) bad, made those allegations
against him.
2. Thid.: It is, however, possible that Edward Brunne r was
related to Sir John Brunner, as Holt suggested.
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adventurism m order to preserve the economic independence
of the African native.1
Although Brunrier's West African operations did
not wholly escape public scrutiny, it was Sir William ever's
negotiations that really caused a political stir m Britain.
When terested sections of the public came to 1v about
these transactions, they rrade spirited protests to the
Colonial Office. The Chambers of Commerce, as usual, pro-
clained hunitarian motives when actually they were fighting
their own economic war agast a powerful opponent. Other
firms who were likely to be affected by the imminent Palm
Oil Ordinance protested most vehemently agast the monopoly
promised to Lever. 2 Although most of these merc1nts affected
were reluctant to accuse the Colonial Office with corruption
in favourg lever, their protests smelt of this charge.
There were, however, one or two who openly accused the
Colonial Office of hypocrisy and corruption. In Janrry 1913,
G.E. Powell, who lived	 Lincoln, asked the Colonial Office
why it gave "a radical firm" like Lever Brothers large areas
without rent or tribute tax. He told the Colonial Office:
"You have, by your extraordinary protectionist policy on
______________________________ _______ 	 -
1. rel to Cadbury, 14 Oct. 1912, çppy F8/Cadbury.
2. For the protests from the Chambers of Commerce, Simpson,
North, Harley and Co., etc. See Cd. 6561.
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behalf of Lever Brothers 'enslaved' all the poor riggers
who .. live in the palm tree region of Sierra leone .. and.
also prevented competition in buying lm oil and nuts
in that region. Your professed free traders bawl out your
belief in free competition In trade, but before God you are
hypocrites." 1 Although the officials minuted that "this
effusion" should be "put by", 2 others had even uade bolder
charges. A few days before this, a certain nrobant interests
In alrn produce on the Gold Coast, D.D. Dickinson, have gone
up to the Colonial Office and angiily told Ellis that the
Lever affair was squalid. According to Ellis, Dickinson's
anger wa invincible:
"He complained that we favoured the rich - and said it
was the Irconi business over again. I said that f
he had a charge of corruption to bring against H.M.
Ministers the place to bring it was in Parliament;
or a-b any rate not in their offices. .... Finally
be withdrew the charge of cgrruption. Bu1 I dare say
he will make it again ...".'
As Ellis indicated, the ideal venue for criticism
was Parliament. For several weeks the Tory Party had.
conducted a cam1gn of innuendo arid, insinuation by daily
1. G.H. Powell to 0.0. 7 Jan. 1913, 00 267/555.
2. Minutes by Sir H. Just, 8 Jan. 1913, W.D. Ellis, 10 Jan.1913, (ibid.).
3. Minute of 8 April 1913 by W.D. Ellis, on D.D. Dickizison to
0.0. 30 Dec. 1912 and an interview of 8 April 1913, 00,96/526.
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questions in the Commons, accompanied. by offensive and often
disorderly interjections. On 13 November 1912, A]Ired
Ltt1eton led the Tor lee in probi. g the irit and. letter of the
Palm Oil Bill then presented to the Gold Coast Legislative
Council and which bad been opposed by some ' fficial and
native members. 1 Harcourt's explanation that the Ordinance
was "permissive in character", and "general in scope"2 left
members of Parliamentonvinced. A Austen Cbamberlain was
requesting that the relevant papers should be laid before
the 11ouse, W. Moore, told the Commons that Lever's applic-
ation was specially granted to him "in return for services"
he rendered "to the Radical Party". 3 Harcourt's explanation
that he bad asked a de puitat ion from the three rrin Chambers
of Commerce whether they felt Lever was favoured "on account
of political considerations" and that they bad "at once
disavowed any suspicion on -that ground", 4 in fact implied
that Harcourt was already worried about this parliamentary
reaction before it came.
	 n1bers contined to barrass Harcourt,
the
criticising the draft Ordinance and the White Paper on ,±ever
1. HG. 5s. Vol. XLIII, 1912, 1967.
See G.E. Metcalfe, Great Britain and Ghara, op. cit.
pp. 540-4.
2. HC. 5s. Vol XLIII, 1912, 1967.
3. HO. 5s. Vol. XLIII, 1912, 1969.
4. Ibid.
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privileges gust published 1 which did not allay the fears of
nmbers. When on 5 Dec. of the same year W. oore wanted
to 1ow whether Sir William 'ever bad been "placed in
possessiom of his new territory", Colonel Seeley was anzed
at the insinuation 2 led by G.A. Touche, members of the
Tory party dropped hints of corrupt motives,iile allegations
were made that agreements bad been entered into with local
chiefs in Southern Nigeria obviating the necessity for
legislative actionfor Lever there.3
Harcourt was definitely worried by these attacks,4
coming, as they did, at a time when the British public was
already aware of such a ministerial impropriety as the
1. Cd. 6561, op. cit.
2. HC. Debs, 5s. Vol. XLIV,. 1912, 2465.
3. EC Iebs. 5s. Vol. XIX, 1912, 1500-1.
1W Dëbs. 5s. Vol. LII, 1913, 978, 979-80; 519-21.
HO Debs. 5s. Vol. LV, 1913, 213-14.
Vide also 00 267/555; CC) 554/10.
The Daily Citizen, 21 Nov. 1912, 2 Dec. 1912, took Wedgewood.
_task for his iuppor f or the lever Concessions.
Touche, (Sir) George Alexander, 1st Bt. 1920; Kt. 1917;
Born at :Edinburgb 24 y 1861, son of Anthony Murray Touche,banker. Educ. at Edinburgh Institution and Univ. Head of
firms of George A. Touche Co., London and Birmingham, and
Montreal and Toronto, and Touche, Niven & Co., N.Y.,
Chicago etc. Conservative M.P. for North Islington, 1910-18
Died 7 July 1935. A City nan.
4. Vide African Mail, 21 Feb. 1913.
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rconi scandals. The surprising thing, liowever, was -that
Morel openly supported Haroourt and Lever during this crisis.
In an editorial in the African 1il, Morel hoped that "the
attacks upon the Colonial Office in this country and an West
Africa will cease"; ha tzstffed Lever's experiment an vest
Africa and Harcourt's support for it:
"what the economic results of lever Brothers' bold
experiment nay be, time alone can show. But this
experent will now be coniuctd. in British West
Africa, under conditions which inflict no hardship
upon anyone, and which do not conflict with the
policy of rraantainitig both the rights of the natives
in their soil and. the open door for trade, which Mr.
Earoou-t and his predecessor have consistently pursued ".
In Febrtiary 1913, he wrote against those who had. generated the
"odious warfare f or the past three months against" Ircourt
and Lever, 2
 and. cleared Harcourt of corruption in a letter to
Holt:
".. I see there is going to be a regular Tory attack
on Mr. Barcourt on what is erroneously termed thettqi	 They are iiaking a great mistake,
because as I happen to 1now, Ircourt has played an
absolutely straight gan in this matter all through •.".
Although Morel bad privately preached. to Lever the necessity
his
of ii disohargg/uiiperial duty to his West African wards,
and, had also induced the Colonial Office to cancel the railway
1. A.M., (Editorial) 17 Jan. 1913.
2. A.M., (Editora1) 28 Feb. 1913.
3. Morel to Holt, 2 Jan. 1913, 18/3, JHP.
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monopoly promised. to Lever, yet publicly, he wholly supported
Lever. This was an occasion in which Morel's desire for
political support nearly undermined his public advocacy.
Apart from Holt ,wbo regarded Lever's experiment
as dangerous to native welfare, the Anti-Slavery and .Abori-
gines' ?rotection Socety had discussed the implications of
his Congo concessions. On 7 June 1912, John Harris reported
to the Society Commrttee that himself and. J.G. Alexander
had interviewed William Lever on the 15 Lay of that year,
impressin upon him the importance o safeguarding native
rights. The Committee 1-iad regretted that the Congo conces-
sions were granted to Lever since they believed that native
rights had been compromised in principle and. that the affair
1
held. a possibility forr international friction in the future.
The Society had tried to induce Lever to cooperate with it
in its suggested ways of reforming abuses which might occur;
but Lever had replied "in an unsatisfactory sense". lie not
nre1y declined to cooperate with the Society but even told.
that organisation that "its policy iias calculated seriously
to injure the Congo native". 2
 The Society took great
exception to Lever's attitude, and It is not unlikely that
1. Minutes, Committee, AS APS, 7 June 1912, jtem 2170; E2/13,
Vol. VIII.
2. Minutes, Committee, AS APS, 5 July 1912, item 2183; (ibid).
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it cooperated with the Tory Party in criticising his West
African "privileges".
In January 1913, John Harris in his criticism had
told Harcourt that the term 'concession' or "privileges" was
inaccurate in describing lever's 'favour' in West Africa,
particularly in the Gold Coast. He suggested that a "p.irch-
asing monopoly" was more accurate. 1
 This letter produced a
divergence of opinions in the Colonial 0:ff ice about the exact
d.ef:inition of Lever 1 s 'ooncessions'. Sir H. Just regarded
this communication as "a very silly letter" and clained that
"Levers haven't got a monopoly of anything at all
Sir John Anderson minuted that "no monopoly of purchasing
has been granted." 3 Lord Ernmott was of the opinion that
"the letter is well-meant, but foolish". He added, "Let
Mr. Harris down gently; but of all misleading titles what
could sound worse than a 'purchasing monopoly'. 4 Although
Harcourt shared this view too, it would seem that Ellis who
had opposed Lever's applications gave the most accurate
definition when he minuted, ".. all -that is now proposed.
1. John Harris to Ircourt, 1 Jan. 1913, CO 554/15.
2. Minute of 4 Jan. 1913 on ibid.
3. M.i.nute of 4 Jan. 1913 ibid.
4. Minute of 6 Jan. 1913 ibid.
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to be granted is a manufacturing monopoly over a limited
area. 1 Thatever is the exact interpretation of these grants
given to Lever, one feels that political pressure within the
Liberal party, and not corrupt intent, probably influenced
them. But the urgency of protecting an Imperial industry
(not less important than the cotton movement), as Lever and
Morel had argued, might have added some weight in influencing
policy.
In the event, however, it became known that Lever
Brothers, like the BCGA, were not determined to honour their
pledges with the Colonial Office. Not only had they started
hedging on their former promise to invest a prescribed sum
of money in West Africa so as to merit their special priv-
ileges, 2
 but they had also deceived that Office into believing
that they had perfected the machinery which would trensforn
1. Minute of 4 Jan. 1913 ibid.
2. When it becan clear that Lever Bros. were not ready to
spend as mich money as they had promised the 0.0. in S.L.
i.e. £15, 000 during the first year, Harcourt minuted:
"If Mess i's Lever are not pro pa red to stick to the ii' to rms
they rrust drop the whole agreement. I wilLnot budge in
the matter". Minute o 17 Jan. 1913, t)1 Simpson, Jortb,
Harley & Co. to 0.0. Jan 1913, 00 267/555.
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the pa un -oil industry for the British Empire . The n chine
was not even manufactured, and Lever Brothers, although
they had, received their "nEnufacturang monopolies",2
were unvil],ing to spend the 1are sums they had agreed to.
'When t he s e rae ye la t ions we re made kn 0 wn to lia roo u rt d.0 ring
the heat of the Tory tirades, he was struck with immense
mortification: "1 see no reason w1y I should be pinched'
by the Concessionaires, whilst I am being accused of
1. Emmott found that Lever's eonpetitors have revealed. the
true position. "Sir W. lever led Mr. Harcourt and me",
he minuted, "to suppose that he bad. peiected nchinery
enabling him to go ahead at once. Prom what I have since
heard I am in doubt whether anyone has yet invented a
perfect machine for expressing oil from the perloarap.
This letter adds to my doubt ...".
Minute of 17 Jan. 1913 (ibid.).
2. See (a) License by Sir Edward Marsh Merewater Governor,
to lever Brothers Limited, under the provision of the
palm Oil Ord]nance (No. 7 of 1913) within the area in the
Yonni District of Sierra leone Protectorate, dated 29 Oct.
1913(b) Grant of Easement over in the Yonni District of Sierra
Leone by H.B. Sir E.M. Merewater, Gov. of S.L. to Lever
Bros. Ltd., Dated. 29 Oct. 1913.(o) Lease of lands in the Yonni District of the S.L. Pro-
tectorate by Chief Bal Sherbro and others acting as tribal
authority of the Yonni Chiefdom in the protectorate of
S.L.; Dated 29 Oct. 1913.(d) Agreement varying Grant of Easement in the Yonni Dis-
trict of S.L. Protectorate. LB. Sir Edward Marsh Mere-
water JC.C.V.O., C.M.G. to 	 ssrs. Lever Brothers Ltd.
Dated 29 Oct. 1913.
See CO 267/555.
In the Gold Coast, the Oil Palm Ordinance was passed. an
July 1913 as Ordinance No. 10 of 1913. Vide G.E. rtca1fe,
Grept Britain and Ghana. op. cit. pp. 542-4 for later
proceediñgs in the Gold. Coast Legco.
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oorription by the Tory Parrty When I die my heart will
be found to be enveloped an a perloarpit" It was a
unfortunate affair brought about mainly by personal
influence and party allegiance.
1. Minute of 6 Feb. 1913, by Harcourt on Simpson, 1corth,




One of the arguments advanced by the Mary Kingsley
school against the Crown Colony system was that it in-
evitably produced an extravagant financial administration.1
This school alleged that waste in expenditure, to a great
extent, was due to monopolistic practices and Inefficient
administration inherent in the system which always tended
to operate against both Imperial and colonial interests.
They argued that the West African Colonies were financially
capable of maintaining their governments and all necessary
'developments'.	 Unfortunately, they claimed, this was not
effective under Crown Colony rule; mismanagement mi-
poverished the West African Colonies already suffering from
the effects of various monopolies.	 This impoverishment
meant that Colonial rule attempted three expedients:
introduction of direct taxation which the natives resisted;2
increased duties against the wishes of the merchant
1. See Chapter II of this thesis for Mary Kingsley's case
against the Crown Colony system, in particular the ex-
position of her believed Government by commercial men
which she believed would reduce administrative costs
while providing a much better type of rule for tropical
peoples.
Also Mary Kingsley, Studies, op.cit.
2. See Appendix.
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community; and more imperial loans which it was alleged
were against the interest of the British tax-payer.
Criticism was not, however, confined to the Crown Colony
system, for the new energy which Chamberlain brought to
the Colonial Office had meant more expenditure in
imperial and colonial spheres. Almost every item of
colonial administration was seen as wasteful, starting
from the cost of harbour works in the Gold Coast, 1 to
the introduction of coinage to West Africa. 2	Some of
these attitudes were, in fact, hardened but naive, rear-
guard action against forces of change.
	 But their question-
ing of the time-honoured institution of Crown Agents,
their suspicion of the selfish interest behind the then
current craze for railway construction, and their open
criticism of the West African Shipping monopoly, show
that they were at times forward-looking.
1 , Mary Kingsley to bit; 21 June 1898, 16/2,JHP.
Chagrined by reports she had received about harbour works
on the Gold Coast, Kingsley cynically remarked in this
letter: 'I should not be surprised if there were some
idea in the official mind to construct docks etc. and.
ships on the Gold Coast at the cost of thousands more
than it could be done, either in Sierra Leone or Lagos
even.----".
It seems that it was the high cost of construction that
she was against and not merely 'the building of harbours'
as Dr. Flint says in his Reassessment, op.cit. p.104
2 . The introduction of coinage to West Africa is a fascinatin
theme which, however, is tangential to this thesis,
For a good account, See AG. Hopkins, 'he Economic
History of Lagos, 187-l914 (Unpublished London Pb.D.
thesis, 1963).
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Thus the argument that they were inereiY trying to
'fossilize' the 'rudimentary' conditions of the informal
empire 1 shows only one side of the story. There can be
no doubt that they were disheartened by the huge economic
involvement of sufficiently integrating the informal
colonial structure into a new scheme for either global
political strategy or expansive consolidation and
'development' 2.	 But the third Party argued that if the
New Imperialism was to achieve a constructive function,
it was imperative that eagerness to raise revenue and
advance loans should be matched by a willingness and
ability to administer this colonial development on sound
financial basis.	 In other words, the most constructive
Imperialism was that which sought to fuse into that
popular movement for imperial greatness, a sober, shrewd
and honest application of Gladstonian efficiency.
	
The
Third Party were constructive Imperialists who though
they deplored the economic necessities of the new order,
were also kicking against the sanctity of old—world
systems of patronage which they felt were perverting the
Z. Flint, Re—assesment, op.cit.
2. See Chapter I; Introduction.
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true imperial ideals.
The ardour of denunciation which had characterized
Mary Kingsley's attitude towards the Colonial Office also
characterized her followers. Although Morel gave it a
new application (for while he denounced some actions he
always did so amidst a general tenor of adulation for the
Colonial Office) there can be no doubt of their dis-
satisfaction with the financial administration of the
Colonies.	 Kingsley's charge of incompetence and selfish-
ness against the Colonial Officials (at home and abroad)
was taken up by Bolt ,who believed that Africa could finance
her developments if she had "not greedy, unscrupulous,
spend-thrift administrations to bleed her", for "it is
the greed of this ruling class which will not find enough
revenue out of Africa for their unlimited wants, and turns
to fools or knaves in this country to help them to bleed
the home tax-payer as well - - ".	 Mary Kingsley had
concentrated her criticism on the system of administration
itself; John Bolt now saw that it was mainly the arrival
of Chamberlain which had worsened things.
Therefore, although he saw monopolies as agents of
extravagance, Bolt was particularly worried about the
implications of Chamberlain's "development" of West Africa.
i. Bolt to Morel, 3 Feb 1900, F 8/1,EDMP.
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Towards the end of 1900, he complained to Morel that the
"Estate Development business of Mr. Chamberlain Is
bringing debt to Colonies which have hitherto had revenue
to Invest.	 From being prudent thrifty children of the
Empire they are to become wasteful spendthrlfts whose end
Is beggary - crushing taxation, heavy debt, and Impoverished
hard-up administration through accumulated creations of
lucrative sinecures, which nobody will abolish, lest
their income should be reduced or their office follow
suIt- .-".	 He regarded Chamberlaints policy as "nothing
less than moonlight madness."	 He saw the colonial
administrations under Chamberlain's charge as existing for
no other thing "apart from taxation and punitive expeditions,"
without any attempt by these administrations 'to spend
the increased revenue for any worthy public purpose",
except syphoning the colonial resources into the pockets
of one or two monopolists. 	 He alleged that most of
the West African Colonies bad been saddled with debts
out of proportion to the improvements made there; and
regarded it as "disgraceful" that any British Colony
should be In debt.	 H ascribed this state of affairs also
to the haste and energy of Chamberlain and his aides:
. Molt to Morel, 21 Nov. 1900, F 8/1, EDMP.
2. Molt to Morel, 8 Nov. 1902. F 8/2, EDMP.
.IIolt to Morel, 2 Jan. 1901. F 8/1, EDMP.
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"Some people are not happy unless they are in debt and
the more they are the greater progress they see - but
it is a load put on the backs of those who have to
follow.	 They too will iave their problems to solve
and this huge expenditure of capitalists will be an
obstacle to their enterprise. 	 It is the action of a
spendthrift generation seeking to obtain praise for
their energy and Imperialism.	 Whilst lavish ex-
penditure goes merrily on apparent but illusive success
as shown by manipulated figures delude the bewildered
spectators, but pay-day must come and curses loud and
deep will be heaped on the heads of those outrageous
proceedings on a helpless Colony, by a band of 'patriots'
'egotists', 'reckless swaggering buccaneers' - -
Holt made this point, particularly with reference to
Chamberlain, in another letter to Morel:
"Until J.C. came with his development of our estates
ideas, it was the pride of our West African Colonies
to work their administrative machinery on modest lines
with a small tariff, and have a balance to their
credit; but now under the present regime they are
being run on extravagant lines, such as the Prodigal
Son would have employed and the end must mean either
bank 2 (empty) or a load of debt which will absorb the
population to pay the interests therein.
	
It seems to
parade an artificial appearance o progress, but it is
imprudent, and will earn the malediction of future
generations who will have to hear the burden. We are
or pretend to be shocked by the borrowing of self-
governing Colonies but I think all we say about them
can be more truthfully applied to our Crown Colonies -
where is there another Colony which can equal the debt
of Sierra Leone in proportion to its exports? - -" 3
He always bad in mind the teachings of Mary Kingsley
who never ceased preaching that mal-adminitration of the
West AfricanColonies would inevitably find them In a
1. bit to Morel, 8 Nov. 1902 F8/2, EDMP.
2. 'to bank' is a North country expression meaning 'to be
broke'; He 'banked' means 'he went bankrupt'.
3. bolt to Morel, 23 Nov. 1902., F8/2,EDMP,
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similar impecunious plight to the West Indies. 	 And when
he saw that the Colonies were becoming incapable of
financing the 'development' programmes which Chamberlain
had drawn up for them, bit found the inevitable almost
at hand:
"What Miss Kingsley told us would happen is coming and
very shortly.	 The home government will have to dole
out pittances to carry on government and the picture
of another British Colony ruined by rampant extra-
vagant and waste will be presented to a bewildered
public" •1
According to him, things might have been different "if
the busness had been gone about in a practical careful
thrifty way, but then the show would have been missing.
There would have been reality in place of illusion and the
stage effect; the flags and drums would have not been there
to deceive us or make us feel so momentarily proud and
happy.	 It is a fantastic and sham world we live in"
bolt's conclusion was that "nothing but economy of the
administration instead of wilful waste and reckless ex-
penditure can prevent these West African settlements from
becoming a disgrace to our intelligence and competenøy for
governing alien races - _."
This plea for a more economical administration was
persisted in by Morel and Rolt long after Kingsley had
blazed the trail with her abortive scheme for government
• bolt to Morel, 8 Nov.1902, P8/2, EDMP.
2. Ibid,
3,. bolt to Morel, 16 AprIl 1902, F8/2, EDMP.
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by traders.
	 In 1903, for eamp1e, when Hazzledine,
Lugard' f1 Secretary , publicly demanded more imperial grants
for Northern Nigeria, he was at once rebuked by Morel, who
told him that the true imperialism favoured "less ex-
pensive desiderata"; that military campaigns and poll-
tical absorption which carried more apparent success were
not the ideal po1icy.	 Holt and Morel always compared
French and British colonial administrations, and came
to the conclusion that the French were better administrators,
particularly with reference to native interests. 2
	Holt
found the salaries of British West African Governors too
high in comparison with their German counterparts;
1 . West African Mail, 10 April 1903.
• liolt to Morel, 19 Oct.1903, F8/2, EDMP.
• Holt to Morel, 27 Feb.1910. F8/4, EDMP.
Holt rejoiced at the report in the Morning Post that
the salary of the German Governor of Kia Chow had been re-
duced from £2500 to £2000 p.a. by the Budget Committee of
the Reichstag, and commended the Germans as 'a practical
people'.	 He shrewdly observed: "the governor need not
indulge In luxurious living - In respect of salaries,
Germans cannot hope to compete with England - No; nor
need she wish to. Upon that principle will in the long
run depend whether a country is to become great or small,
prosperous or decadent. 	 That Is the difference between
wealth and poverty.	 The nation4 that can restrain Its
politicians from wasting public money on emoluments in
favour of those who run its affairs must lead among the
nations of the earth. It implies mental power to
restrain one's natural impulses. It means simplicity Of
living, work and practical results. Can you imagine
any power we possess in this country being used to stop
the increase of salaries, or expenditure of any kind,much
less to reduce It? Who have we In the House of Commons
with the power to stop the ever increasing expenditure
over luxuries of every kind in our Crown Colonies for the
indulgence of men who live a drowsy, careless,sport and
pleasure-loving life for the most part and who in one form
or another are continually adding to the burdens
of the country for their benefit.
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and in any case, they were not justified by hard work.
continued from previous page.
I was asking an of:ficial the other day to tell me why he
got duty pay; what it was for, why it was put on. He
could not tell me.	 He said he supposed it was an in-
direct way of increasing the salaries of the people who
receive It.	 It seems to me that we have the rot amoit
our people In finance and the end will prove disastrous
to our country unless we Imitate our German cousins, who
set us such a fine example - - - -"
It must be noted that the scheme of salaries which
Governor Egerton recommended in 1906 and which Elgin
approved was attacked by several people as excessively
high.	 For example, the Lagos Standard of 13 June 1906
denounced it as fantastic,	 A public meeting In Lagos on
6 June of the same year demonstrated against the salary
increase. (See CO 520/36, Egerton to Elgin, 11 Aug.1906,
end 2)	 In the Legislative Council meeting of 25 May
1906, Sapara Williams and Dr. Obadiah Johnson urged the
necessity of economy everywhere. (CO 591/3, S. Nig.
Govt. Gazettee, 13 June 1906.
In reorganising salaries, Egerton copied the Gold Coast
'custom' of attaching 'duty pay' to all posts carrying
initial salaries of £400 or more pa. 	 This duty allow-
! ance (about 20% of the salary attached to an office)
which an officer drew while in West Africa, became an
acting allowance when the substantive officer was on
eave of absence,"	 This In fact meant an increase in
'active salary',	 On 31 Jan. 1908, The African Mall
attacked these .ary Increases. 	 But the C.0. also
watched these increases, always examining the merits of
each case. (Co. 520/63, Minute by J. Anderson pp Egerton
to Crew 11 July 1908). When Mr. Smith, the/U&vrnor
of S.L. proposed a general rise in salaries for that
colony and protectorate, the C-0 opposed the measure.
As A. Fiddlan minuted, "the financial position of Sierra
Leone" was "Too precarious to justify us in embarIing on
a general revision of salaries."
L.Pobyn to C-0. 27 Sept. 1910; minutes by A. Fiddian
5. Oct. 1910; W,D. Ellis, 5 Oct. 1910. CO 267/520
1. Rolt to Morel, 14 Aug.1905, F8/2,EDMP.
flolt furiously alleged that the West African officials
worked only 6 hours	 hdIem and then took & months
boiday at the end o 7 ear, in addition to looking up to
a pension: "They are a contemptible lot of lazy parasites
for whom I have no respect. Other people have to work
I continued on next page............
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They condemned the spread of luxurious living in the
Colonies, particularly in Western Nigeria," and in the
Gambia.	 For example, when in 1909, it was reported that
it had cost £3,658 to refit the yacht of the Governor of
the Gambia, Holt flared up:
"Just imagine that Governor's yacht costing £3,658
to refit.	 Don't you think that this sum would have
bought a new yacht ( If such a thing be necessary at
all which I think not) big enough and good for any
reasonable trustee of such a colony as the Gambia or
any other of our West African Colonies'?
	 It is shame-
ful luxury and waste -
Thegeneral criticisms might have been regarded as the
rantings of people who were Ignorant of the true nature of
British involvements in West Africa.	 For surely, Holt's
reference to the Colonies as 'settlements' indicates that
he was probably still thinking in terms of the pre—Imperial
situation when 'government' was scattered along the coast;
when the merchants bartered their commodities in the
traditional way, and when the burden of indirect taxation
was not as onerous as now that the 'informal empIres had
1 continued from previous page.
all the harder and live on less because of their laziness
and extravagance. 	 Why must we be public servants in
order to indulge In such ease? What k1n of a system
is It that we have which gives such privileges to a
governing class at the expense of the workers? - - -"
1. Morel to bit, 2 Jan. 1913., P8/4, EDMP.
On the Information from Jonathan bolt, Morel told bit,
"The people in Lagos have got swelled heads; the
whole pack of them, including the Educated Natives.
I quite agree with Deemin, the whole expenditure of the
Western Province wants cutting down - - -"
2. bolt to Morel, 26 Sept. 1909. F8/3, EDMP.
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become a real administration with all the paraphernalia
which were thought to be necessary for public order and
modern development. Moreover, the Jeremiah—like comparison
which the Third Party always made with the West Indies was
very misleading.	 The West Indies was an 18th century slave
society, whose planter economy was in ruins. West Africa
was a peasant society, developing new urban centres whose
economy was expanding, and where therefore there was a
very strong case and justification for capital in,flow.
Nevertheless, the case of the Third Party was not so much
against advancement of initial and necessary capital
to the colonies as against Its extravagant 'spending';
they alleged that much of the money earmarked for develop-.
ment of the West African colonies never went into this
development but were pocketed by favoured monopolists.
An examination of the position of the Crown Agents, motives
behind railway construction, and the economic Implications
of the various trading monopolies, in West Africa, will
serve to show that much of the grumblings of these re-
formers were not conjured up from thin air.
The Institution of Crown Agents had been a source
I . For the history of the Crown Agents and its manner of
doing business see CO 885/19, MIscel. No.223. also
A.W. Abbott, A short History of the Crown Agents and
their office. (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1959).
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of persistent questionings almost from its inception, but
It always managed to weather the storms.	 The most
Systematic criticism would seem to have been made towards
the end of the 19th century. 	 On 7 April 1881, a Member
of Parliament (Anderson) bad asked in the Commons whether
the Government wanted the public to understand that the
Crown Agents were servants of the Crown and that the
British Government was responsible for their actions. 	 The
Under-Secretary of Statelr the Colonies, Grant Duff, while
replying in the negative, told Parliament that "they were
servants of the Colonial Government, paid from Colonial
not Imperial funds, nor Is Her Majesty's Government in
any way responsible for their actions," Therefore, on
4 May 1881, the same Anderson put down notice of a motion
"to call attention to the anomalous position of officers
who are called 'Crown Agents' for the Colonies and yet
are not servants of the Crown, who are appointed by the
Government, instructed by the Government to Issue loans,
and yet whose actions the Government denies all res-
ponsibility, and to move that in the opinion of this
House conditions so contradictory are misleading to the
public and to investors and ought to be changed". 	 Grant
Duff was almost powerless against this heady motion. He
minuted that "the name Is of course somewhat clumsy and
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we cannot defend it too strongly if it is seriously
attacked". 1
At the beginning o:f the 20th century criticism came
from many sides; from Parliament, from humanitarian
reformers, and from the Colonies. This criticism had
become so incessant that in 1901 Chamberlain had tried to
find out the attitude of the Governors of Crown Colonies
and High Commissiopers of Protectorates to the "Conunercia]..
Business transacted by the Crown Agents to the Colonies."
In a circular despatch, he intimated that from time to
time complaints had reached him from certain of the
Colonies of mistakes or neglect on the part of the Crown
Agents in regard to commercial business entrusted to them.
He then wanted them to inform him whether they were
"entirely satisfied with the relations between the Crown
Agents and the Colony which you administer, and if not,
to furnish me with particulars of any instances in which
- - you have reason to believe that the commercial interest
of the Colony under your Government have not been ade-
quately protected by the Crown Agents".2
1. Memo, by A.J.Harding, 2 April 1908, CO 885/19 Misc.
No.223. C.P.
There is no reference, however that Anderson ever
moved his motion.
2. Chamberlain to Governors, 1 June 1901. Confidential
Circular Despatch, CO 885/8 Misc. No.142.
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Almost all the West African Governors, except Sir
William MacGregor, said they were satisfied.	 The
Governor of Sierra Leone, Sir .A. King-ilarman "un-
hesitatingly' stated that "the greatest satisfaction "was
given by the Crown Agents. But his feeling ihat "the
admirable management of the financial bu8iness more than
counterbalances any shortcomings with regard to the filling
of orders" 1
 was certainly ominous.	 The Governor of
Gambia reported that "matters have been conducted in a
satisfactory manner.n21	 Major Nathan of the Gold. Coast
said that "very few real causes for complaint in this
colony existed - - -"s Sir Ralph Moor of Southern
Nigeria was of the opinion that relations were generally
satisfactory and commercial interests generally protected
by the Crown Agents. He paid glowing "tribute to the
Crown Agents for the expeditions and satisfactory manner
in which stores, supplies, equipment etc. for the
Expedition have been purchased and sent out", and did not
suppose that there was "any business firm in the United
Kingdom that would have executed the work more promptly
and satisfactorily."
1. King-Harman to Chamberlaln,16 July 1901,Conf.No.4
CO 885/8
Gov.Slr GC. Denton to Chamberlain,5 Aug 1901, no.5in(ibid)
3. Gov.Major Nathan to Chamberlain,21 Nov.1901,No .24 in (ibid)
4. H.C. Sir Ralph Moor to Chamberlain, 30 Nov.1901. No.27
in (ibid).
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These Governors had emphasised the good work of the Crown
Agents, but even from their replies, it is obvious that
they tried to suppress the criticising of the system which
came from their more professional subordinates. 	 Thus in
Sierra Leone, there was evidence that the Heads of Public
Works and Railway Departments, whose requirements through the
medium of the Crown Agents far exceeded those of any other
departments there, had complained of delays in obtaining
articles and materials long indented.
	
Even the otherwise
completely satisfied Harman had at the same time remarked:
"Dissatisfaction is not infrequently caused by a tendency
which, rightly or wrongly, is attributed to the Crown Agents
to attach more Importence to the excuses or denials of in-
criminated agents or firms than to the remonstrances of the
Colonial Governments, who believe themselves to be aggrieved
by delay or by mismanagement in tbe execution of their
duties - -". In the Gambia, there were complaints 'of some
instances of delay in the delivery of articles' long requisi-
tioned, a roof ordered for a female hospital indented for in
January 1901, did not arrive evn In August of the same year.
In the Gold Coast, also, there was evidence of avoidable delays;
certain gilvanized iron sheets for the roofs of the Police
Barracks at Axim, Sekondi and Saltpond ordered on 14 August 1899
did not arrive till February of the fol)owlng year. 	 Even Sir
Ralph Moor's eulogy could not easily suppress complaints
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from the Marine Department in Southern Nigeria against the
delay in arrival and quality of stores indented.1
In the Colonial Office itself, different views were
expressed after the Governors had reported their attitudes.
J.F.N. Green, a second class clerk, was of the opinion
that "the total number of complaints worthy of considera-
tion is, considering the size and complexity of the Crown
Agents' business, wonderfully small, and the general
impression is that their office is thoroughly, and indeed
remarkably, efficient".	 While pointing out that delays
had certainly been frequent (for which he blamed the
contractors employed by the Crown Agents), Green, however,
endorsed the singular view of Sir. F. Sweetenham, High
Commissioner for the Federated Malay States, who had made
a serious case against the Crown Agents.	 Sweetenham had
complained that the Crown Agents seemed to occupy a
position "which is not exactly that of an Agent of the
Colony, but rather of an Independent authority prepared
to execute the orders of the Colonial Government, with
considerable limitations - - ". 	 Green noted that
Colonial officials were frequently hampered, delayed and
sometimes blamed owing to delays in the supplies of
stores, through mistakes not caused by them.
	 Naturally,
CO 885/8, No.4,5,24 and 27.
IGreen continued they wanted to get at the persons res-
ponsible and to ensure that the same misfortune should floL
occur again instead, they found that the Crown Agents
disclaimed all blame, and yet stood as a "permanent buffer
between them and the peccant contractor or shipper," He
said that the Colonial officials felt that the Crown
Agents with whom they dealt should be held responsible
to them; but they had no way of making them feel the
responsibility and were correspondingly exasperated. 1
Green, therefore, made suggestions for improving
matters.	 He was of the opinion that the only way of
avoiding friction was for "more responsibility to be thrown
on the Colony".	 This meant reducing the Crown Agents
to the position of agents pure and simple", obeying
the orders of the Colony, the control of the Secretary
of State being only exercised through the Governor, except
in such matters as penallaing contractors, or taking other
action which might indirectly effect other Colonies by
making firms less willing to tender. 	 He also suggested
a kind of annual handbook by the Crown Agents to "blow
their trumpets loudly enough" 2
But an Acting Principal Clerk, G.W. Johnson, strongly
deprecated "altering the present rule under which the
1. Minute of 12 Sept. 1902, CO 885/8.
2. Ibid.
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Crown Agents do not comply with the requisitions without
reference to this office, unless the proper authority for
the expenditure is written on the requisition." 	 He
explained that "this rule does not involve the Secretary
of State exercising any control over the Crown Agents, but
it is a necessary part of the control which he exercises
over the government of the Crown Colonies - -
Arthur A. Pearson, principal clerk at the time, also did
not think much of the complaints preferred, against the
Crown Agents, except perhaps that of delay in execution
of orders; he did not consider as genuine the complaints
lodged against prices of commodities and delivery, quality
of articles, and faulty packing mistakes, a 	 As far as
West Africa was concerned, Charles Strachey, who was a first
class clerk in that tepartment, found that the experience
of his department was that the Crown Agents did their
work well at times, but sometimes not well; though he
did not believe that matters would improve under any other
system.	 He was sceptical, however, of Green's suggestion
that the Crown Agents should issue an annual commendation
of their proceedings, in which all records of success
would be brought prominently forward and nothing would be
said of failures.	 This might appeal to the Crown Agents,
4 . Colonial Regulations Nos. 272 and 273.
• Minute of 22 Sept. 1902, CO 885/8.
Minute of 7 Oct. 1902, Co 885/8.
he said, but it would induce the dissatisfied Colonies to
blaspheme and to issue companion volumes.	 Moreover, he
noted that it would surely be exasperating for a West
African Governor, who was complaining against the supply of
faulty rails, to be assured that the Transvaal received
their statunery in record time.1
It soon became obvious, however, that, all told, the
Colonial Office was in favour of the Crown Agents continuing
as previously.	 "With regard to the general question of
the working of their system, the Crown Agents appear to be
making all the Improvements they can - - "	 minuted
another principal clerk, F.R. Round. 	 Chamberlain was
equally convinced that this was so. 	 Some months later,
he informed the Colonial Governors that there was no
cause for change In the position of the Crown Agents.
This decision might have quietened the Colonial officials
who having known the feelings of their energetic chief were
not tempted to incur his displeasure. 	 To Morel, who
of
may well have been told/the correspondence by his friend,
Charles Strachey, it was a signal for renewed protest.
I. Minute of 22 Oct. 1902, CO 885/8
• Minute of 22 Oct. 1902 by Round, CO 885/8.
3 • Chamberlain to Governors etc. Circular Despatch, 25 Aug.
1903, CO 885/8. C.P. also conveyed later by his
successor LyZtleton In a circular despatch oX 26 Feb.1904.
See P.P., 1904 (Cd.1944).
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In his Affairs of West Africa, published soon after, Morel
listed the Institution of Crown Agents as one of the
imperative reforms, making a very severe condemnation of
the Institution.
"If anyone attempted to define the duties of that body,
he would be hard put to it to do so. 	 They are here,
there and anywhere, and their interference puts a
premium upon extravagance and waste. 	 The Crown Agents
are an anomaly which ought to disappear. 	 At present
they constitute a sort of half-way house between the
Colonial Office and the Vest African Governors, and
are a positive obstacle to sound finance and good
business methods - - - The West African Colonies are
hampered right and left by the powers conferred upon
ills body.	 The Colonies are not allowed to purchase
what they require in the shape of stores, equipment,
material and so forth In the open market. 	 Everything
has to go through the Crown Agents, with theatural
result that the Colonies have to pay between'er cent
and fifty per cent more than they would have to if
allowed to invite tenders on their own account - -
Having denounced the system, Morel In the same book
pointed out particular examples to illustrate the extra-
vagance caused by the Crown Agents. 	 He alleged that
railway construction In West Africa had become the monopoly
of one particular firm under the direction of the Crown
Agents, a firm which, it was alleged, was not very ex-
perienced in such work, and which was , "metaphorically
speaking, fa11ing	 upon Its feet In West Africa." 2 The
same criticism applied to the positioi of consulting
1 • E.D. Morel, Affairs of West Africa (1902) Pp. 30-31.
2 . Ibid, P.31. The firm was Shelford and Sons, Ltd.
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engineers to the Colonial Office. 	 Morel felt it was
anomalous from the business standpoint for a firm retained
as "consulting engineers' to a Government Department to
carry out the actual construction of the West African
Railways - to play the adviser and arbiter at the same
time was to Morel incompatible. He supported the wide-
spread impression that the time and cost of constructing
these railways through the departmental system had been
excessive. 1	To support his allegation that all ranks
in West Africa were opposed to the "Departmental System"
(which in fact meant the Crown Agents system) he cited
the remarks made by Sir William MacGregor when he attended
the Manchester Chamber of Commerce in 1900. In reply to
a question by Arthur Hutton, chairman of the African Trade
Section, whether he thought that railway construction
could be better done by contract, MacGregor in condemning
the departmental system said that "there would be men
living who are now rotting in their graves if it had been
taken out of the control of the Crown Agents -
References to mortal accidents caused on railways badly
1. For example, the Gold Coast Railway, begun in Feb.1898,
which was officially estimated to reach Kumasi in 1904,
amounted to taking 6 years to build 1691 miles. Morel
considered even the unreliable official estimate for the
Sekandi—Tarkwa sector of £8000 per mile and £6,300 for
Tarkwa—Kumasl section as too high; ibid, p32
2. Report of the Liverpool Chamber of CommerCe, 1900. Also
rel, Affairs of West Africa, op.clt.
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constructed by the Crown Agents continued to be made.
Apart from this, Morel did not see how the Crown Agents
could claim to know more about the material needs of the
Colonies then the officials in charge of the Colonies
themselves.	 After citing two glaring instances 	 to
disprove this claim, Morel declared that the Crown Agents
were looked upon In official and commercial circles in
West Africa "as an unmitigated nuisance and a stumbling-
block to progress." 2
When the Crown Agents saw what Morel had published about
them, they protested to the Secretary of State. 2 4rhe
publication definitely caused ds-quIet In official circles
for almost immediately afterjChamberlain directed Reginald
Antrobus to correct Morel's impressions and factual
mistakes.	 More important, he stoutly defended the Crown
Agents;
"The Crown Agents are not an independent body and have
no power to interfere in the management of any Colony.
They are appointed by the Secretary of State, who
fixes their salaries and also the charges payable for
business transacted by their department. 	 They are
the agents of the Colonial Governments and act only
upon instructions given to them either by the Govern-
ments themselves or by the Secretary of State In the
exercise of his control over the administration of the
1 . He cited the engine for the light railway, and the scheme
for a bridge constructlon,both In Lagos.
See, Affairs of West Africa, p.33
2 . Ibid, p.34.
3. CA to CO, 4 March 1903 and end. CO 147/168.
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Crown Colonies.	 The rule requiring stores to be obtained
through them is one that has been laid down and main-
tained by successive Secretaries of State on the ground
that the natural result of the rule is to reduce and
not to increase the prices which the Colonies have to
pay, and Mr. Chamberlain sees no reason to doubt that
stores are obtained by Colonial Governments through the
Crown Agents on better terms tan they could be ob-
tained in any other way - - -n
The Colonial Secretary, therefore, took great exception to
Morel's criticisms, using a few minor errors of fact to
cover up what would seem to be a convincing case of un-
businesslike transactions. 	 Chamberlain based his argument
on the necessity of continuing traditional government policy
and the economic necessity of the
Against theideas Morel expressed the general feeling
in West African Colonies (inpite of the equivocal reports
of Governors other than MacGregor) that the institution
of Crown Agents was not to the good of the Colonies, and
this feeling, he alleged, existed with respect to the con-
struction, organisation and management of railways, and
with regard to the supplying of Colonial stores and
material for other public works. He could not accept
Chamberlain's excuse of economic necessity:
ni gather that so far as railway construction is con-
cerned the feeling is based upon the assumption that
the work would be more cheaply and efficiently performed
by contractors.	 In connection with the supplying of
I. Antrobus to Morel, 17 July 1903, official; F9/A-B,EDMP.
4. Ibid.,
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stores and material the feeling is based on the
assumption that greater economy would be effected if a
demand for public tenders were regularly made on the
open market, for all material and stores intended for
the consumption of the West African Colonies - -
I cannot help thinking that the existing. 1 system does
not make for efficiency or economy -
In order to find out which was more efficient and economical,
railway construction under the Departmental system or by
contractors, Morel demanded an open enquiry for data on the
subject to be placed before the public.
In fairness to Chamberlain, it must be remembered that
It Is always a difficult matter to alter expedients which
have been sanctified by custom and usage. Yet this by
no means invalidates the arguments advanced by Morel; the
most relevant consideration was whether better results
could be secured if each colony was allowed to purchase
Its requirements on the open market, benefitting by
competition in the fullest and widest sense, Instead of
having to pass orders through the Crown Agents which meant
restriction of competition to a specific number of selected
firms, which, Morel alleged, might possibly leave the
door open to a mutual understanding amongst these firms
not to nnderquote one another".
	 Moreøver, as Morel
contended, the Crown Agents might legitimately be regarded
1. Morel to Anlxbus, March 1904. copy F9/A—B, EDMP.
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as middlemen, between the Colonies and the manufacturers of
the stores and materials required by the Colonies. 	 There-
fore it could be argued that stores were more expensive
to the original purchaser if he employed the services of
a middleman who receiyed a commission. 	 Morel questioned
the necessity of this intermediate agency:
- - -I understand the Crown Agents are authorised to
charge commission on stores supplied by theft, which
conun1ion forms the funds from which their salaries
are derived - - on the transaction.	 In West Africa
our policy has been to remove the middleman. 	 Would
It not conduce to stimulating a more wider interest
in the possibilities of West Africa on the part of the
manufacturers If the door were flung open to general
competition by public tender? - -" 4
It might be recalled that Morel had given tour
illustrations to prove his charge that the Crown Agents
were a liability to the West African Colonies, viz, the
engine for the Lagos railway, the bridge over the Five-
Cowrie Creek in Lagos, the steam hopper also in Lagos,
and Sir William MacGregor's opinions. 2	Chamberlain
had proved him wrong in some of these by exaggerating the
minor mistakes Morel made with respect to the Lagos
railway and the commission charged by the Crown Agents.
But the case made by Morel for the rest was unanswerable,
based as It was on the official reports themselves.
• MorJ to Antrobus, March 1904 Copy F9/A-B EDMP.
2 • Affairs of West Africa, p.33 and tf.
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In his message to the Lagos Legislative Council, when
presenting the estimates of Revenue and Expenditure for
the financial year 1902-3, Sir William MacGregor had
remarked:
"There can be no doubt as to the urgent need for a
suitable and substantial bridge over the Five-Cowrie-
Creek inlet.	 The cost of repairing the wooden
structure has averaged for several years £375 a year.
Add to this that it is often interrupted and frequently
dangerous.
"Plans were sent to England and materials asked for to
build the new bridge. But instead of the materials
came new plans for a bridge which amongst other things
was designed to carry a watermain; naturally it was
not shewn rhere the water was to come from" 4
Chamberlain cleared the Crown Agents and accepted res-
ponsibility for this misunderstanding of the colonial need;
but, then, his readiness to bear the brunt was both sus-
picious and unhelpful to the colonies.
Moreover, Morel's reference to the steam-hopper was
also a reflection of official complaints. In the same
report, MacGregor had said:
"You are all sensible ot the fact that it is most des-
irable that someUng be done wherever and whenever
possible to facilitate the removal of town refuse.
You will remember that last year two plans were con-
sidered, removal by a Steam-Hopper or by Tramway.
Neither plan found acceptance by the Colonial Office.
It is doubtful that any remedy that would cost less
than £100,000 will ever be approved by the Engineers"'




It would seem, therefore, that Morel's criticisms were
grounded on facts.
Chamberlain might wish to silence ctiticism, but official
reports were still complaining of the Crown Agents system.
A report on the working of the Lagos railway in the first
half of 1902 talked of engines in a "defective condition -
when the line was opened to traffic"; and "the inability"
was spoken of "up to now to do more than keep them in
service for traffic requirements". 	 There were twenty—
eight engine failures during this half year". 	 The
report continued: "With an average of only six engines
in service this high percentage of failures is disquieting".
Again,in another part of the report the "defective condition
of the engines" was further Insisted upon, and the "frequent
failure of locomotive power " was referred to.
It was, therefore, not for nothing that Morel had In—
slated that economy and efficiency would be ensured If
the Colonies were allowed to tender openly for their
requirements.	 If the failures described above could be
attributed to other factors (possibly climatic), the high
price of working the engines was mainly due to the high
prices of stores, in particular the "contract" for coal,
which were procured through the instrumentality of the
Crown Agents. The report alluded to commented as follows:
l. Lagos Railway Administrative Report, 1902
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"The adverse effect of working charges has, however,
been increased by the very high price at which the
coal contracts for the railway have been made. 	 The
ai1way Management has not been advised about the
particulars of these contracts which apparently are
arranged directly between the Colonial Secretary of
the Lagos Government and the Crown Agents."
It was, therefore, believed that the prices paid were
"disproportionately high" and "excessive". 	 Moreover, from
enquiries he had made on the subject, Morel was of the
opinion that since the average price of good Welsh steam
coal in 1903 was about 14 shillings a ton delivered at the
tip of the Welsh ports, it might have been possible to get
coal out to Lagos in a steamer able to cross the bar at
between 30 and 35 shillings per ton, instead of at the
fantastic current cost of 50 shillings a ton. 	 Morel
clinched his case in rhetorical style:
- -It appears to favour the contention which was
the main object I had in view, viz, that a system of
full and open competition In all branches of supply
would result in considerable economy to the Colonies.
That Is my honest opinion and I believe that systematic
enquiry would prove It.
	
The principle holds good in
commercial affairs.	 Why not I the case of a local
Government's purchases?- - -
Despite these strong arguments, Chamberlain did not
change the system.	 The Crown Agents system was a time-
honoured institution which gave those In power an
opportunity to bestow patronages to favourites; and if the
1. Ibid.
2. Morel to Antrobus, March 1904, copy, F9/A-E, EDMP.
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end was served, it did not seem to matter what the Colonies
lost in the process.	 Holt made this point in a letter to
Morel:
"The Crown Agents, like some of the other government
departments, like this private selection business;
it gives them beautiful opportunities to bestow
patronage, but it is apt to open the door to many
abuses, and is certainly a most extravagant way of
pretending to serve the interests of our Crown Colonies.
What they do in materials they do In freight; can
they apply the same reasons for not giving all British
shipowners an opportunity of carrying out material at
the lowest possible rate? How Is It that coal con-
tracts for Lagos are not put to open competition?
If they were there is no doubt that the government
could get steamers to carry out coal today at lO/6d
per ton, as against the rates that they are paying
other people. All this means fining the Colonies
heavily and preventing their economical development
to that extent.
	 These Colonies are handicapped to
a degree by such methods which would be ludicrous if
they were not knavish - - - 4
These criticisms once more echoed in Parliament. On
28 March 1904, Austin Taylor, M.P. for Liverpool, told the
Commons that the price of 50 shillings per ton charged
for Lagos coal in 1902 was excessive.	 Arguing In a vein
similar to Morel's, he said that the best South Wales coal
could be bought in Britain for 15 shillings per ton; and
since the freight rate "to West Africa under ordinary
circumstances would not exceed 15 shillings, he felt that
30 shillings a ton/ should be the appropriate cost of coal.
Taylor,therefore, was "at a loss to account for the extra
1. Holt to Morel, 1 Nov. 1902., F8/2, EDMP.
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20 shillings which brought up the price to 50 shillings per
ton" - a price againstthe Lagos railway 1epartment lodged
a complaint, with the result that in 1903 they were
allowed to buy the coal direct.	 On the general question
of the operation of the Crown Agents as they affected the
Colonies, Taylor was at the same time most critical. 	 The
whole question, according to him, was really one which
could be called 'Tied—house Imperialism'; 'The Colonies
were compelled to come to this country for the whole of
their stores and materials for their public works, whether
telegraphs, railways, bridges, iron piping, or electrical
appliances." He doubted whether the Colonies and Protectorat
were being supplied as efficiently arid economically by the
Crown Agents as they might be under a more elastic system
since
of open competition.	 He was of the opinion that/the
system of Crown Agents was expensive and dilatoçy, the
Secretary should have the courage to set it aside.
	
More-
over, it was a matter of surprise to Taylor that these
gentlemen (I.e. the Crown Agents) "should be operating
enormous sums year after year entirely outside the
rurview of the house of Commons, and without any means
being afforded for having a discussion on their accounts
year by year".	 He concluded by suggesting that the
Crown Agents accounts should be "laid on the table of the
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Rouse", and then implored the Commons that if they were
to think Iniperia ily they might turn their attention to
prosaic duties of the nature he had indicated.1
Another member, F.L. Harris, alleged that the Crown
Agents were engaged in transactions which involved "the
receipt and payment of stupendous sums of money"; that
they enjoyed unlimited powers, and were quite beyond the
control of the Colonial Secretary, and that they owed no
responsibility either to the House of Commons or to the
Legislative Assemblies of the Colonies, who were forced
to employ their services. 	 He contended that since he
understood that the financial transactions of the Crown
Agents for the Colonies in recent years amounted to no
less than the combined estimates for the Army and Navy,
these transactions should be submitted to Parliament for
criticism and review. 	 On the same occasion, Sydney Buxton
11. H.C. Debs.4S. Vol.132, 1904, 935,936,937.
Taylor, Austin, 2nd son of Archdeacon Taylor D.D., Educ.
Liverpool Coil; Corpus Christi, Cambridge, M.A.(l910).
Shipowner (retired 1912); entered City Council of Liver-
pool, 1892, 1900. M.P. for East Toxteth Division of
Liverpool, 1902-10; Chairman Westminster Hospital,
1925-28. Author of Sidelights on Protection. Died
27 Apr11 1955.
. HC. Debs.45.Vol.132, 1904, 939.
Harris, Rt.Hon.Frederick Leverton, P.C.1916. Born 17 Dec
1864; Son of F.W. Harris, J.P. Educ. Winchester and
Cambridge (LA.); Member of Tariff Commission, 1904;
Conservative M.P. for Tynemouth 1900-06; and Unionist
M.P. Stepney, 1907-11; M.P. E.Worcestershlre,1914-18;
L.C.C. Stepney, 1907-10. Published various articles on
Tariff Reform. Club Canton. Died 14 Nov.1926.
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felt bound to admit that "too much mystery surrounded the
Crown Agents' Office" which, be said, "ought to be dis-
solved by some form of inquiry. He alleged that they
were allowed to spend large sums of public money without
control; that they were dilatory, unbusinesslike and ex-
pensive in their operations; and that a system under
which orders had necessarily to be placed in Britain,
"did a great deal to discourage locAl enterprise" in the
colonies.	 He supported Taylor's demand for a Committee
to inquire into this business. 1
In the Lords, the Crown Agents were subjected to the
most scathing criticism.	 Before putting his six searching
questions,2 the Earl of Portsmouth made important pre-
liminary remarks which show the public attitude to this
question: As be said, he had in theprnstwo weeks
received "a very large number of private communications
• HC. Debs 45. Vol.132, 1904, 939-40.
In the same year the House of Commons therefore called
for a return of the accounts of the Crown Agents' office
funds:
P.P., 1904 (cd.2241).
• (l)'Whetlier the Crown Agents for the Colonies receive
fixed s.aries for their services In connection with the
Colonies and protectorates they represent; (2)What
those salaries are; (3)Vhether the Crown Agents are
permitted to levy a percentage on expenditure or any
operation undertaken by them as Crown Agents; (4) What
is the amount of this percentage; (5)Are annual returns
made by the Crown Agents to the Colonial Office showing
exactly what sums they have received by the levying of
this percentage; (6)Whether they receive additional
salaries or allowances from the Colonies."
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from responsible persons who have had experience in
this matter'	 It would not be proper to disclose theii
names; yet there certainly appeared to be a very
general and widespread complaint as to the manner in
which the Crown Agents have performed some of their
duties - - - - I have been told not by people who do
not know, but by those who speak with authority - - -
that there does obtain the very bad practice of giving
Crown Agents commissions on the expenditure which has
passed through their hands and through their office".
He asked what had been done about the "very serious
complaints" lodged by Governor MacGregor in 1903 as regards
the inefficiency in the construction of the railways
managed by the Crown Agents.	 When the Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State, the Duke of Marlborough, explained
that the Crown Agents charged 1% on all stores supplied,
PoZ'tsmoutb retorted, "if so, then the greater the ex-
penditure, the greater the commission". 	 And when
Marlborough explained that he meant "on all work carried
out by them", Portsmouth added: "Then the greater the cost
of the stores the greater the commission".	 Marlborough
had to agree with him, his explanatory point that "their
one desire Is to supply the stores at the cheapest possible
price" was not convincing especially as he said that it
was not the Imperial Government but the Crown Colonies
that paid these commissions. I
Thus Earl Grey was of the opinion that the Information
1 .U.L. Debs.45.VolCX.XX 1904, 946,948,950,953-4.
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which Marlborough had given to the etfeet that the expense of
the offices of the Crown Agents was debited to the various
Crown Colonies affected " supplies us with an additional
reason for being most jealous as to the way In which that
office performs its duties".	 He continued: "I understand
that the Crown Colony is affected and not the British tax-
payer If the administration of that office Is lax and ex-
pensive".	 Refuting the defence that the Crown Agents were
the best buyers that could be found, in Britain (by citing the
experience of Sir Harry Johston with them), Earl Grey agreed
with Portsmouth that an impartial inquiry was necessary
"Inspite of the eulogy" on that office by Aarlborough. 1 A
motion moved by Portsmouth at that instance "that a Select
Committee be appointed to inquire into the system by which
the Crown Agents of the Colonies are paid, and their methods
of transacting the duties attaching to their office," was,
however, negatived.2
Because the operations of the Crown Agents particularly
1. H.L. Debs.45. CXXX 1904, 954,955,956.
Some time, Sir Harry Johnston, when he was Commissioner of
Br.Central Africa, had requisitioned for a steamer for
Lake Nyasa.	 By private tender he found that this would
cost £8,000; but when be went through the CA, he ivas told
the price would be £13,000' Sir Harry refused to order
through the CA, and went straight to the PM, Lord Salisbury
who decided that in this case there was reason to depart fro
the usual custom.	 The steamer was built for £8,000 and was
called "Lady Gwendolen" as a compliment to Salisbury.
2. See A.W. Abbott, op.cit. P.29.
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affected the overall problem of railway constructional costs,
the attitude of the third Party on this question must be
examined.	 Mary Kingsley had participated in the arguments
regarding railway routing in the Gold Coast. 1
	She had
opposed the Sekondi-Kuniasi route which was, however, later
adopted.	 Her first contention had been that "a good deal
of it" would "be along a piece of country that could be
worked by water, the River Ancobra". 	 Secondly, the
Colonial Office had dropped the hint that that route was
"a sort of experimental section and that by and by itit
pays it will make the rest of it up 10 up to Ashanti",
Kingsley argued that since this had to go through a very
expensive sort of country for a railway, dampish and water-
logged ('and it might not pay right at onee'), then it
meant that the remaining section would not be built.
	
She
was opposed to the Accra route because "that route would
1. Dr. Flint in his Reassessment has shown that 'although
she never attacked railways in principle, she was
scathing and sarcastic about each of the proposed
schemes.
In a letter of 29 April 1898, Kingsley told Holt that
Baden Powell 'got up at the Colonial Institute talking
on railways and all manner of 'tommy rot', winding up
by saying "Administer' Administer!"; and added that
'Nothing short of an earthquake in Westminster is
going to stop this 'Administration' fad, and West Africa
will be another West Indies only with bigger cemetries,
unless Chamberlain can be persuaded to entirely recast
the administration of these colonies - - -'. As ever
the question of costs, in railways construction as in
other realms of administration, is the primary con-
sideration.
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go through a district that from its nature won't pay at all,
but it would be a drier route, and the Colonial Office would
not have had a chance at the rate its intelligence works of
finding out until the railway is fin1shed;"	 she was
thinking of the Vganda Railway.	 In the event, Mary Kingsley
became disillusioned with the whole idea of railway con-
struction in the Gold Coast, explaining this lack of en-
thusiasm by pointing at the absence of any strategic necessity
for them and the unsettled condition of the Interior. 	 She
told Rolt that "since the Niger Convention we are cut/off3
from reaching the Niger In its middle course by means of
one"(i.e. railway); moreover, she claimed that according
to information she received, "that the state of Ashanti is
bad - the sickflGss among thetroops has been dreadful up there,
a sort of yellow fever - - and the natives have left Kumasi and
now come flooding in as was expected."To her, this was not a
propitious moment to construct railways. But If one was to be
built at all, It had better go to the mining districts and
no more. 2	But ICIngsley's lack of support for railways did
not affect policy. The Railway Ordinance of 1898 gave the
government powers to acquire necessary lands for the line and
railway stations. A loan of £220,000 for the Sekonth-'atrki satr v
1. KIngsley to Bolt, 21 Sept.1898, 16/2,JKP.
2. Ibid.
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raised in Britain using the resources of the Gold Coast
Colony as security. In the same year the construction
started in Sekondi; the line reached Tarkwa in 1901, Obuasi
In 1902 and finally arrived at Kumasi at the end of 1903.
be
As wjll/sbown, the critloisms which were made against
this railway construction which proved very expensive,
were similar to those Morel had made about absurdity of
the railway advisers undertaking thLater construction.
There was also a lot of antagonism between the resident
engineers 1who had no sound knowledge of local economic
conditions, and the Colonial officials who had. 	 In the
event, the line was completed only in 1903 after two large
Imperial loans to the tune of £665,000 and £360,000 were
made available, and the railway charges on the Gold Coast
were highest among the West African ColonIes.
It is here not so much intended to make a historical
sketch of railways in West Africa as to expose some aspects
in these transactions which are not well known.	 The force
I • On 5 an.l903, Thomas Bayley, Liberal M.P,, had told
More], that it was "really the height of business in-
competency" that a salaried engineer shouldwhave the
making of the Railway". 	 Re said that "such a method
of doing business in public affairs must lead to all
sorts of irregularities", and requested that Morel
should write to the Times or the Liverpool papers on
the subject. In Parliament, Bayley himself questioned
the role of Messrs. Shelford in the construction of
these Colonial railways.
2 • CO 879/91; African (West) No.803.
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with which several schemes for railway construction were
thrown at the Colonial Office during the period covered by
this study tended to cover up the real motives behind some
of these agitations. 	 The Gold Coast Railway proved to be
economically necessary, but this did not imply that Sir
Alfred Jones ,who particularly canvassed in favour of its
construetion1 was inspired by this economical development
of the Colony
	
It is possible that since railways were
primarily import-export lines, Elder, Dewpster and Company
would have more freight; .t is more possible, however, that
he supported railway constructiois e%ther in the Gold Coast
or elsewhere in West Africa, because since his firm had
the monopoly of shipping, he would carry the railway
materials at extravagant cost to the Colonies.
It should be emphasised that flohn Holt was not averse
to the idea of railway$ a se. e had even participated.
in the hysterical demand or railways in Vest Afr3.eaand.
in 1892 had told the Colonial Office that seventy miles
of railway into Yorbaland was a more civilizing agency
1'than a battalion of missionaries. 	 After 'political'
arguments between the Nigerian officials, the Lagos-
Iba4n line was completed in March 1901 at a cost of one
million pounds.	 At the same time talks began about
1. Holt to CO, 16 Dee. 1892, Copy. JHP.
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extending the Ibadn railway and other railway routes in
Nigeria, and new schemes In Sierra Leone, but not before
John Holt had realised what bad caused the high costs of
the railways.	 He then began to oppose further extension
of railways In West Africa.	 He did not regard railways
as useless but was against the practice of constructing
railways at uneconomic costs.	 Being particularly sceptical
of the intentions of the railway propagandists, he
channelled all his arguments via sound economic considera-.
tions In favour of the West African Colonies.
After the death of Mary Kingsley, Jiolt became a lone
voice in the wilderness of materialism which had siezed the
British Chambers of Commerce.	 Although nominally a
member of the Liverpool Chamber, who had shown remarkable
interest in its affairs, Morel was not actually admitted
by the Liverpool merchant community as one of them; and
in any case, he did not see through the true temper behind
the railway agitation until Rolt rallied him. 	 Moreover,
the reformism of Alfred Emmett ,though apparent at meetings
of the Oldham and Manchester Chambers of Commerce, was
reflected outside merc antile gatherings. 	 Until he made
Morel understand the selfish gusto behind Sir Alfred Jones's
agitiation for railways everywhere, Halt alone(until
Parliament took it up) tried to stem the swelling tide of




when the rest of the Committee of the Liverpool Chamber of
Commerce voted in favour of a Sierra Leone Moutain Railway,
Bolt not only voted against the measure, but also "laughed
at the thing - as a piece of tom-foolery, which none of them
would undertake if they had to pay it themselves,"1 And when
Sir Alfred Jones, feeling that his own enthusiasm was justi-
fied, informed Bolt that the Sierra Leone Railway had started
making profits, Bolt cynically doubted the whole thing. 2 He
was of the opinion that most of these railways had been built
extravagantly, and wanted the extension of railways to cease.
Referring to the Sierra Leone Railway, which was built in
spite of him, he told Morel that they should not "advocate
more railvay building until we can get rid, of the knaves and
fools who are emptying the colonial treasuries - if that ever
he possible.3
1. Bolt to Morel, 26 May 1902.
The contemplated mouta.n railway was merely a five mile
distance which, according to Bolt, "any man of average
energy could work daily, and net kill himself". Against
the view that the occupation of the hills was vital for
health reasons, Bolt told the Liverpool Chamber that the
Germans were then occupying the Cameroon hills where they
had cows and farms on European footing, got their milk
regularly, made their own butter and cheese, and lived
on a comparatively healthy altitude, much higher than any-
one could hope to get in Sierra Leone.	 He said that It
took 5 days to get there (i.e. In the Cameroons) but the
Germans still could occupy it and transact Government busi-
ness from there, and yet it was 'perfectly healthy'!
2. Bolt to Morel, 21 Nov 1900, F8/l, EDIIP,
3. Bolt to Morel, 23 Oct. 1902, F8/2, EDMP.
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Holt diagnosed this extravagance as resulting front the
determination of the Colonial Office and the Crown Agents
not to put the buying and transportation of the railway
materials and other Government stores to public tender:
"I would put it to Mr. Chamberlain, as a businessman
does he not think that if the buying of the railway
materials and government stores generally were in his
hands he could not by open public tender for these
and for the freight therein save tens of thousands a
year for the West African Colonies. 	 I would point
out what an important bearing such a saving would
have on the development of these Colonies; how
greatly extravagance or waste of any kind directly
retards such development. 	 Economy of working is
absolutely necessary if we are not going to present
to the world another instance of Colonial Office in-
capacity to that awful object-lesson we have in the
West Indies for which Mr. Chamberlain has no other
cure than does oçmoney extracted from the British
tax-payer - - -"
He regarded it as a disgrace to British administrative
capacity that any tropical Colony should be found in such
an impecunious position as not to finance Its railway
projects.	 Re was convinced that there was absolutely no
cause for this situation except the extravagance and in-
competence of the machinery employed to manage these
affairs.	 The French experience, to him, was not always
so sombre:
Look over the border of Lagos and see what the French
are doing by economical working.	 They have revenue
enough to run their administration on lines simple but
quite sufXicient for the protection of life and
property.	 They build their railways besides out of
I. Holt to Morel, 26 July l9O3 F8/2, EDMP.
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their revenue whilst we have to borrow an enormous
sum of money to do ours in Lagos -
And he did not regard as a cogent explanation the views
of MacGregor that the French Colonial Governments gave
land grants to the railway contractors; firstly, because
it meant giving away "other people's property in partpay-
ment", but particularly because It was quite an unnecessary
procedure 0	Indeed, contractors were not needed at all
there, since Dahomey, be said, could have found from her
revenue all the money needed for not only making the
permanent way but also for providing stations, engines
and wagons.2
The Colonial Office never likolcoinparison of British
and French Colozies; but Holt always advised Morel to
continue to do this in the African Mail.	 This was
not merely a strategical move to counter the general
belief In the excellence of British colonial rule; it
provided Rolt with that disgust which always seemed to
Inspire his denunciation of Colonial OCfice bureaucratic
methods.	 Thus he saw no reason why Lagos, or any other
British Colony in West Africa, could not Imitate the
economical methods of French Dahomey. 	 According to him,
this was impossible because of the "ridiculous ideas which
I . Iolt'to Morel, 26 July 1903, F8/2, EDMP.
. Ibid.
3. bit to Morel, 19 Oct. 1903, F8/2, EDMP.
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permeate the official m1nd, their selfishness and in-
competence and Chamberlain's ambitious programme:
- -They spend the money on themselves and do as
little as they can for It. 	 The Colonies are feeding
places for the misfits of London and if you doubled
the revenue every year these people would spend it all
and more if they can borrow. What care they? They
are birds of passage with no permanent interest in
the places.	 I am of opinion that if worked on
economic lines our West African Colonies could
build all the necessary railways without asking favours
of anyone.	 It has been the pride of these Colonies
to keep out of debt until Chamberlain came and Inspite
of increased duties and revenues far beyond all
proportional increase of trade out of which to pay
them, there are three of them now with big debts
round their necks, and another taking £350,000 a year
out of the foolish British taxpayer who is too ric1
or too big a fool not to see thjough the game that
Is going on."17
It might be argued that since Holt himself would have
wished to be favoured with these contracts, he tended to
exaggerate the shortcomings of those who were favoured
and sourly hinted at torrupt motives in the officials
and Crown Agents who influenced these wards. 	 It is
possible also that the glorious picture which he painted
of the economic life of these Colonies before Chamberlain
arrived could not be sustained with plausible evidence; in
other words, that his impressions were a romantic illusion
from the haze of time,	 But it will be pointed out too
that many of these transactions were regarded by others
as very questionable; that the only conclusion which seems
most tenable is that these contracts provided avenues for
1. bit to Morel, 26 July 1903, F8/2, EDMP,
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patronage; and that when the Government bewtowed these
patronage, It did not always count the cost for the colonies.
Although the Third Party humanitarians always dropped
the broad hint that some Ministers and permanent officials
were not only incompetent but also corrIDt, they saw
Sir Alfred Jones as the bate noire of the whole trans-
action.	 The personal relationship between Jones and the
various sectors of the establishment was close. Re was
Chamberlain's confidant, but also his sycophant, and as
already noted, could sacrifice a friend for financial
expediency.	 He maintained fervent ties with politicians
of all parties, cultivating a keen friendship with the
leadership of each.
	
Ministers in charge of Colonial
and Foreign Offices were prably his most important friends;
while his pervasive influence held almost every West
African governor to ransom.	 There Is no evidence to
show that the permanent officials were enanioured of him,
but they feared his political and economic power. 	 There
can be no doubt that Jones was pushful, energetic, fore-
sighted and strenuous.
	 But he was also unscrupulous,
ambivalent, hypocritical and iincandid.
	
His single aim
in life was a consuming ambition for economic predominance;
he, therefore, did not care how he achieved his economic
ends.	 Though perspicacious and zealous, it does not seem
that Jones was particularly over-endowed with either
intellectual or business acumen; but as often happens,
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people like him who succeed in business are credited with
intuition they may not have possessed.	 He advertised
a sense of Imperialism which was fashionable at the time,
but his patriotism may well have been less intense than
personal considerations and desire for economic power.
He was in essence a conservative in politics, but he would
pass as a non-party man when conservative fortunes were
low.	 His ambition for economic power was substantially
achieved; he secured monopoly of shipping, Crown Agents'
contracts, supply of silver and other coinage to West Africa,
and its banking.	 He directed the British Cotton Growing
Association, using his influence to secure Imperial grants
or subsidies for some of these enterprises which be ad-
vertised as imperial missions,	 He was generally regarded
as a personal friend of Hoith, but Jones did his friend
incalculable harm behind his back.
flolt himself regarded the whole imperial and patriotic
pose in Jones as a sham. 	 He saw the swaggering cotton
dinners as destitute of true imperial interests and as
1. For different views of A.L. Jones vide, A.H. Mime,
Sir Alfred Lewis Jones, K.C.M.G. (Liverpool,l914),a.
rather uncritical work which must be read with die-
crimination
P.N. Davies, Sir Alfred Jones and the Development of
West African Trade, (Unpublished, Liverpool LA. thesis,
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really Jones'çpromotions desired to miead others for his
own interests.	 He was or the opinion that Jones ad-
vocated railways not because he cared for their development
value (which In any case favoured Jones as well), but
primarily because he wanted to receive the carrying trade
of the constructional materials.	 Even Mary Kingsley, who
was not opposed to Jones, had agreed with bit that the
gusto with which Jones canvassed the Gold Coast railway
construction was connected either with his interest in
the gold concessions or with the freight of the constructional
materials. 1	It is possible that this attitude was In
harmony with natural commercial instincts; one feels,
however, that even commerce has its ethical maxims. 	 Jones'
idea was : "build railways anyhow, but build them." 2 He
was reported to have told the Imperial Institute in August
1904 "that he did not care about the cost of those
railways, that West Africa must have them whatever the cost
may be"	 bolt condemned these as "the sentiments of a
prodigal spendthrift which if acted upon either individually
1. kingsley to bolt, 21 Sept. 1898, 16/2, JUT'.
In this letter she told Holt how she had "hurt" the
"feelings" of Jones by telling him that "he was not bit
by errors because freight was freight". 	 She was referring
to errors In colonial administration which led to waste
of funds.
2. bolt to Morel, 13 Juie 1910, F8/4, EDMP.
3. bolt to Morel, 5 Aug. 1904, F8/2, EDMP.
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or collectively must lead to disaster", and cynically re-
marked that these bloated views of Jones were "in
accordance with our latest modern ideas of economy i la
1Chamberlain and the fiscal school of politicians
	 - -"
There was no doubt in his mind that "all the ai1ways we
have built in West Africa could have been built for half
the cost; so that the cer half represents waste and
plunder." 2	He explained his stand on railways to Morel:
"I was always with Jones and Ellis Edwards over building
railways on sound economic lines, but not on wasteful
lines, such as I saw they were going to do, when the
Liverpool Chamber advocated railways without regard to
the main point which in my opinion was 'how much they
were to be built for, what they were to cost, and what
returns were likely to be on the capital cost of same'.
It is disgraceful economically that the railway at
Lagos should ever have to be supported out of the re-
venue of the country. 	 As for the Sierra Leone Moutain
Railway, I looked upon that as an official piece of
waste from the beginning greatly to the offence of
Mr. Ellis Edwards - - -"s
In order to prove that it was mainly because of the
carrying trade in railway materials that Jones advocated
Immediate and general building of railways in West Africa,
Holt investigated the rates which Jones charged. 	 When it
was known that the shipping company directed by Jones
iharged as much as 45 shillings per ton, bit cynically
1. bolt to Morel, 5 Aug. 1904, F8/2 EDMP.
2. Ibid.
3. bolt to Morel, 13 June 1910; P8/4, EDMP,
Ellis Edwards was a Member of Parliament, friendly with
A.L. Jones.
611
remarked: "well may certain people agitate for the building
of railways anyhow and anywhere In our West African Colony -"
He was surprised at the "fools at the head of our affairs"
who were "willing to pay these ridiculous rates." He
castigated the current system of abuse in the same letter
to Morel:
"Rates of freight above ordinary market rates are to
that eztent a robbery of the Colonies who pay them.
From a national point of view it is a wrong policy
to support a monpolistic line of steamers combining
with foreigners t keep up rates of freight and by
their nefarious rebate system put one of the greatest
obstacles ever Invented for keeping out any opposition.
The Government ought to set an example In this matter
and If need be put on their own steamers to carry
their own stuff, and those of other people who are
at the mercy of these monopolists.	 They have the
power to ruin anybody who likes to act at all in-
dependently; they can refuse to carry his goods;
they can charge him differential rates; they can
allow rebates to other people in (whose business) he
does not participate. It is all very well to talk
about freedom of contraot but there can be no free-
dom of contract under modern conditions, where the
carrying as been monopolised by what is practically
a trust".'
He advised Morel to make members of Parliament follow up
matter
the/persistently to get at more facts and Inform the country.
Since he knew that it was practical businessmen who would
understand "the game that was going on", Holt exhorted
Morel to bring businessmen in Parliament to see how
detrimental it was to the West African Colonies that these
high rates were paid by the Government.




The attitude of many Members of Par1iamcnt was already
very critical of the Crown Agents and its railway operations.
On 6 March 1903, William O'Doherty bad told the Commons
that he was disturbed by the information which he received
that the firm of Shelford and Sons were given commission
"on the cost of the railways lately built, or at present
under construction in West Africa"; even an official
denial of this rumour could not dispel doubts many members
entertained on these transactions)	 Thus in March of the
following year, the Earl of Portsmouth, while probing the
efficiency of the Crown Agents, made the most critical
examination of their railway construction in West Africa.
He pointed out that the Ashanti Railway, literally built by
the Crown Agents, which was estimated to cost £8,000 a mile,
actually cost £13,000 a mile; and since the distance of the
railway was practically 100 miles, he found that the difference
between the estimate and the cost approximated to £500,000.
Portsmouth told the Lords that a group of well-known South
2	 railways in
African contractors, Pauling and Company, had built/trQpical
1. HC Debs.45,Vol.119.1903.5.
O'Doherty, William, M.P,(Nationalist)North Donegal 190l.Born
at Carndonagh, Co,Donegal1868. Educated at St.Columbus'Coll.
Londonderry. Admitted a solicitor 1893; ember of Londonderr
Corporation from 1896; Chairman Public Health Committee.
Lived in Londonderry. Clubs: Reform and National Liberal.
Died 18 May 1905.
2. This Company had alarmed the British public when it
published in the Times that it had offered to build
the Uganda Railway for less than half the cost of its
2 continued on next page............
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portions of Portuguese East Africa where the climatic and
physical conditions were of the same character as obtained
in Ashanti, at an average cost of £5000 per mile.
	 He
maintained that "not only has this Ashonti railway been
expensively constructed, but I am informed by those who
are thoroughly acquainted with the circumstances of the
case that It is badly constructed ant that It can barely
keep up a speed of ten miles an hour". 	 Quoting a letter
which the African Trade section of the London Chamber of
Commerce had written to the Colonial Secretary, in which
that section had pointed out that the cost of the Ashanti
Railway had far exceeded the crginal estimate, and that
If the construction had "been put to tender and given to
a contractor, It would have cost very much less, been
built more quickly, and generally given greater satis-
faction,"	 Portsmouth emphasized the Importance of
efficiency in Imperial as well as domestic operations:
"I do not think that sufficient weight is given, from
time to time, to the fact that we are obliged by
our Imperial position to be expending these large
sums of money in the development of our Empire. But
if this expenditure is so badly and extravagantly
administered and we have to Impose heavy rates,
naturally the result Is that industrial development
Is most seriously checked. 	 I have heatd it said,
but I do not know how far It is true, that the
2 continued from previous page
construction by the British Government. This firm aslo
"offered to build the West African Railways but were
burked by the Permanents". bit therefore tearfully
ex1aied in this same letter to Morel,"How canwe get
these rascally doings Inquired into and exposed. These
vampires are sucking the life—blood of our Colonies --"
Halt to Morel, 20 Dec 1902, F8/2, EDMP,
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development of Africa is seriously affected by a
shipping trust, by high railway rates, and by other
commercial facts which ought not to exist, but which
do have the result of enormously Increasing the cost
of living to the white man, and of seriously Inter-
fering with Industrial development. 	 I think this
question of the Asbanti Railway is one which, In
itself, could justify an independent inquiry into the
Crown Agents' Office",!
On the same day, Earl Grey had also referred to the
Ashanti Railway as "the most glaring instance of extra-.
vagant railway construction." 	 According to Grey, since
it took the Crown Agents three and half years to build 40
miles, at an average cost of £15000 a mile, "the people
Interested In the development of West Africa were so
distressed" with the slow rate of construction and the
extravagant cost, that they approached an outside contractor -
Messrs. Pauling - who undertook to build the remaining
distance at £6,650 a mile.	 Earl Grey lamented that "the
Government refused the offer made by this responsible
firm of contractors - who were prepared to give LM's
Government any guarantee they wanted and who have built
over 2,000 miles of railway in South Africa -
On 10 June of the same year, the Earl of Portsmouth
produced new evidence to prove his ealier allegations.
Accusing Shelford and Company "of making one of the most
la. HL. Debs. 45 Vol. CXXX. l904	 948.
2. H.L. Debs. 45. Vol.CXXX. 1904, 956-7.
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notoriously bad lines that has ever been made," Portsmouth
read to the Lords a letter from a certain LG. Lowe
described as a gentleman of great experience living at
Sekondi, to support his charge of incompetence. 	 But
it is his analysis of the personal relationship of the
Crown Agents and the Colonial offivals that was most
revealing. Afleging that the Colonial Office permanent
officials were "mot a cheek upon the Crown Agents",
Portsmouth pointed out that "there exists in a most
curious and remarkable degree a sort of family party in
the Crown Agents' Department and the Colonial Oftice"•
Portsmouth declared:
"The Permanent tTnder-Secretary for the Colonies is
Sir Montague Omman	 Mr. Ommaney, a nephew of Sir
Montague Oinmaney, is a member of a firm of solicitors
who are solicitors to the Crown Agents. 	 Mr
Shelford, who constructed the precious and costly
line - - is son-in-law to Sir Montague Ommaney, and
is himself a member of the firm of Messrs. Shelford,
who are also the consulting engineers to the Crown
Agents.	 If I may say so, that is rather like a
comic opera of Gilbert and Sullivan. 	 First of all,
the work of the Crown Agents is handed over to
delegated constructors selected by them, and then
they are paid besides for the duty of reporting on
their own work.	 That seems to me to be a condition
of things which in the public interest is quite
indefensible, and I think it certainly should be
carefully and fully inquired into - - - -" '
As has been indieated, Portsmouth's motion of that year
was not carried; but parliamentary pressure for an
inquiry into the Crown Agents' systeni of railway construction
ILL. Debs. 45. Vol. 135.. 1904, 1332,1333.
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in West Africa persisted.
This allegation of extravagance would seem to have
worried those who raised or advanced the required funds
for the railways.	 The Lagos railway up to Ibad4n had
been constructed at an enormous cost of over £1 million
from loans advanced from the Imperial Treasury using the
revenues of the Lagos Government as guarantee.
Chamberlain and MacGregor were in favour of its extension
with further imperial funds.	 Thus when in August 1901
Chamberlain told the Treasury that new railway surveys
were taking place with a view to extending the Ibadn
line, he had tried to procure the necessary required
funds by emphasising that the new railway affected
"Imperial as well as local interests." 1
	But the Treasury,
now smarting under the scathing criticism of squandermania,
replied that "no such work ought to be undertaken until
the finances of Northern Nigeria,either by improvement
In its own revenue, or by largely increased contributions
from Southern Nigeria and Lagos, are In a vastly different
position." 2	The Treasury was so hostile to the request
from the Colonial Office that even Lyttleton desired to
experiment with construction by "contract" in any new lines
1. CO to Treasury, 27 Aug 1901, CO 147/158.
2. Treasury to Co. 10 Sept. 1901, CO 147/158.
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tbat might be contemplated. 1
 When in March 1904 the
Colonial Office asked the Treasury to guarantee a loan of
Limillion which Lagos wanted to raise for the extension of
the Ibadan line to Oshogbo, the 'Gladstonian garrison'
doubted the need for such an extension and did not think
that the current state of affairs made it advisable "for
any of the Colonies to raise money for the purposes of
capital expenditure." 2	It may, perhaps, be apposite
to point out that the Treasury had by this view probably
invaded the legitimate grounds of the Colonial Office.
Whatever might have been its traditional attitude to
Colonial Office expenditure, it is hardly tenable to argue
that it was the Treasury's business to determine when it
was most appropriate for any colonial scheme to be launched.
In the event, however, by itself , Lagos floated the loan
for the extension of the line to Oshogbo.
Apart from the Treasury's opposition, it should be
noted that even Chamberlain himself was not really very
keen on the extension of the Lagos line at that time,
although the Lagos Governor had pressed him to approach
the Treasury for guarantees.
	
He had declined to ask
Parliament either for a further loan from the Imperial
exchequer or for an imperial guarantee for such a loan
1. CO to Treasury, draft. 15 March 1904, CO 147/169.
2. Treasury to CO. 26 March 1904, CO 147/167.
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for the Lagos Colony, but had rather adopted an administra-
tive process.	 It seems that he hesitated to ask Parlia-
ment for funds either because he felt that the extension
of the Railway was not urgent or because he might have
wanted to experiment with construction by 'contract' since
the 'departmental' or Crown Agents' system was then under
heavy parliamentary attaek 	 His failure to confront
Parliament could be explained from his views on the
Northern Nigerian Railway costs.
	 In November 1902, he
had told Lady Lugard that the British public now opposed
"too rapid progress," having been disillusioned by "the
slow progress and the enormoUs cost of the Uganda Railway."
Re seems to have agreed with Holt when he at the same time
suggested that "until the promise of trade is more evident
than can be expected at present it would be difficult to
obtain a grant for any very large undertaking which would
appear to people in this country to be speculative."2
Moreover, the notion at that time that taxation In Britain
was "high" would have made it inopportune to ask for a
large sumtr railways even three years after.3
1. See Minute by P.11. Ezekeil on MacGregor to Lyttleton
10 Jan 1904, CO 147/169.
Also CO to Treasury, draft, 15 March 1904,C0147/169.
Minute of June 1903, byJ,C. a Manchester C/C to 0.0.
26 June 1903, CO 147/168.
2. Chamberlain to Lady Lugard, 20 Nov.1902, Lugard Papers,
BrIt.Einp. MSS. S.62.
3. Chamberlain to Sir. FD. Lugard, 22 March 1905, 30 May
1905, ibid.
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Thus Chamberlaints reluctance to ask Parliament to
intervene (although it indicated the difficulties which
probably subdued his enthusiasm) was merely a reflection
of Treasury opposition and the hostile mood of the country.
For the Colonial Office, apart from these difficulties,
was still enthusiastic about railways, and merely waited
f or an opportune mement to carry them through. 	 Although
the Colonial Office was severely attacked in Parliament
for extravagance, and although that office became very
uneasy about public attitude to railways since Uganda,
yet the King's Speech of February 1904 referred to
Imperial cotton supply and people like Sir Alfred Jones
(whose ability was cherished by King Edward Vu 1 ) knew
the this reference to cotton and railways went together.2
Hopes began to be cherished also that an extension of the
Lagos Railway would lead to development of Northern
Nigeria, and thus lessen the Imperial funds It frequently
received; 3 and in an effort to prepare the way for this
development Governor Egerton had advised European trades
in the South to open new stores in Northern Nigeria.
1. King Edward VII Is supposed to have said, "if I had four
men like Alfred Jones always at my side I could rule the
whole Empire single—handed".
Vide P.N. Davies, op.cit.
2. Minutes by Strachey, R.L. Antrebus, Ommaney on MacGregor
to C.0., 10 Jan 1904. CO 147/167.
3. CO to Treasury, draft 15 March 1904, CO 147/169.
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But the most compelling factor which ultimately carried
the day was the anxiety then expressed by many people
over the Railway programme in French West Africa, es-
pecially Dahomey.	 In 1901 while opening the Lagos rail-
way to public traffic, Governor MacGregor had broached
this problem.	 But the Colonial Office at that time
treated the idea of Prench competition with polite slight.
When, however, an article apped in a French journal1
claiming that if the Dahomey railway came up to Tehaourou,
the French would then be in a position to divert Lagos
trade, the Colonial Office was alarmed since unless the
Lagos railway was extended, the French might also divert
a great portion of the trade of Northern Nigeria which
had passed to Lagos by a route near the Anglo-French frontier
2
on the West.
The question of further extension of the Ibadan line
to meet this French challenge, however, remained a matter
of mere academic minutes until July 1906 when Winston
Churchill's strong memorandum determined policy. 	 Churchill
started his long submission by emphasising the necessity
of extending the Lagos Railway to Jebba since Southern
1. See the Dpche Coloniale I11ustre' of Jan 1904.
Extracts referred to by Strachey in MacGregor to C.0.,
10 Jan.1904, CO 147/169.
2. CO to7Preasury draft, 15 March 1904, CO 147/169.
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Nigeria (now amalgamated) could raise loans on its own
security.	 Suggesting that any plan for a railway in
the Eastern zone of Nigeria must be for future consideration,
be supported the Baro-Zaria project which Lugard had
proposed, since they were "for strategic, administrative
and development purposes".	 He magnified the imminence
of the threat the extension of the French railway from
Dahomey to Say implied; it would mean, he said, tapping
off the trade of the Ha1usa States.	 lIe was of the opinion
that such a railway would have a good strategic value
for they would enable troops to hold that portectorate
for a longer time than would be the case.
	 And since
there was a likelihood of local trade and greater pro-
duction of cotton resulting from this railway, Churchill
concluded that these necessities justified the application
of imperial funds. 1	In this adoption of this policy,
Sir Alfred Jones had played a tremendous part either by
his incessant and publicised cotton dinners where be
extolled the necessity of railways as an imperial pTiorlty
or by his personal transactions with Cabinet ministers,
in particular, Lord Crewj and Winston Churchill with whom
he maintained very close ties.2
1. CO 879/93: Memo by W.S. Churchill, July 1906.
Also see African (West) No.850.
2. Churchill had attended some of these dinners and had
paid glowing tributes to Alfred Jones.
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To all these arguments Rolt was opposed.	 He had
looked upon the idea of rivalry between the British and the
French in regard to the Niger Railway as merely artificial
because, as be said, "there is no rivalry whatever",	 lie
was of the opinion that Britain would not take French
trade there "because of our railway to the Niger, nor will
they take British trade If they get there before us, which
is very likely." He felt that British steamers up the Niger
could be used to carry both goods and produce at much less
rate than the French railway was likely to charge (forgetting
that the Niger was only seasonably na yigable); But "if
they get any trade at the head of their railway from
British territory, they ought to be welcome to It, as it
will be a trade which is not diverged from any other place
of ours." 1	bit disagreed with all the arguments of
MacGregor and !orel that the railway at Ibadan should be
extended to the Niger, resting his opposition now mainly
on economic grounds:
"Railways ,we all agree, are advisable wherever they
can be constructed with a fair prospect of an ade-
quate return on the capital employed; that is my
first proposition, and I cannot go beyond it, unless
you take me to political grounds which I do not under-
stand - - - If we cannot make the railway to Ibadan
pay fair Interest on the capital invested, we are
Incapable of doing It anywhere -----
1. Hoit to Morel, 22 Apr11 1903, F8/2, EDMP.
This indicates that the Third Party were we].1 aware of
the French threat argument ever before it exercised the
minds of the C,0,
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"I believe in people paying their way as they can,
and pot putting off to some future date, and upon
some future people the burdens that belong to us.
1f the railway from Ibadan is justified, we ought
to have no difficulty in finding the necessary funds
to construct It, but it must be done on commonsense
lines, and the jobbery that characterizes the
present line must be avoided - - -"1
When finally the scheme for the extension of the
Railway to the Niger and the construction of the Northern
Nigerian line was decided upon and Elder Dempster and
Company was once more favoured with carrying the con-
structional materials, bit's pessimism was mournful:
"I am afraid Jones has got on the right side of
Winston Churchill, and the Niger Railway will be
all the more costly in consequence.
	
Why are not
these officials honest or why are they such ools?
Anybody but a rogue would advertise for tender to
carry the railway material to Baro and Jebba just
as they advertised for tenders for the supply of
the material Itself and made public the price at
which the contract were placed. Why are they not
equally honest about freight - - _"2
The construction of the Northern Nigerian lines by the P.W.D
greatly decreased the cost in comparison with the Lagos-
Ibadan railway, but the opinion was general that this
cost might have been lower still if Jones's shipping
company had not had the monopoly of freight. Thus when
Trigge, who had just become a Director of the Niger Company,
fixed up a contract with Elder Dempater for the carriage
1. bolt to Morel, 22 April 1903, F8/2, EDMP.
2. bolt to Morel, 11 Feb. 1908, F8/3, EDMP.
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o:f some 30,000 tons of Railway material, to the Niger,
Holt's grumbling reflected the angry mood of Parliamentary
critics of the Colonial Office which apparently was un-
impressed by the plea for public tender:
"Antrobus Is not altering the system of hole and
corner - contract by which many thousands oX pounds
of public money are being given away annually in
sheer muddle. Why are these things not put up
honestly to public tender? It doesn't seem to
matter if It be Marlborough, Churchill or Seeley,
the same sheer idiotic waste of money goes on.
Either these men are Incompetent or worse - which
is it?- -
Before and after the construction of the 11orthern
Nigerian line, parliamentary criticism seemed to have
supported these grumbiins of ohn Holt. 	 On 19 November
1906, before the decision was taken to construct the
Northern Nigerian line, II. de R. Walker, Member for
had
Leiscestershire,%ried In the Commons to dissuade Chuchill
from giving its construction to the Crown Agents, in view
of the excessive expenditure of other railways they had
built. 2	The following day, Sir William Holland, member
1. Holt to Morel, 13 Feb l, F8/4, EDMP.
2. HC. Debs.4s.Vol.165.; Nov 1906; 385
Walker, Henry de Rosenback,BA.;born 30 May 1867 Son
of R.F. Walker of Shooter's Hill, Kent and Marie von
Ronsenback of Karritz, Esthonia, Russia. Educ,at Winchester
and Trinity Coil. Cambridge; clerk in F.O. 1889-92;
Contested N.W. Suffok (Liberal)1895; Plymouth 1900; M.P.
(Liberal)Melton Div. Liescestersblre,1906-1O; elected to
L.C.C. for East St.Pancras, 1913. Travelled In various
parts of the world. Published works on the Empire. Died
31 July 1923.
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for Yorkshire, had implied criticism of the construction
of railways so far in West Africa when he forced Churchill
to issue a detailed table of costs and expenditure,'
Criticism of the Crown Agents and their West African
railways construction continued well till the Commission
of Enquiry of 1908 into the administration of the Crown
Agents; 2 But members of Parliament persisted in probing
railway cost even after.
	 On 23 August 1909, L. Ginnell,
an Irish member, barely failed to foistef upon Colonel
Seeley the "arduous task" of stating the gross expenditure
on railways and other engineering works in each of the
Crown Colonies and protectorates "for the last twenty years",
and "the amount of it spend under the Departmental control
and under contract after public tender respectively."3
On 18 October of the same year, the same Ginnell while
alleging "dishonesty" in the Crown Agents' operations,
implied that he had a proof for this when he asked Colonel
Seeley to state "the met cash profit, as distinguished from
patronage and other consequential advantages, derived by
the Crown Agents from each and all of the railways
1. UC. Debs. 48, Vol. 165; 1906; 598.
2. See fleport, PP. 1909 (cd.4473), Evidence, P.P. 1909
(Cd.4474). Also Abbott, op.cit. P.30.
3. 1W. Debs 5% Vol1X; 1909; 1923-4. &innell,Laurence,B.L.
M.P.(Nationalist) N.Westmeath, native county since 1906;
Barrister of Middle Temple and also of King's Inn,Dublin,
Born 1854; 3rd son of Laurence Ginnell; sell-educated.
One of the founders of the Irish Literary Society,London.
Publications: Brehon Laws,1894, Doubtful Grant to Ireland,
1899; Land and Liberty, 1908. Died 17 April 1923.
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coructed under their control during the last twenty years."1
Criticisms continued ranging from high freight rates to
the Crown Agents' "mysterious operations; from the
dubious relationship between Jones' Shipping Compy and
the Crown Agentg to general charges of extravagance in
the financial management of the West African Colonies.2
Thus on 5 July 1910, Joseph King forced Colonel Seeley to
deny the charge that construction of railways En Southern
Nigeria was not proceeding economically and. satisfactorily!
especially .n view of a recent report of the auditor that
it was no exaggeration to say that thousands of pounds
worth of material had been lost to the Government 3 ",	 Yet
these criticisms continued.
One direct result of these criticisws was that people
who had supported the construction of these railways
began to question the motives of the noisiest and most
energetic among the railway party. 	 Although Morel had
begun to attack the Shipping monopoly of Alfred Jones, he
did not immediately discern that basic in Jones' en-
thusiasm for railway construction in West Africa was his
monopoly of carrying the constructional materials. 	 He
had been one of those who rightly saw railways as tropical
1. BC Debs 5g Vol.XII. 1909, 101, 103.
2. Cf S. Buxton's allegations; HC Debs.48.Vol.132; 1904,
939-401.
3. HC Debs 5s, Vol.XVIII, July 1910; 1494.
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desiderata,	 ut now the facts were becoming overwhelming
and Uo].t's importunity almost Irrestible.	 Holt's re-
velations removed the scales from Morel's eyes:
"I am afraid in those days I was not very familiar
with the financial aspect of the question. 	 I rather
took Jones' view, that railways should be built
anyhow, so long as they were built at all, to keep
out the French from the hinterland.	 I have learnt
wisdom ever since!"1
Comment on this may mar the picture ot self-Interest that
is clearly presepted.
It comment on motives is superfluous, an analysis
of charges made by humanitarIans and other critics of the
government Is most essential.	 It is pretty obvious that
bit and other critics greatly exaggerated the financial
position of the Colonies and the uneconomical operations
of the railways. At the same time they never took Into
consideration other factors which affected the economical
administration of some of these railways. 	 Also an exam-
ination of the finances of the Lagos administration, for
example, will show that their mournful charge of colonial
indebtedness was magnified.
Even before the railway construction, the Lagos
administration was not even nearly as prosperous as the
Southern Nigeria protectorate; but 	 the railway
movement had accentuated this difference.	 For example
1. orêl to bolt, 1 July 1910. 18/7, JH.
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between 1900 and 1904 when Southern Nigeria ba contributed
£162,750 to maintain the impecunious Northern Nigeria
administration, Lagos had donated nothing) 	 It is possible
that much of this reluctance to contribute was influenced
by MacGregor's dislike of Northern Nigeria; one feels,
that
however,/the involvement ot the Lagos administration in
huge railway expenditure was greatly responsible.
	 It
is estimated that apart from the loans of over £1 million
floated up to March 1903, the Lagos Government had spent
a sum of £139,381 between 1898 and 1903.2 Notwithstanding
thtse.staggering railway costs, the Lagos Government might
be said to have had some reserves (although it must be noted
that these were probably not real reserves). 	 Although
there was a deficit of £30,498 in 1899, by 1903 a balance
of revenue over expenditure of £93,463 was reported
(although this did not include administrative expenses on
running the railways). 	 Again, an "unaudited" balance
for the financial year till March 1904 stood at £27,002
according to official reports.	 These figures might
indicate that the charge of colonial bankruptcy which the
Third Party often made was not always true. 	 But it should,
at the same time, be noted that these reports did not
always say everything; sometimes a phrase such as
1. C.O. to MacGregor, draft, 27 May 1903, CO 167/165.
2. See C.0. 147/165.
Also Tamuno, op.cit.
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"less expenses on the railway", might have all the facts
behind it.
	
Moreover, the humanitarian charge that some
of these official figures were "manipulated"to justify
the necessity of development in face of public citicisin
of extravagance, Is something which though it is difficult
to prove, yet might have elements of truth.
If the railway revenues for Lagos are examined, it
will be seen also that the humanitarians were not always
wrong, though they expected too much.
	
For example, the
revenue derived from the Lagos railway for the period 1901
to 1902 was £17,898 against an expenditure o.f £21,640; thus
it Is clear that there was a deficit of £3,742.
	
But
between 1902 and 1903, the financial position was better;
a revenue of £45,961 against an expenditure of £33,795 meant
a balance of £12,166.	 y March 1904, that is the first
quarter of 1904, another credit balance of £4,608 was
realised. 2	One feels, therefore, that although revenue
from railways was not large, the figures at least belie
the extreme views expressed by critics that the whole
thing was run at a loss,(allowing for the charge of
'bianipulation").
	
	 But when the huge loans which were put
and
into the railways are taken Into account/compared with
1. Kingsley, Holt and Morel, between themselves, always
accused the colonial officials and the C.0. of
'manipulating' the figures so as to give false impressions
to public and parliament I
2. C.O. 147/165.
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the very little revenue4 derived, it seems that the stong
views expressed by bit and others were not totally un-
justified.	 Moreover, it does not seem that the Railway
had begun to pay the cost of the loans (i.e. interest on
in view of
capital).	 At least,/the fact that it concentrated at
the early stages on mere working expenses, it could be
argued that profits from Lagos railway should have been
able to finance its extension to the Niger, as bolt
pointed out.
But there were other political and economic factors
which adversely affected railway revenues. 	 The Colonial
Government always felt it was a part of Its benign duty
to charge low freight rates on the railways, hoping that
this "high policy" would indirectly induce other benefits
via general economic development of the area. 	 Thus If
the Lagos railway charges on public merchandise within
the first six months of 1903 were as high as on the Gold
Coast, the Lagos Railway might have trebled Its revenue
for that period. 1	On the other hand, water competition
between Abeokuta and Ibadan reduced railway revenue.2
Apart from these considerations, the Lagos Government
probably did not expect large revenue from such a short
distance unless the rates were Increased which it declined
1. Moseley to C.O., conf. 5 May 1904, CO 147/170
2. Ibid.
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to do.	 The Government anticipated that, like the Indian
Railway, the Lagos one would make profits with further
extension. 1
From the expressed views of several members of Parliament,
who supported Holt's suspcions, there is every indication
that there was corruption, incompetence and patronage
In these transactions; that high salaries were not always
commensurate with the slow pace of development; and
that waste might have been avoided.	 But whatever the
shortcomings in detail of colonial policy, the point surely
was that for the first time the British Government was
moving to equip these colonies with basic communications
and other services in order to create conditions in which
those services could pay for themselves. 	 To entirely
adopt Holt's Ideas, which were truly Gladatonian, would
probably have delayed for a long time many needed economic
advances.
	
Yet in giving credit to the greater foresight
behind the aims of the British Government in West Africa,
there is a certain amount of plausibility in the Third Party
argument than an economic policy which was already un-
dermined by a corrupt, inefficient and extravagant ad-
ministrative machinery would never achieve true Imperial
Ideals.
1. Moseley to C.0., eon!. 5 May 1904, CO 147/170.
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Apart from abuses intrinsically connected with the
Crown Agents' mode of operation and waste in financial
administration of the Colonies which was alleged, It was
the shipping system between Britain and West Africa which
the effect
was most venomously attacked.	 An examination of/this
shipping monopoly on the economy of th West African
colonies is, therefore, most necessary in assessing the
merits of humanitarian grievances.
Before the arrival of Sir Alfred Jones in the West
African shipping scene, there seems to have existed no
monopoly in the carrying trade. Merchants trading to
that part had carried their goods In their own ships.
—When in ihe 1850's steamships replaced sailing vessels
and it was discovered that most merchants could not affoid
the large capital required to operate a shipping line, two
Interests emerged - the shippers and ship—owners. 	 As
early as 1852, MacGregor Laird had operated the first
steamship line, the African Steamship Company, between
Britain and Yest Africa, followed by a second line, the
British and African Steam Navigation Company, formed in
Glasgow in 1869, but managed by two Scotsmen, Alexander
Elder and John Dempster through the agency, Elder Deznpster
and Company, which the latter men had formed in Liverpool.
The two shipping lines competed between themselves for
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West African cargo, though gradually they arrived at a
mutual time-table agreement.	 When in 1879, Alfred Jones,
formerly a ship's broker, joined the firm of Elder
Bempster and Company, as a partner, he showed remarkable
industry; and by 1890 when he mysteriously became its
chairman, he had practically brought the two shipping lines
under his management. Through a process which assured
him a financial control of the two firms, Jones by 1900
"held a virtual monopoly of the West African Trade")
But this implied a monopoly of only the trade between
Britain and West Africa for another shipping firm, the
Woermann Line of Hamburg, virtually monopolised the
important trade between North-Western Europe and West
Africa.	 Founded in 1837, thIs merchant house specialised
in the trade of West Africa. 	 When Germany acquired
colonies in West Aftica, this line was mainly supported by
the trade which existed between Germany and these Colonies,
1. See Charlotte Leubusoher, The West African Shipping Trade
1909-1959, (1963) Pp. 3-15 for details of the history of
vVest African shipping.
See also P.N. Davies, Sir Alfred Jones and the Development
of West African Trade (Unpublished Liverpool M.A. thesis)
Leonard Fay, 1der Dempster Lines Ltd (Liverpool, 1948)
Note also that John bit had acquired an ocean-going
vessel, for his Company in 1908. Vide Johil Holt and
Company Ltd, Merchant Adventure, P.22
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but was gradually involved in the trade of other West
African territories, particularly that of Lagos.
	
Towards
the end of the 19th century, this firm competed vigorously
with the firm of Elder Dempster; but in 1894 they came
and
to an agreement/thus inaugurated the first ITest African
Shipping Conference.	 It was a shipping ring which shared
the available freight between its members while adopting
a ferocious method against parties which might try to
disrupt the system.'
Common to most shipping rings w.&& what wa-s called
'rebates'. In order to secure a high load !or their
ships and to prevent shippers from transferring their
custom to outside lines, shipping conferences usually
compelled shippers to accept conditions under which they
pledged to use exclusively conference ships. 	 The chief
means for enforcing this condition was "the deferred
rebate system".	 By this a shipper could claim a discount,
usually 10% oX the freight, if he had shipped exclusively
with conference ships during the 'account' period and a
further deferment' period.	 In the West African system,
the 'account' period was six months to which another six
months' deferment was added.	 Thus shippers were tied to
the Conference, and part of their capital was tied up with
the shipping firms for about a year. 	 This deferment
op.c it.
1. C. Leubuscher,/rp. 13-15.
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period ensured that shippers could not break away without
losing their claim to the rebate, for at least Six months.
Moreover, 'loyalty' to the ring 'recuired the shippers not
only to withhold cargo from outside lines, but also to
refrain from the chartering of tramps'. 1
	Thus a shipping
line like Elder Deinpster and Company acquired an interest
free loan to the tune of about 10% of their annual freight
receipts from shippers.2.
At the same time the Brjt1sh lines and the German
line were guided by other decisions they arrived at when
the conference was launched.	 Although the two British
firms under Jones were allowed to call at continental
ports, the Woermannjwas not allowed Into British ports.
Also by putting the direct freight rate from New York to
West Africa at the same level as that charged from
Liverpool to West Africa, the Conference protected itself
against a possible American competition, though this led
to/cuitous process of carrying cargo from America to
Liverpool and thence to West Africa.
	
This process
embittered British merchants who were forced by the
conference to ship via this route, whereas other American
firms shipped direct to West Africa at cheaper costs
and sold American goods there at cheaper prices.
	
Bet-
ween 1900 and the first world war, therefore, this shipping
1. C. Leubusoher, P.17.
2. P.N. Davies, op.elt. Pp 111-3.
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conference was attacked both by merchant shippers who
suffered under the system and others who saw in its deta11s))
a situation inimical to the economic interests of both
Britain and the West African Colonies.1
The most obstrusively prominent fact about the
specially onerous features of the West African Shipping
Conference was the abnormally high freight rates between
Britain and West Africa.	 The merchants who were most
directly affected by this state of affairs had grumbled
and complained, but had apparently succumbed to it.
Gradually, however, when public and parliamentary criticisms
were systematically directed against the alleged financial
maladministration of the Colonies, people began to probe
into the effects Of these abnormally high freights on
the development of West Africa.	 Although merchants like
John Bolt (who had over £10,000 at a time tied up with
Elder Dempsters by way of deferred rebate) complained and
tried to counter this system, it was E.D. !Lore1 who brought
the Issue to the notice of the British public and parliament
when he openly stigmatised the operations of the shipping
system:
i?°	 -
1. IbId, Pp. 112-3.
(P.T.o)
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reasoning logically and economically, the rate to Bathurst
should have been between lls.3d and 15s per ton (unless
there were other factors to be considered,like buying
expensive coal, after Las Palmas, which was not the case).
The reason why this rate was as high as 45s per ton at
Bathurst was that no other regular British vessel visited
Bathurst.	 Other British steamships regularly visited
Las Palmas and carried cargo at moderate rates. 	 But
where the "monopoly" of the Conference shipping started,
• competition apparently ceased, and high rates prevailed,
Morel lamented the state of affairs which had brought about
the sudden jump in rates:
"Opportunity - is responsible for the unequal and
unfair penalsat	 f West African commerce.
Immediately7 k , tHir treatment ceased and
monopoly began, and with monopoly came an anarchic
annihilation of the laws of legitimate barter, an
abridgement of commercial rights, a destruction of
that concrete level of equality from which are
conducted equitable bargains and mutually beneficial
business transactions.	 The present position of
the West African shipowner is somewhat analogous
with that of the man possessing a well—stocked larder
In a beseiged famine—stricken city: he alone has
bread and he will make his fellow—citizens pay for
it at ten times its value, or else they must starve -"
But In order fully to understand the operations of
this shipping system, the rates from Bathurst to the Niger
ryA
1. West.African Mail, 14 Dec 1906.
These rates were based on Morel's account. 	 It seems he
derived them from LLoyd's egister; but with his
experience in the employ of A.L. Jones, we can believe
they were accurate.
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The Shipping Company which monopolises the carrying
trade between Great Britain and West Africa is a
singular one.	 It has an individuality and a re-
putation quite its own: in many respects both are
unenviable.	 By virtue of its monopolist position,
Its rates of freight inward and outward are greater,
intrinsically and comparatively, than that of any
other regular line of ocean service..
"It forces merchant, trader ani Government to pay prices
practically Ceflt per cent over the actual commercial
value of the carrying service rendered, at the same
time retusing modo et forms, to be In any way res-
ponsible for delay, damage, destruction or less
suffered by goods in its charge.
"In practice it shows a complete disregard for, and
lack of Interest In, the requirements and development
of British trade and native Industries, unless such
regard and interest can be exercised at some immediate
or ultimate advantage to Itself.
	 It professes a
strong Imperialistic policy, whilst It subsidises,
in effect, foreign Industries and penalises British
ones, and makes Its Government pay huge rates of
freight on the thousands of tons ot material shipped
for railways and public works.
"It professes a commendable desire and anxiety to assist
In the progress and development of the native African,
and puts thjs desire into work by making him pay
heavily for carrying his goods to him and taking back
to European markets the results of his labour and
the products of his land - - -
Although Morel's severe criticisms of Jones' interests
were a reaction to the latter's hostility to the Congo
Reform Association, they were not really unfounded. 	 The
charge that the freight rates were capricious and ex-
cessive could be both Illustrated and explained. From
Liverpool to Las Palmas, the rate was between 7s.6d and
lOs per ton; and from Liverpool to Bathurst between 25s
and 45s per ton.	 But since Liverpool to Las Palmas is
about two-thirds the distance from Liverpool to Bathurst,
1. West African Mail, 14 Dec.1906
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Delta must be examined.	 From Bathurst to Cotonou, and all
the intervening ports, it was possible in those days to
discharge cargo at Bathurst rate. 	 However, from Cotonou
to the Niger Delta ports (i.e. Sapele, Warn, Buguma,
Degema) the rate dropped to between 2ls.3d and 33s9d;
even along the coasts of the Niger Delta proper, it
dropped further to between 21s.3d and 27s.6d per ton.
But from these ports to Rio del Rey and Victoria the rates
once more went up and stabilised between 27s.6d to 50s
per ton.	 The reason why the rates to the Delta ports
were reduced so much below the Rorznally high rates which
obtained at other ports was that Jones was playing for
safety.	 In the immense trading area tapped by these
rivers there existed several large merchant trading
companies, sufficiently powerful, if constrained by
unbearable economic oppression, to combine and run a
steamship line of their own, and probably disrupt the hold
of the Conference line in other areas. 	 The most out-
staiding of these companies were the Niger Company,
Miller Brothers and John Holt.
	
Although there was
mutual trade suspicions between them, yet they had also
made secret agreements with the shipping firms to reduce
rates in their favour in order to share the market between
themselves and so keep newcomers out of the trade of
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these ports.	 But the merchant firms were never totally
satisfied with the shipping arrangement. 	 In the 1890s
plans for setting up a rival line of their own were dis-
cussed by the Liverpool merchants, especially the African
Association then led by Holt and George Miller, but these
fell through.	 Jones played a divisive role within this
Association, skilfulkept the members apirt in order to
prevent their establishing a line operated by them, and
succeeded in discrediting Holt's leadership of this
Association.	 When Holt resigned as leader of the African
Association, the way was open for Jones to manipulate
others into supporting his line. 1 But he was always
afraid that these merchants might combine against him at
any time; with the result that while he used his rebate
sys t em to keep them in subjection, he withheld his hand
in the Niger Delta where too severe treatment might induce
the richer merchants to combine.	 Apart from Lagos, where
special and natural difficulties probably justified the
high rates, freight rates in other West African ports
were disproportionately high. 	 But since none of the
comparatively small merchants who shared in the trade of
these other areas bad sufficient at stake to justify the
formation of an independent shipping movement, they
1. See Davies, op.cit. Pp.64-102 for the details of these
combinations.
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succumbed to the stranglehold of Conference shipping.1
Although Alfred Jones used economic discretion to
quieten some of his powerful opponents while containing
the grumbling of the smaller ones, other factors forced
the shipping arrangements once more into the open. Critics
of the monopoly enjoyed by Jones began to point out that
the simultaneous holding by him of the chairmanship of
Elder Dempster and Company and the Presidentship of the
BCGA put him in an ambiguous position.
	
They alleged that
this combination of function was responsible for the high
rates charged for the transportation of West African
cotton, his interests (as a shipowner) in high rates
outweighing his desire to encourage cotton growing in
West Africa.	 Although as has been indicated the cotton
Industry in West Africa suffered from other misfortunes,
this charge was not untrue,	 It is true that when the
BCGA commenced experiments in the cultivation of cotton
in West Africa, Elder Dempster and Co., in response to
the generous gesture by the Lagos Uailway to carry cotton
free of charge, had also generously offerred to ship
cotton to Britain free of charge for a period of two years,
as a practical demonstration of their sympathy for a
movement which would benefit the cotton trade of the Empire.
1. Leubuscher, op.cit., Pp 27-28.
West African Mail, 10 Jan 1907
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It may be ungracious to comment adversely on this act of
self-sacrifice; but as Morel, however, pointed out, one is
constrained to suggest that since the amount of cotton
shipped during the first two years of the infancy of the
cotton growing movement was naturally comparatively small,
the shipping company could afford the "free" period, after
which they charged double rates until they recouped them-
selves from any temporary loss occasioned by this act of
ostensible abnegation.	 For Elder Dempster and Company
and their German allies to combine and charge the BCGA
a rate of +d per lb when it was known that Id per lb would
be a fair return (still to allow American cotton the
advantage of being delivered in British markets at the
cheapest price) tends to show that the initial act of
generosity was but a shadow bereft of all substance. 	 The
subsequent high charges retarded the progress of the
cotton movement In Northern Nigeria, and probably helped
to kill it in many areas in the South.1
If the lot of the BCGA (and other fantastic rates paid
for transporting coal and railway materials) do not give
full enough proof of alleged abuses, the most revealing
Illustration of what Morel has called the "superficial
philanthropy" which Alfred Jones always proclaimed was
1. WAM, 14 Dec 1906.
Also Davies, op.clt., Pp 157-161.
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the very high rates LbYr the West African Colonies for
articles of food,' in particular,salt. 	 As an organic
necessity, salt was, and has been, one of the greatest
needs of the African.	 "It is so essential," said Morel,
"that he (the African) has even proceeded to the extent
of bartering his own flesh and blOod in order to obtain it."
In order to understand how the rate charged for this
necessary commodity by Elder Dempster compared with the
rates charged in other countries'where monopoly was non-
existent, a glance at the following list is startling:
Rates of Freight on Salt from Liverpool to
Countries	 Shillings per ton
West African Ports(by E.D. & Co.) 	 20s to 30s
Calcutta (including Suez Canal dues) 4s.6d
Savannah, (Georgia)	 4s





The Cape	 iSa	 (g)
Comment on these figures would be superfious were it not
for the fact that the full implications of this ex-
cessive rate must be examined.
If the transit rate on this single commodity alone
had been within reasonable ratio of its real market value,
1. e.g. the rate for rice and flour from Liverpool to West
Africa was between 30s and 35s a ton by Elder Dempster
lines, as against 1/6d from Liverpool to New York.
2.WAfl, 1 Feb 1907 for this table.
Also see Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on
Shipping Rings, P.P (1909) (d.467o, XLVII), pp 165-173
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thousands of pounds would have been saved to each of the
West African Colonies, and an essential physical re-
quirement would have been delivered to the native markets
at a much cheaper price. 	 This would have meant not
only that the natives would have benefitted individually
and collectively by having a vital necessity supplied to
them, but also the consequent supplemented demand would
probably have increased the magnitude of the African trade
and source of revenue. 	 For example, during the years
1904,1905 and 1906, about 150,000 tons of salt were
Imported into West Africa from Liverpool alone, not to
mention that which was imported from the continent. 	 Had
the freight rate upon this quantity been at ten shillings
per ton (still leaving the price much higher than the
rates to Calcutta, Savannah, Halifax and Quebec,) a sun' of
£75,000 would have been left for other purposes, and yet
the shipowner would have been adequately remunerated for
his services.	 Morel summarized the effect of this high
rate on the economic development of West Africa:
"In three years, upon one article of trade alone,
has been litral1y given away to a private monopoly
a sum of money sufficient to build 25 miles of light
railway!	 The whole of the West Coast ports, each
of which taps a considerable trading area, are
afflicted to a varying extent with the pena].i.satlons
of the present system of ocean carriage.
1. !! 1 Feb 1907.
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It would, therefore "be exceedingly difficult for the
shipping company which controlled the carrying trade between
Great Britain and West Africa to substantiate any claim
to having given impetus to the progressive trend of
West African cOmmercial and colonial development with any
other object than that of securing huge considerable
pecuniary advantage to itself"'
	 These facs, which are
eye—opening, would tempt one to the conclusion that the
proposed policy of Imperialism so often announced by
Alfred Jones was one which, as Morel truly pointed out,
failed to agree with the creed of trusteeship which was the
ideal British policy.
This is proved more convincingly by pointing at the
high freight rate charged on some other items 4 the port
of Lagos.	 Although Lagos was particularly unfortunate in
having exceptional natural difficulties which bad
necessitated the use of small fleet of light—draught branch
boats fr transhipping cargo across the bar before its
modern harbour was constructed, this handicap was probably
of smaller importance than the principal one regarding
the huge amount which was annually takea from the Colony
by the Shipping Company under Sir Al!re Jones.bis is
best illustrated by the table below:
1. WAM]. Feb 1907.
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From this table it is seen that the total tonnage for
the two years was 148,120; and the total cost of freight for
the two years was £230,855.
	
It was held by }Ioltwho knew
the mysteries of the West African trade, and by Morel,who
bad been in the employ of A.L. Jones 1 that the equitable rate
for these commodities should never have exceeded 22s 6d per
ton.	 This means that the total cost for the above tonnage
should have been about £166,635; thus the shipping company
had charged £64,220 in excess for the two years alone'1
1. WAM, 1 Feb 1907.
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It is, therefore, clear that upon only eight principal
exports from one port alone in two years only, a sum of
£64,220 had been given away to monopoly above the legitimate
market value of ocean carriage.	 As the imports were rated
equally high, it would then be reasonable to suppose that
the total rate on the whole Imported goods would amount to
about a m1lar sum (probably more), making altogether, In
regard to Lagos alone, a total of about £128,400 extra charge
in two years'	 There can be no doubt that a large portion
of the profits made by Elder Denipster and Company were used
to re—equip their fleet and to improve services generally.1
But It is no exaggeration to say that between 1904 and 1905
alone, Lagos had been robbed of a sum of money more than
equal to cover the cost of her projected harbour works
which were then estimated to cost the Colony about £125,000.
If West Africa had been blessed with competitive shipping
systems, the amount of money which would have been saved
to the Colonies between 1895 and 1907 would have more
than sufficed to meet the outlay necessary to equip them
with necessary railways without resorting to imperial loans
with interests.	 Morel who always watched the operation
of this shipping system with the insight he bad previously
gained into Jones' business, described "the whole history
of the present monopoly" as "an object lesson In legalised
1. Davies, op.clt.
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oppression, shewing to what extent extortion can be
profitably practised upon a coinmunity.1
Morel also pointed out in the African Mall that
another effect of the West African Shipping Conference was
that it operated more favourably to the Woermann and German
trade than to British Interests.	 Morel's opinion was that
the dif:ferential rates between Liverpool and Hamburg res-
pectively,to West Africa not merely subsidised foreign goods
but actually penalised British commerce. 	 For example while
the rate on normal Items of trade from Liverpool to the
Niger Delta ports varied, between 27s.6d and 33s.9d per ton
(exclusive of 10% primage), that from Hamburg to these ports
never exceeded 2].s.3d per ton.	 These figures indicate that
the British shipping company could in effect allow a subsidy
of between 6s.3d and 12s.6d per ton to continental manu-
facturers upon goods shipped to British West African ports
from Hamburg.	 And since Elder Demjer lines were allowed
into German ports by the terms of the Conference agreement
with Woermann Company, it would seem therefore that the
British company had arranged with a foreign firm to generally
penalise British commerce for its own individual advantage.
One would, therefore, agree with Morel and Rolt that the
"sublime patriotism" which Sir Alfred Jones always
preached was apparently a sham.2
1, YAM, 1 Feb. 1907.
2. WAM , 16 Nov.1906, 7 Dec 1906.
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As has been shown, parliamentary criticisms of the
Crown Agents by people like the Earl of Portsmouth, Earl
Grey and Austin Taylor had also included the shipping
system. 1	Gradually, however, members of parliament began
to show special interest in the high rates of freight
charged and in particular criticised the preferential
treatment the West African Shipping Conference gave to goods
shipped at Hamburg.	 Compbints from the Colonies against
the shipping system were so incessant that in 1906 the
Colonial Office thought of employing charter steamers.
But it acquesced in the existing arrangement, since, as
it claimed, good steamers were not available. 2
	A1thugh
the West African Shipping Conference was merely a small
aspect of the several shipping rings established in the
world, complaints had been spasmodically lodged against
those within the British Empire that in 1906, the Liberal
Government appointed a Royal Commission to investigate the
operation of these Shipping Rings.	 The appointment of. this
Commission was due almost entirely to pressure from the
Governments of Australia, South Africa and the Straits
Settlements (three of which most bitterly resented the
existing sYstem),but it gave those interested in West Africait
1. H.L. Debs. 4s. Vol. CXXX, 1904, 948.
H.C. Debs. 4s. Vol.132,	 1904, 936.
2. CO to CA, 27 Jine 1906, CO 147/79
Also Egerton to E]gin, 21 Jan 1907, Minutes by Butler
14th March 1907, CO 520/43.
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own
reform an opportunity to air their/grievances.
Morel did not give evidence before the Commission,but
he persistently continued the attack on the shipping
monopoly, lobbying members of parliament and supplying
them with commercial intelligence for parliamentary questions.
Towards the end of 1906, Morel declared in the African
Ma ii:
"It is absolutely imperative to the interests of West
African trade and the progressive development of the
West African Colonies, that a competition shall be
set up In its shipping, and every support accorded
to It.	 It i.s an absolute commercial and politic
necessity.	 Competition has always been fundamentally
necessary to development. Monopoly is a cosmic
deformity.	 It is an enemy of progress - -
The evidence of John Bolt before the Shipping Commission
confirmed almost every criticism which Morel and others bad
been making on the effects of the West African Shipping
system on the development of the Colonies and on British
commerce.	 In order to prove his case, for example, Bolt
produced figures to show that between 1896 and 1904 he had
gradually paid more to the German line than the British line
for shipment of his goods.
	
Apart from the lower rates
charged by the continental line, Bolt was also of the opinion
that it was better managed and organised than Elder Dempster
1. VIde C. Leubuscher, op.cit. Pp 13-15.
2. WAM, 16 Nov. 1906
See also VAM, 7 Dec. 1906.
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and Company.1
Although small merchants like Zochonis, and Hutton,
in their evidence, supported the operations of the Shipping
ring, other highly—placed witnesses testified to the bad
effects of the system In the 'Vest African Colonies. 	 Sir
Walter Egerton, Governor of Southern Nigeria, fiercely and
bitterly condemned "the extraordinary position taken up
by Sir Alfred Jones that the Crown Agents are principals
and not agents" - a position which involved all four West
African Colonies In the loss of their rebates If for
example the Crown Agents arranged for one of them to charter
a steamer for the transportation of material. 2	The
Governor of the Gold Coast In a written statement condemned
"the present shipping monopoly" as "an unmitigated evil."3
Inspite of these charges, however, the Commission did not
report against the system.	 Although differences of
opinion among its members led the Commission Into producing
a minority and majority report, 4
 It was clear that so far
1. flolt told the Commission that in 1896 he had paid a total
of £23,693 to the British lines and £4,714 to the German,
but by 1904 he had paid £16,521 to the British line,
while the payment to the German line had increased to
£12,573.
2. Cd. 4670, P.411.
3. P.P. (1909) Cd. 4669, XLVII, P.196.
4. teport of the Royal Commission on Shipping Rings. P.P. (1909)
Cd. 4668, XLVII.
It has been pointed out that Alfred Jones' evidence given
in camera 'bad a considerable Influence on the conclusions
reached by the commission'. See A.G. Hopkins, op.clt.
P.328 ti.
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as Alfred Jones was alive there could be no effective
challenge to his monopoly.
	 Even after his death in 1909,
no serious opposition threatened his company's shipping
sway, till the first world war.	 Permanent officials In
the Colonial Office and even the Crown Agents Department at
tiine8 tried to "emancipate" themselves from "Elder Denipsters'
freight monopoly", 1 but they feared the political power
which Jones had with Ministers of the Crown, and the
various Crown Agents. 	 The attitude adopted by Lord Elgin
in April 1907 when he suspended all attempts being wade by
the Colonial Office to counter the shipping monopoly of
Jones, 2 might have reflected his growing confidence in the
ShIpping Commission; but it represented one of those
repeated political interventions which ensured the monopoly
of Jones against the itching but diffident criticism by the
permanent officials.3
1. CA to CO, 12 June 1897, CO 147/122.
2. Minute of 24 AprIl 1907 on Egerton to ElgIn, 31 March
1907, CO 520/44.
3. For example, in March 1909, a conference between the
Crown Agents, the Colonial Office and the Royal Mint
decided to end the existing monopoly of banking and
supplying of specie to West Africa enjoyed by the BBWA
(led by A.L. Jones) by transferring control over the
supply to the Mint, and thus treating the BBWA and the
Bank of Nigeria as equals.	 However, Lord Crewe, after
verbal representations from Sir A.L. Jones and the
supporters of his bank, curiously reversed the unanimous
opinion of his officials, and allowed the existing
situation to continue.
Minute by Crewe, 28 Aug.1909, on Coke to Hopwood, 15 Aug.
1909, Co 520/88.
Also discussed by A.G. Hopkins, op.cit. P.231-232.
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Having tried almost every expedient to undermine the
various monopolies held by Jones and apparently failed, the
Third Party was virtually powerless. 	 Articles in the
African ! ta1l, lobbying of members of Parliament and
personal interviews with findly officials bad brought these
private attitudes towards West Africa to national re-
cognition; but they were substantially futile to remedy
the system then in vogue. 	 With nothing now left except
a sober hope in the future of West Africa, they found unity
in pessimism.	 A doleful lampoon, written in the 1890s, yet
summarised their mood and attitude at this time:
"This huge combination of ships, cash and stations,
The long—suffering Shareholders find,
Beget but orations, re trade and inflations,
To which they've been stupidly blind.
Imperial bluster, assertions and brag
Have served very well for a while
But the dividends go to the shj.powners' bag
Not to traders in nuts and palm oil,
How long, Oh Lord! how long."1
1. This poem is not dated and is anonymous. But it appears




In spite of its perpetually doleful appeals to
Providence, the Third Party was incomparably the most effect..
Lye humanitarian sect during the period covered by this study.
S(noe Mary Kingsley's abortive scheme, this small band of
devoted guardians sought to 1nflueice British imperial thought
at a time when humanitarianism was generally in decline.
Originally conceived as a traders' lobby, this 'family corn.
pact' progressively became the most dynamic humanitarian
pressure-.group at the time.
Holt became the pater familias of the Third Party,
but his dyrimiam was more instinctive, more psychologically
disposed, than physically bound. He was almost always followed
by the shadow of an agonlaing infirmity and when this physi...
cal failing is squared with hIs innate dislike of display
and eelf..advertisewent, his 'back-room' direction of events
L
is more discernible. He was ondid and publio.. spirited, but
be was at the same time too cynical of the motives of men
and governments, and tended to rc*nanticiee the irrecoverable
past. At times, persona]. issues also obscured the real
merits of his sincere advocacy, but if John Holt had been
more robust and less embarrassed by his dual commitment, he
might have translated his buoyant idealism and honest zeal
into a much greater public crusade.
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Morel was destined to fulfill this public effort.
His ubiquitous advocacy was a movement. He had the vital
qualities for leading a cause: capacity for prolonged effort
which made it possible for him to reconcile his West African
work with the demands of the Congo Reform Association, and
a single mind which innoculated him against unnecessary
doubts when his fortunes were low. His personal relations
with the officials, with Members of Parliament, with editors
of newspapers, made him an inestimable asset to his school,
But it was his own editorial power, his vast and incisive
knowledge of Afri4an affairs, not to mention his sinceilty
and honesty, that added significance to the movement that
became synonymous with his name. At 4ttinee, however, he
took extreme views of issues. Moreover, lack of financial
independence necessarily undermined the sanctity of his
ideals, while an instance of political expediency threatened
them. But apart front the destined conmiitment of the Third
Party to the cause of enlightened commerce, be was both a
sincere advocate and a critic of experience. After the death
of Holt, and with the Lands Committee Report in 1915, Morel
became more interested in international issues related to the
war ) during which be was imprisoned for an indiscreet role.
athie release, however, he remained radically devoted to his
Union of Democratic Control on which platform be was elected
to Parliament for Dundee in 1922. But before he could prove
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his parliamentary mettle, be fell sheer. He died abruptly
in 1924.
Politically, the Third Party was unoompulsi've they
began as disheartened Gladatonians, always solicitous of the
demands of the
	 But old idols were a.t that time
being challenged by new myths. These new tendencies in the
national politics were reflected within the Third Party it-
self. Whereas the old-fashioned liberalism of Kingsley and
Rolt had bordered on reactionarl conservatism, Morel was to
direct this legacy to a radicalism that was poised between
liberalism, socialism, and conservatism. Experience of
social misery at home had influenced him and his fellow radi .
-cals to guard against similar tendencies in the colonies. He,
therefore, sought, via a land settlement, to provide for the
greater mu]titude in West Africa; but in so doing be adopted
a rigid formula of conservatism called Indirect Rule thich
was not liberally disposed towards the aspirations of the
educated natives, who, it mast be noted, were themselves too
ccnmi.tttod to selfish and elitist interests. Handicapped by
the sublime opportunism of the B.C.G.A and the Chamber of
Commerce men, the humanitarian bankruptcy of the African
Society, end the apathy of the general public, the Third
Party was nevertheless aided by a quaker alliance in William
Cadbury, the wayward gusto of Josiah Wedgwood, the stray
radicalism of Charles Dilke and Cathcart Vason, aid the
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practical force of Mrs. Green. What united them was that
hwnR.nitarian idealism which they felt was the necessary
bulwark of imperial policy.
Although it was older and more professional in the
field of humanitarian agitation, Exeter Hall was at this time
progressively in decline. In spite of Fox Bourrie's sincere
zeal, the traditional loyalty of the Buxtons, the indomitable
spirit of other quaker clans, and the amalgamation itself,
the two societies could not be transformed into a movement
immediately responsive to the new imperial situation. o1m.
Harris was pre-eminent because he was the most progressive
and far.'sighted of the later humanitarians. He saw the
ultimate political destiny of the Wet African peoples which
others could neither see nor regard as important at that time.
Morel and a few other radicals tended to see this also, but
they emphasised the economic destiny, not the political.
Devoted, steadfast and courageous, Harris brought a balanced
mind to bear on the problems of the new empire in West Africa.
A man of considerable energy, his spirit, like Morel's and
Noel Buxton's, was not merely national but cosmopolitan. He
gave vigour and efficiency to the amalgamated society, but,
like Fox Bourne, be could not translate his society into an
organisation more directly effective at the Colonial Office.
At a time when public meetings provoked the cynicism/ of many
who might have regarded them as an attempt to shock the
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sensitivity of normal human beings, John Harris should have
2'eil±aed that cordial private relationship with the officials
was probably more rewarding.
In spite of John Harris, therefore, Exeter Hall.
remained irrevocably conventional. Traditionally and aenti
mentally attached to the humanitarian cause, members, moat of
whom were at this time very old, attended Society meetings,
beard celaiial information, and passed resolutions. A
deputation, might follow, but in most cases letters to the
Colonial Office embodied these views. Except in very rare
Instances, these letters did not always try to go beyond ethic
statements (which the Colonial Office might claim It knew as
well); they were not always detailed, and not very urbane.
The operational tactics of the Society thus reflected an
attitude both intellectually aid psychologically unprepared
f or the problems of the new empire. Almost barren of new
ideas, which demanded a tborougb. grasp of economic principles,
Exeter Hall. continued to harp on the early Christian ideals,
Justice, humanity aid charity still struggled with slavery and
temperance as in the traditional order. Always on the defen-
sive, it could not, for example, create such a situation as
the West African Land Question, which as a Society It almost
compromised. It sincerely criticised the injustice alleged
done to West Africans at the time, but it was relatively
ignorant of the details of colonial administration; not even
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the administrative ma].praotices which Morel ws daily pointing
out to the Colonial Office seriously atfected this imperturb-
able attachment of Exeter Hall to traditional causes. As
always, members were prone to be sentimental: they at times
gave credibility to inteeted and unrationalised colonial infer-
mation. They wera given political support particularly by
mature and advanced liberals like (}.P. Gooch, Oilbeft Murray,
Herbert Samuel and the Buxtons, but backed in strength by the
quaker clans. They were largely a disinterested sect, though
one feels that these devoted 3uardians found a professtot
in humanitarian agitation and tended to magnify colonial
calamities in order to justify their own existence. They
were sincere and religiously inspired men who although they
were ready to point at the superficiality of educated African
pretensions, were, unlike Morel, at the same time willing to
pander to hi conceit.
Thus although Exeter Hall represented a continuity
of that moral policy traditionally associated with British
politics, it made no great direct impact on official policy
at this time. Its parliamentary basis was widened by non-
party commitment, but it is clear that most parliamentary
members were primarily fighting their party wars. Moreover,
the Colonial Office files make several uncomplimentary re-
marks about the two Societies, and only vague and distant
references to features in the Aborigines' Friend and the
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AntiSlavery Reporter. This compares badly with detailed
minutes that would follow a penetrating editorial in the
African Mail which was both superior in material content
and ournalistio Integrity. Again, at a time when Morel
bad sincere firends In Charles Strachey and Alfred Enimott,
arid was sometimes listened to by Antrotius, Lord Crewe and
Lewis Harcourt, the officials were ill-disposed to associate
the Colonial Office with 'any schemes' proposed by Exeter
Hall. Occaaionalll, however, the Society met successes but
these were excaptions, not the norm. If, as Mary Kingsley
said, Holt was worth ten &borigines' Protection Society men,
Morel was probably worth the whole Exeter Hall at this time,
But the relative position of the two sects should
fiot obscure the fact that as a humanitarian force both were
not directly influential. Howeverp the off icia3.s were wLlling
to listen to Morel In the land question, the Colonial Office
did not wish to share power with any extraneous body, be it
the Third Party or Exeter Hall. The failure by that Office
to change the various systems criticised by the ThIrd Party
shows the limit of their own influence. Indirectly, however,
they both influenced that Office. Their eternal vigilance,
publications, question In Parliament 1 memorials, official
deputations and personal influence, led the Colonial Office into
anticipating humanitarian rievancea, and thus imperceptibly
Provided Colonial rule with a humanitarian conscience.
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The influence of the huins.nitarians on the public
cannot be easily assessed. But of all things, the most
difficult to change is a piblio attitude. It is probable tbt
things could not remain exactly as they had been; yet public
attitudes were substantially unchanged by humanitarian action.
Individually, the results of the crusade were varied. Sir
Alfred Je*es at his death left a very substantial sum of
money for West African education; It was probably intended
to redeem him from Morel's strictures. But Sir William
Lever was later to refurbish his notorious project into
another 'imperial' scheme; this shows that the old pre
datory commercial Instincts were not yet vanquished. In
the last resort, the bunianitarian contribution cannot ex-
actly be measured by concrete achievements, but In terms
of ideals. They emphasised the morality of Imperialism
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THE SIERRA LEO}IE HETT-TAX
The Third Party opposed the Hut-Tax because, as
they alleged, taxation was contrary to native law and native
sentiment, because It discriminated against the people of
the Protectorate, and because it was recklessly enforced.
But they emphasised the tact that it was historically un-
justified and nequ1table:
"Looking at the historical relation in which the
Protectorate chiefs stood towards the British
Government as represented by the Sierra Leone
Administration, it would seem very questionable
whether Britain had the right to force a 'Hut-Tax
upon the natives of the Protectorate at the point
of the bayonet. The Protectorate has never been
conquered by Great Britain, which would have given
her a prina fade right of taxation over its in-
habitants. The oouttry was ceded to Great Britain
at various times by the Chiefs - acting as md.-
pendent contracting Powers on a friendly basis
of unitual advantage, principally founded upon the
development of trade and commerce...."
From Morel, E.D,	 The Sierra Leone Hut-Tax Disturbances :
A Rep1 to Mr. Stephen (Liverpool, 1899)
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